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Abstract 
The application of default rules as a soft incentive to promote renewable energy uptake has 
proven successful in previous research. While the strength and longevity of the default effect 
is demonstrated to a large extent in current studies, analysis of its heterogeneity is still 
missing. This study aims to explore the heterogeneity of the default effect according to 
customer characteristics, such as the differentiation between household customers and 
business customers. Building on behavioural theories, it asks: Is the default setting of 
renewable energy more successful in influencing the choices of household customers than 
business customers? In this context, the household customers are the household customers 
and the business customers are the commercial customers of a Swiss utility company. 
A customer dataset (n=237,333) received from the utility company gives insight into 
customers’ contract choices over four years. The main focus of the quantitative analysis is the 
comparison of contract choices before and after the utility company introduced a renewable 
energy contract as its default product. The analysis of the dataset is led by recent and 
established theories coming from sociology, psychology, and economics.  
An analysis of the data demonstrates that the default setting on renewable energy is 
more successful in influencing the contract choices of household customers than those of 
business customers. 
The results indicate that heterogeneity can be found in the default effect with regards 
to customer characteristics. On this basis, it is advisable to adjust the implementation of a 
default rules intervention that promotes renewable energy uptake to different customer 
groups. Further research is needed when it comes to exploring the dependency of the default 
effect on the opt-out costs and the awareness of the customer concerning the behavioural 
intervention.  
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Kurzfassung 
Die bisherige Forschung zeigt auf, dass die Anwendung von Default-Setzung ein sanfter Anreiz 
zur Verhaltenslenkung ist, der hervorragende Wirkung zeigt, wenn es darum geht, den 
Verkauf von erneuerbaren Energieprodukten zu steigern. Die verhaltenslenkende Wirkung 
der Default-Setzung wird in zahlreichen Studien als ein starker und langlebiger Effekt 
beschrieben. In der bisherigen Forschung fehlt jedoch bisher eine Untersuchung der 
Heterogenität in diesem Effekt. Die vorliegende Studie widmet sich spezifisch der 
Heterogenität im Default-Effekt hinsichtlich der Unterscheidung von Kundenmerkmalen, wie 
zum Beispiel, Haushalts- und Geschäftskunden. Aufbauend auf gängige Verhaltenstheorien 
wird gefragt: Hat die Default-Umstellung von einem konventionell gespeisten Energietarif auf 
einen erneuerbaren Energietarif eine stärkere verhaltensändernde Wirkung auf die 
Haushaltskunden als auf die Geschäftskunden?  
Der vorliegende Kundendatensatz (n=237,333) zeigt die Tarifwahlen aller Kunden über 
den Zeitraum von vier Jahren. Der Hauptfokus der quantitativen Analyse, der Prinzipien der 
empirischen Sozialforschung folgt, liegt auf dem Vergleich der Tarifwahlen vor und nach der 
Default-Umstellung auf den erneuerbaren Energietarif. Die Datenaufbereitung und -analyse 
ist theoriegeleitet und bedient sich der neuesten Erkenntnisse aus Psychologie, Soziologie 
und Betriebswirtschaftslehre. 
Die Analyse der Daten zeigt, dass die Default-Setzung auf den erneuerbaren 
Energietarif eine stärkere verhaltensändernde Wirkung auf die Haushaltskunden als auf die 
Geschäftskunden ausübt. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen auf, dass die Heterogenität, die im Default-Effekt vorhanden ist, 
mit Kundenmerkmalen korreliert. Daher ist es ratsam, bei der Planung einer Default-
Umstellung auf einen erneuerbaren Energietarif die verschiedenen Kundengruppen mit zu 
bedenken. Aufbauend auf der vorliegenden Arbeit sollte sich die künftige Forschung 
einerseits dem Einfluss von der Höhe der Ausweichkosten und andererseits dem Einfluss von 
Probandenaufmerksamkeit auf den Default-Effekt widmen. 
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1. Introduction 
One goal of Switzerland’s Energy Strategy 2050 is to reduce the country’s energy-related 
environmental impact. The National Research Programme "Managing Energy Consumption" 
(NRP 71) was implemented in order to explore the behavioural aspects of energy efficiency. 
The study at hand is part of the NRP 71, and is dedicated to promoting renewable energy 
uptake among citizens through the use of soft incentives instead of hard regulations. The core 
obstacle in the promotion of renewable energy uptake in Switzerland is the regulated 
electricity market, in which existing customer pools in large majorities hold the cheapest form 
of electricity – that is, conventionally sourced. Motivating existing customer pools to switch 
to more expensive renewable energy without hard regulations marks the ultimate obstacle.  
Previous research has demonstrated the successful application of default rules as a soft 
incentive in many areas, including the promotion of renewable energy uptake. Studies show 
that default rules interventions have strong and long-lasting effects on subjects’ choices. 
While the strength and longevity of the default effect is demonstrated to a large extent in 
existing studies, analysis of heterogeneity in the default effect is still missing. The study at 
hand explores the default effect not only in its strength and longevity but also in its 
heterogeneity in influencing different subjects in different ways according to their 
characteristics. The main subject characteristics in the study at hand are whether the 
electricity customers are buying for a household or a business. In this context, the household 
customers are the household customers and the business customers are the commercial 
customers of a Swiss utility company. Other subject characteristics on the individual level are 
the amount of utility use, gender, and previous renewable energy uptake. On the municipality 
level, there potential influencing factors include the proximity to the nearest nuclear power 
plant, voting results for the nuclear power phase out initiative, and municipality structure. All 
these possible determinants are explored regarding their influence on either increasing or 
decreasing the renewable default product acceptance.  
Heterogeneity in the default effect is analysed with the help of a quantitative analysis 
of a natural field experiment of one Swiss utility company changing its default product from 
a conventionally sourced electricity product to a renewably sourced one. The whole customer 
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dataset (n=237,333) is made up of 229,658 household customers and 7,675 business 
customers. The dataset includes two different default rules treatments: the introduction of a 
renewable default product for 230,881 customers and the introduction of a renewable-plus 
default product for 6,452 customers. The dataset covers four years and includes a number of 
descriptive customer characteristics on the individual level. Customer characteristics on the 
municipality level have been added. The main focus of the quantitative analysis is the 
comparison of contract choice before and after the utility company introduced the renewable 
energy default products.  
An analysis of the data shows that customer characteristics, both on the individual level 
as well as on the municipality level, influence default product acceptance. Therefore, there is 
proven heterogeneity in the default effect. The default product was accepted in larger 
quantities among household customers than business customers. On this basis, it is advisable 
to adjust the implementation of a default rules intervention that promotes renewable energy 
uptake to different customer groups. Further research is needed when it comes to exploring 
the dependency of the default effect on the opt-out costs and the awareness that the 
customer has of the behavioural intervention.  
In this paper, Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the research problem. Chapter 2 
addresses the relevant theoretical background. The theory chapter is divided in two sub-
chapters (2.1 and 2.2). The first sub-chapter defines soft incentives and the four core 
characteristics of nudging (2.1) and explains nudging using the theory of behavioural change 
(2.1.1). The second sub-chapter defines default rules as a soft incentive intervention (2.2). It 
covers the application of default rules in a couple of different decision areas (2.2.1), the 
application of default rules in the area of renewable energy uptake (2.2.2), and the third sub 
chapter is dedicated to the unwanted side effects of the application of default rules 
interventions (2.2.3). The section describing the unwanted side effects is further divided into 
three sub-chapters (2.2.3.1, 2.2.3.2, and 2.2.3.3). The first section points out moral self-
licensing as an unwanted side effect of default rules interventions (2.2.3.1). The second 
highlights ethical problems in form of manipulations as an unwanted side effect of default 
rules interventions (2.2.3.2). The third reveals other forms of possible unwanted side effects 
(2.2.3.3).  
The theory chapter is followed by Chapter 3, which covers the study background and 
data. This chapter is divided into four sub-chapters (3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4). To set the scene, 
the first sub-chapter describes the renewably sourced electricity market in Switzerland (3.1). 
This general study background is followed up by a description of the experimental utility 
company (3.2). Next, there is a description of how the experimental utility company 
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implemented the default product change (3.3). The fourth and last sub chapter concentrates 
purely on the data, covering data preparations (3.4), including data cleaning (3.4.1), and data 
re-coding (3.4.2).  
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the results and is divided into three sub chapters: descriptive 
analyses (4.1), bivariate analyses (4.2), and multivariate analyses (4.3). The descriptive 
analyses show descriptive statistics for utility use (4.1.1), renewable energy contracts (4.1.2), 
and customers’ contract choices (4.1.3). The bivariate analyses show a diverse range of 
analyses ranging from analysis of the main default effect (4.2.1), analyses of two sub-samples 
(moving customers (4.2.2) and renewable-plus default (4.2.5)), and analyses of municipality 
level characteristics, including the voting initiative for a nuclear power phase out (4.2.3) and 
the proximity to a nuclear power plant (4.2.4). The multivariate analyses are divided into 
three sub-chapters. The first examines the results of a logistic regression of the short-term 
default effect (4.3.1) and the second reports the results of a logistic regression of the long-
term default effect (4.3.2). While the first two analyses are on the individual level, the third 
multivariate analysis adds variables on the municipality level (4.3.3).  
The results chapter is followed by a summary of all the results (Chapter 5) and a 
discussion of results (Chapter 6) that is divided into two sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter 
of the discussion is concerned with the default effect and the unwanted side effects in the 
study at hand (6.1). The second sub-chapter explores the moral aspects of applying soft 
incentives and, more specifically, the application of nudges as a soft policy tool (6.2). Finally, 
Chapter 7 addresses potential future research questions.  
 
2. Theory   5 
 
2. Theory 
This chapter will lay out the theoretical groundwork, building the foundation for the analysis 
and interpretation of the experiment. In Section 2.1, nudges will be explained, starting from 
the four core characteristics defining a nudge: (1) intentionally changing choice architecture, 
(2) not changing (economic) incentives, (3) leaving the freedom to choose, and (4) being 
transparent to the decision-maker. A psychological explanation of how nudges influence 
decision-making will be provided with the help of the theory of behavioural change. After 
establishing what defines a nudge and how a nudge operates, the application of nudges will 
be discussed as a paternalistic soft policy tool. Here it will become clear that the core 
characteristics of what defines a nudge are not only hard to objectively evaluate but also give 
rise to concerns when the nudge is applied. 
In Section 2.2, default rules will be explored as they apply to nudges in this experiment. 
The different ways of framing a decision and different options on how to set a default will be 
explained. With the help of the dual process theory, how default rules influence decision-
making will be laid out. Furthermore, several behavioural presuppositions will explain the 
efficiency of the default rule. After establishing what defines a default nudge and how a 
default nudge operates, the application of default rules, first in different decision-making 
areas and then more specifically in the area of renewable energy, will be documented. 
At the end of the theory chapter, the unwanted side effects of nudges and specifically 
default rules will be laid out in Section 2.3. Tools of behavioural manipulation are deemed to 
be controversial, and this is the case with the default rule nudge. On the one hand, the 
manipulation of a choice through a nudge can have unforeseen side effects like rebound 
behaviour and moral licensing, where the nudge influences one target area positively but 
other areas in an unintended negative way. On the other hand, the influencing of choice has 
the potential to distort decision preferences and therefore comes with the ethical concerns 
surrounding manipulation. 
Overall, the theory chapter will cover topics ranging from a broad perspective on 
nudges to the more specific case of default rules, and end with a discussion on possible side 
effects and ethical concerns of applying nudges and more specifically default rules. 
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This journey through theory will address the different characteristics of influencing 
choice through the application of a default rule, thus providing the documented experiment 
with a critical background from which the success of the default effect can be judged and 
considered in relation to its possible side effects. 
2.1 Defining Nudging 
Nudging is a popular term that receives frequent attention, but is not defined by a single 
agreed-upon definition (Gigerenzer, 2015; Michalek et al., 2016). With the publication 
‘Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness’, Thaler and Sunstein 
demonstrated a number of examples of non-monetary incentives and systematically 
categorized them (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). This book was a bestseller and gave the 
discussion about nudging its first real boost in attention, which was added to by subsequent 
publications and public discussions. Now riding the end of the public attention wave, nudging 
has become an over-simplified concept to the public. The public has seen it all, judged it all, 
and argued it all, resulting in a much-muddied idea of the term in the end. The definition of 
nudging given in this chapter weighs the different common definitions (Michalek et al., 2016) 
against each other with the aim to successfully distinguish nudging from other types of 
behavioural manipulations as monetary incentives or education campaigns. The two main 
defining features of nudging techniques are freedom of choice and transparency, which will 
be discussed in more detail. The dual process theory (Fazio, 1990; Kahneman, 2013) will be 
laid out as the behavioural theory explaining nudging techniques. In line with its name, the 
theory describes two ways of influencing behaviour through communicative interventions. 
One way is cognitive reflective, and is thus an active process of changing attitudes, intentions, 
and behavioural implementations. The other way is automatic, involving not reflective but 
intuitive processing to change attitudes, intentions, and behavioural interventions. Most 
researchers understand nudges to change behaviour through communicative interventions 
to fall into the second category (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2014; Sunstein, 2017; Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2009). The definitions about nudging as a behavioural influencing tool are as 
diverse as the classification schemes that try to sort nudging techniques in groups. One of the 
most common classifications will be discussed in this chapter, giving insight into the broad 
spectrum of nudging techniques.  
Even though the term nudging is quite new in public discussion, the phenomenon of 
nudging is not. Multiple disciplines research and apply nudges, also called soft incentives, 
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such as economics, sociology, psychology, and social marketing sciences. Nudging techniques 
have been researched for a long time in consumer research, psychologically oriented 
behavioural sciences, and environmental sciences, but without being called nudges. Tversky 
and Kahnemann for example, showed in their theory of loss aversion that framing the same 
question in terms of loss aversion rather than framing it in terms of the realisation of profits 
brought forth different degrees of risk-taking (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In a growing 
number of countries, nudging advisors give guidance on policy questions for governmental 
agencies and NGOs (for example, in the United States, Great Britain, and Denmark; for an 
overview, refer to Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). Consumer research has long known that nudges 
influence decision outcomes a great deal (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Nudging has received 
much attention as a promising new soft policy tool. The benefits of using nudging as such a 
policy tool along with the disadvantages will be discussed in this chapter. Examples will be 
used to illustrate both sides and develop some guidelines.   
Nudging, therefore, does not have only one definition, but rather several 
interpretations. To bring clarity to this frequently debated term it will first be defined along 
with its core characteristics, and then sorted with the help of a system to categorize nudging. 
Subsequently, the way that nudges operate will be addressed with the help of the dual 
process theory. Finally, the application of nudges as a soft policy tool will be discussed. 
The Four Core Characteristics of Nudging 
While the term ‘nudging’ is heterogeneously defined (Gigerenzer, 2015; Michalek et 
al., 2016), most common definitions still seem to agree on the following four core 
characteristics: (1) intentionally changing choice architecture, (2) not changing (economic) 
incentives, (3) leaving the freedom to choose, and (4) being transparent to the decision-
maker. 
The first core characteristic of nudging is the intentionality with which the choice 
architecture is changed. For each choice, there is a choice architecture present. Nudging takes 
this choice architecture and changes it to make a certain choice outcome more likely to occur. 
Nudges can make one part of information about the choice more salient and with that, 
influence the intuitive decision-making that is described by the dual process theory as type 1 
processing (automatic and intuitive processing). Information can be introduced or made 
more salient at the point of decision-making or beforehand. The nudging techniques ‘framing’ 
and ‘default rules’, for example, change the choice architecture at the time of the choice, and 
‘priming’ changes the choice architecture before the choice (Michalek et al., 2016, pp. 8–9).  
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In the realm of libertarian paternalism, nudges change the decision-making 
architecture through ‘nudging’ in the sense of gently pushing the decision-maker to a specific 
outcome. Nudges, therefore, change the decision-making architecture with a specific 
outcome in mind (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015, p. 19). This specific outcome is seen as superior 
to the other outcomes. The superiority of an outcome can be argued on a number of grounds 
(Reisch & Sandrini, 2015, p. 19). The superior decision outcome can be the choice outcome 
that embodies social welfare improvement for the individual and/or for society. It could also 
be the outcome that is preferred by the majority, or just that it embodies the interest of the 
regulator who applies the nudge. 
While a decision-making context is always present, it is the intentional influence on the 
decision-making context with a specific behavioural outcome in mind that defines nudging 
(Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). Therefore, if the decision-making context is not intentionally 
influenced, nudging has not occurred. This defining characteristic of nudging – the 
intentionality of changing the choice architecture – is commonly agreed upon (Hausman & 
Welch, 2010) and stands as the strongest argument against the assumption that there is no 
alternative to nudging. On the grounds of the intentionality characteristic, it becomes clear 
that there is an alternative to nudging, because nudging is not the omnipresent decision-
making context but rather the intentional changing of the decision-making context (Hansen 
& Jespersen, 2013). It follows that an untouched decision-making context is not a nudge but 
a true alternative to a nudge. 
The second core characteristic of a nudge is that it does not change the incentives of 
the choice alternatives, particularly the economic incentives. Thaler and Sunstein define 
nudging as intentionally changing choice architecture without changing economic incentives 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009, p. 6). Other definitions of nudging have an even broader 
understanding of not changing incentives, not only including economic incentives but also 
including all other things that could change the presumable cost of a choice alternative, such 
as time, and effort (Hausman & Welch, 2010).  
The third core characteristic is that nudges allow freedom of choice. One important 
point in defining nudging is that the decision-making framework is changed in a way that 
leaves the decision-maker the option to opt-out and retain his or her individual freedom to 
go against the nudge (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). If the freedom to choose is not preserved, 
the behavioural influencing strategy could not be termed a nudge, but would have to be 
described as mere prohibition. This simple characteristic of leaving the freedom to choose is 
debated when it comes to specifics. Section 2.2.3.2 (Ethical Problems of Manipulation) will 
discuss when and how a nudge leaves the freedom of choice intact. The freedom to choose 
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cannot be directly translated as preserving the array of decision options or providing more 
than one choice alternative. The freedom to choose is only intact if the decision-maker can 
withstand the nudging influence so that his or her true freedom of choice is retained. 
The fourth core characteristic is that nudges are transparent to the decision-maker. A 
nudging technique needs to be a transparent influence in the choice architecture, and an 
attentive decision-maker should be able to recognize the behavioural influencing strategy. 
Without this core feature, a nudge would not be able to be differentiated from a hidden 
manipulation (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). Despite the defining characteristic that nudges are a 
transparent behavioural influence, some theorists have tried to divide nudges into 
transparent nudges and non-transparent nudges. This sub-categorization is vague at best and 
prone to subjectivity (see Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). Therefore, this work will assume that 
nudges have the defining characteristic of being transparent, and will not enter the diverse 
sub-discourse of which nudges are transparent and which are not. While it sounds obvious 
that nudges must be transparent in order to not be labelled as mere manipulations, the more 
specific terms of the transparency characteristic of nudging are also widely debated (Hansen 
& Jespersen, 2013). The main argument revolves around whether nudges that are defined by 
only influencing the automatic and intuitive processes of decision-making (see Section 2.1.1: 
Explaining Nudging Using the Theory of Behavioural Change) can ever be called transparent? 
How transparent can an intentional change to the choice architecture be if it is designed to 
only influence the automatic and intuitive response of the decision-maker (type 1 nudge)? A 
critical discussion on the arguments regarding transparency and the claims of manipulation 
regarding nudging techniques will be provided in Section 2.2.3.2 (Ethical Problems of 
Manipulation). 
The four core characteristics of nudging techniques cannot be defined separately, but 
go hand in hand. The freedom to choose does not only mean that there are choices available, 
but also that the behavioural intervention needs to be transparent. A behavioural 
intervention that gives different decision options but has a lack of transparency can be 
described as a hidden manipulation, and is not fulfilling the terms of freedom of choice. Both 
freedom of choice and transparency need to be fulfilled to define a behavioural intervention 
as a nudging technique. Without those staple characteristics, nudging cannot be 
differentiated from hidden regulations or flat-out manipulation (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015, 
p. 20). In the same way, the presence of a choice architecture is not a nudge if it was not 
intentionally shaped with a specific outcome in mind. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, nudges are behavioural interventions that clearly fulfil the four core 
characteristics: (1) intentionally changed choice architecture, (2) without changing 
(economic) incentives, (3) the freedom to choose, and (4) transparency to the decision-
maker. Nudges purposefully change the choice architecture, thus influencing the occurrence 
of a choice outcome that is preferred by the regulator. Nudges are not to be confused with 
other behavioural interventions that lack these core qualities. Now that the definition of 
nudges is established, the next chapter will discuss how nudges influence choice outcomes. 
2.1.1 Explaining Nudging Using the Theory of Behavioural Change 
Building on the understanding of the four core characteristics of nudging techniques, the 
theory of behavioural change explores how nudging techniques affect decision outcomes. 
More specifically, the dual process theory will explain successful nudging as targeting one of 
two processes: type 1 processing, the automatic and intuitive processing. In line with the dual 
process theory, one of the common classification schemes for nudging techniques that 
divides nudges into type 1 nudges and type 2 nudges will be discussed. At the end of the 
chapter, cognitive biases will be discussed with respect to how they might be overcome by 
nudging techniques in the reality of policy making. 
Dual Process Theory 
Dual process theory has evolved over time but was initially developed in the 1970s, 
when it aimed to explain the connection between attitudes and behaviours (Wason & Evans, 
1974). While different theories that mark the evolution of dual process theory (Epstein, 
Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Fazio, 1990; Kahneman, 2013; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986) do not completely overlap, they have in common a distinction between 
two processes that govern behaviour. Type 1 processing is automatic, not reflective, but 
intuitive processing that changes attitudes, intentions, and behavioural implementation, and 
type 2 processing is cognitive reflective, and an active process in changing attitudes, 
intentions, and behavioural implementation (Michalek et al., 2016).  
This work will follow the more recent dual process theory of Evans and Stanovich 
(2013), from which the terms type 1 processing and type 2 processing originated (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013). According to the default-interventionist theory, type 1 processing 
happens automatically as the default processing in which type 2 processing can intervene 
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(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Therefore, type 1 processing needs to be overridden by type 2 
processing in order for type 2 processing to occur. As long as the individual is content with 
the outcome of his or her type 1 processing, he or she is less likely to engage in type 2 
processing on the matter (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 processing and type 2 processing 
interact with each other. Type 2 processing is always dependent on type 1 processing, but 
type 1 processing is not dependent on type 2 processing (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). Type 2 
processing is different from type 1 processing in the extended use of working memory 
resources needed for hypothetical thinking. Decision-making that considers all 
consequences, mental simulations, and cognitive decoupling is what marks type 2 processing 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). While type 2 processing’s defining characteristic is the intense use 
of working memory resources, type 1 processing’s defining characteristic its use of few 
working memory resources. The extent of working memory resource usage is what 
differentiates the two processes. Type 1 processing is the default method of processing and 
type 2 processing is only engaged when needed, which saves working memory resources 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The use of few working memory resources in type 1 processing is 
the reason that it is also called autonomous processing, and makes it the quicker processing 
method of the two. Type 1 processing is also described as being more associative because 
the use of fewer working memory resources can also be described as requiring less controlled 
attention. Type 1 processing shows heterogeneity because automatic and intuitive processing 
can be applied to mundane task as well as complicated but familiar tasks (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). The behaviour resulting from type 1 processing, which can be described as reflexive, 
does not have to be a mundane, low involvement task; it can also be a complicated, mentally 
challenging behaviour that training has made into a reflex (Michalek et al., 2016). Even 
though the intense use of working memory resources is the defining characteristic of type 2 
processing, there are other qualities that mark it this type as well. Type 2 processing is slower 
and more sequential than type 1 processing. Type 2 processing, along with working memory 
resources, is said to correlate with measures of general intelligence (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Nudges aim for influencing type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processes), and 
therefore are especially successful in directing behaviour to a specific outcome when the 
behaviour involved can be described as reflexive or time pressured, or calls for low personal 
involvement (Michalek et al., 2016).  
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Figure 1. Connections between Type 1 Processing/Type 2 Processing and Nudge Type 
1/Nudge Type 2 (Michalek et al., 2016, p. 7)  
 
 
 
Nudge Type 1 versus Nudge Type 2 
Nudge type 1 is aimed at the outcome of type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive 
processing), and nudge type 2 is aimed at influencing the outcome of type 2 processing 
(reflective processing) by influencing type 1 processing as a priming agent (Michalek et al., 
2016). Some argue that type 1 nudges are central to the definition of nudging techniques, 
saying that the pure definition of nudges comes down to their influence of the outcome of 
automatic and intuitive type 1 processing (Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 2016). There are several 
behavioural influencing tools other than nudges that directly influence type 2 processing, for 
example, monetary incentives, prohibitions, and campaigns that try to educate or persuade. 
These behavioural influencing tools directly influence type 2 processing, which is why they 
are often confused with type 2 nudges. However, type 2 nudges only indirectly influence type 
2 processing. Monetary incentives are not classified as nudges because they change the 
incentive structure of the choice alternatives. Prohibitions cannot be classified as nudges 
because they leave no freedom of choice and minimize the choice alternatives. Information 
campaigns that educate or persuade aim for influencing type 2 processing (reflective 
processing), and thus cannot be classified as type 1 or type 2 nudges (Michalek et al., 2016, 
p. 6).  
The nudge type 1 is describes either biasing or re-biasing type 1 processing (automatic 
and intuitive processing). The re-biasing of type 1 processing can happen through a nudge 
type 1 that stresses information that leads to a re-consideration of the standard intuitive 
outcome of the type 1 processing. Biasing and re-biasing of type 1 processing can happen 
through type 1 nudges that trigger or block heuristics (Michalek et al., 2016). One example of 
a type 1 nudge is a change of default settings that aims for influencing automatic and intuitive 
processing (type 1 processing). This default setting change could be to place smaller plates 
and bowls in a more prominent location than bigger plates and bowls in a cafeteria setting. 
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This could result in less food intake by customers in that cafeteria, since the size of plates and 
bowls communicates the consumption norm. This nudge of changing the default setting 
influences automatic and intuitive processing, which leads most decision-makers to follow 
the new consumption norm automatically and consume less food (Wansink, 2004). In this 
example, it becomes clear that behaviour is influenced without reflective processing, which 
is the characteristic trademark of type 1 nudges (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013).  
Informational nudges, on the other hand, are known as type 2 nudges. These motivate 
the individual to switch from type 1 processing to type 2 processing while priming the 
outcome of reflective type 2 processing using given information (Michalek et al., 2016).  
One example of a type 2 nudge involves framing a choice that triggers an emotional 
response during automatic and intuitive processing (type 1 processing) that then influences 
reflective processing (type 2 processing) (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). The engagement of 
reflective processing is the characteristic trademark of type 2 nudges (Hansen & Jespersen, 
2013). Type 2 bias belongs to type 2 processing, and is harder to successfully address than 
the re-biasing of type 1 processing (Selinger & Whyte, 2011). Type 2 bias occurs when type 2 
processing is used too much, leading to an overthinking-bias that creates enough cognitive 
noise to reduce preference consistency. In order to address this bias, one would have to find 
a way to let the individual switch back to type 1 processing, thus ending the overthinking bias 
through a switch to automatic and intuitive processing. Three ways to address type 2 bias 
have been described: reducing decision time, adding complexity to the decision, and 
activating heuristics (Michalek et al., 2016). Reducing decision time forces the individual to 
switch from reflective processing to automatic and intuitive processing, thus dissolving the 
overthinking bias. Adding complexity to the decision adds even more cognitive noise, which 
can lead the individual to switch back to automatic and intuitive processing, also dissolving 
the overthinking bias. Activating heuristics can simplify the decision for the individual in such 
a way that he or she would use automatic and intuitive processing instead of engaging type 
2 processing and succumbing to the overthinking bias (Michalek et al., 2016).  
It can be confusing that type 1 and type 2 nudging do not directly correspond to type 
1 and type 2 processing. While type 1 nudges correspond directly to the outcome of type 1 
processing, type 2 nudges correspond to the outcome of type 2 processing via influencing 
type 1 processing. It is important to understand that no type of nudge aims directly at 
changing type 2 processing (reflective processing), including type 2 nudges (Hansen 
& Jespersen, 2013). A nudge would not be called a nudge if it had the strength to directly 
change the outcome of type 2 processing. It would be called something more forceful than a 
nudge (in the literal sense) – maybe a ‘firm, unrelenting push’, because that is what it would 
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take to influence as type 2 processing as effectively a nudge can influence type 1 processing. 
There are other forms of behavioural interventions that can be successful here: monetary 
incentives (positive and negative), information campaigns that educate or try to persuade, 
and flat-out prohibitions (Michalek et al., 2016).  
The use of type 1 nudges is recommended if the aim is to influence type 1 processing 
in a non-lasting way under very specific circumstances. The use of type 2 nudges is 
recommended if the aim is to indirectly address the outcome of type 2 processing under 
longer-lasting and less restricted circumstances that ask for more reflective thinking. In the 
latter scenario, it would be necessary to administer the nudging stimuli over a longer time 
period (Michalek et al., 2016).  
A clear understanding of what type 1 and type 2 nudges are and what their aims are 
can be very beneficial when planning a behavioural intervention. The type of nudge can be 
chosen depending on the outcome to be influenced. If an outcome of type 1 processing is to 
be influenced, a type 1 nudge can be planned. If an outcome of type 2 processing is to be 
influenced, a type 2 nudge can be planned. In some circumstances, however, it is not enough 
to plan on only influencing the outcome of type 1 processing or type 2 processing. Rather, 
both outcomes need to be addressed simultaneously. This can be due to suspected 
heterogeneity in responding to the decision using either automatic or reflective processing. 
This heterogeneity in processing methods can be found in the same individual reacting 
differently over time to a decision or among individuals being prone to react differently to a 
decision. A behavioural intervention that combines a type 1 nudge with a type 2 nudge is 
described as a ‘fuzzy nudge’ (Michalek et al., 2016). One real-life example of a fuzzy nudge is 
the Ambient Orb, a real-time feedback device measuring a household’s energy use. It 
translates real-time energy feedback into colours, with red indicating high energy use. The 
colour red can be understood as priming with information (type 2 nudge), or it can be 
understood intuitively as something bad (type 1 nudge) (Selinger & Whyte, 2011). This fuzzy 
nudge can influence the outcome of type 1 processing when the red light is understood as 
something intuitively bad, resulting in an automatic response to minimize household energy 
use. However, it can also influence the outcome of type 2 processing by priming with the 
information that the red light indicates high household energy use, setting the framework for 
reflective processing. Not only can a fuzzy nudge address expected heterogeneity in 
processing a decision, it can also enhance the effect of nudging techniques. Many nudging 
techniques benefit from being combined with another type of nudge that is in the same 
category or in a different category. An example is the combination of a social descriptive norm 
nudge with salience. The added salience strengthens the effect that the social descriptive 
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norm nudge has on the decision outcome (Michalek et al., 2016). Another example of a 
common combination of a type 1 nudge with a type 2 nudge is the combination of a social 
descriptive norm nudge with an injunctive norm nudge. This combination is known to balance 
out the boomerang effect that individuals who already fulfil the social descriptive norm (type 
1 nudge), might adjust their behaviour in an undesirable way, as this is hindered by the 
injunctive norm (type 2 nudge) (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007).  
Cognitive Bias or Human Cognitive Presupposition? 
Nudges influence decision outcomes by targeting type 1 processing. An additional 
concept that further explains how nudges influence decision outcomes is cognitive bias. The 
term ‘cognitive bias’ has a negative connotation. The word ‘bias’ in cognitive bias seems to 
describe a systematic mistake in human cognition, but if it is common and systematic, why 
should it be deemed a mistake? If having a cognitive bias is the norm, why not call it 
something more neutral, such as a cognitive presupposition? Hausman argues that cognitive 
biases are not factors that interfere with rational choice, but rather are rational determinants 
of choice (Hausman & Welch, 2010). The root of the negatively tainted word choice of 
cognitive bias can be found in its origin in economics. Economics as a field is driven by the 
assumption of homo economicus, the rational agent that always strives to maximize its utility, 
depicting the gold standard of human behaviour (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). Any other form 
of behaviour that cannot be strictly translated as maximizing utility is, therefore from this 
perspective, considered biased behaviour. For sociologists, human behaviour is not 
necessarily measured and judged against the homo economicus. Cognitive bias can be 
translated and perceived as a human cognitive presupposition that is a defining marker of 
human processing, and not a sign of human insufficiency. A sociologist might want to add 
that our cognitive biases are indeed what make us human and differentiate the human 
species from mere machines. On the argument that human decision-making is systematically 
flawed by cognitive biases rests the justification for re-adjusting said flaws using 
paternalistically inspired behavioural interventions.1 With nothing less than the individual 
liberty riding on either understanding – that human decision-making is either riddled with 
cognitive biases or just cognitive presuppositions – it is understandable that the discussion is 
diverse, given the high stakes. 
Regarding successfully applying nudges as soft policy tools, Sunstein recognizes four 
main cognitive biases that strongly influence decision-making (Sunstein, 2011). Sunstein is an 
                                                          
1 For a critical discussion on this argument, refer to Section 6.2 - Using Nudging as a Soft Policy Tool. 
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advocate of understanding human decision-making as systematically flawed, and thus 
promotes nudging as a way of either cancelling out or making use of these ‘cognitive biases’. 
The first is inertia and procrastination. Here, default rules can help to ease the negative 
consequences of inertia and procrastination through things like automatic enrolment and 
changing default settings from opt-in to opt-out. As complexity increases inertia and 
procrastination, simplification of information is another way to minimize the negative effects 
of inertia and procrastination. The cognitive bias of hyperbolically discounting the future is 
also classified as falling in the category of inertia and procrastination. While inertia and 
procrastination have short-term gains, they come with long-term costs that are hard to assess 
and are discounted in the present (Sunstein, 2011). The hyperbolic discounting of the future 
can also be described as a present bias. The focus on the present in decision-making 
concentrates on the short-term gains that are achieved through inertia and procrastination 
and takes attention away from possible long-term costs (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). In the same 
way, hyperbolic discounting of the future hinders individuals in paying short-term costs that 
could lead to substantial gains in the future, for example, saving for retirement. Regarding 
policy-making, addressing inertia and procrastination successfully means setting default rules 
like automatic enrolment for important programs like retirement savings programs, thus 
minimizing the inconvenience of actively enrolling and the complexity of choosing the right 
retirement fund (Sunstein, 2011). An alternative perspective would be not to manipulate 
individuals into making the ‘right’ choice by enrolling them by default, but forcing an active 
choice instead. This active choice could be backed up with an educational campaign about 
the program. 
The second cognitive bias that strongly influences decision-making is the framing and 
presentation of the decision. The salience of the information is connected to the attention a 
decision is given, and therefore can influence behaviour. Attention is a scarce resource, and 
only salient information can hope to influence behaviour. The cognitive bias of loss aversion 
is classified as falling in the category of framing and presentation. Loss aversion is the 
phenomenon that losses are disliked more than corresponding gains are preferred. A decision 
can easily be framed in terms of either gains or losses, but loss aversion concerning an 
individual’s status quo is less easy to manipulate. With the status quo being the reference 
point, the individual will judge the decision outcomes in terms of losses and gains, with a bias 
toward avoiding losses. This also leads to the status quo bias, which leads individuals to stick 
with the status quo for fear of losing something, namely the status quo. Even if the 
presumable gains associated with the change are sufficient, fear of losing the status quo is 
judged to have more weight in comparison. In regards to policy making, addressing framing 
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and presentation of a decision requires being aware of loss aversion and framing decisions 
accordingly, as well as aiming to keep relevant information salient and clear (Sunstein, 2011). 
An alternative to manipulating the framing of a decision is stating clearly the resulting gains 
and losses (Gigerenzer, 2015). This gives the individual liberty to choose and weigh both gains 
and losses at the moment of decision-making. 
The third cognitive bias that strongly influences decision-making is the social influence 
of what is perceived as the norm. The social descriptive norm nudge tries to take advantage 
of the fact that each individual is influenced by what they think the norm is. Individuals are 
motivated by a commitment to fairness and a fear of punishment for deviating from the 
norm. Regarding policy making, addressing social influence in a decision means 
communicating a new social norm or bringing attention to an established social norm in order 
to influence individual behaviour to align accordingly (Sunstein, 2011). The alternative to 
manipulating behaviour through social norm nudges is relying on individuals’ own 
perceptions of common social norms and letting them choose accordingly. 
The fourth cognitive bias that strongly influences decision-making is found in judging 
probabilities. As probabilities are abstract and complicated to assess, it is no wonder that this 
area shows many cognitive biases – or in other words, mental shortcuts to deal with this 
complexity that most likely do not do the complexity justice. The list of possible cognitive 
biases in this area is long, ranging from the above average effect to confirmation bias and 
availability bias. The above average effect is marked by unrealistic optimism when judging the 
probability of good fortune in comparison to the probability of bad fortune. A possible 
nudging techniques to minimize this behavioural presupposition would be to frame a decision 
in a way that heightens the salience of the probability of the negative event. Confirmation 
bias is in line with cognitive dissonance, giving more weight to information that confirms 
beliefs and less weight to information that contradicts beliefs. The availability bias refers to 
the positive connection a cognitively available event has with the probability given to that 
event (Sunstein, 2011). Both behavioural presuppositions can be addressed with nudging 
techniques that re-frame decision making and heighten salience to the information that is 
underestimated. The list of potential biases when judging probabilities show that decision-
making according to one’s own preferences based on probabilities is not an easy undertaking. 
In regards to policy making, addressing the challenge of judging probabilities correctly when 
decision-making means keeping the specific listed biases in mind and communicating the 
decision accordingly (Sunstein, 2011). An alternative to using a nudging technique to help 
judge conditional probabilities correctly is to reframe them in natural frequencies, which are 
easier to understand and judge (Gigerenzer, 2015).  
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Conclusion 
Nudging techniques influence decision making through either targeting type 1 
processing (automatic and intuitive processing) directly or type 2 processing (reflective 
processing) indirectly. Regulators using nudging techniques can either be motivated by an 
economic perspective, comparing human behaviour to that of the homo economicus, or by 
an alternative perspective that described cognitive biases as human cognitive presupposition. 
Finally, there are always alternatives to nudging techniques.  
2.2 Defining Default Rules 
Default rules are one of the most established nudging techniques due to their high efficiency 
in influencing decision-making on a diverse range of topics and situations. Default rules 
describe the default setting in a decision as one of the decision options. This decision option 
is pre-activated, and is realized if the decision-maker does not actively change the setting to 
another decision option. Default rules can be best described versus the neutral standard in 
decision-making, which is active choice. 
Figure 2. Active Choice: No Presumed Consent and No Explicit Consent (own 
illustration) 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the active choice with no presumed consent and no explicit consent. In 
the most simplified way, the decision-maker has a choice between consenting, not 
consenting, or staying undecided. With an active choice, the decision-maker decides actively 
between those three possible options. If he or she does not actively consent, or chooses not 
to consent, the decision-maker stays in the category of ‘Undecided’. In this sense, the setting 
of a default choice is the direct opposite of an active choice. In an active choice setting, the 
decision-maker has to actively choose between the options, and no decision on the part of 
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the decision-maker is translated into no choice on the matter. This stands directly opposite to 
the default setting. A default setting is the initial setting that is activated if the decision-maker 
does not actively change the initial setting to another setting (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). 
In many decision-making areas, an active choice is simply not feasible. For example, this is 
the case in the area of utility contract choices. Here, the decision-maker enters a contract 
with the utility company simply by switching on the light in a new apartment. Once the 
contract is entered, the utility company has to book the electricity consumed as one of the 
many products it offers. The utility company sends a letter to the new tenant letting him or 
her know the different products and asks them to make a choice. If the new renter does not 
answer with a product choice in one month, the utility company has to book the used 
electricity under some kind of product, which is naturally the default product. If there were 
no default product amongst the products the utility company offers, the utility company 
would have trouble booking all those new tenants that do not answer the utility company’s 
letter in time. It would be unnecessarily complicated, and in most cases impossible, to first 
force the new renter to choose an electricity product and only then supply electricity to his 
or her new home. Here, a default setting on one of the electricity products is helpful for both 
parties. 
Opt-in Versus Opt-out Default Settings 
Default settings in their simplest form can be categorized as opt-in default settings or 
opt-out default settings. Of course, if the decision becomes more complicated, the default 
setting can be set on any of the choice options. But in the case where the decision-maker has 
only the choice to give consent, to withdraw consent, or to stay undecided, the default can 
only be set as an opt-in or an opt-out default setting. 
Figure 3. Opt-out Default Setting: Presumed Consent (own illustration) 
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Figure 3 shows the opt-out default setting in which consent is presumed. The opt-out 
default setting can be translated as presumed consent by the decision-maker. In the case that 
the decision-maker does not actively choose to withdraw consent, it is assumed that he or 
she gives consent passively. This way, the group of decision-makers that neither choose to 
actively withdraw their consent nor actively give their consent – the undecided decision-
makers – is counted towards those decision-makers who actively give their consent. 
Figure 4. Opt-in Default Setting: Explicit Consent (own illustration) 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the opt-in default setting where explicit consent is needed. While with 
the active choice the decision-maker is left the option to be undecided about his or her 
consent, here the group of undecided decision-makers is counted towards the group that 
actively withdrew their consent. In this way, the opt-in default requires the explicit consent 
of the decision-maker, where only those decision-makers that actively give their consent are 
counted as consenting. A popular example that portrays the opt-out and the opt-in default 
setting use is the area of consent to becoming an organ donor. Here, different countries either 
presume consent (opt-out default setting) or require explicit consent (opt-in default setting). 
This example and many more are discussed in detail in Section 2.2.1, Applying Default Rules 
in Different Areas, and in Section 2.2.2, Using Default rules to Promote Renewable Energy 
Uptake. 
Figure 5 shows a default setting in the more complex setting of three options. In a more 
complex decision setting, the default can be set on any of the choice options. Here in Figure 
5, the default is set on Option 2. In this example, the group of undecided decision-makers is 
counted towards those who actively chose Option 2. In the sense of the former default 
settings, there is a presumed consent towards Option 2, and explicit consent is needed for 
options 1 and 3. 
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Figure 5. Default Setting in a More Complex Setting (own illustration) 
 
 
Default settings can be communicated in different ways. For one, they can be in text 
form informing the decision-maker that, in the case that they do not choose otherwise, they 
will receive the default setting. For another, it can also be communicated by already pre-
selecting the box of the default choice. In this case, the default option will be realized if the 
decision-maker does not actively select another option. While the text-based presentation is 
popular in written material, the pre-selection of the box indicating the default choice is 
popular in online formats. 
Default Rules and Dual Process Theory 
Default rules are well documented to work efficiently as a nudging technique. 
Numerous other studies in different decision-making areas testify to the strong effects of 
default rules (compare for example Ebeling & Lotz, 2015; Egebark & Ekström, 2013; Johnson 
& Goldstein, 2004; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). Several examples for default rules applied 
to different decision-making areas are given in Section 2.2.1, Applying Default Rules in 
Different Areas, and more specifically for renewable energy in Section 2.2.2, Using Default 
rules to Promote Renewable Energy Uptake. Default settings address, as with every other 
nudge, type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing), and do not address type 2 
processing (reflective processing) directly. Therefore, they try to guide decision-making 
through influencing decision-makers’ automatic and intuitive processing. With the help of 
behavioural theories, however, it will become clear that default settings can not only target 
type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing) directly, but they can also indirectly 
target type 2 (reflective processing) processing through priming the type 1 processing. While 
arguably most decision-makers will respond to the default setting with type 1 processing 
(automatic and intuitive processing), some decision-makers can also be primed by the default 
setting so that their type 2 processing (reflective processing) is influenced. In that sense, some 
22  2. Theory 
 
decision-makers do not pay a lot of attention to the default setting but just accept it. Other 
decision-makers first process the default setting with type 1 processing (automatic and 
intuitive processing), and then engage type 2 processing (reflective processing) on the 
decision matter. Here, they can either reflectively think about the default as friendly guidance 
and accept the default or mistrust the default and choose an alternative option. Therefore, 
default rules hold the potential to influence the decision outcomes of decision-makers that 
process the default setting of the decision in an automatic and intuitive way as well as those 
who process it additionally in a reflective way. 
Behavioural Presuppositions that Explain the Efficiency of Default Rules 
There are different behavioural presuppositions that provide an explanation of the 
effectiveness of default rules in influencing decision outcomes. One behavioural construct is 
the costliness of gathering enough information to confidently make the decision without 
being led by the default. One reason is that default settings are often understood as ‘the 
normal choice’, ‘the advised choice’, or the choice that the majority would make. Default 
settings can relieve the decision-maker of making his or her own choice when decision-
making is costly (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). The default effect is especially strong when 
the decision-maker is uncertain about the decision content and his or her preference. This 
uncertainty can happen for different reasons, such as a lack of information (Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008). Default settings are often seen as the norm that is accepted by 
society, which is then understood as the right choice (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). An 
active choice in comparison to the default setting is connected to costs such as gathering the 
information needed to make the choice and weighing the options presented according to 
one’s own preferences. This behavioural construct of the costliness of choosing an alternative 
to the default choice is along the lines of default settings priming type 1 processing (automatic 
and intuitive processing) in order to influence type 2 processing (reflective processing). The 
decision-maker is primed by the default setting in automatic processing, engages his or her 
reflective processing on the matter, and comes concludes that the cost of gathering 
information in this case is too high. He or she finally chooses to be led by the default setting 
to avoid these costs. 
Another behavioural construct that explains the effectiveness of default rules is called 
loss aversion. Loss aversion describes the phenomenon that people prefer safe gains and 
forgo risks, but are willing to take greater risks in order to compensate for losses (Sunstein, 
2011, p. 1355). This great aversion to loss drives risk-seeking behaviour (Tversky & Kahneman, 
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1981). In a hypothetical decision-making experiment, people had the choice between two 
medical measures to fight a flu epidemic. One group saw a negative wording of the effects of 
the medical measurement (‘probability of dying’). The other group saw a positive wording of 
the effects of the medical measurement (‘probability of survival’). Holding all else constant, 
people choose differently in the two groups, and these choices were correlated to the positive 
and negative wording. The group that saw the treatment framed by the ‘probability of dying’ 
chose medical measurements with greater risks than the group that saw the treatment 
framed by the ‘probability of survival’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). So far, studies have 
researched loss aversion as single nudges (not in terms of being part of default rules, etc.) 
only concerning individual commodities (Camerer, 2009; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1991). This means that gain and loss framing directly affects the individual decision-maker. 
The question remains if this would also work in terms of collective commodities that do not 
directly affect the individual decision-maker. When the context of decision-making is 
environmental sustainability, the commodity in question is of a collective kind, only indirectly 
affecting the loss and gain of the individual decision-maker. It is natural to assume that effects 
would be weaker for loss aversion concerning collective commodities in comparison to 
individual commodities. Loss aversion is a phenomenon mainly driven by type 1 processing 
(automatic and intuitive processing). The decision-maker is primed with the default option, 
and in automatic processing he or she experiences it as loss to change the default setting. 
The effect that loss aversion has on the acceptance of default rules is mirrored in the 
behavioural presupposition of the status quo bias. The default setting can be experienced as 
the status quo of decision-making. In this way, the decision-maker would also experience a 
loss if he or she were to choose not to stay with the default choice. This tendency to accept 
the priming of the default setting as a kind of anchoring effect is also described as status quo 
bias. The decision-maker finds it in general easier to accept the default and be primed by it 
in later decision-making than to switch away from the default. The effect of the status quo 
bias becomes even higher with rise of decision complexity (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015).  
Another cognitive presupposition is the simplification that a default setting potentially 
brings to any decision-making frame. Default rules simplify the decision-making process by 
offering a guiding choice. Active choice settings do not offer such a guiding choice. The more 
complicated the decision topic is, the more the decision-maker will be likely to accept this 
simplification by accepting the default choice. A decision can be experienced to be complex 
in many ways. It may be a decision topic that is emotionally complex (as in the decision to 
become an organ donor). The complexity can also stem from a great number of alternative 
choices. Even unclear preferences of the decision-maker can make it a complex task to align 
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the possible choice alternatives to their preferences in such a fashion that a satisfying choice 
can be made in the end. The complexity of a decision can induce indifference, delay of action, 
and even confusion (Sunstein, 2011, p. 1402). Complexity cannot only make the acceptance 
of a default choice more likely, it can also lead to inaction. With a default setting, inaction or 
being undecided is directly translated into accepting the default choice. Thus, the complexity 
of a decision makes the acceptance of the default choice more likely (Sunstein, 2011, 
pp. 1352–1353). In order to analyse an application of a default rules intervention regarding 
the behavioural presuppositions that strengthen the default acceptance, it is also important 
to estimate the costs of opting out of the default. These opt-out costs are not only 
information costs but maybe, in some cases, be monetary costs or opportunity costs of 
facilitating the opt-out. Monetary costs can be estimated by, for example, comparing the price 
of the default choice with other choices. Opportunity costs can be estimated by analysing the 
opportunity costs of the opt-out options. Depending of the ease of the opt-out, not staying 
with the default option can be different costly. For example, contacting a company on the 
phone can be experienced as less costly as logging into an online interface of that same 
company. 
Conclusion 
Default rules are one of the most effective nudging techniques. As with any nudging 
technique, it targets type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing) and does not 
address type 2 processing (reflective processing) directly. Nevertheless, it holds potential to 
indirectly influence type 2 processing (reflective processing) through priming of the type 1 
processing (automatic processing). This potential and several behaviour presuppositions lead 
to the high efficiency of the default setting. Default rules are documented to be an effective 
way to influence decision-making in many diverse decision-making areas, which will be 
documented in the next two chapters (2.2.1, Applying Default Rules in Different Areas, and 
2.2.2, Using Default rules to Promote Renewable Energy Uptake). 
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2.2.1 Applying Default Rules in Different Areas 
The nudging technique of default rules is widespread and has been successfully applied in 
many areas. It can be described as one of the more trusted nudges when it comes to steering 
a decision to a specific outcome. As formerly described, default rules show their strongest 
effects in decisions that decision-makers are reluctant to make. This reluctance or hesitation 
can occur for a multitude of reasons, ranging from avoiding a difficult topic, being faced with 
overly complicated choices, and decision consequences that seem to be too far in the future 
or not relevant, or even repressed at this point in time. 
Default rules work well in simplifying the process of dealing with uncomfortable topics, 
which can be uncomfortable because of associated guilt, repressed fear, or other repressed 
feelings. Such decision topics include giving the consent to become an organ donor, which 
reminds decision-makers of their own mortality since they would only become organ donors 
after death. Another topic would be the choice of automobile insurance with different suing 
tariffs, from which one would only benefit if severely injured in an accident. Even the topic of 
choosing to engage or not to engage in energy saving behaviour can be experienced as 
uncomfortable, since personal comfort and injunctive morals of being a good person collide 
in this decision. 
Default rules work well when the decision topic seems overly complicated and the 
decision-maker has not made up his or her mind before entering the decision time point. 
Rather, he or she looks for direction in the ad-hoc situation, which can be found in the default 
setting. Here, default rules are often understood as guidance to simplify the decision-making 
process, as they are interpreted as the choice that suits most people or as the choice that is 
recommended. Decisions regarding 401(k) retirement plans fall in this category. The options 
for choosing a 401(k) retirement plan are numerous and hard to compare. Default rules are 
also applied successfully when the topic of decision-making is connected with what seems to 
be far off future consequences, as in the area of 401(k) retirement plans. When young and 
just having started in the work force, the consequences of retirement and saving plans seem 
to be far off in the future. The consequences of not investing enough in pension savings are 
often underestimated, and it seems that old-age poverty is something that happens to 
everyone else but oneself. The same logic applies to insurance choices where options seem 
overly complicated and hard to compare. Default rules have also been applied successfully in 
the area of consumer research where the consumer has not only to make the decision to 
purchase a product or not, but also decide what features they want in that product and how 
much they are willing to pay for the end product. Here, defaults show strong effects due to 
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complication of a multitude of choices and the complexity of comparing product features and 
their according prices. One’s own preferences for product features must be compared with 
the willingness to pay for those product features. Internet privacy policies are also seen as an 
overly complicated affair, where the decision-maker is not prepared with already decided 
preferences but has to make a decision ad-hoc with what is often experienced as insufficient 
knowledge about the topic. Here, default settings are willingly accepted because they provide 
much needed guidance in what might be experienced as making a decision in a sea of 
excessive options. 
In this chapter, the successful application of default rules will be explored in different 
decision areas and with different motivations behind the successful application of the default 
effect. The areas presented are: organ donations, 401(k) retirement plans, insurance choices, 
consumer research, Internet privacy policies, and energy reduction behaviour. 
Default Rules in the Area of Organ Donations 
Figure 6. Opt-in (Explicit Consent) for Organ Donations (own illustration) 
 
 
The most popular example of the default effect is on the consent rate of organ 
donations. One reason that default rules work well in the area of organ donations is the 
common hesitation of people in making the decision of whether to become an organ donor. 
Thinking about organ donations makes most people uncomfortable, not only about possibly 
becoming an organ donor. Even the prospect of becoming ill enough to become an organ 
receiver can be frightening. An overview on countries and their policies for organ donations 
is in the paper ‘Defaults and Donation Decisions’ by Johnson and Goldstein, which was 
published in 2004. The paper contrasts two default conditions – opt-in (explicit consent) and 
opt-out (presumed consent) defaults – and their effects on organ donation consent rates in 
different countries (Johnson & Goldstein, 2004).  
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Figure 6 shows how the explicit consent of the opt-in default for organ donation counts 
the group of undecided decision-makers towards those who have decided to not become 
organ donors. Johnson and Goldstein compared consent rates for organ donations in different 
European countries. European countries with an opt-in (explicit consent) default show 
following consent rates by country: 4.25% for Denmark, 27.5% for the Netherlands, 17.17% 
for United Kingdom, and 12% for Germany (Johnson & Goldstein, 2004).  
Figure 7. Opt-out (Presumed Consent) for Organ Donations (own illustration) 
 
 
Figure 7 shows how presumed consent in the opt-out default setting counts the group 
of undecided decision-makers towards those who decided to become organ donors. 
European countries with an opt-out (presumed consent) default setting show the following 
consent rates by country: 99.98% for Austria, 98% for Belgium, 99.91% for France, 99.997% 
for Hungary, 99.5% for Poland, 99.64% for Portugal, and 85.9% for Sweden (Johnson 
& Goldstein, 2004). The choice of the opt-in versus the opt-out default setting has a strong 
effect on the consent rate. There is no overlap in the opt-in default and the opt-out default 
distribution, and both distributions are 58.4 percentage points apart. This goes to show how 
default settings can have a remarkable influence on decision outcomes. When comparing the 
percentages of organ donors in Austria (99.98%) to the percentages of organ donors in 
Germany (12%), the effect is drastic. In Austria, the default setting is that every citizen is a 
potential organ donor unless pro-actively indicated otherwise through a non-organ-donor-
identification card. In Germany, the default setting is that every citizen is not a potential organ 
donor unless indicated otherwise through an organ-donor-identification-card. This difference 
in default setting results in a difference in organ donor rates of 87.98 percentage points 
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2004). The default setting of having every citizen be a potential organ 
donor can save many lives (Johnson & Goldstein, 2004).  
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In this example, it becomes clear that if a decision topic is mostly avoided due to 
discomfort, such as is the case with organ donation, most people do not form a strong opinion 
on the topic but rather stay undecided. When the topic is avoided, no opinion can be formed, 
and outside influences such as the country’s default settings make the decision for those 
citizens who are undecided whether to become an organ donor or not. For the few citizens 
that braved facing this uncomfortable topic, the default setting might have a weaker effect. If 
they have a strong viewpoint on the topic that is in opposition to the default setting, they will 
choose to opt out of the default.  
The question of choosing the default settings of explicit consent or presumed consent 
in organ donations is ultimately a choice between honouring the means of many or the means 
of the individual. The default setting of explicit consent in organ donation honours the means 
of the individual over the means of the many as it gives priority to the individual’s right not 
to be pushed towards becoming an organ donor when they are undecided and do not clearly 
indicate that they want to become an organ donor. The default setting of presumed consent 
in organ donation gives priority to the means of the many over the means of the individual 
as it gives priority to the survival of many citizens as achieved through more available organ 
donations. Setting the default in organ donations is not only a practical choice but also a 
choice of ideology, and one that each country will have to decide for itself. 
Default Rules in the Area of US Retirement Contribution Plans 
Another topic in which default rules have a significant and relevant effect on citizen 
welfare is the participation in 401(k) retirement plans (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 
2001). The 401(k) plan is one of the main pension saving plans in the USA. In about 86% of 
companies, enrolment in the pension savings plan needs to be initiated by the employee 
(Choi et al., 2001). Due to the prevailing default of non-enrolment, companies fail to pass the 
IRS (Internal Revenue Service) non-discrimination rules in the 401(k) plan which aim for an 
equal share of highly compensated and lower-compensated members (Choi et al., 2001). The 
prevailing structural disparities on an individual level for participation rates are driven by the 
prevailing default of non-enrolment. The default of non-enrolment leads to more highly 
compensated employees signing up for and benefitting from pension plans. Most participants 
fit the demographic of mature age, higher income, and tenure, and tend to be male and 
Caucasian (Madrian & Shea, 2000). This failure to pass the IRS non-discrimination rules in the 
401(k) plan motivates companies to change the default setting to enrolment.  
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One paper reporting on default setting effects on participation in 401(k) pension plans 
is ‘Defined contribution pensions: plan rules, participant decisions, and the path of least 
resistance’ by Choi et al., published 2001 (Choi et al., 2001). The natural field experiments 
and questionnaires conducted contrast the participation effects of default enrolment versus 
default non-enrolment in 401(k) pension saving plans. The paper has a sample size of almost 
200,000 individuals in different firms in the USA with either default enrolment, default non-
enrolment, or the introduction of default enrolment. This study collected covert data on 
participation rates through the natural experiment of comparing participation rates before 
and after the introduction of default enrolment and combines this with overt questionnaires 
on the preferences of employees concerning their pension savings behaviour. Default 
enrolment in in a 401(k) plan had a significant long-lasting positive effect on participation. So 
did the acceptance of a default contribution rate, which was not altered by an overwhelming 
majority of employees (Choi et al., 2001).  
Another paper reporting on default effects on participation rates in the 401(k) 
retirement plans is ‘The power of suggestion: inertia in 401(k) participation and savings 
behavior’ by Madrian and Shea, published in 2000 (Madrian & Shea, 2000). The paper reports 
on a natural experiment that contrasts default enrolment with default non-enrolment on 
participation rates in 401(k) retirement plans. The covert study was conducted in the USA 
from June of 1997 through June of 1999, with the default setting change from non-enrolment 
to enrolment starting on April 1, 1998. The natural experiment compared 401(k) savings 
behaviour and participation rates of employees in a firm before and after the firm introduced 
the default change. Default enrolment in the 401(k) had a significant positive effect on 
participation rates compared to default non-enrolment. In the same line, defaults in 
contribution rates and investment allocations also had strong effects on saving behaviour. 
Many employees stuck with all three newly introduced defaults: the default ‘enrolment’, the 
default contribution rate, and the default fund. This stands in stark contrast to the savings 
behaviour choices that the same employees made before the change to default enrolment 
(Madrian & Shea, 2000).  
Nonetheless, the prevailing default setting in the USA is still non-enrolment, which has 
difficulties passing the IRS non-discrimination rules in the 401(k) plan as it is prone to produce 
inequality, and might even reproduce wealth inequality through generations for a specific 
demographic. Having a default setting of enrolment not only increases participation rates 
overall, but especially for a specific demographic that would be more prone to old-age-
poverty otherwise. It seems as if the default change to enrolment might be of help when it 
comes to breaking down wealth inequalities arranged by demographics. In a country where 
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the topic of pension savings lays squarely on the shoulder of individuals and their immediate 
families, a default setting to a sensible pension plan can ease that load, especially for 
individuals who are already occupied with everyday financial trials. The default change to 
enrolment would hold the potential to foster equality as long as the default setting is truly in 
the interest of the decision-makers choosing a sensible contribution rate and fund. 
Default Rules in the Area of Insurance Choices 
Default settings do not only apply to the relevant and pressing topics of organ 
donations and pension funds. They also show significant effects when it comes to insurance 
choices. The paper ‘Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions’ by Johnson et 
al. was published in 1993 (Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 1993) and reports on 
default settings in automobile insurances in the USA and their effects on customer’s 
insurance choices. It reports on a natural experiment contrasting two default rules that were 
facilitated in Pennsylvania and New Jersey concerning automobile insurance law. Both states 
introduced the option of a ‘reduced right to sue’ to lower insurance rates in the year 1992. 
The main difference was the interpretation of this change concerning insurance laws caused 
by introducing it in two different default settings. 
Figure 8. New Jersey Default Low Insurance Rate and Reduced Right to Sue (own 
illustration) 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the New Jersey default setting, which is a lower insurance rate and a 
reduced right to sue. It also shows that 80% of customers in New Jersey picked the default 
setting. Only 20% opted out of the default setting and chose the higher insurance rate and 
the full right to sue. 
Figure 9 shows the Pennsylvanian default setting, which is a higher insurance rate and 
a full right to sue. It also shows that, as a result, 75% of customers in Pennsylvania picked the 
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default setting and only 25% choose the lower insurance rate and the reduced right to sue. 
In New Jersey, 80% stayed with the default of lower insurance rates and a reduced right to 
sue and only 20% bought the full right to sue at a premium. In Pennsylvania, 75% stayed with 
the default of higher insurance rates and the full right to sue and 25% opted for the lower 
insurance rate and the reduced right to sue. Therefore, the rate of citizens having the high 
insurance rate and full right to sue ranged from 20% (New Jersey) to 75% (Pennsylvania), and 
for the lower insurance rate and reduced right to sue, from 80% (New Jersey) to 25% 
(Pennsylvania). These rates depended on the state and their interpretations of the new 
insurance law through different default settings (Johnson et al., 1993).  
Figure 9. Pennsylvania Default High Insurance Rate and Full Right to Sue (own 
illustration) 
 
 
Insurance choices are a decision that often overwhelms decision-makers through 
(unnecessary) complication and confrontation with the uncomfortable notion of a disaster 
happening, against which the insurance is purchased. This combination is likely to make the 
decision-maker uneasy and uncertain of their preferences and therefore more willing to 
follow the guidance that the default setting is interpreted as offering. This is shown in the 
paper, which reports on immense default setting effects on the two different insurance 
options. Although the default setting is different in each state, it is understood as guidance in 
both cases. Most citizens accepted that guidance and stayed with the default (75% in 
Pennsylvania and 80% in New Jersey). 
In particular, this paper illustrates that oftentimes, default rules are understood as 
guidance, reflecting what the majority wants and what is recommended to fit the majority. 
Therefore, the setting of the default should not be done hastily, but with the aim to actually 
reflect what would be of benefit to the majority of customers and not what would be of 
benefit to the insurance company. Insurance companies have a skewed playing field (in their 
32  2. Theory 
 
favour) when it comes to the decision-making of their customers. This information advantage 
on the side of the insurance companies paired with the diffusion of responsibility found in 
larger entities can easily lead to decision frames and default rules that are not in the interest 
of the majority of customers but rather in the interest of the companies. 
Default Rules in the Area of Consumer Research 
Not only insurance companies take (unfair) advantage of default rules. This also 
happens in the area of consumer research. Consumer research is a field dedicated to 
encouraging individual consumption and spending. 
The paper ‘The Sceptical Shopper: A Metacognitive Account for the Effects of Default 
Options on Choice’ by Brown and Krishna was published in 2004 (Brown & Krishna, 2004), 
and reports on default effects on consumption and spending. The paper contrasts two 
interventions and their effects on consumer choices and the total price that the consumer 
pays for the final product. The two treatments were the default ‘high product qualities with 
a high price’ and the default ‘low product qualities with a low price’, which were tested in 
two overt questionnaire studies conducted in the USA. Both treatments used a small sample 
of undergraduate students (n=60 and n=96).  
The study found that defaults carry meaning about the marketplace to the customer 
and change customers’ perceptions of product value. Customers understand defaults in 
product design (low or high settings of product qualities set as the default product bundle) 
as intentional messages from the seller. In order to interpret the message hidden in the 
default setting, the customer goes back to their interpretation framework: the marketplace 
metacognition, which is argued to be the moderator for the default effect. If the customer 
experiences a default setting as incompatible with the marketplace metacognition, it will 
diminish the default effect or even result in a negative default effect.  
Brown and Krishna conclude that default settings should always be regarded in 
connection to what may be the main marketplace metacognition of the customer (Brown 
& Krishna, 2004). In other words, if the main marketplace metacognition that the customer 
holds is not in line with the presented default product bundle, the customer will notice and 
as a result will make a decision that is in opposition to the presented default. When the 
presented default product bundle is in line with the marketplace metacognition, the 
customer will be aware of that and be more likely to stick to the default.  
In other words, the customer can become suspicious that the default product bundle 
is not really a guide that offers the best-matched product bundle to the preferences hold by 
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the majority of customers. On the grounds of these suspicions, the default setting can be 
interpreted as a manipulation by the seller holding only the seller’s interests in mind. Then 
the customer will not accept this default setting, but will be more likely to choose an 
alternative. This finding highlights the feature that the default setting in general is not 
mindlessly accepted by the majority due to inertia. The default setting has to be trustworthy, 
otherwise it can cause an opposite effect. 
Another paper reporting on defaults in consumer research is ‘Choosing what I want 
versus rejecting what I do not want: an application of decision framing to product option 
choice decisions’ by Park, Jun, and MacInnis, published in 2000 (Park, Jun, & MacInnis, 2000). 
The paper is based on three studies that were all conducted in the USA. The first study cited 
was an overt survey study with 126 business students, the second was a randomized survey 
study with 302 business students, and the third cited study was a randomized survey study 
with 101 business students. All three studies tested either the default of a subtractive option-
framing method or the default of an additive option-framing method on consumers’ decisions 
regarding option choices. These two selection procedures of product qualities were 
contrasted for the same product. 
Figure 10. Default Setting of Subtractive Option-Framing Method in Consumer 
Research (own illustration) 
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Figure 10 shows the default setting ‘subtractive option framing method’ in a highly 
configured product, which resulted in a high final purchase price in comparison to the 
additive option-framing method. In the default setting ‘subtractive option-framing method’, 
the consumer is confronted with a highly configured product and gets to subtract the 
configurations that he deems unnecessary before the final product purchase. 
Figure 11. Default Setting of Additive Option-Framing Method in Consumer 
Research (own illustration) 
 
 
Figure 11 shows the default ‘additive option-framing method’ for a low-configured 
product, which resulted in a low final purchase price in comparison to the subtractive option-
framing method. With the default setting ‘additive option-framing method’, the consumer is 
confronted with a low-configured product and has the option to add the configuration that 
he or she desires before the final product purchase. The studies show that consumers chose 
more additional product configurations with a higher total product price in the default 
‘subtractive option-framing method’ in comparison to the default ‘additive option-framing 
method’ (Park et al., 2000).  
The finding that consumers who start with a highly configured product, in which they 
get to subtract the configurations that they deem unnecessary before the final product 
purchase, receive a higher total product price highlights that defaults can be understood as 
guidelines or reflect the preferences of the majority. When faced with a complicated purchase 
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choice and the balancing of feature preferences and willingness to pay, most customers are 
open to outside guidance, and a default setting can be understood as what the majority 
would want.  
In order to deviate from what the majority prefers, one would need well-established 
personal preferences for product features and corresponding ideas of how much one is willing 
to pay for each feature. Therefore, most will accept the guidance of the default, only deviating 
on product features where they feel comfortable doing so and leaving all other product 
features for which they are uncertain on the default setting.  
If the default setting is the highly configured product, all the uncertain features will 
remain on the highly configured type, resulting in an overall higher purchase price for the 
final product. Some other arguments why consumers end up with a higher final purchase 
price when starting with the highly figured product is loss aversion and anchoring. If the 
customer starts on a highly configured product, it makes him or her ‘give up’ high product 
features for low product features. It also anchors customers on a high price for the overall 
product to which every reduction of product features and according price is compared to in 
the process of shopping. Therefore, the customer will be more likely to end up with a highly 
featured and more expensive product than if they started with a lower priced and lower 
featured product. 
Default Rules in the Area of Online Privacy Policies 
As in insurance choices and consumer research, Internet privacy policies can also be 
counted towards those areas where default effects are mainly used not in the interest of the 
consumer, but as a tool to serve the interest of the company. The European Union Data 
Directive decreed in 1995 that the default for handling online privacy policies should be that 
the consumer needs to give their explicit consent to the program that collects their personal 
information. There are two contrasting ways of handling Internet privacy policy. One way is 
to make use of an opt-out default in which consumers have to explicitly opt-out of sharing 
their personal information with the online program. Another way is the use of an opt-in 
default, where consumers have to explicitly opt-in to sharing their personal information with 
the online program.  
In the case of the United States, no default recommendation or restriction is given at 
this point in time. This results in a prevailing opt-out default on US websites in regard to 
Internet privacy policies. The consumers using any online program are assumed to agree with 
sharing their personal information with the online program. Only with an active request can 
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a consumer opt-out of sharing their personal information with the website operators 
(Johnson et al., 2002). There are also no sufficient guidelines that the protocol for actively 
choosing not to share personal information should be easy for the consumer to follow. 
Therefore, online programs have no incentive to give consumers a fair chance to easily opt-
out of the default rule that the website operators have skewed to their own advantage. 
The effect of default rules on the sharing of personal information online is documented 
in the paper ‘Defaults, framing and privacy: why opting in-opting out’ by Johnson, Bellman 
and Lohse, published in 2002 (Johnson et al., 2002). The paper contrasts the different 
manifestations of the opt-in and opt-out responses that are an important element of online 
privacy and permission marketing. The opt-in and opt-out responses are all respondents’ 
answers to the question of if the researchers would be allowed to contact respondents again 
for a health survey.  
One study in the paper reported on the effects of positive and negative frames as well 
as defaults on participation rates. The randomized online survey experiment (n=277 from an 
US online panel) with four question formats asked the respondent to agree to be contacted 
for further studies (Johnson et al., 2002).  
Figure 12. Formats of Participation Agreement Statements in Experiment 1 in 
‘Defaults, Framing and Privacy: Why Opting In-Opting Out’ by Johnson, Bellman, 
& Lohse (2002) 
 
 
Figure 12 shows the four different formats of participation agreement statements in 
the experiment by Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse (Johnson et al., 2002). The four conditions 
varied on whether the frame was positive or negative and whether the default was to 
participate or not participate. In the first condition (frame positive and default not 
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participate), only 48.2% agreed to be contacted again. In the second condition (frame 
negative and default participate), 96.3% respondents agreed to be contacted again. 
Conditions three and four were the same as the first condition (frame positive and default 
not participate) and the second condition (frame negative and default participate), but with 
a pre-checking of the agreement.  
This reversal of the defaults should have provided the opposite results of the first and 
second conditions. But instead of the opposite results, intermediate results of about 70% 
agreement can be found. A presumed reason is that the checkmark sign in front of the stated 
agreement is seen as a strong signal for a decision being made, and respondents had a 
heightened attention, resulting in the 69.2%, and 73.8% respectively, agreeing to be 
contacted again. 
In conclusion, there is a major difference between first condition (48.2%) and the 
second condition (96.3%) that cannot solely be explained by low attention. When reversing 
the defaults by pre-checking the stated agreements, the reversed first condition (frame 
positive and default now participate) received a 73.8% participation rate. The reversed 
second condition (frame negative and default now not participate) received a 69.2% 
participation rate (Johnson et al., 2002).  
Default Rules in the Area of Reducing Energy Behaviour 
Default rules settings in the areas of insurance choices, consumer research, and 
Internet privacy policies show that default rules are often used at the disadvantage of the 
customer. But not all areas of decision-making that use default rules use default effect only 
in pursuit of their own interest. There are also some other areas where default rules are 
applied to serve the greater interest. One of these decision areas is reducing energy 
behaviour.  
The paper ‘Lights, building, action: Impact of default lighting settings on occupant 
behaviour’ by Heydarian et al. was published in 2016 (Heydarian, Pantazis, Carneiro, Gerber, 
& Becerik-Gerber, 2016). The energy saving behaviour promoted was a lighting adjustment in 
a single occupancy virtual office space. The aim was to minimize the brightness of lighting 
and therefore the electricity usage of the participants. The overt experiment was conducted 
with a sample size of 160 subjects in the USA in a virtual environment. Respondents were put 
in a virtual environment that mimicked a single occupancy office space. The treatment was a 
default lighting of the office that varied in different artificial light and mimicked sunlight 
treatments. Defining the default lighting setting with simulated daylight had a significant 
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positive effect on respondents keeping the default setting in comparison to the default 
lighting setting with no simulated daylight, where respondents were less likely to keep the 
default lighting setting and rather increased the amount of lighting. Therefore, choosing the 
right lighting setting as a default can promote energy saving behaviour (Heydarian et al., 
2016).  
Another paper reporting on the default effect on energy saving behaviour is 
‘Motivating Energy-Efficient Behavior with Green IS: An Investigation of Goal Setting and the 
Role of Defaults’ by Loock, Staake, and Thiesse, published in 2013 (Loock, Staake, & Thiesse, 
2013). The study uses default rules in goal setting in the form of a specific electricity usage 
goal to promote energy saving behaviour. The covert online experiment was conducted in 
Austria. It was facilitated with a web portal designed to motivate customers of a utility 
company to reduce their electricity consumption. A sample size of 1,791 customers of the 
utility company was divided into one of the three treatments, which were no goal-setting 
(control group) versus goal-setting with an active choice versus default goal-setting (Loock et 
al., 2013). The first treatment of no goal-setting was the control group, which was not asked 
to set a maximum electricity usage goal for a specific time. The second treatment of goal-
setting was an active choice treatment, where the participants actively choose between 
different maximum electricity usage goals for a specific time. The third treatment was the 
default goal-setting, where customers received a default maximum electricity usage goal 
from which they could opt-out. The study ran from November 2010 to March 2011. The 
default goal led to statistically significant savings by affecting goal choice. The study also 
found that if default goals are set too low or too high with respect to a self-set goal, the 
defaults will detrimentally affect energy saving behaviour (Loock et al., 2013).  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, default rules show effects in versatile areas including organ donations, 
401(k) retirement plans, insurance choices, consumer research, Internet privacy policies, and 
energy reduction behaviour. The versatile decision areas in which significant default effects 
are reported differ in many aspects. Some decisions are between two alternatives (to 
participate or not to participate), as in the area of organ donations or 401(k) retirement plans. 
Other decisions have a great variety of alternative choices, as in the area of consumer 
research. Regardless if the decision is between two alternatives or many, the default effect 
has proven significant among these varying decision formats. This highlights the core of a 
working default effect: as long as the decision content has an overwhelming feature, which 
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might be due to the decision topic being uncomfortable or the alternatives being 
overwhelming, a default will deliver a highly accepted reference to guide behaviour towards 
the default setting. 
Setting the default is not only a practical choice, but also a choice of ideology, as 
highlighted in the decision topic of organ donors. The choice between explicit consent and 
presumed consent in becoming an organ donor is a relevant to citizen welfare and balancing 
the means of many with the means of the individual. What might seem like lower stakes is 
the setting of defaults in Internet privacy policies. But here as well, citizen welfare is 
concerned. The right to privacy can be diminished by setting defaults in Internet privacy 
policies in such a way that websites gain and use private information to their own advantage, 
thus selling out citizens and their rights to privacy.  
Consumer research also goes along these lines, taking advantage of default rules to 
gain a higher end price sale from the customer. It is remarkable to see that customers in this 
area judge defaults on the grounds of their former knowledge about the seller and will 
comply with the default only if it does not contradict with their knowledge about the seller. 
This illustrates that defaults that produce significant positive effects are mostly seen as 
trustworthy guidelines. If defaults are not willingly accepted by the majority, it might be a 
sign that the default setting is contradicting with some beliefs of the majority. 
The act of default setting is a powerful tool with a relevant effect on the decision-
making outcome of many. In most cases, the actors behind the default setting are not 
regulated to preserve the interest of citizens, but have an incentive to take advantage of their 
powerful position and serve their own interests instead. Without a doubt this is true in the 
case of consumer research, and can also be expected in the areas of Internet privacy settings 
and insurance choices. 
2.2.2 Using Default Rules to Promote Renewable Energy Uptake2 
Default rules are one of the nudging techniques that are often successfully applied to 
promoting renewable energy uptake and energy reduction. Default rules are often applied as 
a solo nudge treatment, and not in combination. One reason might be that it is one of the 
more potent nudging techniques, and is promising enough on its own in comparison to other 
nudging techniques that are mostly applied in combination due to their ambiguously 
documented effects. 
                                                          
2 The Section 2.2.2 Using Default rules to Promote Renewable Energy Uptake is also groundwork for 
the paper Liebe, Gewinner, and Diekmann (2018). 
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In this chapter, four papers will be presented that use default rules as a nudge to 
promote renewable energy uptake. All four papers are specifically selected to have used 
default rules as a solo nudge treatment, since a combination with other nudging techniques 
makes the interpretation and comparison of effects impossible. At the end of this section the 
main hypothesis is formulated and anchored in the research already done.  
Studies using Default Rules to Promote Renewable Energy Uptake 
The paper ‘Domestic uptake of green energy promoted by opt-out tariffs’ by Ebeling 
and Lotz was published 2015 and uses default rules to promote renewable energy uptake. 
The randomized experiment was conducted in Germany with a sample size of 3,512 
households. The randomized experiment is covert and the experiment setup had a duration 
of 4.5 weeks. The two treatments, a conventional energy default and a renewable energy 
default, were randomly assigned. Respondents were prospective new customers of a specific 
utility company, and the experiment was conducted on the utility company’s website. The 
website had two versions for the contract sign-up for new customers. The conventional 
energy default condition had an optional choice of 100% renewable energy, and respondents 
could activate this choice by ticking the corresponding box. The renewable energy default 
condition had an already activated choice of 100% renewable energy (the box of the optional 
renewable energy choice was already ticked) and respondents would have to actively tick the 
box again in order to return to the conventional energy contract (Ebeling & Lotz, 2015).  
Figure 13. Basic Website Layout for Control (Left Side) and Treatment Groups (Right 
Side) (Ebeling & Lotz, 2015)  
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Figure 13 shows the basic website layout for the conventional energy default and the 
renewable energy default. In addition to the treatment of the renewable energy contract, 
two contracts were offered in both versions; one contract with high service and a higher base 
price and one contract with low service and a lower base price (Ebeling & Lotz, 2015). 
Figure 13 further indicates that the 100% renewable energy contract in both cases was 
promoted as the ‘optional choice’. This might lead respondents to think that the standard 
tariff choice is in reality the conventional energy contract. The renewable energy contract is 
promoted by the utility company as optional and can therefore be understood as not 
necessary. This choice of presentation could have a weakening effect on the renewable 
energy uptake in the renewable energy default condition. 
In the control condition, 7.2% of purchased contracts were renewable energy, and in 
the treatment condition, 69.1% purchased contracts were renewable energy. The difference 
between control and treatment group was significant (2 test, p<0.001). The study also 
reported on a small but significant negative effect of yearly energy consumption on the 
willingness to purchase the renewable energy contract (regression coefficient: -0.16; z-value: 
-1.95; p<0.10). The same goes for the unit price of energy: here they also report a small but 
significant negative effect on the willingness to purchase a renewable energy contract 
(regression coefficient: - 0.14; z-value: 2.39; p<0.10). When regional results from the last 
federal election were added, the researchers found a significant interaction between green 
party preference and the treatment. Green party preference on a regional level was 
associated with the renewable energy choice on the respondent level in the control 
treatment but not in the renewable energy treatment.  
The study also did a small online follow up study (n=168) concerning the question of 
whether respondents consciously stayed with the renewable energy contract in the 
treatment condition. Of the respondents, 84.13% did recall making a conscious decision to 
stay with the renewable energy default in the treatment condition, and 100% of the 
respondents recalled it in the control condition (Ebeling & Lotz, 2015). As this result comes 
from an overt online study, it might be also the experimenter demand effect driving this high 
percentage on ‘conscious decision-making’. It could be associated with negative emotions to 
own up to the truth that the respondent did not notice and might have also not cared about 
renewable energy versus conventional energy contract. 
The paper ‘From intention to action: can nudges help consumers to choose renewable 
energy?’ by Momsen and Stoerk was published in 2014 and also experimented with default 
rules to promote renewable energy uptake (Momsen & Stoerk, 2014). This paper not only 
tested default rules against a control group, but also tested them in comparison with five 
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other nudging techniques: priming, mental accounting, framing, decoys, and descriptive 
social norms.  
The online survey was conducted in Germany with a sample of 475 mostly German 
students. The study was overt and had two treatments: an active choice condition and a 
renewable energy default condition. The active choice condition was a decision between a 
100% conventional energy contract priced at 30 Euro a month and a 50% renewable 
energy/50% conventional energy contract priced at 45 Euro per month. The active choice 
condition (n=85) had no conventional default. The renewable energy default condition (n=33) 
was phrased as an active choice between the 100% conventional energy contract and the 
50% renewable/50% conventional contract (same price difference), but here, respondents 
were informed that if they did not decide, they would keep the 50% renewable/50% 
conventional energy contract.  
The renewable energy default was the only nudge in the study that had a significant 
positive effect in comparison to the active choice group. The renewable default product 
condition had an uptake of green energy of 69.7%, whereas the active choice condition had 
an uptake of 48.2% (Momsen & Stoerk, 2014). It might have been more realistic to have a 
conventional energy default condition instead of an active choice condition as the control 
group. At least in Switzerland (and other countries), the utility company has to have a default 
in place in the case that the customers do not make an active choice. When designing an 
experiment that aims to come close to the natural decision of a household choosing a 
contract, the control group should reflect the praxis of the conventional default. However, it 
is understandable that the authors chose the active choice condition as the control group 
because they wanted to not only compare the renewable energy default condition to that 
control group, but also four more nudges. Therefore, the active choice condition might have 
been moreover suitable to all nudges. 
The paper ‘Green defaults: Information presentation and pro-environmental 
behaviour’ by Pichert and Katsikopoulos was published in 2008. This paper is the oldest in the 
selection to use default rules to promote green energy uptake (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 
2008). The paper reported on three relevant studies, all conducted in Germany: two natural 
experiments and one laboratory experiment. 
The first study was a covert natural experiment with a sample size of 1,669 subjects, 
where the introduction of a renewable energy default was observed (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 
2008). The sample were the inhabitants of a little town in Germany that reacted to the 
Chernobyl disaster with a citizen initiative to no longer use nuclear power in the town. The 
citizen initiative bought the electricity grid from the former utility company one year before 
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the German electricity market opened, meaning that for one year the citizens of that town 
were forced to take renewable energy contracts and afterwards had the ability to change to 
any electricity supplier and any electricity source. Therefore, from the time when the German 
electricity market was opened in 1998, the town’s citizens had the choice between staying 
with their contract provided by the citizen initiative (mostly solar energy) or switching to any 
other electricity provider localized in Germany and downgrading to conventional energy. 
Eight years after the market opened and nine years after the renewable energy default was 
introduced in the town, 1,669 out of the 1,683 electricity meters remained with the 
renewable energy default (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). Hence, 99.17% of all electricity 
meters stayed with the renewable default in this natural experiment after the town’s citizens 
had the choice to defer from the renewable energy default for eight years. 
The second study was a covert natural experiment with a sample size of 150,000 
respondents (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). A utility company in Southern Germany 
introduced a renewable energy default in 1999 to its 150,000 household and business 
customers. Customers had the choice between three energy contracts: a conventional energy 
contract (8% cheaper than default category), the renewable hydropower contract (default 
category), and a premium renewable contract (23% more expensive than the default 
category). Since this introduction of renewable energy tariffs and the introduction of a 
renewable energy default was one year after the German market was opened, customers also 
had the choice to switch to a different utility provider. Two months after this tariff change, 
4.3% of the customers had changed to the conventional contract, less than 1% had changed 
to the premium renewable contract, 0.7% had changed to a different utility provider, and 
about 94% stayed with the newly introduced renewable energy default (Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008). The 94% of customers staying with the renewable energy default was 
a relevant amount, especially when customers had the opportunity to switch instead to the 
cheapest utility provider in Germany. Of course, this switch would have saved money, but it 
also would have cost time and effort looking for a different utility provider and comparing 
prices and services. Staying with the default did save the customer the time and effort of 
switching. 
The third study was an overt laboratory experiment with a sample size of 225 
respondents (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). The experiment randomized respondents on 
one of three treatments: an active choice condition, a conventional default condition, and a 
renewable default condition. For all three conditions, the starting point of the experiment 
was to let the respondents imagine that they had just moved to a new location and received 
offers of service letters from two different utility companies. One utility company offered 
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renewable energy and the other utility company offered cheaper electricity from unnamed 
sources. The active choice condition was an active choice between the renewable energy 
utility provider and the conventional energy utility provider. The conventional default 
condition was described in a way that the respondent already had a contract with the 
conventional energy utility company and then received an offer of service from the renewable 
energy utility company. This led to the decision between staying with the conventional energy 
utility company and changing to the renewable energy utility company. The renewable 
default was constructed in the same fashion, but with the first letter and contract being the 
renewable energy utility company. 
In the active choice condition (n=73), 67% chose the renewable energy utility provider. 
In the conventional default condition (n=75), 41% chose the renewable energy utility 
provider. In the renewable energy default condition (n=77), 68% of the respondents chose 
the renewable energy utility provider (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). Therefore, the 
renewable energy default got most respondents to choose renewable energy even though it 
came with a price increase of five Euro a month. The neutral condition was an active choice 
between conventional and renewable energy, which also led to a high enrolment in 
renewable energy. As this high percentage of renewable energy uptake (67%) was quite 
different from the number of people actually using renewable energy in Germany, it might 
hint at an experimenter demand effect or portray a decision framework that was not similar 
enough to one that could be found in reality. In reality, most households are already 
customers of a utility company holding a conventional energy contract due to the 
conventional energy contract being the prevailing one. This being the starting point, the 
customer would change to renewable energy only if their utility provider were to change the 
default product setting to renewable energy. When people are asked if they understand and 
agree with the importance of using more renewable energy, the overwhelming majority 
agrees. When people are asked if, hypothetically, they would prefer conventional or 
renewable energy, the overwhelming answer again is renewable energy (Farhar, 1999). But if 
they have to invest information and monetary costs in changing from the prevailing default 
product of conventional energy to a renewable energy contract, they are less likely to align 
their preference with actual product choice. 
The paper ‘Does Active Choosing Promote Green Energy Use? Experimental Evidence’ 
by Hedlin and Sunstein was published in 2015 and used default rules to promote renewable 
energy uptake (Hedlin & Sunstein, 2015). The overt online experiment was conducted in the 
USA with a sample size of 1,037 recruited by Amazon Mechanical Turk. It had nine possible 
vignettes, resulting in a 3x3 design alternating study design between a renewable energy 
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default, a conventional energy default, an active choice combined with an alternative of more 
expensive renewable energy, no cost or quality information provided, and information about 
identical cost and quality provided. Each respondent was only given one of the nine possible 
vignettes. 
On average, across all nine vignettes, the active choice led to higher renewable energy 
uptake (82%) than the renewable energy default (76%) or the conventional energy default 
did (69%). The paper argues that active choosing caused respondents to feel guiltier about 
not enrolling in the renewable energy program relative to the renewable default and the 
conventional product default. They showed that the level of guilt reported by respondents 
was positively related to the probability of renewable energy uptake (Hedlin & Sunstein, 
2015). The results of the renewable default were significantly different from the results of 
active choosing, however: active choosing had the most renewable energy uptake (Hedlin & 
Sunstein, 2015). This result again gives rise to the question of whether active choice is a 
feasible option in promoting renewable energy apart from experimenter demand effects and 
artificial decision-making setups. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive details of the six studies in the four papers that used default 
rules to promote renewable energy uptake. All four publications are relatively recent, ranging 
from 2008 to 2015. It is remarkable that three of the four papers and the studies they 
reported on were conducted in Germany, even though the literature search concentrated on 
English-language papers only. The promotion of renewable energy seems to be a relevant 
topic among German researchers. The German electricity market was liberated in 1998, but 
so were most the markets of European countries. Therefore, the topic of introducing a 
renewable energy default product should be a relevant and timely topic of study in Europe. 
Half of the studies were covert and half of them were overt. As this can be described as the 
beginning phase of documenting default effects on the promotion of renewable energy, even 
overt studies (in this case online or laboratory experiments) can give important insights into 
what criteria make the default effect strong. The overt studies all report high percentages of 
renewable energy uptake for the active choice condition (ranging from 48.2% to 82%), which 
cannot be disentangled from the possibility of experimenter demand effects. The covert 
studies did not have the active choice condition, as it is not practical or legal for a utility 
company to have no default product in place. At least in Germany, the customer enters into 
a contract with the utility provider the moment he or she switches on the light bulb in his or 
her new home. It is in line with current law to have a contract in place for customers who do 
not decide whether they want a different contract. Even though when active choosing yields 
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promising renewable energy uptake (minus the experimenter demand effect) it might not be 
a feasible solution in this specific case. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on a Sample of Four Papers and Six Studies of Default 
Rules with Dependent Variable Renewable Energy Uptake  
Paper Country 
Sample 
size 
Method 
Covert 
or overt 
Study design (% renewable 
energy contracts) 
(Ebeling & Lotz, 
2015) 
Germany 3,512 
Randomized 
experiment 
Covert 
Renewable default (69.1%) 
vs. conventional default (7.2%)  
(Momsen 
& Stoerk, 2014) 
Germany 475 Online survey Overt 
Renewable default (69.7%) 
vs. active choice (48.2%)  
(Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 
2008) 
Germany 1,669 
Natural 
experiment 
Covert 
Renewable default (99.17%) 
vs. no other condition 
(Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 
2008) 
Germany 150,000 
Natural 
experiment 
Covert 
Renewable default (94%) 
vs. no other condition 
(Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 
2008) 
Germany 225 
Laboratory 
experiment 
Overt 
Renewable default (68%) 
vs. conventional default (41%) 
vs. active choice (67%)  
(Hedlin & 
Sunstein, 2015) 
USA 1,037 
Online 
experiment 
Overt 
Renewable default (76%) 
vs. conventional default (69%) 
vs. active choice (82%)  
 
The literature shows different implementations of the default rules condition versus 
the control condition. Some studies have a conventional energy default product as their 
control condition (Ebeling & Lotz, 2015) and other studies have active choice as their control 
condition (Momsen & Stoerk, 2014). Still other studies compare the renewable energy 
default product to both an active choice and a conventional energy default product condition 
(Hedlin & Sunstein, 2015; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008).  
One paper reported on two natural experiments with no control conditions (Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008). When designing a control condition to a default rules condition, the 
question arises of what exactly the neutral condition in comparison to a default rules 
condition could be. Is the active choice condition the opposite of the default rules condition, 
or is it the conventional energy default product condition that can most commonly be found 
in real life? Besides understanding the point of the active choice condition as the control 
condition versus the renewable energy default product condition, it might be advisable to 
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give preference to the conventional energy default product as the control condition. Having 
the active choice condition as a control condition gives answer, and contrast, to the question 
of what the real preference of people is. Having the conventional default product as a control 
condition answers the question of how people would change their contracts if a utility 
provider would change their default product setting from a conventional to a renewable 
default product setting. Both are important questions that should be differentiated from each 
other. In this light, one can see the question of active choice condition versus renewable 
energy default product condition in a different way. It is not the question of if active choice 
gets more people to choose renewable energy than a renewable energy default, but that they 
ask different things: the percentage of renewable energy uptake in the active choice condition 
(ranging from 48.2% to 82%) does not necessarily mean that customers would decide on their 
own to enrol in renewable energy if only they had an active choice. All German households 
have an active choice, and still only few energy customers choose a renewable energy 
contract. This documented high percentage of renewable energy uptake in the studies can be 
partly seen as the established injunctive norm to promote renewable energy, partly seen as 
the experimenter demand effect, and partly seen as the answer to: ‘if you would 
hypothetically choose between a conventional and a renewable energy contract (with no 
monetary, no information cost, and no transaction cost) what would you choose?’.  
Previous research on default rules interventions promoting renewable energy uptake 
have established the finding that their default effects show strength and longevity. While the 
default effect is sufficiently demonstrated in its strength and longevity, former research has 
yet to investigate the heterogeneity in default effects in the area of renewable energy uptake. 
The one study (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) that differentiated in its sample between 
business and household customers, did not report on heterogeneity in default effects for each 
customer type. The research gap of exploring possible heterogeneity in customer type 
(household versus business customers) is at the heart of this study. Ad-hoc, it is hypothesised 
that there is heterogeneity in default effect that correlates with the customer type household 
versus business. Household and business customers have one major distinctive customer 
characteristics that is hypothesized to respond differently to the renewable default product 
setting, which is the yearly amount of electricity usage. The yearly amount of electricity usage 
is significantly higher for the average business customer than for the average household 
customer. The new default product of renewable energy comes with an increase in price, in 
comparison to the conventional energy product. It follows, that business customers will 
experience that price increase, according to their higher yearly utility use, more severely than 
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household customers will do, with their lower yearly utility use. Leading to the main 
hypothesis of the study at hand: 
Hypothesis 1: Business customers will have a lower default product acceptance of the 
renewable default product than household customers. 
This hypothesis will guide all following chapters and all analysis from descriptive to 
multivariate will explore the heterogeneity in default effect according to customer type 
household versus business. 
2.2.3 Unwanted Side Effects of Default Rules 
Even though default rules are popular because of their proven ability to steer individuals 
toward a specific decision outcome, they are not without potential unwanted side effects. 
This discussion concentrates mainly on the topics of moral licensing, ethical problems in the 
form of potential manipulation, the distortion of preferences, and rebound effects. 
Moral self-licensing is described as a phenomenon in which moral behaviour increases 
the likelihood of immoral behaviour without the individual feeling like an immoral person. In 
the case of this field study, the default setting of a renewable energy contract could 
potentially be interpreted as moral behaviour that then is followed up by immoral behaviour, 
for example, higher electricity usage. Since the common social norm is to align individual 
behaviour with the collective goal of protecting the environment, the change from 
conventional to renewable energy can therefore be understood as moral behaviour. Coming 
from the same understanding, higher electricity usage is then understood as immoral 
behaviour. This very real side effect of moral self-licensing is described both in general and in 
specific regarding its application to the study at hand. 
Nudging interventions are confronted with accusations of not only influencing target 
behaviour but also manipulating target behaviour. The manipulation accusation is discussed 
in regard to the deceptive and abusive potential that a nudging intervention may hold. The 
deceptive potential is anchored in the level of awareness that the individual being influenced 
will have of the behavioural intervention, and the abusive potential is dependent on the 
promoted end goal and whether it aligns with the individual’s interests that is receiving the 
intervention.  
Other possible side effects include the distortion of preferences – when the individual 
becomes misaligned with his or her true preferences through the nudging intervention – and 
the rebound effect – when overuse nullifies the potential energy savings of a more energy 
efficient product. Both potential side effects are discussed as they apply to the study at hand.  
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In conclusion, the possible unwanted side effects that need to be considered when 
applying a renewable default option in the area of electricity contract choice are concerns of 
moral self-licensing (moral credits as well as moral credentials) and the general ethical 
problems of manipulation, the distortion of preferences, and the rebound effect. 
2.2.3.1 Moral Self-licensing 
Moral self-licensing is one of the main unwanted side effects of this specific default rules 
intervention. Moral self-licensing is described as a phenomenon in which moral behaviour 
increases the likelihood of immoral behaviour without the individual feeling him or herself to 
be an immoral person. When an individual’s self-concept is assured enough through past 
moral behaviour, he or she can afford immoral actions in the present that do not negate the 
positive self-image that he or she holds and portrays to others (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 
2010).  
Moral self-licensing is a consistency break with the stream of past behaviour that, 
under different circumstances, is not only experienced as an uncomfortable threat to self-
identity but also gives ground to being judged as a hypocrite in the perspective of others 
(Barden, Rucker, & Petty, 2005). The threat to one’s identity as well as the threat of being 
judged a hypocrite are both inhibiting psychological and social forces that keep an individual’s 
present behaviour in line with his or her past behaviour, thus ensuring a strong pull towards 
consistency in behaviour (Barden et al., 2005; Lewin, 1947). Moral self-licensing occurs more 
often when both inhibiting forces – the social as well as the psychological – are overpowered, 
resulting in a consistency break between present and past behaviour. How and when the 
break in behavioural consistency – that is, moral self-licensing – occurs is described in this 
chapter. First rooting moral self-licensing in early social psychological theories and then 
returning to current findings, the spectrum of this phenomena is described more closely. The 
last part of this chapter will argue what the phenomena of moral self-licensing means for 
default rules interventions in general, and more specifically for default rules interventions in 
promoting renewable energy. 
Behavioural Theories 
Moral self-licensing is grounded in early social psychological theories describing 
behaviour as the outcome of exertion between forces that motivate actions and forces that 
inhibit actions (Lewin, 1947). Lewin describes the objective of social change as a process that 
occurs with a specific frequency in a certain timeframe. Wanting to alter a social process is 
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wanting to alter the frequency with which it occurs in that timeframe. The frequency of a 
social process is described as the main tangible aspect of the ongoing social process. A state 
of ‘no social change’ is described as a quasi-stationary equilibrium in which the pull of forces 
that motivate and inhibit actions are somewhat stable. If one wanted to change this quasi-
stationary equilibrium of ‘no social change’ toward ‘social change’, one would need to add to 
the motivating forces and/or diminish the inhibiting forces. Therefore, altering the forces can 
alter the quasi-stationary equilibrium toward social change (Lewin, 1947). Lewin describes 
the process of social change in three steps: unfreezing, moving, and freezing (Lewin, 1947). 
The quasi-stationary equilibrium of ‘no social change’ can be unfrozen and moved to ‘social 
change’ by altering the balance between the forces and freezing the social process at a new 
quasi-stationary equilibrium of ‘no social change’. The induced social change gives rise to a 
new force field of motivational and inhibiting forces that can reach a new quasi-stationary 
equilibrium and result in a new state of ‘no social change’ (Lewin, 1947). When explaining 
immoral behaviour, one needs to not only concentrate on the forces that motivate the 
immoral behaviour, but also on what inhibits the corresponding moral behaviour from 
occurring (Merritt et al., 2010). Moral self-licensing can be understood as one of the forces 
that acts as an inhibitor to moral behaviour, removing the social and psychological boundaries 
towards immoral behaviour and thus making it more likely to occur (Merritt et al., 2010). 
Moral self-licensing is not intuitive to understand. It describes inconsistent behaviour that is 
generally experienced as a threat to self-image, and it works against the pull that makes 
individuals behave in line with their former behaviour (Merritt et al., 2010). Moral self-
licensing is the force that lets present/future behaviour deviate from the trends of past 
behaviour. The concept of consistency theory and accusations of hypocrisy are forces that 
consistently align behaviour with previous behaviour. But how can those opposite forces be 
mended, and how can individuals justify inconsistent behaviour as non-hypocritical and 
maybe even reinterpret it as consistent after all? This question leads to the two dominating 
theories that try to explain moral self-licencing: the theoretical framework of moral credits 
and the theoretical framework of moral credentials. In the following, both theories will be 
laid out and compared, focusing on their compatibility rather than their exclusiveness in 
explaining the phenomena of moral self-licensing. 
Moral Credits 
The framework of moral credits goes back to theories stating that in order to make a 
general judgement about a person’s character, one would need to average out both positive 
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and negative attributes of that person’s character (Effron & Monin, 2010). Following this logic, 
the sum of positive and negative character attributes would determine the character 
judgment and the sum of moral and immoral behaviour would determine the judgement of 
an individual’s morality (Merritt et al., 2010). The framework of moral credits portrays moral 
self-licensing as a bank account in which moral behaviour represents credits and immoral 
behaviour represents debits (Effron & Monin, 2010). In this moral bank account, an individual 
can both invest and withdraw, and thus balance out his or her immoral behaviour with moral 
behaviour (Effron & Monin, 2010). In this argument, the presumable ‘size’ or weight of the 
moral or immoral behaviour is of great importance, influencing the end judgement of the 
total sum of morality in a person’s character (Merritt et al., 2010). A positive moral bank 
account balance allows the individual to spend some moral credits on immoral behaviour. In 
the framework of moral credits, the immoral behaviour is still experienced as an immoral 
behaviour, and the individual understands the immoral behaviour to be a deviation from 
consistency and from his or her former moral behaviour. The judgement about morality is not 
altered, but the ‘right’ or entitlement to immoral behaviour is earned through a positive 
moral bank account balance. The individual calculates that even after spending some moral 
credits on an immoral behaviour, he or she will still have a positive moral bank account 
balance overall, and thus is in no danger of judging him/herself or being judged by others as 
immoral or of bad character. The accumulated moral credits secure the self-image of morality, 
and therefore, a leap can be taken without damage to the self-image as a consequence. 
Without damage to the self-image of morality, the individual can engage in immoral 
behaviour without experiencing his or her behaviour as inconsistent or being judged as 
hypocritical (Effron & Monin, 2010; Merritt et al., 2010). It seems as if the individual’s positive 
moral bank account balance buys him or her room to deviate from his or her earlier 
behaviour, stretching out the array of behavioural possibilities from moral behaviour to 
immoral behaviour. This wider array of behavioural possibilities is calculated by the individual, 
who strictly weighs his or her accumulated moral credits to be able to afford some leeway 
without harming his or her self-perception and identity and without fearing judgement as a 
hypocrite. 
The framework of moral credits builds on the logic of self-affirmation theory. Its core 
describes how moral behaviour strengthens an individual’s perception of his or her morality 
and self-worth, and can be described as an act of self-affirmation (Merritt et al., 2010). The 
framework of moral credits also follows the arguments of theories that describe the trade-
off of goals in an individual (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). Moral credits allow the individual to 
change from one pursuit or goal (e.g. establishing morality through selfless behaviour) to the 
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pursuit of a different goal (e.g. an immoral behaviour in pursuit of self-interest) (Fishbach 
& Dhar, 2005). In conclusion, regarding the moral credits framework, moral self-licensing is 
more likely to occur when a positive moral bank account balance allows for spending on some 
immoral behaviour without fear of a consequential threat to self-identity or judgement as a 
hypocrite. 
Moral Credentials 
In comparison to the framework of moral credits, moral credentials do not redeem 
immoral behaviour through moral behaviour as in a moral bank account. However, moral 
behaviour is used to establish moral credentials through which immoral behaviour is framed 
in a more favourable way (Effron & Monin, 2010). The established moral credentials build a 
lens through which the immoral behaviour is no longer seen as an immoral behaviour – thus, 
licensing it (Effron & Monin, 2010). The concept of moral credentials goes back to theories 
where prior information (the moral behaviour) shapes the interpretation of later information 
(the immoral behaviour) (Effron & Monin, 2010). In the sense of causal attribution, moral 
behaviour does not give entitlement to immoral behaviour, but it changes the reference 
frame that reinterprets immoral behaviour as acceptable behaviour (Merritt et al., 2010).  
The concept of moral credentials can also be understood in the practice of tokenism, 
where (whatever little) evidence through a behaviour is used to establish moral credentials 
to shine a more favourable light on immoral behaviour (Monin & Miller, 2001). One example 
would be when companies flaunt their supposedly diverse workforce on an official picture by 
carefully over-selecting their small share of minority workers. This official picture is then proof 
enough for the company to not worry any longer about hiring practices that would foster a 
more diverse workforce (Monin & Miller, 2001). The official company picture establishes 
moral credentials as the company portrays itself as a non-racist workplace. The established 
moral credentials of non-racism let ongoing racist hiring practices seem less immoral to the 
company itself, and, they hope, to the judgement of others as well. In this regard, Monin and 
Miller write that: ‘…decision-makers seem disposed to treat what is at most a molehill’s worth 
of goodwill as though it demonstrates a mountain’s worth of virtue’ (Monin & Miller, 2001). 
As can be inferred, moral credentials can even be successfully applied when moral and 
immoral behaviour seem off-balance, allowing the more and less prejudiced individuals in 
Monin and Miller’s study to use the same moral credentials to voice prejudiced opinions 
(Monin & Miller, 2001). The motivations for being perceived as being without prejudice can 
range from internal motivations to external motivations to both or even none, and do not 
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conflict with the ready use of moral credentials to voice prejudiced opinions (Monin & Miller, 
2001). The opposing force to moral self-licensing and moral credentials is consistency theory, 
which states that an individual’s actions commit him or her to acting similarly in the future 
and describes past behaviour as having a constraining power (Monin & Miller, 2001). 
Consistency theory is constraining, and the motivation is for present behaviour to be in line 
with past behaviour. Moral credentials are liberating, inhibiting the pull of consistency with 
past behaviour and opening up the possibility for deviating behaviour (Monin & Miller, 2001).  
Even though consistency theory and moral credentials seem to be opposites, they do 
follow the same logic. Moral credentials show the defining power of past behaviour on the 
individual’s self-image, but he or she uses that established image to deviate from past 
behaviour rather than to align present and past behaviour (Monin & Miller, 2001). 
Furthermore, moral credentials rely heavily on consistency theory, allowing the individual to 
feel and seem consistent with others while deviating in his or her behaviour – all possible 
through the establishment of moral credentials. Through the lens of moral credentials, 
immoral behaviour is perceived as moral and consistent with past behaviour (Monin & Miller, 
2001). It is shown that moral credentials can be established not only through behaviour, but 
also through other methods – for example, group membership or by association with 
someone proving morality or otherwise taking into account what other people have done, 
providing a good excuse for immorality. All those scenarios strengthen moral credentials by 
providing a label of morality (Monin & Miller, 2001). Merrit et al. found signs in their study 
that moral self-licensing and, more specifically, moral credentials work not only in a passive 
ad-hoc way, but are actively calculated and pursued by the individual (Merritt et al., 2012). 
Moral credentials are described as a wilful bid by the individual to manage his or her moral 
track record in order to satisfy both his or her own judgement and the judgement of others. 
Individuals even actively pursue moral credentials if they expect future behaviour that is 
immoral (Merritt et al., 2012). Therefore, moral self-licensing, in the sense of moral 
credentials, is a way to carefully balance the judgement of one’s moral track record and the 
judgement of others on one’s moral track record by using moral behaviour as a lens through 
which immoral behaviour can be seen more favourably. Through establishing one’s own 
moral credentials, one can license immoral behaviour by letting it seem less immoral and 
more ambiguous (Effron & Monin, 2010). 
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Moral Credits Versus Moral Credentials 
At first glance, the frameworks of moral credits and moral credentials seem to describe 
two different ways of breaking with consistency and engaging in moral self-licensing 
behaviour. Moral credits give license to immoral behaviour by balancing it out through stored 
up moral behaviour. Moral credentials give license to immoral behaviour by reinterpreting it 
as moral behaviour through the lens of established morality. Both processes seem to describe 
moral licensing in different ways, but it has been theorized that neither one nor the other 
framework is closer to describing moral self-licensing – both merely describe the same 
phenomena under different circumstances (Effron & Monin, 2010). Those circumstances are 
the ones mediating the likelihood of moral self-licensing behaviour. One of the main 
moderators explaining the circumstances behind the pull of consistency versus moral self-
licensing is the framing of moral behaviour as either proving commitment or proving 
adequate progress (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). If the moral behaviour is proving commitment, 
the individual is more likely to stay in line with their past behaviour (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). 
Goal commitment can be understood as a continuous variable that frames a behaviour as a 
core feature of one’s self-concept. If a behaviour is framed by the individual within the realm 
of goal commitment, the individual is less likely to break out of that behaviour and follow 
other goals (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). The opposite is true if the past behaviour is proving 
adequate progress towards a goal. Then, the individual is more likely to engage in a moral 
self-licensing behaviour and deviate from their past behaviour (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). The 
individual feels entitled to actively pursue his or her other goals (that could be detrimental to 
the initial goal) when he or she frames behaviour as progress toward a goal. This subjective 
progress is not a continuous variable such as goal commitment, but is perceived as one step 
toward the actualization of the initial goal. Leaving the line of behaviour in order to follow 
another goal (that could be detrimental to the initial goal) is easier to justify since the 
judgement has been made that some subjective progress has been accomplished. This 
assessment of subjective progress towards the initial goal does not necessarily have to be 
proven by actual past behaviour. It is enough to merely anticipate the progress in order to 
engage in a switch to a different (even detrimental) goal and engage in moral self-licensing 
(Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). Therefore, moral self-licensing can be described as helping to 
balance multiple goals that consist of long-term commitments and short-term temptations 
(Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). In conclusion, framing a behaviour as a commitment does not 
provide an excuse for switching to the pursuit to another goal, but framing it as progress does 
give that excuse (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). 
2. Theory   55 
 
Another moderator is the judgement of whether the licensed behaviour is a strong 
moral violation or only a suspected moral violation (Merritt et al., 2010). Concerning present 
immoral behaviour, moral self-licensing is more likely when the behaviour is only suspected 
of moral violation rather than being a strong moral violation. In scenarios where the present 
behaviour is ambivalently immoral, the behaviour reduces the pull to behave consistently and 
increases the likelihood of acting detrimentally since the bridged moral distance is 
understood to be less than when the behaviour is a strong moral violation (Merritt et al., 
2010).  
Most studies examine the likelihood of vague immoral transgressions instead of strong 
immoral transgressions as a sign of moral self-licensing (Merritt et al., 2010). But not only the 
likelihood of moral self-licensing is affected by the degree of the immoral transgression. The 
judgement of others also relies on it. In the same way that individuals feel pulled to act in line 
with former behaviour, they also judge others as hypocrites when they deviate from their 
former behaviour. In agreement with the moral credential framework, a strong immoral 
violation is not nullified by a former moral behaviour in the same arena, but only by an equally 
strong moral behaviour in a different arena. The strong immoral behaviour cannot be 
redeemed by a moral behaviour in the same arena because this brings up the judgement of 
hypocrisy. In agreement with the moral credit framework, a vague immoral transgression can 
be nullified by a moral behaviour in the same or a different arena (Merritt et al., 2010). This 
phenomena hints at another moderator that determines whether former behaviour is 
followed up consistently or is broken from: the similarity of the decision-making arena 
(Merritt et al., 2010).  
Coming back to the two frameworks explaining moral self-licensing, the concept of 
moral credentials argues more on the side of moral self-licensing happening in the same 
decision area and the concept of moral credits argues that moral self-licensing happening 
among different decision arenas (Merritt et al., 2010). Moral credits are more likely under the 
condition of strongly immoral behaviour and when moral and the immoral behaviours are in 
different domains (Effron & Monin, 2010). Only moral credits can license strongly immoral 
behaviour because the moral ambiguity is missing and a reinterpretation of the immoral 
behaviour through moral credentials is less likely to be successful (Effron & Monin, 2010). The 
moral licensing of strongly immoral behaviour through moral behaviour in the same domain 
is altogether unlikely, no matter the process of moral credits or moral credentials, since the 
attribution of hypocrisy will be strong in such a case (Effron & Monin, 2010). Moral credits 
hold the potential to license behaviour among different domains since they do not rely on a 
re-interpretation of the immoral behaviour but rather a hard calculation of the immoral 
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versus the moral behaviour (Effron & Monin, 2010). The process of moral credentials is likely 
to license behaviour when the immoral behaviour is more ambiguous and open to 
reinterpretation through established moral credentials, which should be pursued in the same 
domain in order to provide a believable basis for reinterpretation (Effron & Monin, 2010). The 
processes of moral credits and moral credentials are more likely under different 
circumstances, which shows how they work complementarily at different time points – or 
arguably, even at the same time point (Effron & Monin, 2010). It is presumable that when 
moral behaviour and ambiguous immoral behaviour happen in the same domain, moral 
credentials can skew the interpretation of the ambiguous immoral behaviour more 
favourably and moral credits can work to balance it out. This demonstrates the 
complementary nature of the two frameworks rather than their exclusiveness (Effron 
& Monin, 2010). 
In order to engage in moral self-licensing behaviour, the individual does not necessarily 
need to behave morally. It is enough to anticipate the ideal behaviour that would redeem 
(moral credits) or change the interpretation (moral credentials) of an immoral behaviour 
(Tanner & Carlson, 2009). Moral self-licensing has two starting points: either moral behaviour 
in the past justifies immoral behaviour in the present, or moral behaviour in the present is 
carried out to justify immoral behaviour in the future (Merritt et al., 2010). As individual 
estimates about future behaviour are not simply more moral than their actual behaviour but 
tend to have a bias toward a perception of ideal behaviour, behavioural predictions tend to 
be far off, giving avenue to moral self-licensing behaviour (Tanner & Carlson, 2009). Another 
thing that opens up the possibility of moral self-licensing is merely imagining oneself engaging 
in moral behaviour. In one study, participants were asked to imagine being helpful to another 
student, which resulted in significantly lower donations than those of a control group in which 
participants did not have the task of imagining being helpful (Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
Moral Self-licensing as an Unwanted Side Effect of Nudging Interventions 
Now that the theoretical workings that make moral self-licensing possible are drawn 
up, the question remains: how do nudging techniques, and especially default rules, open up 
avenues for moral self-licensing as an unwanted side effect? 
The study ‘For better or for worse? Empirical evidence of moral licensing in a behavior 
energy conservation campaign’ by Tiefenbeck et al. (2013) examined moral-licensing in 
energy-saving behaviour (Tiefenbeck, Staake, Roth, & Sachs, 2013). In their overtly controlled 
field experiment with a quasi-experimental design, a descriptive social norm nudge was used 
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to reduce water consumption in households. After two weeks of baseline data, half of the 
154 US households received weekly feedback on their own water consumption and the 
average water consumption of their communities along with water conservation tips for 
seven weeks (May to July 2011) (Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). The households’ water 
consumptions were measured daily, and additionally, the households’ electricity 
consumptions were measured on a weekly basis, even though electricity consumption was 
not addressed in the weekly feedback given to the households. The descriptive social norm 
intervention lowered water consumption on average by 6% in comparison to the control 
group. However, the intervention had the unwanted side effect of also increasing household 
electricity consumption by 5.6% in comparison to the control group (Tiefenbeck et al., 2013). 
On the one hand, as the dependent variable of the intervention was water consumption, the 
study could be considered to have successfully shown a significant effect of a descriptive 
social norm nudge on reducing water consumption. On the other hand, the intervention was 
successful in decreasing water consumption but came with the unwanted side effect of 
significantly increasing household electricity consumption. It is presumable that the true aim 
of the intervention was not only reducing household water consumption, but reducing 
household energy net consumption. With that aim in mind, a judgement of success for this 
study would have to calculate whether the reduction of 6% in water consumption was worth 
the increase of 5.6% in electricity consumption in the overall household energy sum. The 
unwanted side-effect of the increase of household electricity consumption can be ascribed 
to moral licencing behaviour. As the moral behaviour of saving water and the immoral 
behaviour of using more electricity both fall in the realm of energy-related behaviour, the 
process of moral self-licensing could be best described by the framework of moral credentials. 
The saving of water established moral credentials for the household members as being 
environmentally minded, through which lens the immoral behaviour of using more electricity 
can be judged more favourably. The additional focus on the connection between 
environmental-mindedness and water-saving behaviour through the intervention material 
gives more room for ambiguity in judging electricity-saving behaviour as less central to 
environmental-mindedness. With this ambiguity in mind, it is even more likely for household 
members to let their efforts in saving water license their increased usage of electricity 
through moral credentials. Since only water and electricity consumption were observed, one 
does not know whether the household members licensed even more immoral behaviour in 
the realm of energy usage through their established moral credentials. This behaviour could 
range in gravity from increasing the usage of cars to booking a cruise to Alaska. The moral act 
of water conservation could not only license behaviour in the same realm, but also in all other 
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realms. Since only water and electricity consumption were measured, one does not know the 
numerous other ways that the household members may have engaged in moral self-licensing 
behaviour in other domains through moral credits. As described before, moral credits are 
transferable; they license behaviour among different domains, but are more bound to the 
same subjective level of moral behaviour than moral credentials. Depending on the subjective 
effort that the household members took to conserve water, they would be able to 
subsequently reinvest that effort in indulging in some immoral behaviours in some other 
domain. The conservation of water could give them an excuse to follow goals of self-interest 
that were previously latent, resulting in whatever behaviour is engaged in that self-interest. 
For example, the individual could buy an additional household appliance that he or she 
previously thought of as a luxury and not necessary. The moral credits gained might make this 
decision possible. While the overall aim for the intervention was to reduce the households’ 
energy consumption, such a purchase could additionally nullify the conservation effect of 
decreased water consumption. 
Only a few studies control for other kinds of energy consumption when testing an 
intervention meant to decrease one specific type of energy consumption. The electricity 
consumption of the households in this study shows that moral licensing behaviour should be 
accounted for as much as possible when judging the effect of a nudging intervention. It is not 
enough to only judge a nudging intervention in comparison to the control group in order to 
understand its potential to affect a target behaviour. A nudging intervention has to be also 
understood as an intervention in an entire system of choices and behaviours that are more 
complicated and less straightforward than most studies account for, and even could account 
for. In order to understand all the possible sides of the effects of a nudging intervention, one 
needs well-documented studies of interventions that investigate an array of behaviours for a 
long duration. The moral self-licensing effect of the increase in households’ electricity 
consumption shows that nudging effects are less predictable and more multifaceted than 
they are portrayed. It is a caution for the logical link of actions and effects that is often praised 
in nudging interventions. Nudging interventions never affect only the target behaviour, but 
hold the potential to simultaneously affect a whole array of behaviour. 
Another study reveals that environmentally-minded behaviour lets participants engage 
in moral self-licensing of immoral behaviour in other domains (Merritt et al., 2010). Studies 
show that even the purchase of environmentally friendly products can increase immoral 
behaviour such as lying and theft (Mazar & Zhong, 2010).  
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Moral Licensing as an Unwanted Side Effect of the Default Product Change Experiment 
What holds true for nudging interventions in the area of promoting the purchase of 
environmentally friendly products or promoting environmentally minded behaviour in 
general also holds true in the more specific case of default rule interventions designed to 
promote renewable energy. Here as well, the probability of moral self-licensing behaviour 
should caution against too optimistic an evaluation of the default product change on the 
energy consumption of the households and the CO2 footprints of the household members. 
Accepting the default product of renewable energy can serve as an indication of the customer 
demonstrating to him- or herself, as well as to others, that he or she is indeed an 
environmentally conscious individual. The action of accepting a new renewable energy 
default can satisfy moral self-aspiration as well as support the image that an individual aims 
to portray to others so completely that in subsequent decisions, behaviour is no longer bound 
by those concerns. The individual is freed from the former necessity to prove to him- or 
herself and others that he or she is an ecologically minded person. This freedom of not having 
to prove ecologically mindedness through behaviour is loosely translated into engaging in 
behaviour that does not have to be in line with ecologically mindedness (Merritt et al., 2010). 
Agreeing to the default product change to renewable energy can be interpreted as a moral 
act holding the potential to license immoral behaviour in the domain of environmental 
mindedness through moral credentials or in an altogether different domain through moral 
credits. Staying in the same domain, the established moral credentials could be used to 
license increased electricity and/or other energy consumption as well as other non-
environmentally-minded behaviour, for example, a stronger preference for traveling by plane 
instead of train. The default product change toward renewable energy could be understood 
by the customer as a blank check to engage in future behaviour that is not so ecologically 
minded. Therefore, the promotion of one environmentally friendly behaviour – through, for 
example, changing the electricity default product towards renewable energy – can be 
nullified when individuals fall into moral licensing and feel entitled to future non-
environmentally-minded behaviour. As a result, a default effect that is thought to minimize 
the carbon footprint of an individual can in actuality heighten it. Even more, the moral 
behaviour of agreeing to a renewable energy default could also license behaviour in different 
domains through moral credits. In this way, the default product change to renewable energy 
could result in the licensing of an array of unforeseen immoral behaviours. This is especially 
hard to account for because the behaviour could emerge in all different domains. The credits 
gained in individuals’ moral bank accounts through the acceptance of the change to 
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renewable energy can be spent on any other similarly sized immoral endeavour without 
threating the individuals’ self-images or causing them to be judged as hypocritical (Mazar 
& Zhong, 2010). 
But what does the phenomena of moral self-licensing mean in light of the even more 
specific case of the default product change to renewable energy in this utility company? First 
of all, one is cautioned to judge the result of the default product change just as a significant 
increase in renewable energy uptake and not as an overall decrease of the carbon footprints 
of those households that agreed to the renewable energy uptake. As there are no possibilities 
to gather further information on the resulting behavioural changes of the customers, it is not 
possible to judge the extent of moral self-licensing behaviour and its effect on individuals’ 
carbon footprints. Unwanted side effects in the shape of moral credentials are likely in the 
arena of environmental mindedness, ranging in severity and impact on total carbon 
footprints. One simple and direct thought would be that the default product change to 
renewable energy would increase households’ electricity usage. This heightened electricity 
usage could stem from different behaviours, such as additional purchases of appliances or 
the changing of electricity saving habits toward spending more electricity now that one’s 
moral credentials as an environmentally friendly individual are established. The utility 
consumption for the households in the years before and after the default product change was 
considered (referring to Section 4.1.1 Descriptive Analysis of Utility Use). Another presumable 
moral licensing avenue could be the increase in overall usage of water and/or gas, which could 
not be taken account of in this study. Decreases in other kinds of environmentally minded 
behaviour also could not be considered in this study. One factor that usually is a criticism of 
the default rule nudge can here be counted towards the benefits, possibly reigning in moral 
licencing: it is argued that the default effect is only so strong because participants paid little 
attention – or maybe did not pay attention at all – to the decision, since no active response 
was required to accept the default. If they are paying little or no attention, the individual will 
also be less likely to store an action as a moral decision, and as moral credits or moral 
credentials thus will be less likely be used to license future immoral behaviour. The passivity 
of the default product change on the side of the customers is in most cases argued to be 
manipulation. As can be understood here, it might not only be manipulation towards a 
specific decision outcome, but also manipulation towards decreasing moral self-licensing as 
an unwanted consequence when this decision outcome is realized.  
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Conclusion 
Moral self-licensing is understood as one of the inhibitory forces making immoral 
behaviour more likely and removing the social and psychological boundaries against immoral 
behaviour (Merritt et al., 2010). However, it can also be understood in a more neutral way 
that enables individuals to make difficult trade-off decisions that would have been dilemmas 
marked by indecision otherwise (Merritt et al., 2010). When juggling the demands of moral 
socially desired behaviour with self-interest, moral self-licensing helps to resolve the dilemma 
and enables individuals to balance both interests (Merritt et al., 2010). For the specific case 
of promoting renewable energy through default rules, this means that the moral socially 
desired behaviour is realized through the default product change, but at what cost to their 
carbon footprint will the individual balance out his or her interests with a licensed behaviour 
of self-interest? The phenomenon of moral self-licensing shows that decisions cannot be 
analysed in a vacuum. Every decision and every decision manipulation needs to be 
understood as one in a sea of many. Each decision either hinders or promotes other decisions 
and their possible outcomes (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). Since there is no definitive answer on 
what kind of costs the default product change in this study will incur, there is only the thought 
of caution that remains. This includes caution in interpreting the uptake of renewable energy 
through the default product change as just that, and not jumping to conclusions of a 
substantial reduction of the carbon footprints for those households. This conclusion cannot 
be based on results, since information showing the frequency and gravity of moral self-
licensing effects was not possible to collect. 
2.2.3.2 Ethical Problems of Manipulation 
Nudging techniques are being confronted with accusations of not only influencing behaviour, 
but actually manipulating behaviour. This section will confront ethical problems in the form 
of manipulation on a theoretical level. Chapter 6 – Discussion of Results confronts them on a 
more applied level, which is then discussed more critically. 
Defining manipulation in the psychological sense of manipulation – intending ‘to 
change the perception, choices, or behaviour of others through underhanded, deceptive, or 
even abusive tactics’ (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 18) – gives a starting point from which to 
further develop the argument of ethical problems of manipulation regarding the use of 
nudging techniques. Nudging techniques have the aim of changing the perceptions, choices, 
and behaviour of individuals. In order to accomplish that, they use tactics that some describe 
as deceptive and, in some cases, even as abusive. While the description of deceptive tactics 
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is defined by the awareness of the individual regarding the behavioural intervention, the 
description of abusive tactics is more defined by the promoted end goal of the behavioural 
intervention, and whether that end goal is in the interest of the targeted individual. This 
chapter will explore both avenues of the manipulation argument: first, if and when nudging 
techniques can be deceptive towards the decision-maker, and second, if and when nudging 
techniques promote end goals that are not in the direct interest of the decision-maker and 
therefore are considered abusive nudging interventions.  
The deceptive and abusive potential that a nudging technique holds depends on the 
awareness of the individual that is being influenced through the nudging technique and 
whether the promoted end goal reflects the individual’s interests. The ethical problems of 
manipulation when using nudging techniques will be discussed (1) regarding the way that 
nudging only directly influences type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing), (2) 
regarding the four core characteristics of nudging, and (3) in special regard to the nudging 
technique default setting.  
The Manipulative Potential in Solely Aiming for Type 1 Processing 
The argument of nudging techniques being deceptive has its firm roots in the way 
nudges are theorized to influence target behaviour. The dual process theory (Fazio, 1990; 
Kahneman, 2013) is a behavioural theory explaining how nudging techniques work.3 In line 
with its name, the theory describes two ways of influencing behaviour through 
communicative interventions. One way is cognitive reflective, and is an active process of 
changing attitudes, intentions, and behavioural implementations (type 2 processing). The 
other way is automatic, involving not reflective but intuitive processing to change attitudes, 
intentions, and behavioural interventions (type 1 processing). Nudging techniques aim for the 
behavioural outcome of type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing) rather than 
the outcome of type 2 processing (reflective processing) (Gigerenzer, 2015; Ölander 
& Thøgersen, 2014; Sunstein, 2017; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). There are a number of 
behaviour-influencing tools other than nudges that directly influence type 2 processing, for 
example, monetary incentives, prohibitions, and campaigns that try to educate or persuade 
(Michalek et al., 2016, p. 6). Bypassing reflective processing (type 2 processing) and aiming at 
automatic and intuitive processing (type 1 processing) likely results in a low awareness of the 
nudging technique in the targeted individual. This low awareness that the individual has of 
                                                          
3 For a detailed understanding, refer to Section 2.1.1 – Explaining Nudging Using the Theory of 
Behavioural Change. 
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the behavioural intervention can cause the intervention to be labelled as deceptive or even 
manipulative. In conclusion, the core ethical problem of nudging techniques is that they 
target only automatic and intuitive processes. This core problem is the downside of what is 
praised in making nudging techniques so successful: nudges aim to influence type 1 
processing (automatic and intuitive processes), and therefore are especially successful in 
directing behaviour to a specific outcome when the behaviour involved can be described as 
reflexive or time pressured or calls for low personal involvement (Michalek et al., 2016). The 
awareness of the subjects of a nudging intervention is not only dependant on targeting type 
1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing). Subject awareness and the potential of 
manipulation in a nudging intervention also depend on whether the four core characteristics 
of nudging correctly apply.  
The Manipulative Potential of the Four Core Characteristics of Nudging 
Apart from the argument of nudging techniques being manipulative, in the sense of 
deception, for only targeting automatic and intuitive processing (type 1 processing), there are 
also the four core characteristics of nudging techniques to consider (for more details, refer to 
Section 2.1 – Defining Nudging).  
The first core characteristic of a nudge is the intentionality with which the choice 
architecture is changed. One defining object that separates a nudging intervention from any 
other type of behavioural intervention is the intentional shaping of the choice architecture 
with a specific end goal in mind. The manipulative potential of a nudging intervention was 
brought up before in the accusation of an intervention being deceptive and/or abusive. The 
promotion of a specific end goal should be in the interest of the targeted individual or it could 
be accused of being abusive in nature. Therefore, when a regulator is intentionally changing 
choice architecture to promote end goals that are not in the interest of the targeted 
individual, the nudging intervention risks being labelled abusive and manipulative.  
The second core characteristic of a nudge is that it does not change the incentives of 
the choice alternatives, particularly the economic incentives. Thaler and Sunstein define 
nudging as intentionally changing choice architecture without changing economic incentives 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009, p. 6). Other definitions of nudging have even a broader 
understanding of not changing incentives – not only including economic incentives but also 
all other things that could change the presumable cost of a choice alternative, such as time 
and effort (Hausman & Welch, 2010). When this defining characteristic is fulfilled, the 
grounds for the manipulation accusation are held to be minimal. A nudging intervention 
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should avoid changing the (economic) incentives of the choice at hand. While the argument 
of not changing the economic incentives is clear in its definition, the argument of not 
changing other kinds of incentive structures (such as time and effort) is less clear. Judging the 
extent to which the whole incentive structure is held constant might be prone to subjectivity 
(for a critical discussion on this point, refer to Chapter 6 – Discussion of Results). 
The third core characteristic of nudges is that they allow freedom of choice. One critical 
point in defining nudging is that the decision-making framework is changed in a way that 
leaves the decision-maker the option to opt-out and retain his or her individual freedom to 
go against the nudge (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). If the freedom to choose is not preserved, 
the behavioural influencing strategy could not be termed a nudge and would have to be 
described as mere prohibition. This simple characteristic of leaving the freedom to choose is 
debated when it comes to specifics. Chapter 6 will critically discuss when and how a nudge 
leaves the freedom of choice intact.  
The fourth core characteristic is that nudges should be transparent to the decision-
maker. A nudging technique needs to be a transparent influence in the choice architecture, 
and an attentive decision-maker should be able to recognize the behavioural influencing 
strategy. Without this core feature of the nudge, a nudge would not be able to be 
differentiated from a hidden manipulation (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). A transparent nudge is 
defined as ‘a nudge provided in such a way that the intention behind it, as well as the means 
by which behavioural change is pursued, could reasonably be expected to be transparent to 
the agent being nudged as a result of the intervention’ (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013, p. 17). 
The transparency of nudging interventions is the antidote that minimises the potential of the 
intervention to be labelled deceptive, and therefore, manipulative. Only a transparent 
nudging intervention can also allow the freedom of choice. Only an individual who is aware 
of the nudging intervention can have the freedom to choose to either be influenced or not in 
his or her decision making. 
The Manipulative Potential of Default Rules  
Finally, the more specific case of the manipulative potential of default rules need to be 
addressed. Default rules is a nudging technique that has been shown to be a powerful and 
reliable tool in shaping decision-making. As with all other nudging interventions, default rules 
address type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing) directly and have the potential 
to influence type 2 processing (reflective processing) indirectly. Targeted decision-makers 
respond to default rules with type 1 processing and then either follow the default setting 
2. Theory   65 
 
automatically and intuitively or additionally bring in type 2 processing and reflect on the 
default setting before making a final decision. According to the four core characteristics that 
constitute a nudging technique, default rules should be set with intentionality, leave 
(economic) incentives intact, maintain the freedom to choose, and also be transparent to the 
decision-maker. In alignment with the previous argument, the promoted end goal of the 
default rules should be in the interest of the decision-maker in order to not be labelled as 
abusive. The (economic) incentives and the freedom to choose should also be untouched by 
the default rules intervention, otherwise it could again be labelled deceptive. Last but not 
least, the default setting has to be transparent to the decision-maker, or otherwise it could 
also be labelled deceptive. While in theory a default setting intervention can fulfil all the 
requirements of minimizing the potential of manipulation accusations, in practice there is still 
room for manipulation and the misuse of this nudging technique.4  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, a behavioural intervention can be defined as negatively manipulative if 
it is deceptive to the decision-maker and if its promoted end goals are abusive. The degree of 
deception that a nudging intervention can hold depends, on the characteristics of the 
intervention and on the awareness that the decision-maker has of the intervention. Both 
variables need to be looked at in tandem, since the characteristics of the intervention can 
heighten or lessen the awareness of the decision-maker. The promoted end goals should in 
general be in the interest of the decision-maker. Since in the wide field of nudging techniques 
the promoted end goals and the awareness of the decision-makers are all factors that are of 
a diverse nature and not easily generalized, the true potential of manipulation in a nudging 
intervention has to be addressed for each and every possible nudging intervention and target 
group separately in detail in order to achieve a full analysis.  
2.2.3.3 Other Unwanted Side Effects 
While there are highly likely scenarios of unwanted side effects when using default rules in 
the area of promoting renewable energy in electricity contract choice, there are also some 
scenarios that are less likely or can even be discarded altogether. Among those scenarios that 
need to be considered in general when using default rules but do not apply in this setting are 
the distortion of decision preferences and the rebound effect.  
                                                          
4 For more information, refer to Section 6.2 – Using Nudging as a Soft Policy Tool. 
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The Distortion of Decision Preferences 
While judging if the application of default rules can imply a distortion of decision 
preferences, two levels of argumentation must be addressed: the general case of the use of 
default rules and the more specific case of the use of default rules in the area of promoting 
renewable energy in electricity contract choice.  
At the general level, it can be argued that a distortion of decision preferences and the 
application of default rules that leave the decision architecture unchanged are incongruous. 
As long as all choices are still available to the decision-maker, he or she should be able to align 
his or her preference with his or her choices on a matter. However, while default rules do not 
change the decision architecture, they can manipulate the decision-maker into betraying his 
or her original choice preference. Directly targeting type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive 
processing) instead of type 2 processing (reflective processing), a default rules intervention 
can influence a decision-maker into staying with a default option, especially when he or she 
has only weak (or no) preference on the subject matter. In the case of respondents having 
clear and strong decision preferences, it is very unlikely that they would comply with a default 
option against that choice preference. They would be motivated to pay the transaction costs 
of changing the selection from the default option to their preferred option.  
In the more specific case of using default rules in the area of electricity contract choice, 
it is possible to theorise that a default product change from conventional to renewable energy 
could go unnoticed for a share of the customer population at first. That said, it is less likely 
that this would be the case, after one year of quarterly bills that not only indicate the new 
energy tariff but also a cost increase for the household customer. While a default product 
change could hold the power to distort the decision preferences of the customers for a short 
while, with time, customers had the chance to correct any kind of decision preference 
distortion. The default product change was therefore applied in such a way that customers 
had enough time and freedom to align the contract choice with their true preference of 
electricity product. Apart from the argument that the change to renewable energy could 
bring on a distortion of decision preferences, if the default product change was unnoticed by 
the customers, there is also another point to consider: what are the decision preferences for 
the majority of the targeted customer group regarding the promoted product? Do customers 
have strong and readily available decision preferences when it comes to their energy contract 
and its price and sources? It turns out that customers in general seem to have neither a fixed 
preference for a specific electricity product nor the knowledge necessary to differentiate and 
compare products in quality and price (Truffer, Markard, & Wüstenhagen, 2001). With the 
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upswing of renewable electricity, electricity as such has experienced a change in customer 
perception: before, electricity was not grasped as a commodity with different product 
features, but after the introduction of renewable electricity, it increasingly became a 
commodity in which customers need to learn how to distinguish different product features. 
Since this transformation is relatively new, customers commonly do not have fixed 
preferences about their electricity products (Truffer et al., 2001). If left to their own devices, 
customers in liberated electricity markets such as Germany show that differentiating 
electricity products by their qualities is challenging for the average consumer, which leads to 
most consumers differentiating only by price (Roe, Teisl, Rong, & Levy, 2001) or being willingly 
led by a default option (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). In surveys, one can see the public 
support for renewable energy (Farhar, 1999), but this is generally not directly translated by 
customers into renewable energy uptake. Only with a default product change towards 
renewable energy is the stated preference is translated into an actual choice (Pichert 
& Katsikopoulos, 2008). This too, speaks for the weak preference that most consumers hold 
when faced with electricity products. In surveys, respondents can state their preferences 
(arguably biased by the experimenter demand effect, which enforces the social norm of 
environmentally friendly behaviour) without paying a premium for electricity or paying the 
cost in convenience of contacting the electricity supplier and choosing a product. For the 
majority of customers, those preferences seem to be weak enough not to inspire them to 
action on their own, but if faced with a default product change to renewable energy, they 
willingly accept. The default product change to renewable energy bears the cost of contacting 
the electricity supplier and the information costs of finding the right product. Consumers now 
only have to pay a small premium, which they seem not to mind (Farhar, 1999). In conclusion, 
most customers hold no or weak preferences for the product features of electricity contracts. 
When asked hypothetically, most stated a preference for renewable energy (Farhar, 1999). A 
default product change from conventional to renewable energy does not only hold little 
potential to violate the none-to-weak preference spectrum of the consumers, but also aligns 
theoretically stated preferences with a matching default option, altogether giving few 
grounds for accusations of decision preference distortion in the case of applying a renewable 
default option in electricity contract choice. Nonetheless, Chapter 6 – Discussion of Results 
will critically discuss the potential for a distortion of decision preferences in the study at hand. 
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The Rebound Effect 
The rebound effect describes the phenomenon when the surplus use of a product 
nullifies the reduction of energy use reached through the improved energy efficiency of that 
same product (Grubb, 1990). A common example illustrating the rebound effect can be found 
in the area of promoting more energy-efficient electrical appliances in order to reduce energy 
consumption in households. Here, the reduction of energy consumption through appliances 
that are more energy efficient is partly nullified by the overuse of these appliances. The effect 
of saving energy in households through, for example, using energy efficient washing machines 
or automobiles cannot be subtracted as is from the overall household energy consumption. 
With the knowledge of saving energy through a more energy-efficient appliance, individuals 
are likely to increase their use of that appliance. Depending on the energy savings of the 
appliance and the amount of additional use, the rebound effect is calculated. One main 
argument for additional use is that energy efficient appliances make usage cheaper, 
diminishing costs that would have restricted overuse before (Barker, Dagoumas, & Rubin, 
2009). Therefore, the rebound effect is ascribed to the reduction of costs per use through 
heightened energy efficiency (Grubb, 1990). While other unwanted side effects of the default 
product change are likely to have occurred and should be considered in all their facets, the 
rebound effect does not strictly apply in the study at hand. With the default product change 
towards a renewable energy contract, the costs per kWh did increase, as did the costs for all 
the other contracts for that year. In the strict definition of the rebound effect, customers did 
not have the incentive to consume more electricity, since the costs per kWh increased instead 
of decreased.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, in regard to the study at hand, the unwanted side effects of distortion of 
preferences and the rebound effect are considered less likely to occur. Nonetheless, following 
data analyses address both side effects, and conclusions will be addressed in Chapter 6 – 
Discussion of Results. 
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3. Study Background and Data 
In this chapter, the general study background will be described, followed by more specific 
information regarding this specific dataset. In order to understand the study in its setting, it 
is necessary to first understand the development of the renewably sourced electricity market 
in Europe, and then more specifically, in Switzerland. This broad introduction to the topic of 
default product change in renewable energy will provide a background to the more specific 
information on the utility company from which the dataset comes and how the company 
decided to facilitate the default product change to renewable electricity. Once this necessary 
background information is established, the working process of preparing the data for analysis 
will be laid out, concentrating only on the most crucial variables. The specific characteristics 
of the dataset received from the utility company for the purpose of this research will be 
discussed and the handling of these obstacles will be documented.  
3.1 The Renewably Sourced Electricity Market in Switzerland 
During the past three decades, there have been significant changes to the internal electricity 
markets in EU countries and in Switzerland. The political goal of promoting renewable 
electricity that came into play two decades ago can be described as the starting point for 
these changes. From the decree to promote renewable electricity, the renewable electricity 
industry has evolved through the last two decades to the point where renewable electricity 
is holding a steadily growing market share. 
Even though Switzerland is not an EU member country, it is influenced by the political 
climate of its neighbouring countries. Thus, to provide an understanding of the recent 
changes in the renewable electricity market in Switzerland, it will first be described how the 
European renewable electricity market has developed over the last two decades. The 
changing Swiss renewable electricity market will then be documented against the changes in 
the European markets. Similarities, influencing factors, and differences can be more fully 
understood in that framework. The main cornerstone of the renewable electricity market 
changes in the EU was the (full or partial) liberalisation of the internal markets and the 
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obligation of eco-labelling for all renewable electricity products. After this framework of 
understanding is established, the changes in the Swiss renewable electricity market will be 
documented with special regard to Swiss partial liberalisation and eco-labelling initiatives. 
This historical account will be supplemented with the most recent descriptive statistics 
available showing the characteristics of the Swiss renewable electricity market in 2016. At the 
end of this chapter, the overwhelming public preference for renewable electricity will be 
discussed. This public preference for renewable electricity is in direct contrast to the still-low 
rates of uptake of renewable energy. This basic premise – that the public preference for 
renewable energy is strong while actual uptake of renewable energy is comparatively low – 
is a promising one for utility companies changing their default electricity products to 
renewable electricity. 
Brief History of the European Union Renewable Electricity Market 
Europe is at the forefront of renewable energy technologies (‘European Commission’s 
White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). The significant recent changes to the 
renewable electricity market can be dated back to 1997, when the European Commission 
published the White Paper ‘Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy’ and the 
Kyoto climate change conference was held. At the time when the White Paper was written, 
1995, the share of renewable energy in the European Union members’ overall gross inland 
energy consumption was 5.3% (‘European Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy 
Sources,’ 1997). The White Paper was published just before the Kyoto climate change 
conference and made a proposal in line with the conference to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions of EU member countries by 15% by 2010 (the baseline being 1990) (‘European 
Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). As one pivotal step to 
achieve this goal, the promotion of renewable energy was advocated, as it reduces carbon 
intensity and consequently CO2 emissions (‘European Commission’s White Paper on 
Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). Another benefit of promoting renewable energy was the 
possible reduction of EU energy imports, which had reached the 50% mark back in 1997 and 
was showing a strong upward trend (‘European Commission’s White Paper on Renewable 
Energy Sources,’ 1997). It was argued that the promotion of renewable energy could reduce 
the need for energy imports and lessen the geopolitical risk of energy supply insecurities for 
the EU in the future (‘European Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 
1997). 
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The benefits of strong promotion of renewable energy for the EU were not solely 
environmental. Renewable energy also promised new employment opportunities, fuel 
import reductions, increased energy supply security, export development, and local and 
regional development through new renewable power plants (‘European Commission’s White 
Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). An increase from 1995’s 5.3% share of 
renewable energy to 12% of the overall gross inland energy consumption of EU member 
states by 2010 held the potential to save 402 million tonnes of CO2 emissions per year 
(‘European Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). 
In 1997, most of the 5.3% share of renewable energy of the overall gross inland energy 
consumption of EU member states came from large-scale hydropower plants (‘European 
Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). The rise of renewable 
energy uptake has not been translated as such into new renewable energy source 
developments. Rather, it has mostly come from existing renewable energy sources – in most 
cases, large hydropower projects (Bird, Wüstenhagen, & Aabakken, 2002). This lack of new 
renewable energy source development can be ascribed to the renewable electricity market 
being in its beginning stages. More renewable energy source development is expected to 
occur once the market is more established (Bird et al., 2002). 
Since the potential for further large-scale hydropower infrastructure in the EU is mostly 
exhausted, further renewable electricity is expected to come from other renewable energy 
sources, such as small-scale hydropower plants, biomass combustion, wind energy farms, 
solar thermal collectors, photovoltaic devices, geothermal energy, and heat pumps 
(‘European Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). Among EU 
member states, the share of renewable energy in the overall gross inland energy consumption 
in 1995 ranges from a low of 0.7% (United Kingdom) to a high of 25.4% (Sweden) with an 
average of 5.3% for the whole European Union (‘European Commission’s White Paper on 
Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). In the proposal aiming to double the share of renewable 
energy in the European Union from 5.3% to 12%, the highest potential for increase was 
determined to exist in wind power, with an estimated increase potential of 37.5 GW by 2010, 
followed by hydropower, with an estimated increase potential of 13 GW by 2010 (‘European 
Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). 
The White Paper ‘Communication from the Commission - ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE: 
RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY - COM(97)599 final (26/11/1997)’ was commissioned in 
1997, and Directive 2001/77/EC on renewable energy was published in 2001. Both follow the 
same goal of promoting renewable electricity products effectively in the internal markets of 
EU member countries. Directive 2001/77/EC of the European parliament and council stated 
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the need to promote electricity from renewable energy sources in internal electricity markets 
(DIRECTIVE 2001/77/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, 27.10.2001). 
It required the member states to set national targets for renewable energy consumption that 
are consistent with the member states’ national commitments with the Kyoto protocol 
(‘European Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). The White 
Paper formulates policies for the promotion of renewable energy which are needed, since 
the progress of renewable technology alone cannot overcome barriers in the energy market 
that are of a non-technical nature. Those policies aim to promote a stable framework for the 
renewable energy market that encourages investments in the development of renewable 
energy (‘European Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). 
The endeavour of promoting renewable electricity in the EU members’ internal 
markets entails multiple policy changes and action steps, of which market liberalisation and 
eco-labelling are the most crucial in regard to this study. Market liberalisation gives 
consumers the freedom to choose their utility provider, and eco-labelling forces utility 
providers to indicate the composition of energy sources in their electricity products. Together, 
these policies allow consumers to make informed choices regarding electricity products that 
are clearly distinguishable as either renewable electricity products or non-renewable 
electricity products. 
Liberalization of the European Union Electricity Market 
By 2002, liberalization (either full or partial) of internal electricity markets had been 
introduced to most European countries (Bird et al., 2002). Some see liberalization of internal 
electricity markets as force that could push the increase of renewable electricity in the market 
(Truffer et al., 2001). Truffer et al. argue that liberalisation would increase competition 
between utility companies. As a result, consumers would have a broader range of electricity 
products to choose from, and utility providers may differentiate their products not only 
through prices, but also by other characteristics (Truffer et al., 2001). Two common strategies 
of companies attempting to dominate a larger share of the market are either to offer the 
cheapest product (cost leadership) or offer a product that is different from the others at a 
premium price (differentiation) (Truffer et al., 2001). Differentiation for an electricity product 
can be achieved through different means, such as technical features, product offerings for a 
special customer group, additional services, and also environmental characteristics (Truffer 
et al., 2001). Typically, an electricity product that can be clearly differentiated through 
environmental features, for example, can be sold competitively at a low-to-medium premium 
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price (10-30%) in comparison to conventional electricity products (Truffer et al., 2001). 
Renewable electricity products not only enjoy strong public support in EU member states, 
but consumers also indicate their willingness to pay a premium for renewable energy when 
asked (Farhar, 1999). 
With the assumption of a liberated electricity market, Roe et al. show that compulsory 
full disclosure of environmental information helps customers to correctly rank environmental 
attributes of different suppliers. However, once price information is added, it takes attention 
away from environmental information, and customers are less likely to correctly rank 
suppliers on environmental attributes. Thus, when renewable energy providers try to 
compete with less-expensive conventional energy providers, they should focus on strong, 
non-priced product differentiation. Another solution to stay competitive is for utility 
companies to offer both conventional electricity at a low price and renewable electricity at a 
premium price (Roe et al., 2001). 
The liberalisation of internal electricity markets is seen as giving renewable electricity 
products the opportunity to increase their market shares, but also giving rise to a more cost-
competitive electricity market in general. It is the aim of the White Papers’ policies to see to 
it that renewable electricity is not at a disadvantage in newly liberalised electricity markets 
(‘European Commission’s White Paper on Renewable Energy Sources,’ 1997). 
Eco-labelling 
Countries with a high share of hydropower (Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and Austria) 
stand in stark contrast to countries with a high share of coal-based systems (Germany, UK, 
US) which is true in general for the characteristics of their internal electricity markets as well 
as for internal eco-labelling in specific. One of the first eco-labels for renewable electricity 
was introduced in Sweden in 1996 (Truffer et al., 2001). In a country with a high share of 
hydropower, renewable electricity and low CO2 emissions are not unique selling points as 
characteristics of electricity products. However, in a country with a high share of coal-based 
systems, they are (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). Therefore, it is no surprise that Sweden was 
one of the first countries with eco-labels, since their internal electricity market was already 
dominated by renewable electricity – namely, hydropower. This large share of hydropower 
might have been the driving element to motivate eco-labelling, resulting in clearer product 
differentiation and a more justified small premium on prices. Counterintuitively it seems that 
countries with a traditional high share of hydropower are profiting even more of eco-labelling 
than other countries. While coal-based energy countries can sell the novelty of renewable 
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energy, hydropower countries had to re-invent the branding of their renewable energy 
products. For the re-branding and the justification of the premium prize eco-labelling was 
helpful – if not a necessity.  
With the upswing in renewable electricity, electricity has experienced a change in 
customer perception. Before the upswing, electricity was not grasped as a commodity with 
different product features. However, after the introduction of renewable electricity, 
electricity increasingly became a commodity for which the customer has learned to 
distinguish between different product features. Since this transformation is relatively new, 
customers commonly do not have fixed preferences about their electricity products (Truffer 
et al., 2001). The dilemma of the choice between a conventional verses a renewable 
electricity product is that the individual would like to partake in the public good that is 
established through choosing renewable electricity, but at the same time is unwilling to bear 
the extra costs for it. While the benefits are at the group level, the costs are at the individual 
level. These extra costs include not only the premium that one has to pay for renewable 
electricity, but also the transaction costs, which are generally higher for environmentally 
friendly products since the customer has a harder time accurately evaluating the 
environmental characteristics of the product (Truffer et al., 2001). Successful third-party eco-
labelling can minimize the transaction costs for the consumer and thus eliminate one 
hindrance standing between the motivation for choosing renewable electricity and the action 
of choosing renewable electricity (Truffer et al., 2001). A successful eco-label improves the 
customer’s understanding of the product. It is marked by simplicity and accuracy in claims of 
criteria, and is widely recognized in the market (Truffer et al., 2001).  
When utility companies embrace the possibility of labelling their various products for 
environmental attributes, the question arises whether it is ethically correct to differentiate 
between products when the electrons coming from these different products are not 
segregated throughout the delivery to the end consumer (Roe et al., 2001). Even if a 
household has purchased renewable electricity, it will get electricity from different electricity 
sources. Nonetheless, the choice strengthens demand and investment flow for renewable 
electricity (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). 
The main focus of the decree to promote renewable electricity in Directive 2001/77/EC 
is the introduction of a compulsory guarantee of origin for all forms of renewably sourced 
electricity. This guarantee of origin for renewable electricity has been compulsory for EU 
member states since the 27th October 2003. Utilities have to name energy sources as well as 
the date and place of production. The compulsory guarantees of origin were introduced to 
help the producers of renewable electricity to prove that their renewable electricity is 
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genuine (DIRECTIVE 2001/77/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, 
27.10.2001). 
Hence, eco-labelling builds on guarantees of origin and quality marks. It defines 
renewable energy sources as non-fossil renewable energy and applies to following energy 
sources: wind, solar, geothermal, wave, tidal, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage 
treatment plant gas, and biogas (DIRECTIVE 2001/77/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL, 27.10.2001). The credibility of an eco-label lies in that the claimed 
criteria will be guaranteed through quality control procedures that are objective and 
measurable (Truffer et al., 2001). Eco-labels in the area of renewable electricity have the aim 
to be quality marks for environmentally preferable electricity products. However, the claim 
of ‘environmentally preferable electricity product’ can be interpreted using quite different 
criteria. Some eco-labels follow the criterion of the argument that the energy source has to 
be renewable, translating ‘environmentally preferable’ as ‘not using finite resources’ (Truffer 
et al., 2001). Others have as the central criterion that the electricity has to be climate friendly 
and should have low CO2 emissions in comparison to other energy sources (Truffer et al., 
2001). Both criteria (renewable energy and climate friendliness) have in common that they 
strongly simplify their classification scheme to be more overt and simple to understand in 
comparison to the criteria of a life-cycle assessment5 of an energy source (Truffer et al., 2001). 
Additionally, there is also the criterion considering location-specific characteristics of each 
power plant (Truffer et al., 2001). A final additional criterion, which is less concerned with the 
present and more with the future, is judging an electricity product for sustainable 
development concerning its social and economic impacts (Truffer et al., 2001).  
A difficult line to walk is balancing the goal of broad market penetration with high 
credibility of an eco-label. Broad market penetration can be reached when the label’s 
minimum environmental criteria are low enough to be applicable to a majority of the 
renewable electricity products in the market. However, high credibility of an eco-label 
requires a high minimal standard of environmental criteria. Striving for both broad market 
penetration and high credibility of an eco-label at the same time means aiming for competing 
goals that often exclude one another. One solution is to have a multilevel eco-label, such as 
the Swiss Naturemade eco-label (Truffer et al., 2001). The Swiss eco-label Naturemade has 
two levels: Naturemade Basic, applying to a general level of renewably sourced electricity, 
and Naturemade Star, applying to a narrower definition of renewably sourced electricity 
(Association for Environmentally Sound Energy). The benefits of a successfully established 
                                                          
5 For an encompassing overview on the life cycle assessment, refer to Rebitzer et al. (2004). 
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and widely recognized eco-label include not only minimization of transaction costs for 
customers, but also that if customers show a higher willingness to pay for a premium good 
then providers can sell that premium good with minimal communication effort (Truffer et al., 
2001). 
Short History of the Swiss Renewable Electricity Market 
In comparison to EU countries, Switzerland’s renewable electricity market activity was 
rated as moderate in the beginning of the second millennium (Bird et al., 2002). The first 
utility companies promoting renewable electricity started in the mid-1990s, offering first 
solar power and then wind power options. This first generation of renewable electricity 
products was sold in tranches, where customers could buy a specific amount of kWh per year 
of solar and/or wind power to substitute for conventional energy. The second and current 
generations of renewable electricity are full tariffs that rely heavily on hydropower combined 
with small shares of other renewably sourced energy (Bird et al., 2002). These low 
environmental impact hydropower combination tariffs have the benefit of being offered at a 
minimum premium.  
In 2002, the Swiss renewable electricity market was expected to continue to grow, since 
customers indicated an above-average willingness to pay for renewable energy and 
Switzerland has access to certified low-impact hydropower that can be sold more cheaply 
than solar or wind power (Bird et al., 2002). The change in the Swiss renewable electricity 
market was indicated in the change from the first generation of renewable electricity 
products (solar and wind tranches) to the second generation (combination tariffs with a focus 
on hydropower) (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). The Swiss electricity market is dominated by 
nuclear power and hydropower. It is similar to the markets in Norway, Sweden, and Austria 
in the sense that it holds a significant share of hydropower. However, in comparison to 
European countries, the Swiss electricity market is far behind in terms of the development of 
a liberated internal electricity market (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). As of 2019, the Swiss 
electricity market has only been liberalized for commercial business consumers that consume 
more than 100,000 kWh per year. 
Figure 14 shows the different stages of development for a green product in a market. 
The model of ‘Diffusion of Green Products over time among Customers and Products’ by 
Wüstenhagen et al. (2003) is an adaptation of the original model ‘Diffusion of Innovation’ 
which was coined by Everett Rogers (Rogers, 2003). Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the Swiss market for renewable electricity had its introduction phase, in which its few custo- 
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Figure 14. Diffusion of Green Products Over Time Among Customers and Products 
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2003) 
 
 
mers consisted of innovators. These innovators’ environmental awareness and general 
interest in renewable energy motivated them to engage in the effort of purchasing renewable 
energy products (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). While the customers at this market stage are 
called innovators, the suppliers are called ‘Davids’ – referring to smaller companies boldly 
introducing the new green products into the market (see Figure 14). The next market stage 
was the early growth stage in the late 1990s, with the market then engaging the wider 
population of environmentally-minded consumers and innovative business customers. In this 
market stage of early growth, the customers are labelled early adopters and the suppliers 
‘Pioneer Goliaths’. Pioneer Goliaths refer to bigger companies that are at this point 
comfortable with also getting into the market with new green products (see Figure 14). The 
take-off phase occurred in the early 2000s. It was marked by an increasing number of business 
customers and, more importantly, the introduction of competitive renewable electricity 
products sourced with mainly hydropower as well as the introduction of eco-labelling and 
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certification schemes (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). In the take-off market stage, the customers 
are called the early majority and the suppliers as Davids, Goliaths, and new entrants. At this 
market stage, small as well as bigger companies offer the new green product with the 
additional competition of new entrant companies. In this phase, the shift from the first 
generation of renewable electricity products to the second generation took place. This shift 
was not made without difficulty, since the former renewable electricity market, which had 
only entailed new renewable energy sources, now also included the existing hydropower that 
had historically made up a major share of the electricity market (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). 
Even though hydropower is CO2-free and highly energy-efficient, it has the downside of 
negatively affecting the aquatic ecosystem and surrounding landscape. Reinterpreting 
hydropower as a renewable electricity source was only accomplished through the 
introduction of the Swiss eco-labels Naturemade Basic and Naturemade Star (Wüstenhagen 
et al., 2003). The public image of hydropower was highly controversial. In 2003, 80% of the 
potential for hydropower had already been used in Switzerland. Citizens and 
environmentalists have a long history of opposing further exploitation, citing the downsides 
of hydropower plants (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). 
Eco-labelling in Switzerland 
While only renewable electricity products can apply for eco-labels, all electricity 
products in Switzerland have to provide a proof of origin. Proofs of origin identify the 
electricity produced and fed into the electricity network through the institute of Swissgrid. 
Proof of origin has been obligatory since January 1st, 2013 in Switzerland for electricity 
production sites with a power output of more than 30 kVA (kilovolt-amperes). Proofs of origin 
are traded internationally as well as in Switzerland and are voided from the databank once 
they reach the end customer. Proofs of origin are not, in the strict sense, quality marks like 
eco-labels (Verein für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018). 
In contrast to proof of origin, eco-labels also have to provide information on the 
composition of energy sources for each product. Switzerland has the following eco-labels: 
Naturemade Basic, Naturemade Star, TÜV-EE01, and TÜV-EE02. Naturemade Basic and 
Naturemade Star will be introduced further below, since they mark the renewable electricity 
products in this study. 
The Swiss Naturemade eco-label has two levels – Naturemade Basic and Naturemade 
Star – and uses as its environmental standard renewable energy sources and more narrowly 
qualified renewable energy sources respectively. Naturemade’s assessment consists of a list 
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of eligible sources based on life-cycle assessment for the Naturemade Basic label and 
additional local criteria for the Naturemade Star label. The Naturemade labels in principle 
allow for capacity enlargement and improvement for existing hydropower plants. It is 
supported by environmental groups, consumer organizations, renewable energy source 
support associations and utility companies alike (Truffer et al., 2001). Naturemade’s first 
certification was made in the year 2000 (Truffer et al., 2001). In comparison to other eco-
labels available in European countries, the Naturemade labels are well-assessed. They use 
the more encompassing criteria of life-cycle assessment and are supported by all stakeholder 
groups, leading to a broad acceptance of the label in all stakeholder groups (Truffer et al., 
2001). Eco-labels are a voluntary system that aims to guarantee quality standards. The quality 
marks follow clearly measurable criteria for electricity products, are given out by an 
independent third party, and aim to differentiate renewable electricity products from 
conventional electricity products. The system of certification in Switzerland follows the 
guidelines of ISO 14001, calculating the ecological performance of an electricity product for 
its entire lifecycle and keeping an account of the amount of produced and sold electricity in 
order to avoid a surplus of demand. The quality marks try to create transparency, and with 
that, they increase the credibility of the marked electricity products for the customer (Verein 
für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018). Not all electricity products carry 
quality marks in Switzerland. As time passes, the criteria for the quality marks for renewable 
electricity also change. In addition to considering the effects on the climate, it is now be 
becoming increasingly popular to take into account local effects, such as the protection of 
biodiversity in the countryside and in the water of hydropower plants, for example (Verein 
für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018). The eco-label Naturemade Star 
(categorized in this study as ‘renewable-plus’) accounts for this new focus on local biodiversity 
by investing some percentage of its products’ price in biodiversity funds. 
Eco-labelling makes energy sources in electricity products transparent, and through 
that, enables the consumer to make more informed choices when choosing an electricity 
product. It minimizes the transaction costs of researching and comparing the environmental 
characteristics of different electricity products and strengthens the credibility of marked 
renewably sourced electricity products. 
Descriptive Results of Swiss Renewable Electricity Market  
A descriptive account of the renewably sourced electricity market in Switzerland can 
be given through the annual survey for Swiss utility companies by the governmental 
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department of energy Bundesamt für Energie (BFE), which is conducted by the Association 
for Environmentally Sound Electricity (Verein für umweltgerechte Energie) (VUE) (Verein für 
umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018). The results presented below are the 
most fitting as they report from the year before and after the default product change. They 
describe the Swiss internal renewable electricity market in 2016 in comparison to 2015. This 
survey covers data on 299 Swiss utility companies offering renewable energy products. These 
companies account for 75% of the electricity sales in Switzerland. The results show the share 
of renewable electricity sales that are offered as either single-sourced products or 
combination-sourced products, and are restricted to companies that offer renewable as well 
as conventional electricity products. Customers were therefore not forced into a renewable 
electricity contract, but rather had a choice between different contracts, including those 
containing conventional electricity sources (Verein für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, 
January 2018). 
In 2003, Wüstenhagen et al. assumed that the mature renewable electricity market 
would occupy a share of 20-30% of the total electricity market when the renewable electricity 
market would reach maturity at an uncertain date. This could be accomplished if utility 
providers offer renewable electricity products at a low premium that have clear added 
environmental value (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). According to the survey in 2016, 24% of the 
overall electricity usage in Switzerland is renewably sourced, with 14,183 GWh/a (gigawatt 
hours/year) of renewable electricity sold in 2016. This demonstrates an increase in renewable 
electricity consumption of 2,885 GWh/a in comparison to 2015 (Verein für umweltgerechte 
Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018). About one third of all household customers of the utility 
companies in the survey choose (directly or indirectly) a renewable electricity tariff, which 
added up to 1,621,166 renewable contract choices in Switzerland. This is an increase of 
293,239 contracts compared to the previous year (Verein für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, 
Zürich, January 2018). For business customers, 14-18% choose a renewable electricity tariff. 
This means that more than half of electricity consumption (53%) was renewably sourced 
(Verein für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018). 
Table 2 shows the renewable electricity products sold in Switzerland in 2016 by those 
utility providers that partook in the latest BFE survey, which was published in 2018. It 
differentiates between mono-sourced products (solar, wind, water, and biomass) and 
combination-sourced products (referred to as ‘mixed’). For each mono-sourced product, the 
survey further differentiates between those products labelled with the eco-label Naturemade 
Star and those without the label.  
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Table 2. Renewable Electricity Products Sold in the Year 2016 in Switzerland (Verein 
für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018)a 
 Sold in 2016 Product orders 
GWh/a Share in % Number Share in % 
Solar Naturemade Star 51  30,518  
Solar other 2  1,297  
Solar total 53 0.4% 31,815 2.0% 
Wind: Naturemade Star 4  571  
Wind: other <0.1  11  
Wind: total 4 <0.1% 582 <0.1% 
Water: Naturemade Star 288  6,505  
Water: other 5,642  567,335  
Water: total 5,930 41.8% 573,840 35.4% 
Biomass Naturemade Star 0  0  
Biomass other 5  52  
Biomass total 5 <0.1% 52 <0.1% 
Mixed Naturemade Star 718  109,528  
Mixed Naturemade Basic 5,641  718,321  
Mixed other 1,831  187,028  
Mixed total 8,191 57.7% 1,014,877 62.6% 
TOTAL 14,183 100% 1,621,166 100% 
a The data in the analysis is based on utility contracts and not on customer numbers. The customer 
numbers are always lower than the numbers of utility contracts because some 
households and business customers have multiple utility contracts. It is estimated that 
for each customer, the number of contracts is approximately 1.333. Naturemade Basic 
products are listed as mixed products only (Verein für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, 
Zürich, January 2018). 
For the combination-sourced products, it differentiates between products with the eco-labels 
Naturemade Basic and Naturemade Star and those without either label. To get an overview 
of the renewable electricity market one can look into the electricity amount supplied from 
renewable energies in kWh on the one hand and in contract choice on the other hand. The 
market share of solar energy was 53 GWh/a, which amounted to 0.4% of the overall 
renewable energy consumption in 2016. The market share of wind energy was 4 GWh/a, 
which corresponded to <0.1% of the overall renewable energy consumption in 2016. The 
market share of water energy was 5,930 GWh/a, which accounted for 41.8% of the overall 
renewable energy consumption in 2016. The market share of biomass energy was 5 GWh/a, 
which amounted to <0.1% of the overall renewable energy consumption in 2016. The market 
share of mixed energy was 8,191 GWh/a, which was 57.7% of the overall renewable energy 
consumption in 2016. Hydropower held the greatest market share among the single-sourced 
energy products, but came in second to the combination-sourced products. Solar, wind, and 
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biomass energy played only minor roles in the renewable electricity market, with solar energy 
having the highest market share of the three. 
Overall, according to the survey, 1,621,166 contract choices could be categorized as 
renewable electricity products in 2016. The market share of contract choices for solar energy 
was 31,815 GWh/a, which accounted for 2% of the overall renewable contract choices in 
2016. The market share of contract choices for wind energy was 582 GWh/a, which amounted 
to <0.1% of the overall renewable contract choices in 2016. The market share of contract 
choices for water energy was 573,840 GWh/a, which accounted for 35.4% of the overall 
renewable contract choices in 2016. The market share of contract choices for biomasses 
energy was 52 GWh/a, which was <0.1% of the overall renewable contract choices in 2016. 
The market share of contract choices for mixed energy was 1,014,877 GWh/a, which was 
62.6% of the overall renewable energy contract choices in 2016. The order of the energy 
sources according to their market shares was reflected in the number of choices made for 
each product. 
The market share of Naturemade Basic-certified renewable electricity out of the overall 
renewable electricity consumption was 47.3% (6.7 TWh/a)6, which was an increase compared 
to its share of 37.7% (4.3 TWh/a) in 2015 (Verein für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, 
January 2018). It has been argued that the increase in the Naturemade Basic market share 
was due to more utility companies changing their default products to renewably sourced 
electricity products that were Naturemade Basic certified. The market share of Naturemade 
Star-certified renewable electricity out of the overall renewable electricity consumption was 
7.5% (1061 GWh/a), which was a small decrease from its share of 8.8% (996 GWh/a) in 2015 
(Verein für umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018). Nonetheless, if one were to 
calculate not only the solo tariffs with Naturemade Star certifications but also the amount of 
electricity in combination tariffs that are marked Naturemade Star, the total would be 1,459 
GWh/a, which is an increase from 1,158 GWh/a in 2015 (Verein für umweltgerechte Energie 
VUE, Zürich, January 2018). 
The dominant renewable electricity source in Switzerland was still hydropower. Single-
sourced hydropower generated 5,930 GWh/a and the mixed products, which mostly rely on 
hydropower, generated 8,191 GWh/a. Across these products, hydropower accounted for 
99.5% of renewable electricity sold in 2016. The overall trend of renewably sourced electricity 
products sold is rising from 2015 to 2016. 
                                                          
6 TWh/a is the electrical unit terawatt hour per year. 
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The default electricity products of the 53 utility providers in Switzerland named in 
Wikipedia7 show that the dominance of hydropower is also found in hydropower being the 
overwhelming default electricity product among those utility providers (see the table of 
utility providers and default settings in Appendix 1: Utility Companies in Switzerland and their 
Default Settings as of 12th July 2017). 
Preferences and Motivations for Choosing Renewable Electricity 
According to the most recently available descriptive data, the use of renewable 
electricity is on the rise in Switzerland. However, the uptake of renewable electricity is still 
remarkably lower than the stated preference for it. The question of what kind of internal and 
external variables influence the willingness to choose a premium renewable electricity tariff 
combines economic and psychological perspectives. The economic perspective looks at the 
external factors that could influence the participation uptake, such as consumers’ incomes, 
prices for the tariffs, and the socio-economic characteristics of the consumers. The 
psychological perspective focuses on internal factors, which can be described as the 
consumers’ values, beliefs, and attitudes (Clark, Kotchen, & Moore, 2003). While economists 
try to promote pro-environmental behaviour with rewards, punishments, and regulations, 
psychologists prefer using tools such as increasing awareness, education, guilt, and 
persuasion (Clark et al., 2003). Renewable energy can be understood as a public good that 
contains not only environmental benefits but also the possibilities of minimizing electricity 
costs in the long run through research and development and minimizing the possibility of fuel 
supply interruption (Clark et al., 2003). Results on who is most likely to take up a premium 
renewable electricity tariff show that smaller households, higher incomes, and pro-
environmental and altruistic attitudes are correlated with renewable energy uptake (Clark et 
al., 2003). When looking into the motivations of customers choosing premium renewable 
electricity tariffs over cheaper conventional electricity tariffs, the strongest motivating factors 
are bio-centric motives, followed by altruistic and egoistic motives (Clark et al., 2003). For the 
household customer, the motivation to choose renewable electricity over conventional 
electricity comes mainly from a desire to improve his or her own environmental track record 
and engage in the impure altruism of the warm-glow effect8 (Truffer et al., 2001). In the same 
way, for business customers, the motivation to choose renewable electricity comes mainly 
from a desire to improve their environmental image (Truffer et al., 2001). Pichert 
                                                          
7 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kategorie:Elektrizit%C3%A4tsversorger_(Schweiz), last checked 10th 
July 2017. 
8 For the origin of the warm glow effect, refer to Andreoni (1989). 
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and Katsikopoulos show that consumers tend to use the kind of electricity product that is 
offered to them as the default product by their utility company (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 
2008). Therefore, changing the default from conventional energy to renewable energy can 
promote pro-environmental behaviour and translate public support of renewable energy 
(Farhar, 1999) into renewable energy uptake (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). 
Over the past 10 years, most Swiss utility companies have changed their sales tactics 
toward offering consumers electricity products with different qualities from which they can 
choose actively. Now, an increasing number of the Swiss utility companies offer a renewable 
product as their default product. The first Swiss utility company introducing a renewable 
default product was Services Industriels de Genève (SIG) in 2003. According to the 2016 
survey, at least 20 of the Swiss utility companies have decided on a default product change 
from conventional electricity to a fully renewably sourced electricity product (Verein für 
umweltgerechte Energie VUE, Zürich, January 2018). 
In conclusion, motivations for renewable electricity uptake vary, and even though the 
stated preferences for renewable electricity are strong, there is only low renewable electricity 
uptake. The gap between the preference and actual choice of renewable electricity can be 
reduced by the introduction of renewably sourced default products (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 
2008). 
Conclusion 
The short history given for the past two decades of the European electricity market 
reveals significant changes that occurred when the promotion of renewable electricity was 
set into force. The liberalization of internal electricity markets as well as the eco-labelling of 
renewable electricity products all empowered consumers to make informed choices between 
renewably and conventionally sourced electricity products. That fact that the Swiss electricity 
market is still not fully liberalized can also be seen as an advantage in the sense that it shields 
utility providers from competitors and gives them the chance to experiment with new 
products such as renewably sourced products (Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). The high share of 
24% renewably sourced electricity sold in Switzerland can be ascribed to the comparatively 
high willingness of customers to pay for renewable electricity and the significant share of 
hydropower in the electricity market, which opens up the possibility of offering low premium 
renewable energy products as well as high premium renewable energy products 
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). With a relatively large share of renewable electricity product 
sales that is still growing, it appears that renewable electricity products (at least those in the 
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low premium sector) are competitive with cheaper conventionally sourced electricity 
products. The demand for renewable electricity is currently fulfilled mainly by hydropower 
offered at a low premium price, which seems well positioned and differentiated from other 
conventionally sourced products in the overall market. Further growth of the renewable 
electricity market share could come from more diversified renewable energy sources and the 
additional development of small-scale hydropower plants. 
3.2 Description of the Utility Company 
The data from the default experiment stems from a Swiss utility company and covers a 
timeframe of four years, ranging from 2013 to 2016. In this quasi-experimental natural field 
experiment, the utility company changed their default electricity product from a 
conventionally sourced electricity product to a renewably sourced electricity product. The 
utility company is a mono energy supplier based in Switzerland, which focuses on electricity 
solely. It supplies electricity to households, businesses, and the public sector. Since the utility 
company opted to remain anonymous, the details given to describe the utility company are 
minimized to the essentials. 
Genesis and History of the Cooperation with the Utility Company 
This project9, along with a number of other projects, was submitted for funding at the 
Swiss National Science Foundation. The umbrella project under which funding was applied 
for was titled ‘Reducing Energy Consumption and Promoting Green Electricity: The Role of 
Soft Incentives’. This research program contained, along with this project, one more project 
on the topic of defaults, two symbolic reward projects, and a national environmental survey. 
The Swiss National Science Foundation agreed to fund the entire research program under the 
national research program titled ‘NRP71 Managing Energy Consumption’.10 
After funding was cleared, the Swiss energy supplier agreed to share the anonymised 
data from its default product change. Data access was given through the data service 
company that processed all the data for the utility supplier. In cooperation with the utility 
company, research questions were formed. The research interests on both sides concentrated 
                                                          
9 Contact with the Swiss energy supplier was made through Professor Ulf Liebe, who was at the time 
a professor of sustainable social development in the sociology department at the University of 
Berne. Mutual cooperation between the University of Berne and the Swiss utility provider was 
agreed upon and funding was applied for. 
10 For more information, refer to http://www.snf.ch/en/researchinFocus/nrp/nrp-71-managing-
energy-consumption/Pages/default.aspx (last checked on 18.07.2018). 
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on the heterogeneity of the default effect among utility customers. The utility company was 
interested in finding out underlying similarities of customers who accepted the new default 
setting in comparison to customers who did not accept the new default setting. The topic of 
exploring the heterogeneity of the default effect was especially promising since the customer 
pool of the utility company contained not only household but also commercial business 
customers. As defined by the utility company, household customers are metering points with 
a household type utility contract. Most have a yearly utility usage of less than 20,000 kWh. 
Business or commercial customers are metering points with a commercial type utility 
contract. Most have a yearly utility usage of more than 8,000 kWh and less than 20,000 kWh. 
The business customers brought more diversity to the range of utility use and 
geography of customers. The range of utility use was extended largely due to the fact that 
businesses in general have higher utility usages than household customers. The diversity of 
geographic locations occurred because customers that have a utility use higher than 100,000 
kWh per year are not restricted to the regulated market but can freely choose their utility 
provider from anywhere in Switzerland. Therefore, many of the utility company’s bigger 
business customers had geographic locations outside of the utility company’s regulated 
trading area. This had the effect of bringing more geographic diversity to the dataset. 
In cooperation with the data service company, key variables for answering the research 
question were identified. The data service company extracted the requested key variables 
from its three data sources for the timeframe in question and supplied the raw data. The first 
delivery of raw data was on June 28th 2017. At this time point, the variable utility usage for 
2016 was only available as partly simulated data.11 The tariff choices of the customers after 
the default product change were only available for the time point January 1st, 2016, which 
was the day of the default product change. Therefore, a second data delivery was planned for 
the real data on the utility use in 2016 of all metering points and the tariff choices, which was 
collected at a later point in 2016. The data service company extracted the necessary variables 
from the three different databases that the utility company used for their everyday business 
activities. With the feedback of the data service company, the data was prepared. There are 
specific conditions that apply to data from utility companies. One of these is that the 
databases from the utility company had as the dominator of all data the metering points and 
not the customer numbers. A metering point is fixed to each apartment/house and is a unique 
value, whereas a customer number could change houses (if the customer moved but stayed 
                                                          
11 For clarification and details on the specifics of utility use data, refer to Section 4.1.1. - Descriptive 
Statistics for Utility Use. 
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in the supplier area) or apply to multiple apartments/houses (if the customer had more than 
one apartment/house). Having the metering point as the denominator is a typical occurrence 
when dealing with data in this research area. 
During the process of cleaning and verifying the raw data from the first delivery, many 
lessons were learned and incorporated into processing the raw data from the second delivery, 
which arrived on April 30th, 2018. There was a major discrepancy in expectations of data 
quality between the utility company and the research team. While the utility company is used 
to working with forecasted and (partly) simulated data, in science, simulated data is often 
seen as inferior to real data. Another discrepancy was that the utility company, in its day-to-
day business, did not need information on which customer held which differently sourced 
tariff choice before 2016. However, the research team needed that information in order to 
compare customer choices before and after the treatment. A different report was imported 
into the data that showed the tariff choices of customers in greater detail pre 2016.12 The 
second raw dataset held all of the variables available that were related to answering the 
research questions in as much detail as possible. All analyses were re-calculated using the 
second dataset. The whole process of working on the first dataset led to improved data 
quality and ensured the data quality of the second dataset, which held all available important 
variables and was of the desired quality. 
A Quasi-Experimental Natural Field Study 
An ideal experiment involves measurements before and after an intervention and a 
random distribution of participants into intervention and control groups. While in this study 
there were measurements before and after the intervention, there was no random 
distribution of participants into intervention and control groups. Often, it is not possible to 
randomly distribute participants into intervention and control groups, and there might not 
even be a control group at all. In such cases, direct measurement before and after the 
intervention can help to minimise some of the hidden heterogeneity in the participants 
(Campbell & Stanley, 2011). The default setting was changed by the utility company for all of 
the customers in the regulated market and remained unchanged for all of the customers in 
the free market. Experimental designs without the randomisation of participants to 
treatment and control groups, but with precautionary measures to control distortion through 
heterogeneity in samples, are described as quasi-experimental designs (Diekmann, 2004, 
                                                          
12 For more information on the re-coding of the tariff choices before 2016, refer to Section 3.4.2 – 
Re-coding. 
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p. 356). The current experiment has a quasi-experimental design, since customers of the 
utility company were not randomized to the treatments of the default product change and 
control group. Customers were not randomly part of either market type – regulated or free – 
but fulfilled certain criteria that sorted them into either market type. The distribution of 
customers receiving the default product change versus not receiving it was along the free 
versus regulated market structure that is the rule in Switzerland. The customers in the 
regulated market received the new default product, which was sourced renewably, and the 
customers in the free market kept their old contracts and stayed with the conventionally 
sourced energy default product. Only customers with a yearly utility usage of above 100,000 
kWh and who had applied to be in the free market were in the free market group, which did 
not receive the default switch of the utility company. All other customers were in the 
regulated market. There was a minor subgroup of regulated market customers who received 
a renewable-plus default product which is a 100% renewable electricity product with 
premium qualities and price.13 
Another crucial identification factor of field studies is that participants are not aware 
of the intervention or that a specific behaviour is being studied. The great advantage of the 
field experiment lies in its covertness in documenting real-life behaviour and decisions 
untainted by the common experimenter demand effect. When covert interventions on 
human subjects are administered, ethical concerns arise, which should be addressed 
appropriately (Diekmann, 2004, pp. 87–89). If the intervention is more of a natural kind, as it 
is in the case of this study, ethical concerns are held to be minimal. The utility company 
decided on the treatment and how the customers were assigned to the different treatment 
groups with no intervention from the outside. The study had a natural setting in which the 
researchers observe the quasi-experiment but do not intervene in the experimental setup. In 
this sense, this study offered behavioural-based data in a natural setting without the 
customers noticing that their choices were being studied.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the data received from the utility company could be categorized as a 
quasi-experimental natural field study. The benefits of the natural field study were the 
opportunity to study behaviour in a natural setting without fear of the behaviour being biased 
by the experimenter demand effect. The downside of this study design is that customers were 
                                                          
13For a description of this subgroup, refer to Section 3.3 – Implementation of the Default Product 
Change, and for an analysis of this subgroup, refer to Section 4.2.5 – Subsample Analysis: 
Renewable-plus Default. 
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not randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, but assigned according to customer 
characteristics. This missing randomization can be contained to some degree by the 
comparison of data before and after the treatment. All in all, the dataset received from the 
utility company offered great potential to explore the research question about heterogeneity 
in the default effect. It covered a diverse range of customers and their characteristics and 
thus held the potential to illustrate which customer traits responded best to the default 
product change. 
3.3 Implementation of the Default Product Change 
This chapter is dedicated to covering all relevant background information on the facilitation 
of this default product change. Starting with the chronological sequence of the default 
product change, the timeline is laid out over which customers were informed about the 
change and were able to choose to stay with the new default or opt out of the new default. 
The form letters that were used to inform customers about the default product change are 
the private propriety of the utility company and were not cleared to be printed in this work. 
Nonetheless, the original letters were accessed and are paraphrased and analysed in this 
chapter. Not only is the introduction of the default product change from conventional to 
renewable electricity of interest, but also the comparison of the same to the default product 
change from conventional to renewable-plus electricity. The differences in customer 
treatment while facilitating the default product change(s) will be explained with the help of 
a detailed description of which customer type was chosen to receive the renewable default 
and which to receive the renewable-plus default. At the end of this chapter, the choice 
architecture of the default product change will be shown in prices. For this overview, the 
prices of the most common energy product for each energy option will be shown and 
compared for time points before the renewable default introduction and after.  
Chronological Sequence of the Default Product Change 
In August 2015, the first communication of the default product change was sent out to 
all of the customers in the regulated market, as it is custom, to inform customers about price 
changes each August for the following year. The announcement of price changes, different 
product arrangements, and the default product change to renewable energy was done in 
writing. The households and business customers received letters with all the relevant 
information. The letter included a customer service phone number and a personalised code 
to access an online portal which was created for facilitating the default product change. There 
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was no mail-in response card, and customers could either call the electricity company on a 
local phone number or use the personalised code to access the online portal where they then 
could change to a price upgrade (renewable-plus tariff, the premium renewable product) or 
downgrade (conventional tariff). Actually, most customers who logged into the portal chose 
the renewable tariff. It seems like those customers did not clearly understand that if they 
wanted to keep the default tariff (renewable tariff) they did not have to log into the portal. 
The online portal was open from the end of August to the end of November 2015. The default 
product change and switch to the new product arrangements and pricing went into effect on 
January 1st, 2016. From that date, the electricity company gave a grace period of six months 
during which customers were allowed to switch tariffs, affecting their utility bills back until 
January 1st, 2016. 
Differences in Customer Treatment while Facilitating the Default Product Change 
The utility company’s customers in the regulated market – that is, the electricity market 
with customers using up to 100,000 kWh per year – received the renewable energy default 
on January 1st, 2016. The non-regulated/free market – that is, the electricity market with 
customers using more than 100,000 kWh per year – kept the old contracts from before. 
For customers in the regulated market, there was an exception rule where customers 
received a renewable-plus energy default, the premium renewable product, instead of the 
renewable energy default. This affected customers who paid more than 2.5 Rappen/kWh on 
premium surcharges on average (not including the basic tariff). They would either have had 
to have chosen the tariffs Energy Nature or Energy Nature Star in the past or they would have 
had to pay 2.5 Rappen/kWh more than the basic tariff, which could only been archived 
through choosing eco-tranches of wind energy certified Naturemade Star and/or solar energy 
certified Naturemade Star in the past. At first glance, it seems like this special customer group 
only migrated from one premium renewable electricity product to another premium 
renewable electricity product. At closer look, they underwent the massive default product 
change from a decision-setting where conventional electricity was the default product to a 
new setting where the renewable-plus, the premium renewable electricity product, was their 
new default product.  
The saturation of the conventional default setting on August 31st, 2015 was zero for 
business and household customers, as the database of this overview excludes the free market 
customers who stayed on the old default setting (see Table 3). The majority of the customers 
in the regulated market received the renewable default, and only a small minority received 
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the renewable-plus default setting, the premium renewable electricity product. Altogether, 
this exception rule of the renewable-plus default affected 6,452 meter points, as can be seen 
in the descriptive statistics of the variable tariff choice from August 31st, 2015 that show the 
initial default setting for each metering point.  
Table 3. Overview of the Saturation of the Default Setting on 31.08.2015 
Default Setting 
Whole Dataset 
(n= 237,333) 
Household Dataset  
(n= 229,658) 
Business Dataset 
(n= 7,675) 
Conventional 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Renewable 230,881 (97.3%) 223,248 (97.2%) 7,633 (99.5%) 
Renewable-plus 6,452 (2.7%) 6,410 (2.8%) 42 (0.5%) 
TOTAL 237,333 (100%) 229,658 (100%) 7,675 (100%) 
 
The customer letters announcing the default product change were sent out in August 2015. 
From that point, the customers were able to reject the new default setting until May 2016. 
The percent of metering points affected by the main default switch of conventional energy to 
renewable energy was 97.3% for the whole dataset, 97.2% for the household customer 
dataset, and 99.5% for the business customer dataset. The percent of metering points 
affected by the minor default switch from conventional energy to renewable-plus energy was 
2.7% for the whole dataset, 2.8% for the household customer dataset, and 0.5% for the 
business customer dataset. This shows that the default switch to the renewable electricity 
product affected the overwhelming majority of the customers in the regulated market. The 
switch to the renewable-plus default occurred only in rare cases of customer characteristics 
which makes for a small and biased sample.14  
Form Letters of Renewable and Renewable-plus Default for the Household Customers 
The form letters for business customers and household customers in the regulated 
market were congruent. Here, the form letters for the majority of customers who identify as 
being household customers in the regulated market will be documented and analysed. Since 
the letters for the business and household customers were congruent, the letters for the 
                                                          
14 For a description of this subgroup, refer to Section 3.3 – Facilitation of the Default product change, 
and for an analysis of this subgroup, refer to Section 4.2.5 – Subsample Analysis Renewable-plus 
Default. 
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household customers will represent the letters sent to both customer groups and the letters 
for the business customers will not be analysed separately. The form letters regarding the 
renewable default and the renewable-plus default were congruent in most parts, apart from 
the obvious difference that they announce either the change from a conventional default to 
a renewable default or from a conventional default to a renewable-plus default. 
The letters announcing the default product change were send out to customers in the 
regulated market during August 2015. The letter head was titled ‘New Energy Products and 
Prices from 2016 On’. The first paragraph gave an explanation of the reason for changing the 
structure of the energy products and the prices. Accordingly, the utility company wants to 
focus on renewable energy in the future and thus is introducing the renewable energy 
product as a default for all clients. This paragraph is the same in both letters. The letter for 
the renewable-plus default mentions not the renewable default but the renewable-plus 
default. 
The second paragraph of the letter announced a 9% price increase overall and gave an 
explanation for the price increase. It stated that the overall price of electricity is made up of 
three components: the price for the energy, the price for network usage, and the price of 
government-ordered fees concerning the energy usage. The 9% price increase was due to the 
increased price of network usage. The letter stressed, both in text and in a figure, that this 
price increase was not due to changing the default product and that the price for energy was 
remaining the same. This paragraph was also congruent in both letters. At this point in the 
letter it would have been fitting to inform the customer of the option to combat the 9% price 
increase by downgrading to the conventionally sourced energy product. It seems like this 
information was purposefully not offered at that point in the letter and in general not offered 
prominently in the whole of the letter. Even though the overall 9% price increase was said to 
be not due to the utility company changing the default from the conventional to the 
renewable electricity product, staying with the old conventional default would have 
dampened the price increase. 
The third paragraph introduced the newly restructured energy products: Renewable-
plus, Renewable, and Conventional. The first part of the paragraph listed all three energy 
products and explained that Renewable-plus is made up of renewable energy that is sourced 
from solar and hydropower. Renewable was described as renewable energy mostly sourced 
from hydropower, and Conventional is sourced mostly from nuclear power. All of the energy 
products are produced mainly in Switzerland. 
For the customers receiving the renewable-plus default, there was an additional 
paragraph at this point in the letter explaining to the customer why the renewable-plus 
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product was chosen as the default product for this customer. It explained that since the 
customer had chosen renewable energy products in the past, it would be most suitable for 
them to migrate to the renewable-plus product at this point. It was stressed that this 
migration will not involve higher costs for the customer. But again, the information that a 
downgrade to the renewable or conventional products would save the customer some costs 
was not given. 
The next paragraph was again the same for both default groups and explained the web 
portal where customers can log in with the help of a customer number and a code. In the 
web portal, customers could find a personalized calculation of their utility bill from January 
1st, 2016 on. Customers are informed that they could change their energy product on this 
web portal. If customers did not change their choice before November 30th, 2015, they would 
receive the new default product (respectively, the renewable or renewable-plus products). 
The last paragraph before the signatures of the utilities companies’ chief of sale and 
chief of retail and marketing communication thanked customers for their trust in the utility 
company and welcomed customers into the ‘renewable future’. 
A postscript at the end of the letter added information on the monthly utility costs for 
an average four-room household with a yearly utility usage of 4,500 kWh for all three energy 
products. With the renewable-plus product, this household would pay approximately 105 
CHF per month. With the renewable product, they would pay approximately 95 CHF per 
month, and with the conventional, approximately 91 CHF per month. Therefore, at the end 
of the letter, the information about price differences for the different products was revealed 
along with the information that the choice of the conventional product would save the 
customer money and possibly combat to a large extent the overall price increase. It seems 
intentional that this information was given in the postscript of the letter, where attention of 
the reader is supposedly the lowest. The choice to do so could be seen as a deceptive 
manoeuvre by the utility company, as judged from the customer’s perspective. The form 
letters announced a price increase of 9% due to an increased price for network usage and 
increased government-ordered fees concerning energy usage. A logical way to combat that 
price increase would have been to keep the conventional default in place, but the utility 
company changed their default to the renewable electricity package, stressing that this 
default product change was not the reason for the price increase. As a customer, one might 
doubt that one can change from a conventional electricity product to a fully renewable 
electricity product without taking a price increase into account. Apart from this confusion, 
the utility company purposefully put the information that there is a cheaper electricity 
product than the default assigned in the postscript on the second page of the letter. Those 
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two points – the statement that the price increase had nothing to do with the default product 
change and the semi-hidden information that there is a cheaper alternative to the default 
product – might have aroused some negative responses on the customer side. In the 
literature, the acceptance of nudges is quite high when respondents feel that they are for a 
good cause, like the protection of the environment (Reisch & Sunstein, 2016; Sunstein, 2015). 
Nonetheless, it is an open secret that utility companies are motivated to change their default 
product to a renewable product not only for environmental reasons, but also for monetary 
gain. The high acceptance of the default product change15 may be an indicator that most 
customers were either unaware of the manipulative nature of the form letter or that their 
negative feelings were dampened by the promoted upfront cause of the default product 
change, which was environmental protection. This would mean that the customers were most 
likely unaware of the monetary gain in changing to a renewable default product for the utility 
company. Especially the argument given in the form letter that the default product change 
did not add to the price increase might have added to the illusion that both electricity 
products – the conventional as well as the renewable – bring the same return on investment 
for the utility company, even though sales margins are likely more profitable for the 
renewable product. 
Choice Architecture of the Default Product Change in Prices 
This price overview is a simplification of the tariff options in which the tariff option that 
had the most customers highlighted for each year (conventional/renewable/renewable-plus) 
and average prices are displayed for household customers or business customers in the 
regulated market (see Table 4). Tariff choices in 2016 relied on the simplified heuristic of the 
utility company that divided tariff choices into three categories: Renewable-plus, Renewable, 
and Conventional. Renewable-plus is made up of at least 50% solar energy and a maximum 
of 50% hydropower. The solar energy is mainly, but not solely, produced in Switzerland and 
the hydropower is only produced in Switzerland. Both energy sources in this tariff are certified 
as Naturemade Star. One Rappen per kWh of the hydropower is invested in an ecological fond 
that funds environmental projects.16 Renewable is made up of 90% hydropower, certified as 
Naturemade Basic; 7.5% hydropower, certified Naturemade Star where 1 Rappen per kWh of 
the hydropower is invested in an ecological fund that funds environmental projects; and 2.5% 
                                                          
15 For descriptive information on acceptance rates of the default products along the years, refer to 
Section 4.1.3 – Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice: 2013-2016. 
16 For more information on eco-labelling in Switzerland, refer to Section 3.1 – The Renewably 
Sourced Electricity Market in Switzerland. 
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other renewable energy, certified Naturemade Star (solar energy, wind energy, and/or 
biomass). The energy is mainly produced in Switzerland. Conventional is made up of 75% 
nuclear energy, 20% hydropower, and 5% energy supported by the governmental 
Kostendeckende Einspeisevergütung (KEV) fee. This tariff is not certified and its energy 
sources are not solely in Switzerland.  
Table 4. Choice Architecture of the Default Product Change in Prices: Comparing 
Electricity Prices 2015-2016 
 
Conventional Default Option (2015) Renewable Default Option (2016) 
Package Prices per kWh Prices per kWh 
  Day Night Day Night 
Conventional H: 0.26 CHF 
B: 0.12 CHF 
H: 0.17 CHF 
B: 0.08 CHF 
H: 0.28 CHF 
B: 0.11 CHF 
H: 0.18 CHF 
B: 0.07 CHF 
Renewable H: 0.29 CHF 
B: 0.15 CHF 
H: 0.20 CHF 
B: 0.11 CHF 
H: 0.29 CHF 
B: 0.12 CHF 
H: 0.19 CHF 
B: 0.08 CHF 
Renewable-plus H: 0.33 CHF 
B: 0.19 CHF 
H: 0.24 CHF 
B: 0.15 CHF 
H: 0.32 CHF 
B: 0.15 CHF 
H: 0.21 CHF 
B: 0.11 CHF 
Energy packages and average prices per kWh for 229,658 (96.77%) households (H) and 7,675 (3.23%) 
businesses (B) before (2015) and after the introduction of a renewable default option 
(2016). All descriptive details come from the dataset containing customers in the 
regulated markets, business and household customers, renewable and renewable-plus 
defaults. 
The most commonly chosen tariffs for 2015 – when conventional electricity was the 
default – in the conventional categories were Energy Basic for household customers 
(n=138,679) and Energy Basic Power for business customers (n=6,762) in the customer group 
that later received the renewable or the renewable-plus defaults. Energy Basic is a double 
tariff for household customers with a higher utility usage during the night and a yearly utility 
usage of up to 20,000 kWh. A double tariff offers two different prices for utility usage 
depending on the time that the utility is used, differentiating a day tariff from a cheaper night 
tariff. Energy Basic Power is a double tariff for business customers who have a yearly utility 
usage ranging between 20,000 kWh and 100,000 kWh. The Energy Basic and Energy Basic 
Power tariffs are composed of mostly nuclear energy and energy from uncertified sources. 
The most commonly chosen tariffs for 2015 in the renewable categories were Energy 
Nature for household customers (n=2,541) and Energy Basic Nature for business customers 
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(n=9) in the customer group that later received the renewable or the renewable-plus defaults. 
Energy Basic Nature (not to be confused with the Nature Basic tariff) is a double tariff based 
on the Energy Basic tariff (household customers, higher utility usage during the night, yearly 
utility usage up to 20,000 kWh) but with a surcharge of 3 Rappen/kWh. Energy Basic Power 
Nature (not to be confused with Nature Basic tariff) is a double tariff based on the Energy 
Basic Power tariff (business customers, yearly utility usage ranging between 20,000 kWh and 
100,000 kWh) but with a surcharge of 3 Rappen/kWh. The Energy Basic Nature and Energy 
Basic Power Nature tariffs have the following composition of energy sources, all certified with 
the Naturemade label: 85% hydropower, 5% solar energy, 5% wind energy, and 5% biomass 
energy. 
The most commonly chosen tariffs for 2015 in the renewable-plus category were 
Energy Basic Nature Star for household customers (n=698) and Energy Basic Power Nature 
Star for business customers (n=3) in the customer group that later received the renewable or 
the renewable-plus defaults. Energy Basic Nature Star is a double tariff based on the Energy 
Basic tariff (household customers, higher utility usage during the night, yearly utility usage 
up to 20,000 kWh) but with a surcharge of 7 Rappen/kWh. Energy Basic Power Nature Star is 
a double tariff based on the Energy Basic Power tariff (business customers, yearly utility usage 
ranging between 20,000 kWh and 100,000 kWh) but with a surcharge of 7 Rappen/kWh. The 
Energy Basic Nature Star and Energy Basic Power Nature Star tariffs have the following 
composition of energy sources, all certified with the Naturemade Star label: 70% certified 
hydropower, 10% solar energy, 10% wind energy, and 10% biomass energy. 1 Rappen per kWh 
of the hydropower is invested in an ecological fund that funds environmental projects. 
The most commonly chosen tariffs for 2016 (measured at the time point of January 1st, 
2016) – when renewable and renewable-plus energy were the defaults –in the conventional 
category were Energy Conventional Doppeltarif for household customers (n=15,994) and 
Energy Conventional Profistrom for business customers (n=1,053). Energy Conventional 
Doppeltarif is a double tariff that is based on the Energy Basic tariff from 2015 (household 
customers, higher utility usage during the night, yearly utility usage up to 20,000 kWh). 
Energy Conventional Profistrom is a double tariff that is based on the Energy Basic Power 
tariff from 2015 (business customers, yearly utility usage ranging between 20,000 kWh and 
100,000 kWh). The Energy Conventional tariff has following composition of energy sources: 
75% nuclear energy, 22% hydropower, and 3% energy supported by governmental KEV fees. 
The most commonly chosen tariffs on January 1st, 2016 in the renewable category were 
Energy Renewable Doppeltarif for household customers (n=120,605) and Energy Renewable 
Profistrom for business customers (n=5,703). Energy Renewable Doppeltarif is a double tariff 
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based on the Energy Basic tariff (household customers, higher utility usage during the night, 
yearly utility usage up to 20,000 kWh) but with a surcharge of 1 Rappen/kWh. Energy 
Renewable Profistrom is a double tariff that is based on the Energy Basic Power tariff from 
2015 (business customers, yearly utility usage ranging between 20,000 kWh and 100,000 
kWh) but with a surcharge of 1 Rappen/kWh. The Energy Renewable tariff has following 
composition of energy sources: 90% hydropower certified Naturemade, 2.5% solar energy 
certified Naturemade Star, 4.5% hydropower certified Naturemade Star, and 3% energy 
supported by governmental KEV fees. 
The most commonly chosen tariffs for 2016 (measured at the time point of January 1st, 
2016) in the renewable-plus category were Energy Renewable-plus Doppeltarif for household 
customers (n=4,171) and Energy Renewable-plus Profistrom for business customers (n=34). 
Energy Renewable-plus Doppeltarif is a double tariff that is based on the Energy Basic tariff 
from 2015 (household customers, higher utility usage during the night, yearly utility usage up 
to 20,000 kWh) but with a surcharge of approximately 4 Rappen/kWh. Energy Renewable-
plus Profistrom is a double tariff that is based on the Energy Basic Power tariff from 2015 
(business customers, yearly utility usage ranging between 20,000 kWh and 100,000 kWh) but 
with a surcharge of 4 Rappen/kWh. The Energy Renewable-plus tariff has the following 
composition of energy sources: 50% solar energy and 50% hydropower, both certified 
Naturemade Star. Of the hydropower, 1 Rappen/kWh is invested in an ecological fund that 
funds environmental projects concerning nature conservation and the renaturation of waters 
and fish passes in the utility company’s service area. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the timeline of the default product change can be judged as sufficient 
for the customers to make their decisions to remain with or opt out of the new default 
product. The customers were informed in August 2015 and were able to opt out of the new 
default until May 2016 without being charged for the new default product. That means that 
even if a customer decided later than January 1st, 2016 that he or she did not want to receive 
the renewable default product, he or she could notify the company by May 2016 and the 
difference in bills would be corrected for the product chosen at this time point. Overall, 
customers were given three different defaults. The majority of customers in the regulated 
market received the renewable default and a small minority received the renewable-plus 
default. The customers in the free market kept the old conventional default and stayed on 
their former contracts. The form letters introducing the customers to the default product 
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change could have been considered manipulative from the customers’ perspective. Two 
critical reasons for this were the statement that the price increase had nothing to do with the 
default product change and the company hiding the information that there was a cheaper 
alternative to the default product on the second page of the letter in the postscript. The high 
acceptance rate of the default product hints to most customers being either unaware of the 
manipulative nature of the form letter or that their negative feelings were eased by the 
promoted upfront cause of the default product change: environmental protection. Regarding 
the majority of the customers, who received the renewable default and have the 
characteristics of being household customers in the regulated market, the price increase from 
one default setting to the next was 3 Rappen for the day tariff and 2 Rappen for the night 
tariff. Even if this customer group had chosen to stay with the conventional electricity 
product, they would have had to pay a price increase of 2 Rappen for the day tariff and 1 
Rappen for the night tariff. For the second biggest group of customers, which could be 
identified as business customers in the regulated market who also received the renewable 
default, there was no price increase from one default product to the next. The prices for the 
business customers for either default (conventional or renewable) were the same for the day 
tariff as for the night tariff. If this customer group had chosen to stay with the conventional 
electricity product, they would have saved 1 Rappen for the day tariff and 1 Rappen for the 
night tariff. It seems like the price increase of 9% due to the costs of network usage and 
government-ordered fees on energy usage only affected the prices for household customers 
in the regulated market, and did not affect the business customers. 
3.4 Data Preparations 
As might be the case in any natural field experiment, data preparation is not only the process 
to prepare data for analysis but also a pivotal part of understanding and managing the data. 
The same holds true for this experiment on default setting. There are many unique attributes 
of data structure and quality in this field of study. As described earlier in this chapter, the 
utility company affiliated with this research works with a metering point-based data structure 
and not a customer-based data structure. For their day to day business, the utility company 
uses three different data management programs and often has to rely on forecasted 
simulated data. This especially applies to meter-read electricity data. The unique challenges 
that arise when working with meter-read electricity data are laid out in more detail in Section 
4.1.1 – Descriptive Statistics for Utility Use. The data preparation process was done in close 
communication with both the utility company and its data service partner company. The data-
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cleaning process involved getting from a raw dataset from three data management programs 
to a clean dataset that only contained customers who received the treatment of the default 
product change on January 1st, 2016 and necessary information relevant to said default 
product change. This mainly meant removing all metering points that were in the free market 
and leaving only those in the regulated market as well as identifying all relevant variables that 
could offer intel on the default product change and incorporating them into the existing data 
structure. In addition, the utility company made major changes to their product range and 
customer treatment during the time span of 2013 to 2016. Standardizing the product ranges 
and making them comparable across years was a major but necessary endeavour. The 
struggle was in getting all the information on the energy quality and classification for each 
existing electricity product during the time span of 2013 to 2016. While from the researchers’ 
perspective this information was crucial, for the utility company, it was not. The utility 
company concentrated on different attributes of the electricity products and had only just 
begun to document the energy quality and environmental classifications of their electricity 
products in preparation for the default product change. The work of re-coding the variables 
salutation and contract choices will be discussed in this chapter. Overall, the time invested in 
data preparation was necessary in order to prepare a database that could show a clear picture 
of the default effect on the customer’s choice of contract. 
3.4.1 Data Cleaning 
The main goal of data cleaning was the identification of metering points that received the 
default switch and those that did not. As only the metering points in the regulated electricity 
market received the default switch, all metering points that were identified as belonging to 
the free market were excluded from the dataset. Another goal was to minimize unnecessary 
heterogeneity in the data, which translated to excluding the metering points for which a 
customer switch had happened during the years 2013 to 2016.  
Regulated Versus Free Market  
The dataset received contained all of the metering points of the utility company for the 
regulated as well as the free energy markets (n=338,574). In general, the regulated market 
contains customers in the utility company’s service area that have a yearly utility usage lower 
than 100,000 kWh. The free market in general contains customers in the whole of Switzerland 
that have a yearly utility usage higher than 100,000 kWh a year. Since only customers in the 
regulated market received a default switch, data cleaning involved the differentiation of 
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customers in the regulated market from customers in the free market. For this differentiation, 
not one but several variables had to be consulted for successful differentiation between 
metering points in the two market types.  
One variable is the measuring point, which serves as an ID and builds the basic 
structure of the dataset. The measuring point is the natural subject level from the utility 
company’s view. For billing purposes and other processes, the utility company concentrates 
on the measuring point and not on the customer number. The measuring point is a stable 
entity, as it marks the connection from the electricity network to the building where the 
electricity is used. The customer number is not a stable entity, because a customer can move 
and change measuring points. In the dataset received, there were measuring points without 
IDs, indicating that these are not using energy from the utility company but instead supplying 
energy back to the utility company. Since those back suppliers are not in the regulated market 
and also did neither receive electricity nor the default switch from the utility company, they 
have been excluded. 
Another variable that provided some information on the differentiation between the 
two market types was the variable indicating the customer type, which sorted all customers 
into four different categories: household customers, business customers, special, and VNB 
(distribution network company). The customer type was coded on the basis of the contract 
type for each metering point. The contract type indicated if a metering point was billed as 
any one of the customer types. The customer types special and VNB are both in the free 
market and hence did not receive the default product switch. Therefore, over the course of 
data cleaning, the customer types special and VNB were excluded.  
Another variable that contained information that indicated free market metering 
points was the variable of contract choice in the years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016. If a 
metering point had a dummy tariff in its contract choice in any of these years, it indicated 
that this metering point did not belong to the regulated market but to the free market. 
Therefore, all metering points with a dummy tariff were excluded over the course of data 
cleaning. 
As mentioned before, the goal of data cleaning was to separate the regulated customer 
market from the free customer market. Omitting data without a measuring point and for the 
customer types marked special or VNB from the cleaned dataset sets in force the separation 
of the two markets. As can be seen in the cleaned dataset, the values for the variable of 
contract choice in 2016 indicate the successful separation of the regulated market from the 
free market. The tariffs Renewable, Renewable-plus, and Conventional all indicate customers 
in the regulated market, since only the regulated market received the package update to 
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Renewable, Renewable-plus, or Conventional and the renewable default/renewable-plus 
default. After data cleaning, only the tariffs Renewable, Renewable-plus, and Conventional 
remained. Other tariffs besides Renewable, Renewable-plus, and Conventional were 
additionally excluded. Before data cleaning, the tariffs besides Renewable, Renewable-plus, 
and Conventional marked the customers in the free market, since they had stayed with their 
old packages and did not receive the product update or the default product change to 
renewable energy. The IT service of the utility company is of the opinion that testing the 
distribution of the variable of contract choice in 2016 was a better indicator for testing a 
successful market separation than for testing the distribution of the variable utility usage in 
2015, where logically, values under 100,000 kWh/year mark the regulated market and over 
100,000 kWh/year mark the free market. Testing the distribution of the variable utility usage 
for 2015 was less clear, and had the disadvantage that customers at the threshold of 100,000 
kWh/year could be miscategorised since their utility usage could fluctuate yearly. In addition, 
there was the possibility of miscategorising customers if their utility usage was higher than 
100,000 kWh/year but they formally chose to stay in the regulated market. 
Removing Metering Points with a Customer Switch 
Another main goal for data cleaning besides isolating the regulated market from the 
free market was to make the measurements as homogenous as possible by excluding those 
metering points for which the customer had moved between 2013 and 2016. Apart from the 
physical makeup of a home, the behaviour of the individuals inhabiting that home is the 
biggest impact factor on electricity usage. In order to hold the heterogeneity of that impact 
factor to be as small as possible, all metering points on which the customer number switched 
were excluded. As the utility company did not have any information on household size and 
household makeup, there was no possibility of controlling for other changes in the 
household. Removing the metering points with a customer switch only identified the 
households where the billed individual had moved out. It cannot identify households where 
a person was added, like if child was born or a partner moved in, or subtracted, as in the 
death of a household member or a partner moving out. 
Removing Empty Values in Initial Default Distribution and at the Point of the Default 
Product Change 
Empty values in the variable initial default distribution (time point of measurement: 
August 2015) mostly correspond to the number of empty values in the variable that measured 
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the contract choice at the point of the default switch realisation (time point of measurement: 
January 1st, 2016). In the original dataset, there were 34,163 empty values for the initial 
default distribution (August 2015), and 27,091 empty values were in the variable contract 
choice on January 1st, 2016 amongst other empty variables. Since all analysis focused on the 
default product change, cases with empty values in those two variables were excluded from 
the dataset. Having an empty value in the initial distribution of the default and at the point 
of the default switch does not only hinder the analysis of the default product change but also 
shows customers who have not received the default treatment and are thus likely to be in the 
free market. 
Separating the Customers who Received the Renewable Default from Those Who 
Received the Renewable-plus Default 
As written earlier, data cleaning involved the aim of keeping only customers who 
received the default product switch on the January 1st, 2016. Since there was not only one 
new default that was introduced but two parallel defaults, it was also necessary to identify 
which customers received which kind of default product change. 
Figure 15. Number of Customers Receiving Renewable and Renewable-plus Defaults 
(own illustration) 
 
 
Figure 15 shows the number of customers on the renewable and on the renewable-
plus default for the whole dataset and then separated for household customers and business 
customers. Identifying which customers received which default was imprecise and difficult 
with the first data transfer but simplified in the second data transfer through the new variable 
that showed the contract choice on August 2015. In August 2015, the customers first received 
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the letters notifying of the default product change. After data cleaning, the whole dataset 
containing all household and business customers had n=237,333 data points, which is the 
sum of the whole dataset of the customers receiving the renewable default (n=230,881) and 
the renewable-plus default product (n=6,452). There were altogether 229,658 household 
customers, of which, 223,248 received the renewable default product and 6,410 received the 
renewable-plus default product. Of the 7,675 business customers, 7,633 received the 
renewable default product and 42 received the renewable-plus default product. As can be 
seen from the distribution of customers between the renewable and the renewable-plus 
defaults, the renewable default was applied to the vast majority of customers and only a few 
customers with special customer characteristics were treated to the renewable-plus 
default.17 As a rule of thumb, the renewable default was the standard given to all the 
customers in the regulated market, with a few exceptions. In the following, the dataset 
including both default forms will be used for common statistic descriptive details, as can be 
found in the appendix. All main analysis will be based on the dataset only containing the 
renewable default, since this was the standard default treatment. The sub analysis regarding 
the renewable-plus default treatment will be based on the dataset only containing the 
renewable-plus default (see Section 4.2.5 – Subsample Analysis: Renewable-plus Default). 
Conclusion 
In order to prepare a clean dataset for analysis, the exclusion of free market metering 
points was pivotal. The aim was to only have metering points which received the default 
switch in the dataset in order to clearly analyse the effect of the default switch. The 
endeavour of cleaning the dataset of free market metering points was managed through the 
information given out in different variables. Another necessity in data cleaning was to hold 
everything as constant as possible by excluding customers who had moved metering points. 
Altogether, excluding free market metering points and metering points with customers who 
had moved prepared the data and established a common working ground for analyses. 
3.4.2 Re-coding 
While all of the variables received were re-labelled in their names, only the variables of 
salutation and contract choice had to also be re-coded in their structure and values. 
Salutation gives the salutation of the individual that is billed for the metering point. This 
                                                          
17 For more on those special customer characteristics and on how it was determined who received 
the renewable-plus default, refer to Section 3.3 – Facilitation of the Default Product Change. 
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information, on individual level, is available for the years 2013 through 2016. Contract choice 
is the electricity contract for which the metering point is booked. This information is available 
for the years 2013, 2014, 2015, the beginning 2016, the end of 2016, as well as the initial 
default allocation for each metering point on August 2015. The re-coding of the salutation 
variables was very straightforward, concentrating on the indicated gender behind the 
salutation for each billed individual responsible for the metering point. The re-coding of the 
variables for contract choice took great research and care in order to establish a common 
heuristic among the contract names and energy source compositions that changed 
throughout the years. 
Re-coding of Salutations, 2013-2016 
The information given out in the salutations for the years 2013 through to 2016 
provides valuable descriptions on the individual level. Since information such as household 
size and other social descriptive information are not available on an individual level in the 
utility company’s data, salutation is the only variable that approaches the metering point on 
the individual level. Salutations connect each metering point with the individual who receives 
the bills for that metering point. In 2013 and 2014, there were 12 different kinds of 
salutations, and for 2015 and 2016, there were 13 different kinds of salutations. The 13 
different forms of salutations and their distribution can be seen in the appendix. In the 
process of re-labelling the salutations, the 12 or 13 possible salutations were re-coded into 
four different kinds of salutations. The four salutations were ‘female’ (ranging in the years 
2013 to 2016 from n=37,221 to n=39,336), ‘male’ (ranging from n=102,883 to n=103,086), 
‘mixed’ (ranging from n=31,343 to n=32,790), and ‘NA’ (ranging from n=62,852 to 
n=65,886).18 The re-coding of the salutations followed the heuristics of determining the 
gender of the billed individual on basis of the information given in the salutation. While 
‘female’ and ‘male’ describe the salutations of billed individuals by clearly indicating the 
gender of the billed individual, the value ‘mixed’ was assigned when a clear gender indication 
could not be derived from the information given in the salutation. This was applicable when 
the salutation addressed a couple, a family, or some other term that did not reveal gender. 
The value ‘NA’ marks all missing entries for salutation.  
The re-labelling of the salutations into the genders of the billed individuals is only that: 
the genders of the billed individual. It does not offer any grounds for further assumptions, 
                                                          
18 For more information, refer to Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables on the Metering 
Point Level. 
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such as household size, for example. A singular or plural form of salutation therefore is not 
an indication of a one-person or more-than-one-person household. In Switzerland, it is 
common practice that in the case of rented properties, the landlord will write to the utility 
company with the information of the tenant. If the tenant is a couple, the landlord can either 
send both names to the utility company or choose one of them. The landlord could be led in 
his or her decision by common prejudice and write the husbands name only, assuming that 
it is the husband’s job to take care of the electricity bills. Or the landlord could be led in his 
or her decision by what names are on the lease agreement and send those to the utility 
company. In the case of owned property, the billed individual would be whoever feels 
responsible in the household to notify the utility company of the change of ownership. Only 
in the case of one-person households would the salutation give a clear indication that the 
decision-maker is either female or male, but since there is no information on household size, 
there is no clear indication of this. 
Re-coding of Contract Choices, 2013-2016 
For the year 2013, there is no clear information on renewable energy uptake and usage. As 
explained before, the utility company was not keeping records of energy quality and 
environmental classification for all of its electricity products before 2016. For 2015 and 
earlier, product descriptions did not entail information on the exact composition of energy 
sources and their environmental labels. In preparation for the introduction of the renewable 
electricity default, the utility company initiated a renewable energy report for the first time 
in 2014 and repeated it in 2015. This renewable energy report had the aim of filling in the 
missing information on energy sources and their composition and the environmental labelling 
of the electricity products. The report was initiated to show for the first time the share of 
renewable energy that customers ordered and used in a year. Starting in 2016, there was no 
need for a renewable energy report since for the first time ever, the tariff names clearly 
identified energy quality, source, and certifications. The renewable energy report was made 
at a different time point than the annual normal energy report. Thus, the variables in the 
renewable energy report may show a different utility use than the variables in the normal 
annual report. Before 2016, the utility company offered either the possibility of purchasing a 
fixed amount of yearly renewable electricity (a renewable electricity tranche) or a full 
renewable electricity tariff that covered all electricity usage during that year. The renewable 
electricity tranches (solar, wind, and hydropower) were separated by ordered amount of 
renewables tranche and used amount of renewables tranche. The ordered renewable tranche 
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shows the amount of kWh that was ordered for a metering point for a given year. The used 
renewable tranche shows how much kWh had been used at a given point in time at a given 
metering point for that specific renewable energy tranche. The usage of kWh is subtracted 
from the ordered amounts of renewable energy tranches in the hierarchy of solar > wind > 
hydropower. This hierarchy is based on the pricing of the renewable tranches. Solar power is 
the highest priced form of renewable energy tranche, wind power is the second highest 
priced, and hydropower is the lowest priced form of renewable energy. If a metering point 
only has renewable energy tranches but not a full Nature Basic or Nature Star tariff, the 
metering point will fall back on conventional energy when its renewable energy tranches are 
used up. Metering points with a full Nature Basic or Nature Star tariff will fall back on this 
tariff when their renewable energy tranches are used up, resulting in a fully renewable energy 
supply for that year. 
The product choices for 2014 and 2015 were re-categorized on the basis of the 
information of six variables. The surcharge for renewable electricity can be seen in tariff type 
and tranches from the renewable electricity reports for 2014 and 2015. Combining these six 
variables made sure that the heuristic behind tariff choices in 2014/2015 was the same as 
that behind tariff choices in 2016. Tariff choice in 2016 relied on the simplified heuristic of 
the utility company as it divided tariff choices for the first time ever into only three categories: 
Renewable-plus,19 Renewable,20 and Conventional.21 For purpose of hiding the identity of the 
utility company the original product names were re-labelled respectively as renewable-plus, 
renewable, and conventional. The idea behind the re-labelling was to emphasis energy 
qualities and to stress that the new default product is in actuality a tariff of 100% renewable 
energy sources, thus labelling it ‘renewable’. The default product change is in fact so drastic 
because it changed from a tariff that was mostly made up of nuclear energy to a tariff that 
holds 100% renewable energy sources. With the labels renewable-plus, renewable, and 
conventional, it is clearer that the major gap between energy qualities in the tariffs is between 
                                                          
19 Renewable-plus Mix is made up by at least 50% solar energy and maximal 50% hydropower. The 
solar energy is mainly but not solely produced in Switzerland and the hydropower is only produced 
in Switzerland. Both energy sources in this tariff are certified as “naturemade star”. One Rappen per 
kWh of the hydropower is invested in an ecological fond that funds environmental projects. 
20 Renewable Mix is made up by 90% hydropower which is certified “naturemade basic”, 7.5% 
hydropower which is certified “naturemade star” where one Rappen per kWh of the hydropower is 
invested in an ecological fond that funds environmental projects and 2.5% renewable energy that is 
certified “naturemade star” (solar energy/wind energy/biomass). The energy is mainly produced in 
Switzerland but not limited to Switzerland. 
21 Conventional Mix is made up by 75% nuclear energy, 20% hydropower and 5% energy supported 
by the governmental KEV fee (KEV: “Kostendeckende Einspeisevergütung”). This tariff is not certified 
and its energy sources are not solely placed in Switzerland. 
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‘renewable’ and ‘conventional’. There is not a similar gap between renewable and renewable-
plus. Renewable-plus is similar to renewable but with a little additional stipulation, thus the 
label name marking the premium renewable tariff. The original product naming of the utility 
company gave the false idea that the gaps between energy qualities for those three tariffs are 
fairly similar when they are not. 
The heuristics for re-coding the tariff choices in 2014 and 2015 follow the logic of the 
tariff choices in 2016. Unfortunately, the necessary information on energy qualities could not 
be found conclusively in the variable of contract choice 2015 as they could for the year 2016, 
but had to be derived from additional variables from the renewable energy report in 2014 
and 2015. The tariff choices of customers in 2014 and 2015 had to be re-coded based on 
information from six different variables.22 
Figure 16. Overview of the Six Variables Used to Re-code the Tariff Choice of 
Customers in 2014/2015 (own illustration) 
 
 
The six different variables are as follows: 
(1) ‘Tranche tariff Sun 2014/2015’ is a variable from the renewable energy report for 
2014/2015 showing the amount in kWh of solar energy that was pre-ordered by customers 
for the year 2014/2015. The energy quality is certified as Naturemade Star. This is a tranche 
product for which the customer chooses a specific annual amount and not a full tariff. 
(2) ‘Tranche tariff Wind 2014/2015’ is a variable from the renewable energy report for 
2014/2015 showing the amount in kWh of wind energy that was pre-ordered by customers 
for the year 2014/2015. The energy quality is certified as Naturemade Star. This is a tranche 
product for which the customer chooses a specific annual amount and not a full tariff. 
                                                          
22 For more information on the descriptive details of the six variables, refer to Appendix 2: 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables on the Metering Point Level. 
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(3) ‘Tranche tariff Water 2014/2015’ is a variable from the renewable energy report for 
2014/2015 showing the amount in kWh of certified water energy that was pre-ordered by 
customers for the year 2014/2015. The energy quality is certified as Naturemade Star. This is 
a tranche product for which the customer chooses a specific annual amount and not a full 
tariff. This water tranche is ‘Nature Star Water’ which is different from ‘Nature Basic Water’. 
Both hydropower tranches/tariffs are made up off 100% certified hydropower made in 
Switzerland, but ‘Nature Star Water’ additionally invests 1 Rappen for each kWh into 
ecological funds that invest locally in water renaturations. 
(4) ‘Full tariff Nature Basic 2014/2015’ is a variable from the renewable energy report 
for 2014/2015 showing the amount of actual used kWh for the year 2014/2015 that was 
booked on the Nature Basic tariff. This used amount is based on simulated data, meter-read 
data, and weighted data. The energy quality is certified as Naturemade Basic. This is a full 
tariff in which the customer chooses the tariff and not a specific amount as with a tranche 
product. Only the metering points with this Nature Basic tariff23 fall back on hydropower after 
their renewable energy tranches are used up. 
(5) ‘Full tariff Nature Star 2014/2015’ is a variable from the renewable energy report 
for 2014/2015 showing the amount of actual used kWh for the year 2014/2015 that was 
booked on the Nature Star tariff. This used amount is based on simulated data, meter-read 
data, and weighted data. The energy quality is certified as Naturemade Star. Nature Star24 is 
a full tariff in which the customer chooses the tariff and not a specific amount as with a 
tranche product. 
(6) ‘Contract Choice 2014/2015’ is a variable from the general energy report for 
2016/2017 showing the tariff choice that the customer chose for the years 2014/2015 as 
recorded in December 2014 and 2015. 
With the aim of categorising contract choices in 2014 and 2015 in line with the 
heuristics used in 2016, the desired end results for labels were again renewable-plus, 
renewable, and conventional. But not only do the labels needed to be the same as in 2016; 
                                                          
23 Unfortunately not all metering points which have this tariff can be found out through this variable, 
some of them have “hidden” Nature Basic tariffs. The composition of the Nature Basic tariff is 95% 
Nature Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, 2.5% Nature Basic Sun, Wind, Bio. The difference 
between Nature Basic Water und Nature Star Water is that even though both are made up off 100% 
certified hydropower made in Switzerland but “Nature Star Water” additionally invest 1 Rappen for 
each kWh into ecological funds which invest locally in water renaturations. 
24 Nature Star composition: 70% Nature Star Water, 10% Nature Star Wind, 10% Nature Star Sun, 
10% biomass energy. The difference between Nature Basic Water und Nature Star Water is that even 
though both are made up off 100% certified hydropower made in Switzerland but “Nature Star 
Water” additionally invest 1 Rappen for each kWh into ecological funds which invest locally in water 
renaturations. 
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the qualities of the energy sources should also be in line with those for 2016. Combining 
information from the former six variables, the labels renewable-plus, renewable, and 
conventional were assigned with the hierarchy renewable-plus > renewable > conventional 
(see Figure 17). 
Figure 17. Heuristic of Hierarchy of Energy Sources to Re-code Contract Choices in 
2014/2015 (own illustration) 
 
 
In that sense, the indicators for the categorization of renewable-plus were checked 
first, and if they were not applicable, indicators for the categorization of renewable were 
checked. If these were also not applicable, the conventional label was assigned. 
In 2016, the renewable-plus label was given to the Renewable-plus Mix, which is made 
up of at least 50% solar energy and a maximum 50% hydropower. The solar energy is mainly, 
but not solely, produced in Switzerland and the hydropower is only produced in Switzerland. 
Both energy sources in this tariff are certified as Naturemade Star. Of the hydropower, 1 
Rappen per kWh is invested in an ecological fund that funds environmental projects. The label 
‘renewable-plus’ in 2014/2015 should be just as strict regarding energy sources, energy 
qualities, and certifications. 
As can be seen in Figure 18, the renewable-plus label was given out in five different 
cases. The first case applied to metering points with a Naturemade Star certified solar energy 
tranche and a full Nature Basic tariff (95% Nature Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, and 
2.5% Nature Basic Solar, Wind, and Biomass). This combination forms a 100% renewable 
energy-sourced contract that holds a significant share of Nature Star-certified energy sources. 
Only the metering points with this Nature Basic tariff fall back on hydropower after their 
renewable energy tranches are used up. All other metering points fall back on conventional 
energy, and thus only the combination of renewable energy tranches and a full Nature Basic 
tariff can be labelled renewable-plus. The second case applies to metering points with a 
Naturemade Star-certified wind energy tranche and a full Nature Basic tariff (95% Nature 
Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, and 2.5% Nature Basic Solar, Wind, and Biomass). This 
combination forms a 100% renewable energy-sourced contract that holds a significant share 
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of Nature Star-certified energy sources. The third case applies to metering points with a 
Naturemade Star-certified hydropower energy tranche and a full Nature Basic tariff (95% 
Nature Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, and 2.5% Nature Basic Solar, Wind, and 
Biomass). This combination forms a 100% renewable energy-sourced contract that holds a 
significant share of Nature Star-certified energy sources.  
Figure 18. Heuristics of the Category ‘Renewable-plus’ used to Re-code Contract 
Choice in 2014/2015 (own illustration) 
 
 
The fourth case applies to metering points with a full tariff of Nature Star (70% Nature Star 
Water, 10% Nature Star Wind, 10% Nature Star Sun, and 10% biomass energy), indicated in 
the variable Full tariff Nature Star 2014/2015. This is a 100% renewable energy-sourced 
contract that holds only Nature Star-certified energy sources. Even though this tariff holds 
100% pure Nature Star-certified energy sources, it does concentrate on the lowest priced 
energy sources among them. In this case, the metering points from case 1 and 2 (see Figure 
18) could pay much more for their kWh depending on the amount of renewable solar or wind 
energy tranches they hold, as those are the highest-priced energy sources of those certified 
as Nature Star. The full tariff of Nature Star cannot be deemed superior to the case 
descriptions 1 and 2 but in some cases to case 3. The fifth case applies to metering points 
3. Study Background and Data  111 
 
that have a full tariff of Nature Star mix (70% Nature Star Water, 10% Nature Star Wind, 10% 
Nature Star Sun, and 10% biomass energy) as indicated in the variable Contract Choice 
2014/2015. The fourth and fifth cases describe the same full tariff, but the variables Full tariff 
Nature Star 2014/2015 and Contract Choice 2014/2015 do not mark all of the same metering 
points, and therefore both need to be listed, though the descriptions and reasoning for the 
full Nature Star tariff are the same. 
Figure 19. Heuristics of the Category ‘Renewable’ to Re-code Contract Choices in 
2014/2015 (own illustration) 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 19, the renewable label was given out in two different cases 
(and only if the metering point had not received the label renewable-plus, which trumps the 
label renewable). The first case applies to metering points with a full Nature Basic tariff (95% 
Nature Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, and 2.5% Nature Basic Sun, Wind, and Bio) 
indicated in the variable Full tariff Nature Star 2014/2015. The energy quality is certified as 
Naturemade Basic. The difference between Nature Basic Water and Nature Star Water is the 
following: both are made up off 100% certified hydropower made in Switzerland, but Nature 
Star Water additionally invests 1 Rappen for each kWh into ecological funds that invest locally 
in water renaturations. The full Nature Basic tariff is labelled renewable because it consists 
of only renewable energy sources with a concentration on locally produced hydropower, just 
like the tariff choice Renewable in 2016, which was also re-labelled as renewable. The second 
case also applies to metering points with a full Nature Basic tariff (95% Nature Basic Water, 
2.5% Nature Star Water, and 2.5% Nature Basic Sun, Wind, and Bio) as indicated in the 
variable Contract Choice 2014/2015. The first and second cases describe the same full tariff, 
but the variables Full tariff Nature Star 2014/2015 and Contract Choice 2014/2015 do not 
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mark all of the same metering points and therefore are both listed, though the description 
and reasoning for the full Nature tariff is the same. 
As can be seen in Figure 20, the label conventional was given out when the metering 
point did not yet receive the labels renewable-plus or renewable, both of which trump the 
conventional label. This group of metering points can also be identified as having a 
conventional mix in the variable Contract Choice 2014/2015, but not all metering points 
holding a conventional mix in this variable can be deemed automatically as conventional. The 
variable Contract Choice 2014/2015 does not indicate if the metering point also holds a re- 
Figure 20. Heuristics of the Category ‘Conventional’ to Re-code Contract Choices in 
2014/2015 (own illustration) 
 
 
newable energy tranche and only in few cases indicates if the metering point holds a Nature 
Basic full tariff or a Nature Star full tariff. The hierarchy of giving out the labels from 
renewable-plus to renewable to conventional was set up to identify all information that is 
missing in the variable Contract Choice 2014/2015 with the help of other variables coming 
from the renewable energy report made for 2014/2015. 
Conclusion 
The steps of re-coding the pivotal variables salutation and contract choice ensured the 
establishment of a common heuristic of information in these variables, even though they 
differed greatly before. While the re-coding of the salutation variables was very 
straightforward, concentrating on the indicated gender behind the salutation for each billed 
individual responsible for a metering point, the re-coding of the contract choice variable took 
great research and care to establish a common heuristic among the contract names and 
energy source compositions as they changed over the years. Establishing a high comparability 
of information in these variables was the necessary groundwork for all of the following 
analyses.
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analyses 
In this chapter, descriptive statistics of the main pivotal variables will be presented and 
discussed. The pivotal variables in the dataset are utility use and information on the 
renewable contract options before the default switch, which can be found for 2014 and 2015 
in the renewable energy report of the utility company. The descriptive statistics of variables 
not discussed in this chapter can be found in detail in the appendix. These variables are the 
measurement of utility use and contract choice over the years 2013 to 2016. Given that the 
research is working with data provided by a utility company, there are some specifics in the 
measurement of these two variables that will be addressed in the necessary detail in this 
chapter.  
Section 4.1.1 (Descriptive Statistics for Utility Use) explains the measurement of utility 
use, which is a yearly measurement that is not done for all customers at the same point in 
time. Customers are sorted into four equally sized groups. These four groups are structured 
after the four seasons in which each group is repeatedly measured. For example, the spring 
group’s meters are read annually in spring.  
Section 4.1.2 (Descriptive Statistics for Renewable Energy Contracts: 2014 and 2015) 
shows the proportion of renewably sourced tariffs and tranches in the two years before the 
default product change. In this section, the number of customers using those renewable 
electricity products as well as the utility booked on those products will be analysed. The 
information on renewably sourced electricity products comes from a renewable energy 
report that was specifically done for the years 2014 and 2015, but unfortunately not done for 
2013.  
Section 4.1.3 (Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice: 2013-2016) shows the re-
coded distribution of contract choices over the years. While in section 4.1.2 the descriptive 
details concentrate on the different renewable products and showing those in more detail, 
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section 4.1.3 shows the broader picture for the distribution of contract choices grouped into 
the categories ‘renewable’, ‘renewable-plus’, and ‘conventional’. 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Utility Use 
The data for utility usage is relevant and at the heart of nearly every analysis in this 
dissertation. The utility provider allowed access to the data for utility usage for all its 
customers from the year 2013 through the year 2016, resulting in four years of measurements 
altogether. The data shows real measurements of the utility usage for each measuring point 
and includes no simulated data. The utility usage is read once a year in person by the staff of 
the utility provider. All customers are divided into four meter reading groups spread out over 
the four seasons. The spring group has their meters read every spring, the summer group has 
their meters read every summer, and so forth. For billing purposes, the utility company uses 
simulated data estimating the customer’s electricity usage based on their previous usage. 
Figure 21. Meter Reading Cycles Explained for Utility Use: 2014 (own illustration) 
 
 
Figure 21 shows the four different meter reading groups and that the utility use for the 
year 2014 contains the utility usage from spring 2014 to spring 2015 for the spring group. 
Furthermore, it contains the utility usage from summer 2014 to summer 2015 for the summer 
group, the utility usage from autumn 2014 to autumn 2015 for the autumn group, and the 
utility usage from winter 2014 to winter 2015 for the winter group. 
Figure 22 shows the four different meter reading groups and shows that the utility use 
for the year 2015 contains the utility usage from spring 2015 to spring 2016 for the spring 
group. Furthermore, it contains the utility usage from summer 2015 to summer 2016 for the 
summer group, the utility usage from autumn 2015 to autumn 2016 for the autumn group, 
and the utility usage from winter 2015 to winter 2016 for the winter group. Figures 21 and 
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22 together show how the annual utility use is made up of the corresponding meter reading 
groups and demonstrates the timeframe of the meter reading groups for that year. 
Figure 22. Meter Reading Cycles Explained for Utility Use: 2015 (own illustration) 
 
 
Once a year, when real utility usage data is available for the customer, the billing is 
adapted again. If the real utility data are higher than the simulated data, the customer gets a 
bill to pay for the surplus. If the real utility data are lower than the simulated data, the 
customer gets the overpaid amount credited to his or her next bill. Since the meters are read 
only once a year in the different quarters of that year, the full cycle of read meters for one 
year is finished exactly one year after. The real utility usage for the year 2016 was received in 
the end of 2017. The winter group, which got its meters read every winter, was the last one 
getting its meters read in winter 2017. The winter group’s utility usage for 2016 shows their 
utility usage from winter 2016 to winter 2017. Since it was not possible to get an indicator of 
which measuring point belongs to which reading cycle, all metering points are treated as 
having the same timeframe. The stable allocation of measuring points to the four reading 
cycles and the nearly random distribution to the four reading cycles diminish the concerns 
that would otherwise arise for this key variable. 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the yearly real utility usage of all customers 
(n=230,881) in the cleaned dataset from 2013 to 2016. This table holds the customers who 
received the renewable default in 2016 but excludes those customers who received the 
premium renewable-plus tariff instead. Through the act of data cleaning, the free market 
customers were divided from the regulated market customers, leaving only the later in the 
dataset. The distribution of the annual utility usage follows the same pattern throughout the 
years, speaking for the quality of measurement of the data. Due to a change in data treatment 
in the years 2014 and 2015, there are zero non-available measurements but a higher number 
of zero-measurements in comparison to the years 2013 and 2016. The important indicators  
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Utility Usage: 2013 – 2016 (n=230,881) 
 Utility Use 2013 Utility Use 2014 Utility Use 2015 Utility Use 2016 
Number of 
values 
224,821 230,881 230,881 229,830 
Number of 
null values 
30 2,822 1,550 34 
Number of 
missing 
values 
6,060 0 0 1,051 
Minimal 
value 
0.0        0.0        0.0        0.0        
Maximal 
value 
3,942,782 3,807,496 3,790,160 3,015,695 
Range  3,942,782 3,807,496 3,790,160 3,015,695 
Sum of all 
non-
missing 
values 
1,510,907,038 1,383,018,122.7 1,435,382,539.1 1,445,487,960 
Median 3,875.5 3,421.0 3,567.0 3,558.0 
Mean 6,720.5 5,990.2 6,217.0 6,289.0 
Standard 
error on 
the mean 
40.3 41.2 41.8 40.0 
Confidence 
interval of 
the mean 
at the p 
level .95 
79.0 80.8 82.0 78.0 
Variance 364,931,654.2 392,235,314.3 404,000,344.7 366,709,301.0 
Standard 
deviation 
19,103.2 19,804.9 20,099.8 19,150.0 
Variation 
coefficient 
defined as 
the 
standard 
deviation 
divided by 
the mean 
norm 
2.8 3.3 3.2 3.0 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business and 
household customers with renewable defaults (n=230,881). 
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vary only slightly over the years, such as the median measurement ranging from 3,421.0 to 
3,875.5. The mean measurement also deviates only a little over the years, ranging from 
5,990.2 to 6,720.5. The sum of all non-missing values ranges from 1,383,018,122.7 kWh to 
1,510,907,038 kWh and shows no indicative pattern over the years. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, even though this measurement of utility usage presents common issues 
such as the once-a-year-measurement, the distribution of the variables shows that this 
measurement can be trusted as a stable basis for the analyses that follow. 
4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Renewable Energy Contracts: 2014 and 
2015 
In order to fully understand the effect that the default switch had on customer choices, it is 
necessary to analyse the situation before the default product change happened. Only in 
comparison to the situation before the default product change can the default effect be 
accurately judged. Before the default product change in 2016, the utility company had 
conventionally sourced electricity contracts as the default for household and business 
customers alike. Only a minority of customers held renewably sourced electricity contracts in 
the years before the default product change. In preparation for the default product change, 
the utility company ordered a renewable energy report in the years 2014 and 2015. For the 
year 2013 and before, there is no clear information on renewable energy acquisition from 
customers and no identification of which customers bought how many renewable energy 
tranches. The report on renewable energy consumption was made for 2014 and 2015 in the 
following spring. From 2016 on, with the product change and default product change, there 
is a clear differentiation between the renewable tariff, the renewable-plus tariff, and the 
conventional tariff. 
Heuristic Behind Renewable Energy Tranches and Tariffs in 2014 and 2015 
Since the customer number for renewable energy contracts and tranches is relatively 
stable, only the most recent descriptive statistics, from 2015, will be documented in this 
chapter. Concerning the information on renewable energy tranches, the report on renewable 
energy acquisition differentiates between the ordered electricity amount and the actual used 
electricity amount. The ordered electricity amount of renewable energy tranche shows the 
amount of electricity in kWh for sun/water/wind tranches that has been ordered annually by 
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the customers. The used electricity amount of renewable energy tranche shows the amount 
of electricity in kWh for sun/water/wind tranches that has been used in that year by the 
customers. The renewable energy tranches ordered are used up by the customer’s energy 
demand in a specific hierarchical order that is built through the price hierarchy of the different 
energy tariffs and renewable energy tranches. The hierarchy order starts at the sun tranche, 
then goes to the wind tranche, then the water tranche, then the Nature Basic tariff, and finally 
the Energy Basic tariff. Below is an example of how renewable energy tranches are used up 
by the yearly energy demand of the customer. 
Example 1: 
Customer A ordered the following renewable energy tranches for 2014: 500 kWh sun 
energy, 400 kWh wind energy, and 300 kWh water energy. He ordered the Energy Basic tariff 
that was the default in 2014. In 2014, he has used 2,500 kWh. The energy demand was met 
using 500 kWh sun energy, 400 kWh wind energy, and 300 kWh water energy, and the final 
1,300 kWh will was fulfilled by the Energy Basic tariff (mostly nuclear energy). 
Example 2: 
Customer B ordered the following renewable energy tranches for 2014: 1,500 kWh sun 
energy, 500 kWh wind energy, and 500 kWh water energy. She has ordered the Nature Basic 
tariff. In 2014, she used 4,500 kWh. The annual energy demand was filled by 1,500 kWh sun 
energy, 500 kWh wind energy, and 500 kWh water energy, leaving a remainder of 2,000 kWh 
that was filled through the Nature Basic tariff (hydropower). 
Example 3: 
Customer C ordered the following renewable energy tranches for 2014: 1,500 kWh sun 
energy, 0 kWh wind energy, and 500 kWh water energy. He has ordered the Energy Basic 
tariff. In 2014, he used 3,500 kWh. The annual energy demand was filled by 1,500 kWh sun 
energy, 0 kWh wind energy, and 500 kWh water energy, leaving a total of 1,500 kWh, which 
was filled with the Energy Basic tariff (mostly nuclear energy). 
Depending on the tariff choice, it is possible that a customer could use renewable 
energy tranches such as solar power in combination with nuclear power because they hold 
the default tariff, which was nuclear power in the years before the default product changed. 
Customers who had the Nature Basic tariff (hydropower) fell back on hydropower instead of 
nuclear energy. Unfortunately, this differentiation between the Nature Basic tariff 
(hydropower) and the Energy Basic tariff (nuclear energy) in 2014 and 2015 cannot be seen 
in the data. The data shows only the customers who solely had the Nature Basic tariff without 
renewable energy tranches. 
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Table 6. Prices and Numbers of Customers Using Renewable Energy Tranches before 
Default Product Change (2015) 
Renewable Energy 
Tranche 
Price Surcharge 
n Household 
Customers  
n Business Customers 
Solar Tranche 2015 +34.56 Rp./kWh 434 39 
Wind Tranche 2015 +19.44 Rp./kWh 363 42 
Certified Water Tranche 
2015 
+3.78 Rp./kWh 1,470 123 
TOTAL  2,267 204 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business and 
household customers with renewable defaults. 
The number of customers on renewable energy tranches in 2015 was very small and 
made up mostly of household customers (see Table 6). In the following, the descriptive 
statistics for customers on renewable energy tranches will be explored in detail, first for 
household customers and then for business customers. Household customers typically have 
much lower yearly utility usage than business customers. As a result, the two customer types 
also vary in their purchase amounts of kWh of renewable energy tranches in 2015 and should 
be looked at separately. The descriptive statistics given in this chapter are based on the 
variables given in the renewable energy report for 2015. For analysis purposes, the 
information given in the renewable energy reports for 2014 and 2015 were re-coded and re-
structured in order to align with the logic of contract choices in 2016.25  
Descriptive Statistics for Household Customers on Renewable Tranches before Default 
Product Change (2015) 
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistic for the sun, wind, and certified water tranches 
in 2015. The data shown in the table are from the dataset (n=223,248) that contains 
household customers who received the renewable default a year later and excludes those 
who received no default product change or received the renewable-plus default. For this 
descriptive statistic, the 0-values are transformed into non-available values (NAs) to show the 
distribution of the variables more accurately. For this variables, the NA values do not mean 
that there are no available values for those measuring points, but rather indicate the custo- 
                                                          
25 For a detailed report on how the re-coding was handled, refer to Section 3.4.2 - Re-Coding. For a 
descriptive overview of this simplified contract choice classification, refer to Section 4.1.3 - 
Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice: 2013-2016. 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Solar, Wind, and Certified Water Tranches before 
Default Product Change (2015) (n=223,248) 
 
Sun: ordered 
amount 2015 in 
kWh 
(n=434) 
Wind: ordered 
amount 2015 in 
kWh 
(n=363) 
Water: ordered 
amount 2015 in 
kWh 
(n=1,470) 
Number of values 434 363 1,470 
Number of null values 0 0 0 
Number of missing values 222,814 222,885 221,778 
Minimal value 50 100 9.5 
Maximal value 12,600 10,000 74,143 
Range  12,550 9,900 74,133.5 
Sum of all non-missing values 90,200 273,237.6 3,014,917 
Median 100 250 2,000.0 
Mean 207.8 752.7 2,051 
Standard error on the mean 31.9 67.4 73.1 
Confidence interval of the mean at the 
p level .95 
62.7 132.5 143.3 
Variance 442,005.5 1,646,773.6 7,849,776.3 
Standard deviation 664.8 1,283.3 2,801.7 
Variation coefficient defined as the 
standard deviation divided by the 
mean norm 
3.2 1.7 1.4 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of household 
customers with renewable defaults. 
mers who did not book the tariff. In the process of data cleaning, the free market customers 
were separated from the regulated market customers, leaving only the latter in the dataset. 
The three tranches (plus the three tariffs below) show the whole range of electricity products 
that can be categorized as renewably sourced in 2015. There are 434 household customers 
who ordered the solar energy tranche in 2015. The tranche amounts ordered range from as 
little as 50 kWh to as high as 12,600 kWh, adding up to a total of 90,200 kWh (Mdn: 100 kWh; 
M: 207.8 kWh). The wind tranche was ordered by 363 household customers in 2015. The 
tranche amounts ordered range from as 100 kWh to 10,000 kWh, adding to a total of 
273,237.6 kWh (Mdn: 250 kWh; M: 752.7 kWh). The certified water tranche was ordered by 
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1,470 household customers in 2015. The tranche amounts ordered range from as little as 9.5 
kWh to 74,143 kWh, totalling 3,014,917 kWh (Mdn: 2,000 kWh; M: 2,051 kWh). One may 
notice that the number of household customers ordering the sun and wind tranches were 
less than those ordering the water tranche. This is due to the fact that the database includes 
the household customers who received only the renewable default. Customers with high 
amounts of sun and wind tranches would have received the renewable-plus default. However, 
as the main default switch was the switch to renewable energy, this small and unique group 
of customers are excluded in this specific overview that aims to demonstrate the renewable 
energy uptake for the main default before the switch happened. 
Descriptive Statistics for Household Customers on Renewable Tariffs before Default 
Product Change (2015) 
Table 8 shows the descriptive statistic for the Nature Basic, Nature Star, and Nature 
tariffs in 2015.26 Only the metering points with the Nature Basic tariff fall back on hydropower 
after their renewable energy tranches are used up. Unfortunately, not all metering points that 
have this tariff can be found through this variable; some of them have ‘hidden’ Nature Basic 
tariffs which also fall back on hydropower after their renewable energy tranches are used up 
but this cannot be seen in this variable.  
The data shown in the table are from the dataset (n=223,248) that contains household 
customers and contains only those customers who received the renewable default in 2016, 
and not those who received the premium renewable-plus tariff as a default. For this 
descriptive statistic, the 0-values are transformed into NAs to show the distribution of the 
variables more accurately. 
The NA values in these variables do not mean that there are no available values for 
those measuring points, but rather indicate the customers that did not book the tariff. In the 
process of data cleaning, the free market customers were separated from the regulated 
market customers, leaving only the latter in the dataset. The three tariffs (plus the three 
tranches from above) show the whole range of electricity products that can be categorized 
as renewably sourced in 2015. There were 2,598 household customers who ordered the Na- 
                                                          
26 Nature Basic composition: 95% Nature Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, and 2.5% Nature 
Basic Sun, Wind, and Bio. Nature Star composition: 70% Nature Star Water, 10% Nature Star Wind, 
10% Nature Star Sun, and 10% biomass energy. Nature Star Water additionally invests 1 Rappen for 
each kWh into ecological funds that invest in local water renaturations. Nature composition: 85% 
Nature Basic Water, 5% Nature Basic Wind, 5% Nature Basic Sun, and 5% biomass energy. All three 
tariffs are full tariffs where the customer chooses the tariff, and not a specific amount as with a 
tranche product. 
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Nature Basic, Nature Star, and Nature Tariffs before 
Default Product Change (2015) (n=223,248) 
 
Nature Basic 2015 
in kWh 
(n=2,598) 
Nature Star 2015 
in kWh 
(n=5) 
Nature 2015 in 
kWh 
(n=10) 
Number of values 2,598 5 10 
Number of null values 0 0 0 
Number of missing values 220,650 223,243 223,238 
Minimal value 0.00048 259.3 3.3 
Maximal value 117,647.4 7,266.3 46,578.0 
Range  117,647.4 7,006.9 46,574.7 
Sum of all non-missing values 10,210,451.1 21,278.7 106,810.6 
Median 3,284.8 4,484.6 7,515.6 
Mean 3,930.1 4,255.7 10,681.1 
Standard error on the mean 72.3 1,277.7 4,335.4 
Confidence interval of the mean at the 
p level .95 
141.8 3,547.5 9,807.4 
Variance 13,585,912.3 8,162,591.2 187,959,494.4 
Standard deviation 3,685.9 2,857.0 13,709.8 
Variation coefficient defined as the 
standard deviation divided by the 
mean norm 
0.9 0.7 1.3 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of household 
customers with renewable defaults. 
ture Basic tariff in 2015 (that are visible in the data). The utility booked through this tariff 
ranges from as little as 0.00048 kWh to as high as 117,647.5 kWh, with the total adding up to 
10,210,451.1 kWh (Mdn: 3,284.8 kWh; M: 3,930.1 kWh). The Nature Star tariff was used by 
five household customers in 2015. The utility booked in this tariff ranges from as 259.3 kWh 
to 7,266.3 kWh, adding up to a total of 21,278.7 kWh (Mdn: 4,484.6 kWh; M: 4,255.7 kWh). 
The Nature tariff was used by 10 household customers in 2015. The utility booked through 
this tariff ranges from as little as 3.3 kWh to 46,578.0 kWh, ultimately totalling 106,810.6 kWh 
(Mdn: 7,515.6 kWh; M: 10,681.1 kWh). The high number of customers on the Nature Basic 
tariff in comparison to the small numbers of customers on the Nature Star and Nature tariffs 
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is due to the profiles of the customers who received the renewable default. While most 
Nature Basic tariff holders were migrated to the renewable default treatment, most of the 
customers on the more expensive Nature Star and Nature tariffs were given the renewable-
plus default. As Table 8 aims to demonstrate the situation of renewable energy uptake in 2015 
for the main default switch, the customers receiving the renewable-plus default were 
excluded from this table. 
Descriptive Statistics for Business Customers on Renewable Tranches before Default 
Product Change (2015) 
Table 9 shows the descriptive statistic for the sun, wind, and certified water tranches 
in 2015. The data shown in the table are from the dataset (n=7,633) that contains business 
customers who received the renewable default in 2016. For these descriptive statistics, the 
0-values were transformed into NAs to show the distribution of the variables more accurately. 
The NA values in these variables do not mean that there are no available values for those 
measuring points but indicate the customers that did not book the tariff. In the process of 
data cleaning, the free market customers were separated from the regulated market 
customers, leaving only the latter in the dataset. The three tranches (plus the three tariffs 
below) show the whole range of electricity products that can be categorized as renewably 
sourced in 2015. There are 39 business customers who ordered the solar energy tranche in 
2015. The solar tranche amounts ordered range from as little as 50 kWh to as much as 11,300 
kWh, adding up to 53,350 kWh (Mdn: 1,000 kWh; M: 1,367.9 kWh) total. Wind tranches were 
ordered by 42 business customers in 2015. The tranches ordered range from as 500 kWh to 
20,000 kWh, adding up to a total of 150,500 kWh (Mdn: 2,000 kWh; M: 3,583.3 kWh). 
Certified water tranches were ordered by 123 business customers in 2015. The tranches 
ordered range from 1,000 kWh to 923,094 kWh – a total of 4,782,805.8 kWh (Mdn: 14,000 
kWh; M: 38,884.6 kWh). One may notice that the numbers of business customers using the 
solar and wind tranches are smaller than the number using the water tranche. This is due to 
the fact that the database includes only business customers who received the renewable 
default. 
Customers with high sun and wind tranche amounts would have received the 
renewable-plus default. As the main default switch is to renewable energy, this small and 
unique group of customers is excluded in this specific overview, which aims to demonstrate 
the situation of renewable energy uptake in 2015 for the main default switch. 
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Solar, Wind, and Certified Water Tranches before 
Default Product Change (2015) (n=7,633) 
 
Sun: ordered 
amount 2015 in 
kWh (n=39) 
Wind: ordered 
amount 2015 in 
kWh (n=42) 
Water: ordered 
amount 2015 in 
kWh(n=123) 
Number of values 39 42 123 
Number of null values 0 0 0 
Number of missing values 7,594 7,591 7,510 
Minimal value 50 500 1,000 
Maximal value 11,300 20,000 923,094 
Range  11,250 19,500 922,094 
Sum of all non-missing values 53,350.0 150,500.0 4,782,805.8 
Median 1,000 2,000 14,000 
Mean 1,367.9 3,583.3 38,884.6 
Standard error on the mean 316.3 777.9 10,186.0 
Confidence interval of the 
mean at the p level .95 
640.4 1,570.9 20,164.2 
Variance 3,902,827.3 25,413,617.9 12,761,850,308.7 
Standard deviation 1,975.6 
5,041.2 
 
112,968.4 
Variation coefficient defined as 
the standard deviation divided 
by the mean norm 
1.4 1.4 2.9 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business 
customers with renewable defaults. 
Descriptive Statistics for Business Customers on Renewable Tariffs before Default Product 
Change (2015) 
Table 10 shows the descriptive statistics for Nature Basic in 2015.27 There are no 
business customers in the group of customers who received the renewable default on the  
                                                          
27 Nature Basic composition: 95% Nature Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, and 2.5% Nature 
Basic Sun, Wind, and Bio. Nature Star composition: 70% Nature Star Water, 10% Nature Star Wind, 
10% Nature Star Sun, and 10% biomass energy. Nature Star Water additionally invests 1 Rappen for 
each kWh into ecological funds that invest in local water renaturations. Nature composition: 85% 
Nature Basic Water, 5% Nature Basic Wind, 5% Nature Basic Sun, and 5% biomass energy. All three 
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for Nature Basic before Default Product Change 
(2015) for Business Customers (n=7,633) 
 
Nature Basic 2015 
in kWh (n=50) 
Number of values 50 
Number of null values 0 
Number of missing values 7,583 
Minimal value 1,250.9 
Maximal value 364,875 
Range  363,624.1 
Sum of all non-missing values 1,552,582.9 
Median 19,972.6 
Mean 31,051.7 
Standard error on the mean 7,475.4 
Confidence interval of the mean at the 
p level .95 
15,022.4 
Variance 2,794,072,783.9 
Standard deviation 52,859 
Variation coefficient defined as the 
standard deviation divided by the 
mean norm 
1.7 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business 
customers with renewable defaults. 
tariffs Nature Star and Nature. The few business customers on those two tariffs were migrated 
to the renewable-plus default, and thus are excluded in this overview. As stated before, only 
the metering points with the Nature Basic tariff fall back on hydropower after their renewable 
energy tranches are used up. Unfortunately, not all metering points that have this tariff can 
be found through this variable, as some of them have ‘hidden’ Nature Basic tariffs. The data 
shown in the table are from the dataset that contains business customers who received the 
renewable default in 2016 (n=7,633). For this descriptive statistic, the 0-values were 
transformed into NAs to show the distribution of the variables more accurately. The NA values 
                                                          
tariffs are full tariffs where the customer chooses the tariff, and not a specific amount as with a 
tranche product. 
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in this variable do not mean that there are no available values for those measuring points, 
but rather indicate the customers who did not book the tariff. In the process of data cleaning, 
the free market customers were separated from the regulated market customers, leaving only 
the latter in the dataset. This tariff (plus the three tranches from above) includes the whole 
range of electricity products that can be categorized as renewably sourced in 2015. There 
were 50 business customers who ordered the Nature Basic tariff in 2015 (that are visible in 
the data). The utility booked in this tariff ranges from as little as 1,250.9 kWh to as much as 
364,875 kWh – a total of 1,552,582.9 kWh (Mdn: 19,972.6 kWh; M: 31,051.7 kWh).  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the descriptive statistics for the tariffs that can be categorized as being 
sourced from renewable energy sources for 2015 show the starting position for the default 
product change towards renewable energy in 2016. It is remarkable to see the small number 
of household customers and the even smaller number of business customers who booked a 
renewable tariff or tranche in 2015. The utility provider made efforts to market the renewable 
tranches and tariffs in 2014 and 2015, but it seems that the vast majority of customers were 
not interested and stayed with conventional tariffs. This documented lack of interest in and 
lack of initiative to actively choose renewable electricity products is the starting position for 
the default product change in 2016, and shows a background that makes the default effect 
even more pronounced. 
4.1.3 Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice: 2013-2016 
The descriptive statistics on contract choice for the years 2013, 2014, 2015 and for the two 
time points in 2016 will document the default product change over the studied timespan. The 
contract choices were re-coded into three labels: conventional, renewable, and renewable-
plus.28 First, the descriptive statistics will be shown for those three contract categories for the 
household customers, and then for the business customers. A more in-depth analysis will 
wrap up the chapter with a concentration on the renewable contract category and how it 
developed over the years, separated for household and business customers.  
                                                          
28 For more information on the re-coding process, refer to Section 4.1.2 - Re-coding. 
4. Results   127 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice 2013-2016: Household Customers 
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice 2013-2016: Household Customers 
(n=223,248) 
Time Point 
n   
Conventional 
Contracts  
n  
Renewable 
Contracts 
n   
Renewable-
plus Contracts 
n 
NA 
Contract Choice 2013 219,564 0 0 3,684 
Contract Choice 2014 220,654 2,009 585 0 
Contract Choice 2015 220,633 2,030 585 0 
Default Product Changed From Conventional to Renewable Contract 
Contract Choice 01.01.2016 24,527 197,892 829 0 
Contract Choice 24.12.2016 25,977  196,376  895 0 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of household 
customers with renewable defaults. 
In Table 11 the descriptive statistics for the household customer’s contract choice from 
2013 to 2016 can be seen. Since 2013 was before the utility company first had its renewable 
energy report (2014 and 2015), there is no sufficient information on renewable and 
renewable-plus contract holders for that year, and a small number of additional metering 
points have no description at all. This explains the unavailable number of contract holders for 
renewable and renewable-plus contracts in 2013. As a result, the 2013 data shows 219,564 
(98.3%) household customers in the conventional contract category. With the improved data 
information on renewable and renewable-plus contracts in 2014, a small number of 
households in the renewable category (2,009 (0.9%)) and an even smaller number in the 
renewable-plus category (585 (0.3%)) become visible. The overwhelming majority of 
household customers hold contracts that are categorized as conventional (220,654 (98.8%)). 
For 2015, the distribution among the three categories remains stable, hinting at the 
possibility that if there had been information on customers with renewable and renewable-
plus contracts in 2013, it would have been similar to the distributions found in 2014 and 2015. 
In 2015, the majority of household customers still held conventional contracts (220,633 
(98.8%)), while a small number of household customers held renewable (2,030 (0.9%)) and 
renewable-plus (585 (0.3%)) contracts. The vast majority of customers holding conventional 
contracts in the years 2013, 2014, and 2015 also demonstrates the power of the default 
effect. In those years, the default contract was conventionally sourced and the majority of 
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household customers accepted this default without deviating from it. In 2016, a new default 
setting was introduced: the renewably sourced contract. The distribution of household 
customers over the three contract categories on the 1st of January 2016 shows the time point 
of the default product change. The customers received a letter announcing the default 
product change to the renewably sourced contract in August 2015 and had until the 1st of 
January 2016 to change their contract settings. The time point 1st January 2016 marks the 
initial default product change realization but not the initial default distribution, since 
customers had four months to opt out of the new default. On the 1st January 2016, the 
majority of household customers now held renewable contracts (197,892 (88.6%)). There was 
a small share of household customers on conventional contracts (24,527 (11.0%)) and an even 
smaller share of household customers on renewable-plus contracts (892 (0.4%)). The small 
number of customers holding a renewable or even a renewable-plus tariff in this overview 
were treated the same as those holding a conventional tariff in 2015. While the 220,633 
household customers on the conventional tariff in 2015 upgraded their energy source to 
renewable, the 2,030 household customers on the renewable tariff in 2015 did not change 
their energy sources, and the 585 household customers on the renewable-plus tariff 
downgraded to only renewable energy. Only the 6,452 household customers with special 
customer profiles were migrated to the renewable-plus default.29 The distribution of the 
household customers over the three contract categories on the time point 24th December 
2016 shows that the initial default product change effect is stable for that time period. There 
are 196,376 (88.0%) household customers on renewable contracts, 25,977 (11.6%) on 
conventional contracts, and 865 (0.4%) on renewable-plus contracts. 
Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice 2013-2016: Business Customers  
Since 2013 was before the utility company had its first renewable energy report (2014 
and 2015), there is not sufficient information on renewable and renewable-plus contract 
holders for that year, and a small number of additional metering points have no description 
at all. This explains the unavailable number of business contract holders of renewable and 
renewable-plus contracts in 2013. As a result, 2013 has 7,346 (96.2%) business customers in 
the conventional contract category. With the improved information on renewable and 
renewable-plus contracts in 2014, a small number of business customers in the renewable 
category (29 (0.4%)) and an even smaller number in the renewable-plus category (21 (0.3%))  
                                                          
29 For more information on this customer group, refer to Section 4.3.5 – Subsample Analysis: 
Renewable-plus Default. 
4. Results   129 
 
Table 12. Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice 2013-2016: Business Customers 
(n=7,633) 
Time Point 
n   
Conventional 
Contracts  
n  
Renewable 
Contracts 
n  
Renewable-
plus Contracts 
n 
NA 
Contract Choice 2013 7,346 NA NA 287 
Contract Choice 2014 7,583 29 21 0 
Contract Choice 2015 7,583 29 21 0 
Contract Choice 01.01.2016 1,166 6,447 20 0 
Contract Choice 24.12.2016 1,283 6,309 41 0 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business 
customers with renewable defaults. 
become visible. However, the overwhelming majority of business customers hold contracts 
that are categorized as conventional (7,583 (99.3%)). For 2015, the distribution among the 
three categories remains stable hinting at the possibility that if there had been information 
on business customers with renewable and renewable-plus contracts in 2013, it would have 
been similar to the distributions found in 2014 and 2015. In 2015, the majority of business 
customers still held conventional contracts (7,583 (99.3%)), while a small number of business 
customers held renewable (29 (0.4%)) and renewable-plus (21 (0.3%)) contracts. The vast 
majority of business customers holding conventional contracts in the years 2013, 2014, and 
2015 demonstrates the power of the default effect. In those years, the default contract was 
conventionally sourced, and the majority of business customers accepted this default without 
deviating from it. In 2016, a new default setting was introduced: the renewably sourced 
contract. The distribution of business customers across the three contract categories on the 
1st of January 2016 shows the time point of the default product change realization. The 
customers received a letter announcing the default product change to renewably sourced 
contracts in August 2015 and had until the 1st of January 2016 time to change their default 
settings. Therefore, the time point 1st January 2016 marks the initial default product change 
realization but not the initial default distribution, since customers had four months to opt 
out. On the 1st January 2016, the majority of business customers held renewable contracts 
for the first time (6,447 (84.5%)). There was a small share of business customers on 
conventional contracts (1,166 (15.3%)) and an even smaller share of business customers on 
renewable-plus contracts (20 (0.3%)). The small number of customers holding renewable or 
even renewable-plus tariffs in this overview were treated the same as those holding 
130  4. Results 
 
conventional tariffs in 2015. While the 7,583 business customers on conventional tariffs in 
2015 upgraded their energy sources to renewable, the 29 business customers on renewable 
tariffs in 2015 did not change their energy sources, and the 21 business customers on 
renewable-plus tariffs in 2015 even downgraded to only renewable energy. Only the 42 
business customers with special customer profiles were migrated to the renewable-plus 
default.30 The distribution of the business customers across the three contract categories on 
the time point 24th December 2016 shows that the initial default product change effect is 
stable for that time period. There are 6,309 (82.7%) business customers on renewable 
contracts, 1,283 (16.8%) on conventional contracts, and 41 (0.5%) on renewable-plus 
contracts. 
In comparison to household customers, the distribution of the business customers 
indicates a stronger preference of business customers for conventional contracts even after 
the default product change in 2016 which supports the main hypothesis of business 
customers having lower acceptance rates of the renewable default product in comparison to 
household customers.31 
Number of Household Customers on Renewable Contracts: 2014 – 2016 
Looking at the change in household customers on renewably sourced contracts over 
time, the default product change effect becomes even more obvious (see Figure 23). The 
number of household customers in the renewable contract category before the default 
product change is quite stable in 2014 (2,009 (0.9%)) and 2015 (2,030 (0.9%)). It can be 
inferred from this stability that similar numbers would have been seen for 2013 if the 
information had been accessible. After the default product change to the renewable contract 
default, the share of household customers with renewable contracts rose substantially to 
88.6% (n=197,892). One year after the default product change, 88.0% (n=196,376) of 
household customers had renewable contracts. Thus, after the default product change, the 
number of household customers on renewable contracts remained quite stable. This points 
to the longevity of the dramatic default product change effect. 
 
                                                          
30 For more information on this customer group, refer to Section 4.3.5 – Subsample Analysis: 
Renewable-plus Default. 
31 For more information, refer to Section 2.2.2 - Using Default rules to Promote Renewable Energy 
Uptake. 
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Figure 23. Number of Household Customers on Renewable Contracts: 2014 - 2016 
(n=223,248) (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of household 
customers with renewable defaults. The year 2013 is left out in this graph because there 
was no information available on renewable contracts for that year. 
Number of Business Customers on Renewable Contracts: 2014 – 2016 
The default product change effect can be seen in the share of business customers with 
renewably sourced contracts along the years (see Figure 24). The number of business 
customers with renewable contracts before the default product change was quite stable in 
2014 (29 (0.4%)) and 2015 (29 (0.4%)). It can be inferred from this stability that the same 
would likely have applied to 2013 if the data were available. After the default product change 
to the renewable contract default, the share of business customers with renewable contracts 
rose substantially to 84.5% (n=6,447). One year after the default product change, 82.7% 
(n=6,309) of business customers held renewable contracts. Therefore, even after the default 
product change, the number of business customers on renewable contracts remained quite 
stable. This further suggests the longevity of the dramatic default product change effect. In 
comparison to household customers, the business customers show a stronger preference for 
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conventional contracts which supports the main hypothesis of heterogeneity in the default 
effect according to customer type.32 This is manifested in an overall smaller default effect. 
Figure 24. Number of Business Customers on Renewable Contracts: 2014 – 2016 
(n=7,633) (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business 
customers with renewable defaults. The year 2013 is left out in this figure because there 
was no information available on renewable contracts for that year. 
Conclusion 
The distribution of household and business customers across the three different 
contract categories shows the power of the default effect. Before 2016, with a conventional 
default, the overwhelming majority of both customers held conventional contracts. After 
2016, one can see the power of the default effect manifested in the overwhelming majority 
of both customer types on renewable contracts.  
                                                          
32 For more information, refer to Section 2.2.2 - Using Default rules to Promote Renewable Energy 
Uptake. 
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4.2 Bivariate Analyses 
After the descriptive analyses of the main variables of interest – the measurement of utility 
use and contract choices over the years – bivariate analyses will further explore the variable 
of contract choice’s dependency on other factors on the municipality level. 
Section 4.2.1 (The Default Effect) shows the short-term and long-term default effects 
separately for the household customers and for the business customers. A connection 
between short-term and long-term default effects depending on utility use will be made. As 
utility use is typically very different for household customers than for business customers, 
these analyses are performed separately for the two customer groups. Overall, it will become 
clear that the default effect in this study shows surprising stability among the different 
customer groups and quartiles of utility use.  
Section 4.2.2 (Analysis of Moving Customers) shows a sub-analysis of customers who 
moved their business or living locations in the year of the default product change (2016). This 
subsample of customers was excluded from all main analyses in this study in order to keep 
the homogeneity of measurement as high as possible. After building factors, as for example 
the building’s isolation, the inhabitants of the building space are the second biggest influence 
on electricity usage. Excluding moving customers meant cutting down on unobserved 
heterogeneity in the measurement of utility usage. It is hypothesised that customers who 
moved in the year of the default product change would read the letter announcing the default 
product change more carefully than would non-moving customers. This higher attention 
could manifest in a lower acceptance rate for the renewable default and a higher take up on 
conventional electricity contracts. However, there were no noticeable differences found in 
the variable of contract choice between the groups of movers and non-movers in 2016. 
Section 4.2.3 (The Voting Initiative ‘Nuclear Power Phase-Out’ and Renewable Default 
Acceptance at the Municipality Level) connects the variable contract choice in 2016 with the 
voting results on the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative at the municipality level. The 
initiative came to a vote in the year just after the default product change, and thus relates to 
this study in both timely and topical manners. The direct democratic vote was either for or 
against a quick nuclear phase-out by 2029. It is hypothesised that municipalities with at least 
50% of votes in favour of the quick nuclear phase-out would have a higher acceptance of the 
renewable default than other municipalities. This was verified, but the effect found was only 
small. 
Section 4.2.4 (Proximity to Nuclear Power Plant and Renewable Default Acceptance) 
analyses the variable contract choice in 2015 and 2016 on the municipality level depending 
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on proximity to a nuclear power plant. In the service area of the utility company is one 
municipality that has a nuclear power plant situated within. It is hypothesised that the closer 
municipalities are to a nuclear power plant, the higher their share of conventional electricity 
contracts and the lower their acceptance of the renewable default in 2016 would be. For 
contract choice in 2015, no difference could be found, but for 2016, the proximity to a nuclear 
power plant showed an influence on the acceptance of the renewable default.  
In conclusion, bivariate analysis explores interesting potential influences on default 
acceptance. On the individual level, it connects the type of customer (household or business) 
as well as the moving status of customers to contract choice. On the municipality level, it 
connects results from the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative and proximity to one of the five 
Swiss nuclear power plants to contract choice.  
4.2.1 The Default Effect 
The impressive overall default effect can be documented over the short term as well as over 
the long term. The short-term default effect describes the time span between the 
announcement of the default product change in the end of August 2015 and the realisation 
of the default product change on 01.01.2016. During that time, customers – household and 
business – had four month to opt out of the new default into either the cost-efficient 
conventional electricity tariff or the premium-priced renewable electricity tariff. As 
documented, they were able to either opt out via personal login to an online portal or by 
calling a local phone number. The online portal held additional information relevant to the 
choice, such as a mock-up calculation of the customer’s yearly utility usage and the cost for 
that usage under each tariff option. 
The long-term default effect can be seen one year later after the realisation of the 
default product change (exact time point of measurement: 24.12.2016). At that time point, 
customers had received their four quartile electricity bills of 2016. Household customers 
would have had the chance to realise the (slight) additional costs in their four bills and 
business customers might have realised the opportunity to save money by downgrading to 
the cost-efficient conventional electricity tariff. 
Table 13 shows the descriptive statistics for utility use in 2016 separated for business 
customers and household customers. Comparing the mean of utility use of business 
customers (45,856 kWh) with that of household customers (4,932.2 kWh) demonstrates the 
unique patterns of utility use for each customer group. As the tariff prices and typical 
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electricity usage patterns vary for household and business customers, the default effect will 
be analysed separately for the two customer groups. 
Table 13. Descriptive Statistics for Utility Usage 2016 for Customers with 
Renewable Default 
 
Utility Usage 2016 
Business in kWh 
(n=7,633) 
Utility Usage 2016 
Household in kWh 
(n=223,248) 
Number of values 7,622 222,208 
Number of null values 0 34 
Number of missing values 11 1,040 
Minimal value 1 0 
Maximal value 3,015,695 541,692 
Range  3,015,694 541,692 
Sum of all non-missing values 349,517,067 1,095,970,893 
Median 29,868 3,427.3 
Mean 45,856 4,932.2 
Standard error on the mean 1,051 12.6 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 2,059 24.7 
Variance 8,412,226,564 35,232,772.3 
Standard deviation 91,718 5,935.7 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean norm 
2 1.2 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset, regulated market, household and business 
customers, renewable default (n=230,881). 
Default Effect for Household Customers 
In Figure 25, the column ‘Before Renewable Default’ shows household customers’ tariff 
choices in 2015, dominated by the conventional tariff and showing a miniscule number of 
renewable and renewable-plus tariffs. The column ‘After Renewable Default’ shows the 
household customers’ tariff choices on 01.01.2016: the realisation of the default product 
change. Here, one can see that the renewable tariff is the dominant one, with 88.6% of 
household customers staying with the newly introduced default. The number of customers 
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Figure 25. Tariff Choices of Household Customers (n=223,248) at the End of 2015, 
the Beginning of 2016, and the End of 2016 (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing the regulated market of household customers 
with renewable defaults. 
opting out of the default is relatively small – around 11.4%, with 11.0% downgrading to the 
conventional tariff and 0.4% upgrading to the premium renewable-plus tariff. The column ‘1 
Year After Renewable Default’ shows the household customers’ tariff choices on 24.12.2016. 
Here, tariff choice is still dominated by the renewable default tariff (88.0%), with a small but 
stable number of customers choosing the conventional tariff (11.6%) or the premium 
renewable-plus tariff (0.4%). Calculating the default effect in the short term would mean 
subtracting the customers who choose the renewable tariff in 2015 from the number of 
customers who choose it in the beginning of 2016. This yields a short-term default effect of 
87.7% (88.6% – 0.9%) for the household customers. Calculating the long-term default effect 
can be done by subtracting the percentage of customers already on the renewable tariff in 
2015 from the percentage of customers staying with the renewable electricity default at the 
end of 2016. This yields a long-term default effect of 87.1% (88.00% – 0.9%) for the household 
customers. The default effect is substantial in the short-term measurement and remains 
stable in the long-term measurement. 
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Default Effect for Business Customers 
Figure 26. Tariff Choices of Business Customers (n=7,633) at the End of 2015, the 
Beginning 2016, and the End of 2016 (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing the regulated market of business customers 
with renewable defaults. 
In Figure 26, the column ‘Before Renewable Default’ shows the business customers’ 
tariff choices in 2015. These were strictly dominated by the conventional tariff, with a very 
small number choosing renewable or renewable-plus tariffs. The column ‘After Renewable 
Default’ shows the business customers’ tariff choices on 01.01.2016: the realisation of the 
default product change. Here, one can see that the renewable tariff is the dominant one, with 
84.5% of business customers staying with the newly introduced default. The number of 
customers opting out of the default is relatively small. The total percent of business 
customers opting out is 15.6%, of which 15.3% downgraded to the conventional tariff and 
0.3% upgraded to the premium renewable-plus tariff. The column ‘1 Year After Renewable 
Default’ shows the business customers’ tariff choices on 24.12.2016. Here, tariff choice is still 
dominated by the renewable tariff (82.7%), with small but stable number of customers 
choosing the conventional tariff (16.8%) or the premium renewable-plus tariff (0.5%). 
Calculating the default effect over the short term involves subtracting the percentage of 
customers who choose the renewable tariff in 2015 from the percentage of customers who 
choose the renewable tariff in the beginning of 2016. This yields a short-term default effect 
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of 84.1% (84.5% – 0.4%) for the business customers. Calculating the long-term default effect 
can be done by subtracting the percentage of customers already on the renewable tariff in 
2015 from the percentage of customers staying with the renewable electricity default at the 
end of 2016. This yields a long-term default effect of 82.3% (82.7% – 0.4%) for the business 
customers. The default effect for the business customers is not only substantial over the short 
term, but remains stable over the long term. 
There is a similar pattern in both customer groups: households and businesses. The 
acceptance and longevity of the default effect seems lower for business customers than for 
household customers. It is hypothesised that this would be the case due to business 
customers being more price sensitive than household customers. This price sensitivity is 
grounded in the nature of businesses having to calculate costs more efficiently. The higher 
electricity usage that further differentiates business customers from household customers 
makes the price difference between electricity tariffs even more pronounced. To test this 
hypothesis, one can look into the default effect split up in quartiles of electricity usage, 
analysed separately for household customers and business customers. The relationship 
between the short-term/long-term default effects and the utility use in 2016 can be explored 
by looking at the pure default effect calculated for the quartiles of utility use. The short-term 
default effect is calculated with the contract choice in the beginning of 2016, and the long-
term default effect is calculated with the contract choice in the end of 2016. The hypothesis 
formulated earlier breaks down into four separately distinguishable hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the utility use in 2016 for household customers, the lower 
their short-term default effect in the beginning of 2016. 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the utility use in 2016 for household customers, the lower 
their long-term default effect in the end of 2016. 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the utility use in 2016 for business customers, the lower their 
short-term default effect in the beginning of 2016. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the utility use in 2016 for business customers, the lower their 
long-term default effect in the end of 2016. 
In order to analyse the relationship between utility use in 2016 and contract choice, 
one can calculate the quartiles of utility use in 2016 for households and then calculate the 
default effect for each quartile. The default effect is the number of customers with renewable 
energy tariffs in 2016 minus the number of customers with renewable energy tariffs in 2015. 
This number is then calculated into a percentage to find the pure default effect (the 
percentage of customers who only held a renewable energy tariff in 2016 because of the 
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default product change). Both short-term and long-term default effects are calculated against 
the percentage of customers having renewable contracts in 2015. 
Short-term Default Effect for Household Customers by Utility Use, 2016 
Figure 27. Short-term Default Effect (01.01.2016) by Utility Use 2016 in the 
Household Sector (n=223,248) (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of household 
customers with renewable defaults. 
The short-term default effect by utility use in 2016 was calculated using the dataset 
containing only the regulated market and household customers with renewable defaults 
(n=223,248) (see Figure 27). 
Quartiles of utility use for the household sector were calculated as follows: the first 
quartile ranges from 0 to 1,796.345 kWh of utility use in 2016, the second quartile ranges 
from 1,796.345 to 3,427.31 kWh, the third quartile ranges from 3,427.31 to 6,077.35 kWh, 
and the fourth quartile ranges from 6,077.35 to 541,692.00 kWh. Each quartile of utility use 
in 2016 has 55,552 customers. 
For the first quartile (n=55,552), there were 51,076 households on the renewable tariff 
in the beginning of 2016 and 430 customers on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a 
short-term default effect of 50,646 customers (91.1%). For the second quartile (n=55,552), 
there were 50,189 households on the renewable tariff in the beginning of 2016 and 561 
customers on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a short-term default effect of 49,628 
customers (89.3%). For the third quartile (n=55,552), there were 48,747 households on the 
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renewable tariff in the beginning of 2016 and 657 customers on the renewable tariff in 2015. 
This gives a short-term default effect of 48,090 customers (86.6%). For the fourth quartile 
(n=55,552), there were 46,916 households on the renewable tariff in the beginning of 2016 
and 382 customers on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a short-term default effect of 
46,534 customers (83.8%). 
The first quartile has the highest short-term default effect percentage (91.1%), which 
steadily decreases in the second quartile (89.3%), the third quartile (86.6%), and the fourth 
quartile (83.8%). Based on the decrease on default effect with the increase of utility usage in 
2016, hypothesis 1 holds true: the higher the utility use in 2016 for household customers, the 
lower their short-term default effect in the beginning of 2016. 
Long-term Default Effect for Household Customers by Utility Use, 2016 
Figure 28. Long-term Default Effect (24.12.2016) by Utility Use 2016 in Household 
Sector (n=223,248) (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of household 
customers with renewable defaults. 
The long-term default effect by utility use in 2016 was calculated using the dataset 
containing only the regulated market and household customers with renewable defaults 
(n=223,248) (see Figure 28). 
Quartiles for the household sector were calculated as follows: the first quartile ranges 
from 0 to 1,796.345 kWh of utility use in 2016, the second quartile ranges from 1,796.345 to 
3,427.31 kWh, the third quartile ranges from 3,427.31 to 6,077.35 kWh, and the fourth 
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quartile ranges from 6,077.35 to 541,692.00 kWh. Each quartile of utility use 2016 has 55,552 
customers. 
For the first quartile (n=55,552), there were 50,791 households on the renewable tariff 
in the end of 2016 and 430 customers on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a long-term 
default effect of 50,361 customers (90.6%). For the second quartile (n=55,552), there were 
49,894 households on the renewable tariff in the end of 2016 and 561 customers on the 
renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a long-term default effect of 49,333 customers (88.8%). 
For the third quartile (n=55,552), there were 48,365 households on the renewable tariff in 
the end of 2016 and 657 customers on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a long-term 
default effect of 47,708 customers (85.9%). For the fourth quartile (n=55,552), there were 
46,370 households on the renewable tariff in the end of 2016 and 382 customers on the 
renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a long-term default effect of 45,988 customers (82.8%). 
The first quartile has the highest long-term default effect percentage (90.6%), which 
steadily decreases in the second quartile (88.8%), the third quartile (85.9%), and the fourth 
quartile (82.8%). Based on the decrease in default effect with the increase of utility usage in 
2016, hypothesis 2 holds true: the higher the utility use in 2016 for household customers, the 
lower their long-term default effect in the end of 2016. 
Short-term Default Effect for Business Customers by Utility Use, 2016 
The short-term default effect by utility use in 2016 was calculated using the dataset 
containing only the regulated market and business customers with renewable defaults 
(n=7,633) (see Figure 29). 
Quartiles for the business sector were calculated as follows: the first quartile ranges 
from 0 to 21,628.50 kWh of utility use in 2016, the second quartile ranges from 21,628.50 to 
29,867.50 kWh, the third quartile ranges from 29,867.50 to 48,112.25 kWh, and the fourth 
quartile ranges from 48,112.25 to 3,015,695 kWh. Each quartile of utility use in 2016 had 
1,905 or 1,906 customers. 
For the first quartile (n=1,906), there were 1,631 businesses on the renewable tariff in 
the beginning of 2016 and 14 businesses on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a short-
term default effect of 1,617 customers (84.9%). For the second quartile (n=1,905), there were 
1,596 businesses on the renewable tariff in the beginning of 2016 and two businesses on the 
renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a short-term default effect of 1,594 customers (83.7%). 
For the third quartile (n=1,905), there were 1,600 businesses on the renewable tariff in the 
beginning of 2016 and nine businesses on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a short- 
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Figure 29. Short-term Default Effect (01.01.2016) by Utility Use 2016 in Business 
Sector (n=7,633) (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business 
customers with renewable defaults. 
term default effect of 1,591 customers (83.5%). For the fourth quartile (n=1,906), there were 
1,611 businesses on the renewable tariff in the beginning of 2016 and four businesses on the 
renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a short-term default effect of 1,607 customers (84.3%). 
There is no significant variance in the default effects calculated for the quartiles of 
utility use in 2016 for the business customers. The default effects range from 83.5% to 84.9%. 
Aside from the small range of default effects, there is no pattern of a decrease in default effect 
with higher utility use. Based on the lack of decrease in short-term default effect given the 
increase in utility usage in 2016, hypothesis 3 is contradicted: the amount of utility use in 
2016 does not influence the short-term default effect for business customers. 
Long-term Default Effect for Business Customers by Utility Use, 2016 
The long-term default effect by utility use 2016 was calculated using the dataset 
containing only the regulated market and business customers with renewable defaults 
(n=7,633) (see Figure 30). 
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Figure 30. Long-term Default Effect (24.12.2016) by Utility Use 2016 in Business 
Sector (n=7,633) (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business 
customers with renewable defaults.  
Quartiles for the business sector were calculated as follows: the first quartile ranges 
from 0 to 21,628.50 kWh of utility use in 2016, the second quartile ranges from 21,628.50 to 
29,867.50 kWh, the third quartile ranges from 29,867.50 to 48,112.25 kWh, and the fourth 
quartile ranges from 48,112.25 to 3,015,695 kWh. Each quartile of utility use in 2016 contains 
either 1,905 or 1,906 customers. 
For the first quartile (n=1,906), there were 1,603 businesses on the renewable tariff in 
the end of 2016 and 14 businesses on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a long-term 
default effect of 1,589 customers (83.4%). For the second quartile (n=1,905), there were 
1,576 businesses on the renewable tariff in the end of 2016 and two businesses on the 
renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a long-term default effect of 1,574 customers (82.6%). For 
the third quartile (n=1,905), there were 1,564 businesses on the renewable tariff in the end 
of 2016 and nine businesses on the renewable tariff in 2015. This gives a long-term default 
effect of 1,555 customers (81.6%). For the fourth quartile (n=1,906), there were 1,558 
businesses on the renewable tariff in the end of 2016 and four businesses on the renewable 
tariff in 2015. This gives a long-term default effect of 1,554 customers (81.5%). 
All four quartiles of utility use in 2016 have steady default effect percentages, ranging 
from 81.5% (the fourth quartile) to 83.4% (the first quartile). There is a small decrease in the 
long-term default effect with the increase of utility use in 2016, as can be seen in the 
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decreasing default effects for the different quartiles of business customers. Based on the 
robustness of the default effect through the different quartiles of utility usage in 2016 for the 
business sector, hypothesis 4 is not supported. The relationship between utility use in 2016 
and the long-term default effect in 2016 for business customers is weak at best. 
Conclusion 
The price sensitivity that was assumed to be more pronounced for the business 
customers than the household customers cannot be verified. For household customers, the 
pattern of a decreasing default effect with increasing utility usage is slight but stable for the 
short-term and long-term default effects. This pattern is more pronounced in the long-term 
default effect than in the short-term default effect, indicating that household customers can 
be described as relatively price sensitive. The picture for business customers is different. 
When looking at the short-term default effect, one can see that the default effect remains 
stable and only ranges from 83.5% (third quartile) to 84.9% (first quartile). In the long-term, 
the default effect for business customers is also remarkably stable along the different 
quartiles of utility usage in 2016, pointing to a lack of relationship between utility usage and 
the long-term default effect for the business customers. In conclusion, the hypothesis that 
with higher utility usage the short and long-term default effects will decrease holds true for 
the household customers, but not for the business customers. 
4.2.2 Analysis of Moving Customers in 2016 
It was theorized that customers who moved within the year of the default product change 
(2016) would pay more attention to the default product change.33 Information on moving 
customers was extracted from changes in customer numbers on metering points in the time 
frame of 31.12.2015 – 31.12.2016. Those moving customers could be more inclined to 
actually read the utility company’s letter of the default product change since they are in a 
new house and have a first time contract with a new utility company. Existing customers 
might not be as likely to read every letter that their utility company sends, and thus might 
have missed reading the letter pronouncing the default product change. Another important 
reason for a separate analysis of moving customers in 2016 is that the utility provider 
provided information us that those who moved in 2016 received additional information on 
the different tariffs and the default product change. In contrast to the standard letter that 
                                                          
33 The idea for a special analysis of the customers who moved in 2016 came from researcher Prof. Dr. 
Lorenz Götte of the Institute for Applied Microeconomics at the University Bonn. 
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was sent out to all regular customers and included only minimal information, the pamphlet 
sent out to moving customers included more detailed information on the different tariff 
choices. This additional detailed information could have led to more moving customers opting 
out of the default since they were more aware of their other choices than the regular 
customers. 
For this analysis, the original raw dataset was used. It had to be prepared specially for 
this analysis since the cleaned dataset did not contain the movers (they were deleted as part 
of cleaning the dataset). The utility company treated customers and moving customers 
differently in 2016. Each metering point has a corresponding customer number that marks 
the individual who is responsible for paying the bill for that metering point. If one individual 
is responsible for the expenses of more than one metering point, the different metering 
points will all show the same individual’s customer number. When a customer moves houses 
and stays geographically in the service area of the electricity company, he or she does not 
need to choose is or her tariff again. The tariff choice is saved under his or her customer 
number and implemented at the new metering point. Customer numbers are never recycled, 
as they are sequenced numbers. In the case of a customer moving outside of the service area 
and not qualifying as a free market customer, their customer number will not be re-used for 
a new customer. The new customer would get a new sequenced number. 
The main differentiation between ‘old customers’ and ‘new customers’ that is of 
interest in this analysis is, as already stated, that the new customers received an additional 
pamphlet showing a clear overview of the prices and sources of all three possible electricity 
products, whereas old customers received the letter announcing the default product change. 
The letter announcing the default product change was less clear in communicating the 
possibility that the customer could also choose the cheaper conventional electricity product.  
Apart from these customer groups receiving different extents of information on the 
three product choices, it became clear in the preparation of the data for this analysis that it 
would not be possible to draw a clear line between the old and the new customers in the 
moving customer group. In the year 2016, the utility company in this study bought two 
regional electricity companies. The two electricity companies together had about 13,000 
customers, who were integrated into the study utility company’s customer pool. The 
customers from this integration appear in 2016 as ‘new customers’, and cannot be 
differentiated clearly from other customers who actually moved to the utility company’s 
supply area (indicated by a new sequenced customer number) or who moved inside the utility 
company’s supply area (indicated by a change of consumer number for one connection 
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object/metering point). This means that 13,000 moves of the total 29,493 moves in 2016 
came from this integration (which comprises about 44% of the ‘mover 2016’ sample). 
Altogether, this sample (n=29,493) contains all metering points where the customer 
number changed on the metering point (that is, on the connection object). As explained 
before, this change could indicate several different situations, each resulting in different 
customer treatments by the utility company. The three possible situations are described as 
follows.  
Possibility A: An established customer moves inside the utility company’s supply area. 
As an established customer, she keeps the old chosen tariff that is saved under her customer 
number and is not asked again to choose between products. 
Possibility B: A new customer moves inside the utility company’s supply area. As a new 
customer, he receives the default product change letter plus the pamphlet with a clear 
overview of the three products and chooses his preferred tariff (or passively receives the 
default tariff). 
Possibility C: A new customer who previously held a contract with one of the two newly 
purchased electricity companies is integrated into the study utility company’s area. As a new 
customer, she receives the default letter plus the pamphlet with a clear overview of the three 
products and chooses her preferred tariff (or passively receives the default tariff). 
As these three possible groups received different treatments from the utility company 
but cannot be differentiated from each other, it can be only estimated that the majority of 
the sample are new customers (possibilities B or C). It is expected that moving customers 
would treat the contract choice with more attention than non-moving customers and are 
therefore more likely to opt out of the renewable default. This is hypothesised as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to established customers, moving customers have a higher 
rate of opting-out of the renewable default in 2016. 
The N Total Mover (n=29,493) is the sum of N Business Mover 2016 (n=492) and N 
Households Mover 2016 (n=29,001) (see Table 14). The samples ‘Mover 2016’ and ‘Non-
mover 2016’ are exclusive and do not overlap, since all customers in the Mover 2016 dataset 
were excluded in the normal sample (here, called ‘Non-mover 2016’).  
Mover 2016 is comprised of 29,493 customers and Non-mover 2016 is comprised of 
230,881 customers. The percentages of households versus businesses is slightly different in 
the two samples: while the Non-mover 2016 sample has 3.3% business customers (n=7,663), 
the Mover 2016 sample has 1.7% business customers (n=492). This difference of 1.6 
percentage points might be due to the lower likelihood of business customers moving in 
comparison to household customers. Originally, It is hypothesised that moving customers 
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Table 14. Contract Choice on 24.12.2016 for Movers (n=29,493) and Non-movers 
(n=230,881): Total, Business, and Household Customers  
 Mover 2016 (n=29,493) Non-mover 2016 (n=230,881) 
Contract Choice 
n Business  
(in %) 
n Households        
(in %) 
n Business     
(in %) 
n Households    
(in %) 
Conventional 
60 
(12.2%) 
3,706 
(12.8%) 
1,283 
(16.8%) 
25,977        
(11.6%) 
Renewable  
430           
(87.4%) 
25,192         
(86.9%) 
6,309     
(82.7%) 
196,376     
(88.0%) 
Renewable-plus 
2  
(0.4%) 
103  
(0.4%) 
41 
(0.5%) 
895  
(0.4%) 
TOTAL 
492           
(100%) 
29,001            
(100%) 
 7,633    
(100%) 
223,248        
(100%) 
All descriptive details for the category ‘Mover 2016’ come from a sub-dataset representing moving 
customers in 2016, which was excluded from the other datasets during data cleaning 
(n=29,493). The Mover 2016 dataset contains only the regulated market, including 
household and business customers with renewable defaults. All descriptive details for 
non-movers in 2016 come from the whole dataset, containing the regulated market of 
household and business customers with renewable defaults (n=230,881). 
would pay more attention to the letter about the default product change and thus opt out of 
the renewable default more frequently. However, as the table shows, there is only a slight 
difference in contract choice for 2016. Comparing the household samples shows that movers 
accepted the default at a rate of 86.9% and non-movers at a rate of 88.0%. Comparing the 
business samples shows that movers overall accepted the default at a rate of 87.4% and non-
movers at a rate of 82.7%. A Welch's unequal variances t-test shows that the mean of moving 
customers choosing the renewable contract is significant different to the mean of non-moving 
customers choosing the renewable contract.34 Therefore, the difference in accepting the 
default is more pronounced for business customers than for household customers. This larger 
difference for the group of business customers could also be an artefact of the smaller sample 
size for moving business customers (n=430). 
                                                          
34 Results Welch's unequal variances t-test: t=8.867944; df=10,976.51; p-value=8.602589e-19. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, coming back to the hypothesis formulated in the beginning, our data 
rejects that moving customers in comparison to established customers had a higher rate of 
opting out of the renewable default in 2016. This is especially true given that the difference 
between the two groups is small in general and points in different directions when split up 
for business and for household customers. 
4.2.3 The Voting Initiative ‘Nuclear Power Phase-Out’ and 
Renewable Default Acceptance at the Municipality Level 
Switzerland is unique in that it practices a direct democratic system. One of the ways that 
direct democracy is carried out is through voting initiatives that come to the public vote when 
an initiative request receives 100,000 signatures from the Swiss people in a timeframe of 18 
months. The Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative came to a public vote in the first year after 
the default product change in 2016. It was therefore only common sense to connect the data 
from the default product change experiment with the voting data found on the Swiss federal 
bureau of statistics to add an interesting descriptive variable at the municipality level. The 
vote on the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative was on the 27th of November 2016, which is 
in the first year after the default product change.35,36 
The demand for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative started to become more 
pronounced with the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima on the 11th of March 2011. In the 
aftershock of this event, the Swiss Federal Council decided on a medium-term nuclear phase-
out for Switzerland.37 This decision can be seen as a direct consequence of action that was 
inspired by the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima. This decision was confirmed by the Swiss 
parliament, whose implementation proposal stated that the building of new nuclear power 
plants is forbidden in Switzerland and already-existing nuclear power plants can be operated 
                                                          
35 Official website on the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative: Eidenössische Volksinitiative “Für den 
geordneten Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie (Atomausstiegsinitiative)”, Website Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft, Bundeskanzlei BK, Chronologie Volksinitiativen, 
https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis407.html, last checked 18.12.2017. 
36 Official information pamphlet on the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative depicting the pro and con 
arguments of the political parties involved: Abstimmungsbüchlein zur Atomausstiegsinitiative, 
https://www.admin.ch/dam/gov/de/Dokumentation/Abstimmungen/Novembre2016/27-11-
2016_DE_screen.pdf.download.pdf/27-11-2016_DE_screen.pdf , download 18.12.2017. 
37 “Historisch: Bundesrat beschliesst Atomausstieg”, Tages Anzeiger, 25th May 2011, 
https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Historisch-Bundesrat-beschliesst-
Atomausstieg/story/21114683#overlay , last checked on 18.12.2017. 
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for as long as the federal inspecting authority acknowledges their safety.38 With this medium-
term nuclear power phase-out comes a loss of energy supply in the future. To plan for 
sufficient energy supply in the future, a campaign has been founded that runs under the title 
‘Energiestrategie 2050’ (Energy Strategy 2050). The Strategy aims to, on the one hand, 
increase energy efficiency, and on the other hand, increase renewable energy sources. The 
prospect of the Energy Strategy 2050 is that increasing energy efficiency will slow the ever-
rising demand for energy, and the extension of renewable energy sources will compensate 
for much of the energy demand that is now met by nuclear energy sources. The NFP71 
research project39, which financed the research on this default product change experiment, 
is based on the Energy Strategy 2050, and so is the NFP70 research project40. Even though 
the Energy Strategy 2050 has the year 2050 in its title, this does not necessarily mean that 
the nuclear power phase-out will be effectively realized by that year. There is no deadline for 
the realisation of the nuclear power phase-out set out. Which was the main reason why the 
GPS (Grünen Partei der Schweiz/Green Party of Switzerland) set off the federal petition for 
referendum ‘Für den geordneten Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie (Atomausstiegsinitiative)’ 
(For the ordered nuclear power phase-out (Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative)). The Green 
Party of Switzerland (GPS) demanded a nuclear power phase-out for Switzerland by the year 
2029. The Swiss Federal Council and the parliament declined the initiative. In a vote on the 
27th November 2016, the people of Switzerland declined the initiative as well. 
The Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative was started by the GPS on the 16th of 
November 2012 as a reaction to the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima. On the 15th of January 
2013, the initiative was ready for a vote with 107,533 signatures. Before 2013, there were 
several tries to get enough signatures to pass a vote for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out, but 
none of them got the necessary number of signatures (>100,000).41 
Since 1969, Switzerland has generated energy using nuclear power plants. By 1984, 
Switzerland had built and connected a total of five nuclear power plants to the electricity 
                                                          
38 “Keine neuen AKW in der Schweiz”, Tages Anzeiger, 19th September 2016, 
https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/news/standard/national-und-staenderat-einigen-sich-auf-
energiestrategie/story/18980254#overlay, last checked on 18.12.2018. 
39 The National Research Programme «Managing Energy Consumption» 71 is a SNF Project that 
focuses on the human factor of energy consumption.  http://www.nfp71.ch/en/Pages/Home.aspx, 
last checked on 01.07.2019. 
40 The National Research Programme «Energy Turnaround» 70 is a SNF Project that focuses on the 
technological side of energy consumption.  http://www.nfp70.ch/en/Pages/Home.aspx, last checked 
on 01.07.2019. 
 
41 NZZ Article “Atomausstiegsinitiative ist zustande gekommen” 17.01.2013, 15:43 Uhr. 
https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/atomausstiegsinitiative-ist-zustande-gekommen-1.17945006 , last 
checked on the 18.12.2017. 
150  4. Results 
 
network. In 2016, 34% of the electricity demand of Switzerland was met through its nuclear 
energy plants.42 
The Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative had the aim of forbidding the building of new 
nuclear power plants in Switzerland and limiting the run-time of the existing five nuclear 
power plants to a maximum of 45 years (with earlier closing due to safety concerns still 
possible). According to their years of installation, the initiative had the aim to close down the 
nuclear power plants Beznau 1, Beznau 2, and Mühleberg in 2017; Gösgen in 2024; and 
Leibstadt in 2029. This would have resulted in a complete nuclear power phase-out by 2029. 
Under prevailing legal norms, nuclear power plants are allowed to stay active as long as they 
are regarded by the federal inspection agency as safe to do so. As can be seen, the proposed 
timeline of the initiative was quite strict, with three out of five nuclear power plants being 
closed down only one year after the initiative came to a vote. This strict approach to a nuclear 
power phase-out is understandable in light of the Fukushima catastrophe and the old age of 
three of the five nuclear power plants. Nonetheless, this strict timeline might have been the 
deciding reason why the initiative was unsuccessful in the end. 
Arguments for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out Initiative 
Figure 31. Official Advertising Poster For the Nuclear Power Phase-Out Initiative  
 
 
                                                          
42 For more information on nuclear power plants in Switzerland, refer to 
https://www.kernenergie.ch/de/home.html, last checked on 18.12.2017. 
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Figure 31 shows the official advertising poster of the political parties that supported 
the initiative. The poster for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative states: ‘ja. am 27. 
November zum geordneten Atomausstieg bis 2029’ (Yes. On the 27th of November for a 
controlled nuclear power phase-out by 2029). The three main arguments for the Nuclear 
Power Phase-Out initiative were the following: 43,44 
1. Nuclear power plants in Switzerland are too old to be safe. 
The nuclear power plant Beznau 1 is the oldest worldwide, and also the nuclear 
power plant that has been active the longest worldwide (47 years). Central elements 
of a nuclear power plant are not built to be replaced or restored (for example, the 
reactor). Mühleberg and Beznau 2 also are some of the oldest nuclear power plants 
worldwide.  
2. The year 2029 is a clear date to finish the nuclear power phase-out. 
The Energy Strategy 2050 does not contain clear dates for the phase-out of the five 
nuclear power plants. 
3. The controlled nuclear power phase-out is feasible. 
Renewable energy sources are being trialled and tested and can be expanded over 
the next 13 years until the nuclear power phase-out is completed in 2029. 
The arguments for the initiative have as a main issue the fact that the Swiss nuclear power 
plants are some of the oldest worldwide, and therefore should be deemed unsafe. There is 
no precedent for running a nuclear power plant longer than those situated in Switzerland, 
and it is therefore uncharted territory. As no one can know from experience, no one can 
guarantee the safety of those nuclear power plants. Another argument is that the Energy 
Strategy 2050 has no deadline for the nuclear power phase-out, which makes the initiative 
necessary. In summary, the ‘pro’ side of the initiative is for a quick nuclear phase-out by 2029 
and feels that it would be feasible.  
Arguments Against the Nuclear Power Phase-Out Initiative 
Figure 32 shows the official advertising poster of the political parties against the 
Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative. The poster against the initiative states: ‘Nein. Nein zu 
Kurzschlusshandlungen beim Atomausstieg’ (No. No short-sighted panic reaction concerning 
                                                          
43 Official information pamphlet on the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative depicting the pro and con 
arguments of the political parties involved: Abstimmungsbüchlein zur Atomausstiegsinitiative, 
https://www.admin.ch/dam/gov/de/Dokumentation/Abstimmungen/Novembre2016/27-11-
2016_DE_screen.pdf.download.pdf/27-11-2016_DE_screen.pdf , download 18.12.2017. 
44 Website for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative: http://www.geordneter-atomausstieg-
ja.ch/de/, last checked on 18.12.2017. 
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Figure 32. Official Advertising Poster Against the Nuclear Power Phase-Out 
Initiative  
 
 
the nuclear power phase-out). The three main arguments of the side against the Nuclear 
Power Phase-Out initiative are the following.45 
1. More electricity would need to be imported from foreign countries. 
Through the initiative’s aim to close three of the five Swiss nuclear power plants in 
2017, Switzerland would produce 1/3 less electricity. This portion could not be 
balanced out quickly enough by renewable energy sources, and therefore electricity 
imports would rise. This electricity would mainly be imported from France and 
Germany, and could very well be coming from their nuclear power plants and/or coal-
burning power plants. 
2. Network infrastructure needs to be changed. 
The existing network infrastructure is not able to cope with the expected heightened 
electricity import from foreign countries. 
3. Compensation money for the nuclear power plant operators would be expensive. 
If the initiative is accepted, it is to be expected that the operators of the five nuclear 
power plants would demand compensation money from the federal government. 
In conclusion, the ‘con’ side of the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative stresses that the 
proposed timeline in the initiative is not feasible and brings with it risks in the form of energy 
                                                          
45 Official information pamphlet on the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative depicting the pro and con 
arguments of the political parties involved: Abstimmungsbüchlein zur Atomausstiegsinitiative, 
https://www.admin.ch/dam/gov/de/Dokumentation/Abstimmungen/Novembre2016/27-11-
2016_DE_screen.pdf.download.pdf/27-11-2016_DE_screen.pdf, downloaded 18.12.2017. 
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dependency on other countries and costs in the form of compensation money for the nuclear 
power plant operators.  
Results of the Nuclear Power Phase-Out Vote 
The results of the vote for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative were 1,098,464 ‘yes’ 
votes and 1,301,520 ‘no’ votes from the Swiss public, and five ‘yes’ votes and 18 ‘no’ votes 
from the government. 
Figure 33. Map Showing the Voting Results in Percentage of ‘Yes’ Votes at the 
Canton Level 46 
 
 
Figure 33 shows the ‘yes’ votes for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative for each 
canton in Switzerland. ‘Prozent Ja-Stimmen’ (% ‘yes’ votes) are separated in 10 classes using 
the two colours purple (<50%) and green (>50%). Our sample is mainly located in the canton 
                                                          
46 Source: https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/kataloge-
datenbanken/karten.assetdetail.1503556.html , published on 27.11.2016 by the Swiss federal 
agency for statistics, grouping voting results based on cantons, BFS-Nummer: KM05-A608a-17.3-c-
kant-2016-df, Copyright: BFS/OFS/UST/FSO  
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marked with a purple shade, which corresponds to 40 – 49.9% ‘yes’ votes. The surrounding 
cantons show different results, ranging from 20 – 59.9% ‘yes’ votes. 
The voting results at the municipality level can be seen and downloaded from the homepage 
of the Swiss federal office for statistics.47 
Connecting Voting Results of the Initiative with Contract Choice 2015/2016 
Since this vote was in the first year of the default product change, the idea came up to 
connect the voting decision at a municipality level with the dataset received from the utility 
company. It is hypothesised that municipalities with a high ‘yes’ vote percentage for the 
Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative would have low rates of changing from the renewable 
default to conventional electricity (mostly nuclear energy) in 2016. It is hypothesised that 
municipalities that had a majority agreeing with the plan of a quick nuclear phase-out would 
also be more accepting of the renewable electricity default. Hypotheses were formulated as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Municipalities with ‘yes’ vote rates of 50% and above have higher numbers of 
customers choosing to stay with the renewable energy default in 2016 compared to 
municipalities with ‘yes’ vote rates of less than 50%. 
Hypothesis 2: Municipalities with ‘yes’ vote rates of 50% and above have higher numbers of 
customers choosing to upgrade to renewable-plus tariffs compared to municipalities with 
‘yes’ vote rates of less than 50%. 
In order to add the voting results at the municipality level to the dataset received from 
the utility company, the municipalities had to be matched with the voting data from the Swiss 
federal institute of statistics. All municipality names in the original dataset were listed and 
matched with those of the voting results. There are over 300 different municipality names in 
the dataset that received the renewable default, and these were each matched to a voting 
result.48 The voting behaviour regarding the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative was added as 
the variable Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016.49 
                                                          
47 Refer to https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/politik/abstimmungen/jahr-
2016/2016-11-27/initiative-atomausstieg.assetdetail.1363831.html, downloaded on 21.09.2017. 
48 Exact number of municipalities cannot be given due to keeping the identity of the utility company 
hidden.  
49 For an overview on the descriptive statistics of the voting results at municipality level, refer to the 
Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables on Municipality Level. 
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Table 15. Contract Choices Before and After the Renewable Default for 
Municipalities For (n=48,321) and Against the Initiative (n=169,970) 
Contract 
Choice 
Tariff choice BEFORE renewable 
default product change (2015) 
Tariff choice AFTER renewable default 
product change (01.01.2016) 
n Total 
(in %) 
n For 
Initiative  
(in %) 
n Against 
Initiative 
(in %) 
n Total 
(in %) 
n For 
Initiative  
(in %) 
n Against 
Initiative 
(in %) 
Conventional 228,216 
(98.8%) 
47,679  
(98.7%) 
168,071 
(98.9%) 
25,693 
(11.1%) 
4,334 
(9.0%) 
19,762 
(11.6%) 
Renewable  2,059 
(0.9%) 
488 
(1.0%) 
1,475 
(0.9%) 
204,339 
(88.5%) 
43,805  
(90.7%) 
149,597 
(88.0%) 
Renewable-
plus 
606 
(0.3%) 
154 
(0.3%) 
424 
(0.2%) 
849 
(0.4%) 
182 
(0.4%) 
611 
(0.4%) 
TOTAL 230,881 
(100%) 
48,321 
(100%) 
169,970 
(100%) 
230,881 
(100%) 
48,321 
(100%) 
169,970 
(100%) 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing only the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable defaults. 
Some metering points are excluded in this analysis because their municipalities do not 
have corresponding voting results at the municipality level (n=12,590). This sample comes 
from the dataset containing only the regulated market of business and household customers 
that received only the renewable default. In accordance with the general results of the voting, 
the majority of the municipalities in our sample were against the initiative (78%). N Total 
shows the contract choice in 2016 of the whole sample. The columns ‘For Initiative’ show the 
contract choice for municipalities with at least 50% ‘yes’ votes (metering points n=48,321). 
The columns ‘Against Initiative’ show the contract choice for the municipalities that had less 
than 50% ‘yes’ votes (metering points n=169,970) (see Table 15). 
Table 15 shows the tariff choice with the conventional electricity contract as the default 
(2015) and with the renewable electricity contract as the default (01.01.2016). In the year 
2015, there were no differences in the two samples concerning contract choice. With the 
introduction of the renewable energy default in 2016, a small difference in contract choice 
appeared. It is hypothesised that municipalities with the majority voting for the nuclear 
power phase-out would in larger numbers stick with the renewable default. This is supported, 
as ‘For Initiative’ has +2.7 percentage points of customers who stuck with the renewable 
default than ‘Against Initiative’. While the difference is small indeed, the results of the 
Welch's unequal variances t-test show that the mean of customers in the group that is for the 
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initiative is significantly different from the mean of the customers in the group against the 
initiative.50 
The second hypothesis was that municipalities with the majority voting for the Nuclear 
Power Phase-Out would also upgrade in larger numbers to the renewable-plus tariff. This was 
rejected, since the percentages of customers choosing the renewable-plus tariff were overall 
the same and did not vary between municipalities that voted for or against the initiative. The 
difference between the two samples is concentrated in the choice to accept the default or 
actively choose to downgrade to conventional energy. The main idea behind looking at voting 
behaviour on the initiative was to make a connection between the proclaimed strong dislike 
for nuclear energy that can be observed in voting for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative. 
A preference for renewable energy could be a driver for customers accepting the default 
product change. It can be theorized that a ‘yes’ vote for the initiative and its strict time plan 
of action for a full nuclear phase-out is a good indicator of a stronger dislike of nuclear energy. 
At first glance, the high acceptance rate of the renewable electricity default (88.5%) stands in 
stark contrast with the vast majority of the municipalities in our sample voting against the 
Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative (78%). How can this proclaimed preference for renewable 
electricity be reconciled with the overwhelming support of nuclear electricity? For one thing, 
the group of customers in each municipality is not congruent to the group of people voting 
on the initiative in the municipality. Even when abstracting to the municipality level, there 
are unobservable differences between those two groups. For another thing, there are many 
reasons to vote for or against the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative, and a preference for 
renewable energy does not have to go hand in hand with a ‘yes’ vote on the initiative. It is 
arguable that a person could be of the opinion that the renewable electricity that is already 
available should be preferred to non-renewable electricity, but that the initiative has too strict 
a timeline and thus vote against the initiative. The nuclear power phase-out is already a 
decided matter in Switzerland; only the timeline is not decided. The Nuclear Power Phase-
Out initiative had a strict timeline that the majority of Swiss people seemed to have felt 
uncomfortable with, maybe mostly fearing energy dependency on neighbouring countries.  
Conclusion 
Interestingly, when splitting the municipalities in two groups – one group being those 
who voted at least 50% for the initiative and another group being those who voted less than 
50% for the initiative – there is no difference between the groups’ contract choices in 2015. 
                                                          
50 Results Welch's unequal variances t-test: t= -17.13655; df= 85536.8; p-value= 1.020395e-65 
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Only with the introduction of the renewable energy default in 2016 does a small difference 
in contract choice between the municipalities that voted at least 50% for and the 
municipalities that voted less than 50% for the Nuclear Power Phase-Out appear. It is 
hypothesised that municipalities voting with the majority for the quick nuclear power phase-
out would in larger numbers stick with the renewable default. This is supported, as ‘For 
Initiative’ has +2.7 percentage points more customers who stuck with the renewable default 
than ‘Against Initiative’. In conclusion, connecting the data from the default product change 
experiment with municipality data in the form of voting behaviour regarding the Nuclear 
Power Phase-Out initiative added an insightful characteristic to the data at the municipality 
level. This connection will be further explored in the Section 4.3.3 (Multilevel Logistic 
Regression) of the multivariate analyses. The short timeframe between the realisation of the 
default product change experiment and the public vote was a fortunate coincidence. 
4.2.4 Proximity to a Nuclear Power Plant and Renewable Default 
Acceptance at the Municipality Level 
Figure 34. Overview of the Municipality with a Nuclear Power Plant and 
Surrounding Municipalities (own illustration) 
 
 
In this chapter, the contrast between nuclear electricity and renewable electricity is a topic 
of study. In the previous section 4.2.3 (The Voting Initiative ‘Nuclear Power Phase-Out’ and 
Renewable Default Acceptance at the Municipality Level), the two electricity sources were 
contrasted through comparing voting results and renewable default acceptance at the 
158  4. Results 
 
municipality level. In this section, municipality location in regard to proximity to one of the 
five nuclear power plants in Switzerland is studied and connected to the renewable default 
acceptance. In Figure 34, one can see a schematic of the municipality holding the nuclear 
power plant and its direct neighbouring municipalities. Living in direct proximity to a nuclear 
power plant seems to underlie some mechanisms of self-selection. People with a strong 
dislike of nuclear power would self-select themselves to move away from the direct 
neighbourhood of the nuclear power plant. The nuclear power plant that is situated in one 
of the municipalities in the dataset was put into operation in 1970’s. Since then, people with 
a negative attitude towards nuclear energy have had enough time to move out of the 
neighbourhood as a response to the installation of the nuclear power plant. Or in case, that 
people were unable to move out of the neighbourhood, they would have time to develop a 
positive attitude towards nuclear energy for the sake of avoiding cognitive dissonance. The 
people that remained in the municipality were likely to have a positive attitude towards 
nuclear energy. This should result in an above-average positive attitude towards nuclear 
energy in the municipality with the nuclear power plant. The self-selection of people with a 
positive attitude towards nuclear energy should be visible when comparing the renewable 
default acceptance of the municipality holding the nuclear power plant with that of other 
municipalities in the dataset where such self-selection did not take place. 
Connecting the dataset of the default product change with the municipality 
characteristics made it clear that one of the five Swiss nuclear energy plants is situated in one 
of the municipalities in the network area of the energy supplier.51 
It is hypothesised that the nuclear power plant (NPP) municipality (the municipality 
with the nuclear power plant) would have a lower acceptance rate of the renewable default 
and a higher switch rate to conventional electricity in comparison to other municipalities in 
the dataset. The presumed higher switch rate to conventional electricity, when faced with the 
introduction of the renewable electricity default, could be seen as a sign of the above-average 
pro-nuclear-energy attitude in this municipality. It is imaginable that citizens who are strictly 
against nuclear energy would have pre-selected themselves by moving away. It also might be 
that citizens living in direct proximity to a nuclear power plant have built up their trust in 
nuclear energy and/or might even be employed at the nuclear power plant, and therefore 
identify themselves as being pro nuclear energy. 
                                                          
51For an overview on the five Swiss nuclear power plants, check the website of the Swiss news 
corporation: https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/die-schweizer-atomkraftwerke-im-ueberblick, last 
checked on 28.09.2017. 
4. Results   159 
 
Hypothesis 1: The NPP municipality will have a lower share of renewable electricity contracts 
and a higher share of conventional electricity contracts in 2016 compared to the other 
municipalities. 
It was also hypothesised that since the NPP municipality is only 26.3 km2 large, the 
same effect, but weaker, might be detectable for the nine municipalities that share a boarder 
with the NPP municipality.  
Hypothesis 2a: The municipalities in direct proximity to the municipality holding the nuclear 
energy plant will have lower shares of renewable electricity contracts in 2016 compared to 
the other municipalities and higher shares of renewable electricity contracts in 2016 
compared to the municipality holding the nuclear power plant. 
Hypothesis 2b: The municipalities in direct proximity to the NPP municipality will have higher 
shares of conventional electricity contracts in 2016 compared to the other municipalities and 
lower shares of conventional electricity contracts in 2016 compared to the NPP municipality. 
Descriptive Statistics on the NPP Municipality and its Surrounding Municipalities 
Table 16. Number of Metering Points and Population Size for Municipalities in Zone 
1 and Zone 2 
Municipality 
Metering points in 
dataset 
Population Total 
Voting Results NPP 
Phase-out Initiative 
in Yes-Votes % 
Zone 1 1,418 2,843 27.4% 
Zone 2 9,523 155,213 40.7%  
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable defaults. 
Table 16 shows the descriptive statistics for the NPP municipality (zone 1) and its 
surrounding municipalities (zone 2). The comparison of metering points and population for 
each municipality shows sufficient coverage for all but two municipalities.52 Metering points 
describe the connection points between the electricity network and buildings. It is therefore 
to be expected that even a full coverage of metering points for a municipality will be in 
numbers way below the population size. Depending on household size, one metering point 
can be used by a number of citizens. For most municipalities, the number of metering points 
                                                          
52 The detailed information of each municipality in zone 2 could not be listed due to data regulations.  
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in comparison to the population is roughly half. Only two municipalities stand out from this 
rule and have only eight or nine metering points. The municipalities directly neighbouring the 
municipality holding the NPP are quite diverse in population size, ranging from about 300 to 
130,000 residents, adding up to altogether 155,213 inhabitants (see Table 16). The yes-votes 
that are for the initiative of the nuclear power phase out are 27.4% for zone 1 and a mean of 
40.7% for the municipalities in zone 2. This is in stark contrast with the vast majority of the 
municipalities in our sample voting against the Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative (72.83%). 
Proximity to NPP and Contract Choices in 2015 and 2016 
Table 17. Contract Choices Before and After the Renewable Default for 
Municipalities, Grouped in Zones Depending on Closeness to NPP 
Contract 
Choice 
 Tariff choice BEFORE renewable 
default product change (2015) 
Tariff choice AFTER renewable default 
product change (01.01.2016) 
n Zone 1 n Zone 2 n Zone 3 n Zone 1 n Zone 2 n Zone 3 
Conventional 1,403 
(98.9%) 
9,381 
(98.5%) 
217,432 
(98.9%) 
384 
(27.1%) 
1,275 
(13.4%) 
24,034 
(10.9%) 
Renewable 11 
(0.8%) 
98 
(1.0%) 
1,950 
(0.9%) 
1,032 
(72.8%) 
8,199 
(86.1%) 
195,108 
(88.7%) 
Renewable-
plus 
4 
(0.3%) 
44 
(0.5%) 
558 
(0.3%) 
2 
(0.1%) 
49 
(0.5%) 
798 
(0.4%) 
TOTAL 1,418  
(100%) 
9,523 
(100%) 
219,940 
(100%) 
1,418 
(100%) 
9,523 
(100%) 
219,940 
(100%) 
Zone 1 contains the NPP (n=1,418), Zone 2 directly neighbours zone 1 (n=9,532), and Zone 3 does not 
directly neighbour zone 1 (n=219,940). All descriptive details come from the dataset 
containing only the regulated market of household and business customers with 
renewable defaults. 
Table 17 shows the contract choices in 2015 and 2016 for zones 1, 2, and 3. Since there 
is only one municipality with a nuclear power plant, the samples compared are not evenly 
divided but rather strongly skewed. There are 1,418 metering points in the dataset that can 
be located in the NPP municipality, which makes up 0.60% of the utility company’s dataset. 
The nine municipalities directly neighbouring the NPP municipality correspond to a total of 
9,523 metering points (4.02% of the utility company’s dataset). These two samples are 
compared to the majority of the metering points, which identify as municipalities neither 
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having a NPP nor neighbouring to a municipality with a NPP (n=219,940; 92.67% of the utility 
company’s dataset). For easy identification, the NPP municipality is described as zone 1 and 
all directly neighbouring municipalities are described as zone 2. All other municipalities that 
do not house a nuclear power plant and do not neighbour a municipality that does are 
described as zone 3. 
The table shows the tariff choices with the conventional electricity contract as the 
default (2015) and with the renewable electricity contract as the default (2016). In the year 
2015, there are no remarkable differences in the three zones concerning contract choice. 
They all behaved very similarly concerning their contract choices. With the introduction of 
the renewable energy default in 2016, differences in contract choice appear. It is 
hypothesised that the NPP municipality would have a higher share of customers choosing the 
conventional contract, and thus actively opting out of the renewable default. This is 
supported by the data, as zone 1 had more customers who actively chose the conventional 
electricity contract compared to zone 3 (+16.2%). The second hypothesis was that 
municipalities directly neighbouring the municipality with the nuclear power plant would 
show a similar effect, and would actively choose the conventional electricity contract more 
often when faced with the renewable energy default. This is supported by the data as well, 
as zone 2 had more customers who actively choose the conventional energy contract 
compared to zone 3 (+2.5%). While zone 1 shows a strong preference for conventional energy 
even when faced with the renewable electricity default, zone 2 shows only a weak preference. 
Even though the difference of default acceptance between zone 2 and zone 3 is about 2.6%, 
a Welch's unequal variances t-test shows that the mean of customers in zone 2 choosing the 
renewable contract is significantly different from those in zone 3 choosing the renewable 
contract.53 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the self-selection of people with pro-nuclear-energy attitude in a 
municipality harbouring a nuclear power plant seems to hold true for the municipality in this 
dataset. The metering points located in the municipality with the nuclear power plant have a 
higher than average rate of opting out of the renewable electricity default and downgrading 
their contracts to conventional electricity, which is sourced mostly through nuclear energy. 
This effect can be also seen for the municipalities directly surrounding the municipality with 
                                                          
53 Welch's unequal variances t-test statistics: t=-7.239318; df=10,223.77; p-value=4.833881e-13. 
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the nuclear power plant. The effect of the surrounding municipalities is visible but weaker in 
comparison to the municipality containing the nuclear power plant.  
4.2.5 Subsample Analysis: Renewable-plus Default 
In addition to the major default product change from conventional to renewable energy, this 
field experiment also offers insight into a small but specific customer group that switched 
from actively choosing renewable/renewable-plus electricity products in a conventional 
default product setting to a renewable-plus electricity product setting. It is natural to assume 
that this small customer group showed strong effort and motivation in choosing a 
renewable/renewable-plus product when the conventional product was the default product. 
They did not only pay surcharges on electricity for their renewable product choice, but also 
made the effort of getting product information from the electricity company and doing the 
paperwork for choosing a product that is not the default product.  
Figure 35. Diffusion of Green Products Over Time Among Customers and Products 
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2003). 
 
 
Coming back to the diffusion of green products over time among customers and 
products, this would indicate that this subgroup can be considered early adapters and that 
the diffusion stage can be described as early growth (see Figure 35) (Wüstenhagen et al., 
2003). In the early growth stage, the market engaged a population of environmentally-
minded consumers and innovative business customers. In the market stage, the customers 
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are labelled early adopters and the suppliers ‘Pioneer Goliaths’. Pioneer Goliaths refer to 
bigger companies that are at this point comfortable with getting into the market with new 
green products. Even though the Swiss renewable electricity market can be considered 
mature at the time point in question (just before the electricity supplier in question changed 
to the renewable default product), the small share of customers actively opting out of the 
conventional default product and choosing a renewable product indicates that the diffusion 
of the renewable product has only reached the early growth stage in this customer 
population. With the switch to the renewable/renewable-plus default product, the critical 
mass of customers using the green product was reached, so the diffusion stage can be 
described as take-off or even maturity (see Figure 35).  
Short Summary of the Renewable-plus Default Facilitation 
For customers in the regulated market, there was an exception rule where a small 
minority of customers received a renewable-plus energy default instead of the renewable 
energy default. This included customers who paid more than 2.5 Rappen/kWh on premium 
surcharges on average (not regarding the Energy Basic tariff). To fall into this category, the 
customer would have to have chosen the tariffs Energy Nature or Energy Nature Star, and/or 
eco-tranches of wind energy certified Naturemade Star, and/or solar energy certified 
Naturemade Star in the past year. This would identify the customer as having actively chosen 
a renewable or a renewable-plus product when the default product setting was a 
conventional product.  
Table 18. Overview of the Saturation of the Default Setting on 31.08.2015 
 Whole Dataset  Household Dataset  Business Dataset  
Conventional 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Renewable 230,881 (97.3%) 223,248 (97.21%) 7,633 (99.45%) 
Renewable-plus 6,452 (2.7%) 6,410 (2.79%) 42 (0.55%) 
TOTAL 237,333 (100%) 229,658 (100%) 7,675 (100%) 
 
Table 18 shows that the majority of customers in the regulated market received the 
renewable default (n=230,881) and only a small minority received the renewable-plus default 
setting (n=6,452). In total, this exception rule of the renewable-plus default concerns 2.7% of 
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meter points. This can be seen in the descriptive statistics of the variable ‘tariff choice’ on 
31.08.2015, which shows the initial default setting for each household before the default 
product change was realized. The customer letters announcing the default product change 
were sent out in August 2015. From then on, the customers were able to reject the new 
default setting until May 2016. The saturation of the minor default switch – from conventional 
energy to renewable-plus energy – is 2.7% for the whole dataset, 2.8% for the household 
customer dataset, and 0.6% for the business customer dataset. The switch to the renewable-
plus default was realized only in rare cases of customer descriptions. As stated before, these 
customer descriptions entailed the necessary 2.5 Rappen/kWh premium surcharge on 
average (compared to the Energy Basic tariff). This was only possible when choosing the 
tariffs Energy Nature or Energy Nature Star and/or wind and solar tranches. 
Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics of the utility use in 2016 separated for business 
and household customers which received the renewable-plus default treatment (n=6,452). 
The mean values of utility use 2016 for business and household customers with the 
renewable-plus default are lower than for those with a standard renewable default (Business 
customers: 24,703.24 vs. 45,856; Household customers: 3,214.4 vs. 4,932.2).54 The difference 
in utility use patterns is more pronounced for the business customers. Nonetheless, this could 
be an artefact due to the small sample size of business customers with renewable-plus 
default.  
At the end of August 2015, the renewable-plus default introduction was announced via 
a form letter. The form letters for the renewable default and the renewable-plus default were 
mostly identical, apart from the obvious difference that they announced either the change 
from a conventional default to a renewable default or the change from a conventional default 
to a renewable-plus default. For the customers receiving the renewable-plus default, there is 
an additional paragraph in the letter explaining to the customer why the renewable-plus 
product was chosen as the default for this customer. It explains that since the customer has 
chosen renewable energy products in the past, it would be most suitable to migrate to the 
renewable-plus product at this point. It is stressed that this migration will not involve higher 
costs for the customer. But again, the information that a downgrade to the renewable or 
conventional product would save the customer some money is not given. It is also explained 
that customers can change their energy product on the web portal. If customers do not 
                                                          
54 For full information on utility use 2016 for business and household customers with the renewable 
default, refer to Section 4.2.1 - The Default Effect. 
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change their choice by the 30th of November 2015, they will receive the renewable-plus 
energy product from 01.01.2016 on. 
Table 19. Descriptive Statistics for Utility Usage 2016 for Customers with 
Renewable-Plus Default 
 
Utility Usage 2016 
Business in kWh 
(n=42) 
Utility Usage 2016 
Household in kWh 
(n=6,410) 
Number of values 42 6,406 
Number of null values 0 0 
Number of 
missing values 
0 4 
Minimal value 1,901 0.5 
Maximal value 108,910 96,694.0 
Range  107,009 96,693.5 
Sum of all non-missing values 1,037,536 20,591,624.2 
Median 18,859.50 2,487.2 
Mean 24,703.24 3,214.4 
Standard error on the mean 3,617.75 36.3 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 7,306.19 71.1 
Variance 549,700,858.77 8,436,258.1 
Standard deviation 23,445.70 2,904.5 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean norm 
0.95 0.9 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset, regulated market, household and business 
customers, renewable-plus default (n=6,452). 
The Analysis of the Renewable-plus Default Effect 
The renewable-plus default effect can be documented short-term as well as long-term. 
The short-term default effect describes the time span between the announcement of the 
default product change in the end of August 2015 and the realisation of the default product 
change on 01.01.2016. During that time, customers (household and business) had four 
months to opt out of the new default into either the conventional or the renewable electricity 
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tariffs. As documented, they were able to either opt out via personal login into an online 
portal or by calling a local phone number. The online portal held additional information 
relevant to the choice, such as a mock-up calculation of the individual customer’s yearly utility 
usage and the cost for that usage given each of the three new tariff options. 
The long-term default effect can be seen one year after the realisation of the default 
product change (exact time point of measurement: 24.12.2016). At that time point, 
customers would have received their four quartile electricity bills of 2016. Customers would 
have had the chance to seize the opportunity to cut costs by downgrading to the conventional 
or renewable electricity tariffs. 
As the tariff prices and typical electricity usage patterns vary for household and 
business customers, the default effect will be analysed separately for the two customer 
groups. 
Figure 36. Tariff Choices of Household Customers (n=6,410) at the Beginning and 
End of 2016 (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing the regulated market of household customers 
with renewable-plus defaults (n=6,410). 
Figure 36 illustrates the tariff choices of household customers who received the 
renewable-plus default treatment in August 2015 (n=6,410). The column ‘After Renewable-
plus Default’ shows the household customers’ tariff choices on 01.01.2016, the realisation of 
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the default product change. Here, one can see that the renewable-plus tariff is the dominant 
one, with 89.8% of household customers staying with the newly introduced default (which 
was of similar price and quality to their former electricity products). The number of customers 
opting out of the default is relatively small – about 10.2%, with 1.4% downgrading to the 
conventional tariff and 8.8% downgrading to the renewable tariff. The column ‘1 Year After 
Renewable-plus Default’ shows the household customers’ tariff choices on 24.12.2016. Here, 
tariff choice is still dominated by the renewable-plus default tariff (88.70%), with a small but 
stable number of customers choosing the conventional tariff (1.90%) or the renewable tariff 
(9.4%). 
Figure 37. Tariff Choices of Business Customers (n=42) at the Beginning and End of 
2016 (own illustration) 
 
All descriptive details come from the dataset containing the regulated market of business customers 
with renewable-plus defaults (n=42). 
Figure 37 illustrates the tariff choices of business customers which received the 
renewable-plus default treatment in August 2015 (n=42). The column ‘After Renewable-plus 
Default’ shows the business customers’ tariff choices on 01.01.2016, the realisation of the 
default product change. Here, one can see that the renewable tariff is the dominant one, as 
83.3% of business customers stayed with the newly introduced default (which was of similar 
price and quality to their former electricity products). The number of customers opting out 
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of the default is around 16.7%, of which 2.4% downgraded to the conventional tariff and 
14.3% downgraded to the renewable tariff. The column ‘1 Year After Renewable-plus Default’ 
shows the business customers’ tariff choices on 24.12.2016. Here, tariff choice is still 
dominated by the renewable-plus tariff (73.8%). A small but increasing number of customers 
chose the conventional tariff (7.1%) or the renewable tariff (19.0%). Even though the default 
acceptance goes down from 83.3% in the short term to 73.8% in the long term, overall it can 
be said that the default effect remains stable in the long-term measurement for the business 
customers. 
There are similar patterns working in both customer groups: households and 
businesses. The acceptance and longevity of the default effect seems lower for business 
customers than for household customers. It is hypothesised beforehand that this would be 
the case due to business customers being more price sensitive than household customers. 
This price sensitivity is grounded in the nature of businesses having the custom of calculating 
costs more efficiently. In addition, the higher electricity usage that further differentiates 
business customers from household customers makes the price differences between 
electricity tariffs even more pronounced.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, business customers opted out of the renewable-plus default in larger 
numbers (16.7%) than household customers (10.2%) did in the short-term measurement. This 
was even more the case in the long-term measurement, where 26.1% of business customers 
opted out of the renewable-plus default and only 11.30% of household customers did. 
Comparing the short and long-term distributions of contract choices for business customers 
receiving the renewable-plus default, there is an increased rate of opting out of the default 
of 9.4% during the first year. For household customers, the increase is only 1.1%. This 
difference could possibly speak to the price sensitivity that is more pronounced in business 
customers, but could also possibly be due to the different sample sizes of household 
customers (n=6,410) and business customers (n=42) receiving the renewable-plus default. 
Comparing the major default acceptance rates (the switch from conventional to 
renewable energy) to the minor default acceptance rates shows that default acceptance rates 
for the household sector are strikingly similar. Acceptance rates for the major default range 
from 88% (long-term) to 88.60% (short-term), and acceptance rates for the minor default 
range from 88.70% (long-term) to 89.80% (short-term). The same holds true for the 
percentage share of customers choosing to downgrade to cheaper tariffs. In the major default 
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product change scenario, customers were able to choose the cheaper conventional tariff, 
which they did at rates of 11% (short-term) and 11.60% (long-term). In the minor default 
product change scenario, customers were able to downgrade to either the conventional or 
the renewable tariff, which they did at rates of 10.20% (short-term) and 11.30% (long-term). 
In both default product change scenarios, both default acceptance rates and downgrade rates 
held stable over the timespan of a year.  
Comparing the major default acceptance rates to the minor default acceptance rates 
shows that default acceptance rates for the business sector are similar in the short-term 
measurement, but not in the long-term measurement. Acceptance rates for the major default 
range from 82.70% (long-term) to 84.50% (short-term), and acceptance rates for the minor 
default range from 73.80% (long-term) to 83.30% (short-term). While the acceptance rate for 
the major default was quite stable over the timespan of a year, the same does not hold true 
for the minor default acceptance rates. The acceptance rates for the minor default drops from 
83.30% (short-term) to 73.80% (long-term), a drop of nearly 10%. This deviation in 
acceptance rate patterns should be judged keeping the numbers of business customers who 
are compared here in mind. The major default product change concerned 7,633 business 
customers and the minor default product change concerned only 42 business customers. This 
deviation therefore could be a mere product of the low number of business customers 
receiving the minor default product change. The same pattern holds true for the percentage 
share of customers choosing to downgrade to a cheaper tariff. In the major default product 
change scenario, customers were able to choose the cheaper conventional tariff, which they 
did at rates of 15.30% (short-term) and 16.80% (long-term). In the minor default product 
change scenario, customers were able to downgrade to either the conventional or the 
renewable tariffs, which they did at rates of 16.70% (short-term) and 26.10% (long-term). 
While, again, the measurement of the downgrade share of customers is stable over the 
course of a year in the major default product change scenario, it is not in the minor default 
product change scenario. In line with the 10% drop in acceptance rate, the downgrade rate 
saw an increase of about 10%. While the difference is obvious, it should not be read too much 
into. This difference in acceptance rate and downgrade share could be due to the small 
number of business customers who received the minor default switch. 
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4.3 Multivariate Analyses 
The descriptive and bivariate analyses demonstrate the massive default effect standing 
on its own, as well as in dependence to other descriptive variables. The multivariate analyses 
will build on these former results, exploring the heterogeneity of the default effect in more 
detail. Here, available customer characteristics will be explored regarding their effects on 
short-term and long-term default acceptance in their accumulation and interdependency. 
Section 4.3.1 (Logistic Regression with Short-Term Default Effect) shows a logistic 
regression with short-term default acceptance being the dependent variable. Models are 
estimated for the whole dataset as well as separately for the household customers and the 
business customers. The influences of utility use, previous renewable energy uptake, and 
customer salutation is explored.  
Section 4.3.2 (Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Effect) shows a logistic 
regression with long-term default acceptance being modelled as the dependent variable. 
Models are estimated for the whole dataset as well as separately for the household 
customers and the business customers. The influences of utility use and customer salutation 
is explored.  
Section 4.3.3 (Multilevel Logistic Regression) shows a multilevel logistic regression with 
long-term default acceptance being the dependent variable. Models are estimated separately 
for the household customers and for the business customers. The independent variables on 
the individual level are customer salutation and utility use. On the municipality level, social 
descriptive details like population density, age structure, and voting results of the initiative of 
the nuclear power phase out were added. Furthermore, the closeness of municipalities to 
the only nuclear power plant in the geographical region of the sample was added. The results 
show how variables on the individual level affect the odds of customers accepting the default 
product and how variables on the municipality level affect the odds of customers grouped in 
municipalities accepting the default product. 
In conclusion, the multivariate analysis explores interesting potential influences 
causing the heterogeneity of long-term default acceptance. On the individual level, it 
connects the type of customer (household or business), utility use, previous renewable 
energy uptake, and salutation with short-term and long-term default product acceptance. On 
the municipality level, it connects social descriptive information, voting behaviour, and 
geographic proximity to the NPP to the long-term default product acceptance.  
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4.3.1 Logistic Regression with Short-Term Default Effect 
In order to explore possible heterogeneity in the default effect, the question that needs to be 
addressed is which customer characteristics boost default acceptance and which seem to be 
hindrances to default acceptance. It follows that default acceptance is the dependent variable 
and the available customer characteristics are independent variables. Even though the 
dataset received from the utility company covers a large pool of customers, it offers little 
information on the customers themselves. The default acceptance will be analysed in its 
short-term effect in this chapter and in its long-term effect in the following chapter (Section 
4.3.2).  
A Word on the Dependent Variable 
Table 20. Contingency Table of Contract Choices on 01.01.2015 and 01.01.2016 
(n=230,881) 
 Conventional 
01.01.2016 
n=25,693 
Renewable 
01.01.2016 
n=204,339 
Renewable-plus 
01.01.2016 
n=849 
Conventional 
01.01.2015 
n=228,216  
25,641 
(11.24%) 
201,837 
(88.44%)    
738 
(0.32%) 
Renewable 
01.01.2015 
n=2,059  
42 
(2.04%) 
1,950 
(94.71%)      
67 
(3.25%) 
Renewable-plus 
01.01.2015 
n=606 
10 
(1.65%) 
552 
(91.09%) 
44 
(7.26%)  
 
A generalized linear model was estimated in which the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the odds of accepting the default product. The dependent variable is the 
contract choice of the customers on 01.01.2016. The former three values 
(conventional/renewable/renewable-plus) of contract choice 01.01.2016 were recoded as 
the default product acceptance (1=yes/0=no) on 01.01.2016. The short-term default effect 
refers to the timeframe from August 2015, when the default product change was announced, 
to 01.01.2016, when the default product change was initiated. 
Table 20 shows the contingency table for contract choices on 01.01.2015 and contract 
choices on 01.01.2016 (n=230,881). This contingency table shows how many customers 
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changed their product choices over the course of the year 2015, which is the year during 
which the default product was changed from a conventional electricity product to a 
renewable electricity product. On the left side of the table, one can see the contract choices 
made on 01.01.2015, and on the right side of the table are the contract choices made on 
01.01.2016.  
The majority of the customer population held the conventional electricity product on 
01.01.2015 (n=228,216) and the renewable electricity product on 01.01.2016 (n=201,837), 
showing the massive default effect on product choice. Of those customers who held the 
conventional standard product on 01.01.2015, 88.44% (n=201,837) accepted the new default 
product, 11.24% (n=25,641) downgraded to the conventional product, and 0.32% (n=738) 
upgraded to renewable-plus. Of the small customer population that held a renewable 
electricity product on 01.01.2015, 94.71% (n=1,950) accepted the renewable default product, 
2.04% (n=42) downgraded to conventional, and 3.25% (n=67) upgraded to renewable-plus 
electricity. Of the even smaller number of customers who held a renewable-plus contract on 
01.01.2015, 91.09% (n=552) accepted the renewable default, 7.26% (n=44) upgraded to the 
renewable-plus product, and 1.65% (n=10) downgraded to the conventional product. This 
contingency table of contract choices just before and after the default product change helps 
to show the distribution of the dependent variable in the model. With the overwhelming 
majority of customers moving from the old default product to the new default product, it 
becomes clear that the rate for the default acceptance is not an even distribution. In actuality, 
88.50% of the customer population accepted the new default product. Another interesting 
point is the persistence of customers holding a renewable contract when the default product 
was still conventionally sourced energy. Of customers who had a renewable contract on 
01.01.2015, 94.71% accepted the renewable default product on 01.01.2016. As this 
acceptance rate is higher than the average default acceptance rate (88.44%), it was modelled 
as one of the independent variables (see Contract Choice 2015 Renewable in Table 20). 
The Independent Variables 
The other independent variables are Customer Type Household, Utility Use 2015, 
Utility Use 2015 Squared, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male.    
The independent variable Customer Type Household is a dummy variable based on the 
variable Customer Type (1=Household and 0=Business). The variable identifies customer 
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types on the basis of tariff choice. Based on the main hypothesis55 and the results of former 
bivariate analyses, it is hypothesised that the variable Customer Type Household would 
increase the log odds of the default acceptance significantly in comparison to the reference 
group Business. 
The independent variables Utility Use 2015 and Utility Use 2015 Squared show the 
yearly utility usage for customers in the time range beginning in 2015 and continuing until 
the end of 2016.  
Figure 38. Meter Reading Cycles Explained for Utility Use 2015 (own illustration) 
 
 
As a recap, Figure 38 shows the four different meter reading groups. It shows that the 
utility use for the year 2015 contains the utility usage from spring 2015 to spring 2016 for the 
spring group. Furthermore, it contains the utility usage from summer 2015 to summer 2016 
for the summer group, the utility usage from autumn 2015 to autumn 2016 for the autumn 
group, and the utility usage from winter 2015 to winter 2016 for the winter group. Chapter 
4.1.1 shows in detail how the annual utility use is made up of the corresponding meter 
reading groups and demonstrates the timeframe of the meter reading groups for that year. 
Since the variable Utility Usage 2015 covers the utility usage before and after the default 
product change, it was chosen over the variable Utility Usage 2016. Based on the theory of 
price sensitivity, it is hypothesised that the variable Utility Usage 2015 would significantly 
decrease the log odds of default acceptance. The relationship between Utility Use 2015 and 
default product acceptance was hypothesised as non-linear based on former bivariate 
analysis, and therefore the independent variable Utility Usage 2015 Squared was 
hypothesised to be significant. 
                                                          
55 For more information, refer to Section 2.2.2 - Using Default rules to Promote Renewable Energy 
Uptake. 
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The independent variable Contract Choice 2015 Renewable is a dummy variable based 
on the variable Contract Choice 2015. Based on the theory of market penetration of green 
products, It is hypothesised that customers already holding renewable electricity contracts 
before the default product change would have higher log odds of accepting the new 
renewable default product than customers who held conventional electricity products. 
The independent variables Salutation 2016 Female and Salutation 2016 Male are both 
dummy variables based on the variable Salutation 2016. Since information such as household 
size and other social descriptive information is not available on an individual level in the utility 
company’s data, salutation is the only variable that describes metering points on the 
individual level. The salutation used for billing connects each metering point with the 
individual who receives the bills for that metering point. The re-coding of the salutations 
followed the heuristics of determining the gender of the billed individuals on basis of the 
information given in the salutation. While ‘female’ and ‘male’ describe the salutations of 
billed individuals whose genders were clearly indicated, the value ‘mixed’ was assigned when 
a clear gender indication could not be derived from the information given in the salutation. 
This was applicable when the salutation addressed a couple, a family, or some other term 
that did not reveal gender. The value ‘NA’ marks all missing entries for salutation. For this 
analysis, the values ‘mixed’ and ‘NA’ were re-categorized as the reference category 
‘undefined’. Even though Salutation 2016 makes assumptions regarding the gender of the 
decision-maker, it is not conclusive. Salutation 2016 indicates the gender of the billed 
individual but not the gender (or number – singular/plural) of the decision-maker per se.56 
Due to the distribution of the variable Salutation 2016, in which the overwhelming number 
of salutations had undefined genders, as well as measurement problems with the variable, 
no hypotheses was formulated.  
Table 21 shows the descriptive findings on the independent variables in the logistic 
regression short-term default acceptance model for all customers (n=230,881). 
                                                          
56 For more information on the variable Salutation 2016, refer to Section 3.4.2 - Re-coding. 
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Table 21. Descriptive Findings on the Independent Variables in the Logistic 
Regression for Short-term Default Acceptance (n=230,881) 
Variable M SD Min Max Description 
Customer Type 
Household 
0.97 - 0 1 
1=Household (n=223,248) 
0=Business (n=7,633) 
Utility Use 2015 6,217.0 20,099.8 0.0 3,790,160 
Yearly utility use of the customers in the 
timespan 2015-2016 (depending on 
reading cycle)  
Contract Choice 
2015 Renewable 
0.01 - 0 1 
1=Renewable (n=2,665) 
0=Conventional (n=228,216) 
Salutation 2016 
Female 
0.16 - 0 1 
1=Female (n=37,571) 
0=Undefined (n=193,310) 
Salutation 2016 
Male 
0.43 - 0 1 
1=Male (n=98,956) 
0=Undefined (n=131,925) 
 
Results of Logistic Regression for Short-Term Default Acceptance for All Customers 
(n=230,881) 
Table 22 shows the results of the logistic regression for the short-term default 
acceptance with Contract Choice 01.01.2016 being the dependent variable and Customer 
Type Household, Utility Use 2015, Utility Use 2015 Squared, Contract Choice 2015 
Renewable, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male being the independent 
variables. 
In interpreting the percentage change for the estimates, one has to take the odds ratio 
of the estimate, subtract 1, and multiply by 100 (Long, 2003, pp. 64–84). The result will give 
the percentage change that the binary outcome variable will be 1, which is in this case that 
the customer accepts the default product in the short-term. The variable Customer Type 
Household is an independent dummy variable where the reference category is business. The 
coefficient is 0.09 and the exponent of the coefficient is 1.094. The effect is significant 
(p=0.023) and supports the main hypothesis of business customers having lower renewable 
default acceptance than household customers. Calculating the same model and excluding the 
highest and lowest 5% of utility use in the variable Utility Use 2015 (and also Utility Use 2015 
Squared) does make Customer Type Household non-significant. It seems as if the distinction 
between household and business customers is mainly due to their different utility use 
profiles. When the highest 5% of utility use is excluded (which can directly be translated as  
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Table 22. Results of Logistic Regression for Short-Term Default Acceptance for All 
Customers (n=230,881) 
Variable Estimate Odds Ratio Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 57    
Intercept 2.046 7.739 0.041 50.116 0.000 
Customer Type 
Household 
0.09 1.094 0.039 2.277 0.023 
Utility Use 2015 -0.006 0.99 0.001 -11.521 0.000 
Utility Use 2015 Squared 0 1.000 0.000 6.778 0.000 
Contract Choice 2015 
Renewable  
0.687 1.988 0.081 8.455 0.000 
Salutation 2016 Female 0.417 1.517 0.022 18.542 0.000 
Salutation 2016 Male  -0.247 0.781 0.014 -17.601 0.000 
Null Deviance=164,739 points on 230,880 degrees of freedom 
Residual Deviance=163,281 points on 230,874 degrees of freedom 
 
excluding the highest 5% of the utility use of the business customers) the significant 
distinction of how the customer type affects the log odds of short-term default acceptance 
gets lost. Therefore, the effect of the independent variable Customer Type Household is 
mostly driven by the underlying utility use profiles, and more specifically the extreme high 
utility users of the top 5% in the business sample.  
The coefficients of the variables Utility Use 2015 and Utility Use 2015 Squared have to 
be interpreted together. Both variables have a significant effect on the odds of customers 
accepting the default product in the short term. Since the direction of Utility Use 2015 is 
negative, one can infer that Utility Use 2015 has a negative effect on the odds of accepting 
the default product in the short term. The direction of Utility Use 2015 Squared is positive, 
which indicates a curvilinear relationship between Utility Use 2015 and short-term default 
acceptance. Therefore, there is no basic linear relationship between Utility Usage 2015 and 
short-term default acceptance, but rather a significant curvilinear relationship. The odds for 
very low and very high utility use are significantly higher than the odds for medium utility 
use, supporting the hypothesised non-linear relationship between Utility Use 2015 and short-
term default acceptance in the beginning. The coefficient of Utility Use 2015 is -0.006, and 
the exponent of the coefficient is 0.99. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the 
                                                          
57 A significance level of 5% is considered if not stated otherwise. 
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odds of short-term default acceptance were decreased for customers by 1% with an increase 
of 1,000 kWh utility use. With a p-value of 0, this effect is significant. The former hypothesis 
that Utility Use 2015 would significantly decrease the odds of short-term default acceptance 
for customers is supported by the data. Calculating the same model and excluding the highest 
and lowest 5% of utility use in the variable Utility Use 2015 (and also Utility Use 2015 Squared) 
does not change the directions or significance levels of those two independent variables. 
Therefore, the curvilinear relationship of Utility Use 2015 and short-term default acceptance 
is valid and not due to uncleaned data containing influential data points.  
Contract Choice Renewable 2015 is an independent dummy variable marking those 
customers that held a renewable contract on the 01.01.2015 when the conventional default 
product was still in place. The coefficient is 0.687, and the exponent of that is 1.988.  
Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-term default acceptance 
were increased by 99% for customers with renewable (or renewable-plus) contracts in 
comparison to customers with conventional contracts as measured on the first day of January 
2015. This effect is significant, supporting the hypothesised positive influence of Contract 
Choice 2015 Renewable on short-term default acceptance and repeating the results of the 
former bivariate analysis (see Table 20. Contingency Table of Contract Choice 01.01.2015 and 
01.01.2016 (n=230,881)). 
The variable Salutation 2016 Female is an independent dummy variable marking the 
female salutations used for billing in 2016. The coefficient of Salutation 2016 Female is 0.417 
and the exponent is 1.517. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-
term default acceptance were increased by 52% for customers with a female salutation in 
comparison to customers with an undefined salutation. This effect is also significant 
(p=0.000). The variable Salutation 2016 Male is an independent dummy variable marking the 
male salutations used for billing in 2016. The coefficient of Salutation 2016 Male is -0.247 and 
the exponent is 0.781. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-term 
default acceptance were decreased by 22% for customers with a male salutation in 
comparison to customers with an undefined salutation. This effect is also significant 
(p=0.000). While both salutation variables show an unpredicted significant effect on the log 
odds of accepting the default product, this effect should be interpreted with care due to the 
measurement issues with the variable Salutation 2016.  
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Model Goodness of Fit 
The analysis of deviance table shows the significance level of the independent 
variables, which were added sequentially (first to last) to the model. The table shows that all 
independent variables are significant. The ANOVA calculation comparing a model containing 
only the intercept and dependent variable with the model including all independent variables 
is also significant. Concerning the goodness of fit of this generalized linear model, the null 
deviance indicates a value of 164,739 on 230,880 degrees of freedom. Including the 
independent variables (weight and displacement) decreases the deviance to 163,281 points 
on 230,874 degrees of freedom, which is a reduction in deviance that is deemed significant. 
The residual deviance is reduced by 1,458 points with a loss of six degrees of freedom. 
Keeping in mind the large sample size and according number of degrees of freedom shows 
that the inclusion of the independent variables does not improve this model by much. Even 
though the inclusion of the independent variables is significant, its reduction of deviance 
might only be judged significant according to the high number of degrees of freedom. While 
the default acceptance effect is very strong in the sample, the independent variables seem to 
not hold a lot of explanatory power of why this effect is so strong. 
Results of Logistic Regression for Short-Term Default Acceptance for Business Customers 
(n=7,633) 
Table 23. Descriptive Findings on the Independent Variables in the Logistic 
Regression for Short-term Default Acceptance (n=7,633) 
Variable M SD Min Max Description 
Utility Use 2015 46,123.68 97,896.43 0.0 3,790,160 
Yearly utility use of the customers in the 
timespan 2015-2016 (depending on 
reading cycle)  
Contract Choice 
2015 Renewable 
0.004 - 0 1 
1=Renewable (n=29) 
0=Conventional (n=7,604) 
Salutation 2016 
Female 
0.027 - 0 1 
1=Female (n=207) 
0=Undefined (n=7,426) 
Salutation 2016 
Male 
0.337 - 0 1 
1=Male (n=2,575) 
0=Undefined (n=5,058) 
 
With the independent variable Customer Type Household having a significant influence 
on the odds of accepting the default product in the short-term in the former model with all 
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customers, it is worth exploring this further by calculating a model separated for the business 
and household customers.  
In the following, the logistic regression model will be calculated for only the business 
customers. The dependent variable is again the contract choice of the business customers on 
01.01.2016, which is recoded as a dummy into the acceptance of the default product on 
01.01.2016. The independent variables are Utility Use 2015, Utility Use 2015 Squared, 
Contract Choice 2015 Renewable, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male.    
Table 23 shows the descriptive findings for the independent variables in the logistic 
regression model for short-term default acceptance in the business customer sample 
(n=7,633).  
Table 24. Results of Logistic Regression for Short-Term Default Acceptance for 
Business Customers (n=7,633) 
Variable Estimate Odds Ratio Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
Intercept 1.819 6.164 0.053 34.521 0.000 
Utility Use 2015 0.0002 1.000 0.001 0.378 0.705 
Utility Use 2015 Squared -0.0000004 1.000 0.000 -1.306 0.191 
Contract Choice 2015 
Renewable  
0.494 1.639 0.473 1.044 0.297 
Salutation 2016 Female 0.204 1.226 0.221 0.921 0.357 
Salutation 2016 Male      -0.380 0.684 0.067 -5.71 0.000 
Null Deviance=6,593.8 points on 7,632 degrees of freedom 
Residual Deviance=6,550.3 points on 7,627 degrees of freedom 
 
Table 24 shows the results of the logistic regression for short-term default acceptance 
for the business customer sample (n=7,633), with Contract Choice 01.01.2016 being the 
dependent variable and Utility Use 2015, Utility Use 2015 Squared, Contract Choice 2015 
Renewable, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male being the independent 
variables. 
The coefficients of the variables Utility Use 2015 (0.0002, p=0.705) and Utility Use 2015 
Squared (-0.0000004, p=0.191) have no significant influence on the odds of customers 
accepting the default product. This finding contradicts the hypothesis that Utility Use 2015 
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would have a significant negative effect on the odds of customers accepting the default 
product. This effect was thought to be even more pronounced in the business sample since 
here the utility use is significantly higher than in the household sample, possibly increasing 
the theorised price sensitivity.58  
The coefficient for Contract Choice Renewable 2015 is also not significant (0.494, 
p=0.297). This might be due to the unequal grouping of this variable that specifically can be 
found in the business sample and not in the household sample. Comparing the descriptive 
findings of the independent variable Contract Choice Renewable 2015 shows that only 29 
business customers held a prior renewable contract choice. For the household customers, 
2,030 customers held a prior renewable contract choice (see Table 21 and Table 23).  
The coefficient of Salutation 2016 Female is not significant either (0.204, p=0.357). This 
also might be due to the unequal grouping of this variable that specifically can be found in 
the business sample and not in the household sample. Comparing the descriptive findings of 
the independent variable Salutation 2016 Female shows that only 207 business customers 
were marked with a female salutation, but for the household customers there were 37,364 
customers.  
Finally, the coefficient of Salutation 2016 Male is significant (-0.380, p=0.000). The 
exponent of the coefficient of Salutation 2016 Male is 0.684. Therefore, holding all other 
variables constant, the odds of short-term default acceptance were decreased by 32% for 
customers with a male salutation in comparison to customers with undefined salutations. 
Model Goodness of Fit 
The analysis of deviance table shows the significance level of the independent 
variables, which were added sequentially (first to last) to the model. It shows that only Utility 
Use 2015 Squared, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male are significant. The 
ANOVA calculation comparing a model containing only the intercept and dependent variable 
with the model including all independent variables is significant. Concerning the goodness of 
fit of this generalized linear model, the null deviance indicates a value of 6,593.8 on 7,632 
degrees of freedom. Including the independent variables (weight and displacement) 
decreases the deviance to 6,550.3 points on 7,627 degrees of freedom. The residual deviance 
is reduced by 43.5 points with a loss of five degrees of freedom, which is a significant 
reduction in deviance. Even though the inclusion of the independent variables is partly 
                                                          
58 For the sake of comparability to the other models, the curvilinear term of Utility Use 2015 was 
included in this model even though it is non-significant. Estimating the model with a linear term of 
Utility Use 2015 shows that the effect is still insignificant.  
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significant, its reduction of deviance can be considered small. While the default acceptance 
effect is very strong in the sample, the independent variables seem to not hold a lot of 
explanatory power of why this effect is so strong. 
 
Results of Logistic Regression for Short-Term Default Acceptance for Household 
Customers (n=223,248) 
Due to the binary outcome variable that is the acceptance of the default product on 
01.01.2016, a generalized linear model in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the odds of accepting the default product was created. The dependent variable is again the 
tariff choice of the customers on 01.01.2016, which was recoded as a dummy into the 
acceptance of the default on 01.01.2016. The independent variables are Utility Use 2015, 
Utility Use 2015 Squared, Contract Choice 2015 Renewable, Salutation 2016 Female, and 
Salutation 2016 Male.   
Table 25. Descriptive Findings on the Independent Variables in the Logistic 
Regression for the Short-term Default Acceptance (n=223,248) 
Variable M SD Min Max Description 
Utility Use 2015 4,852.543 5,819.726 0.0 766,533 
Yearly utility use in 1,000 kWh of the 
customers in the timespan 2015-2016 
(depending on reading cycle)  
Contract Choice 
2015 Renewable 
0.009 - 0 1 
1=Renewable (n=2,030) 
0=Conventional (n=221,218) 
Salutation 2016 
Female 
0.167 - 0 1 
1=Female (n=37,364) 
0=Undefined (n=185,884) 
Salutation 2016 
Male 
0.432 - 0 1 
1=Male (n=96,381) 
0=Undefined (n=126,867) 
 
Table 25 shows the descriptive findings on the independent variables and Table 26 
gives the results of the logistic regression for short-term default acceptance for the household 
customers (n=223,248). 
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Table 26. Results of Logistic Regression for Short-Term Default Acceptance for 
Household Customers (n=223,248) 
Variable Estimate Odds Ratio Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
Intercept 2.394 10.955 0.014 168.933 0.000 
Utility Use 2015 -0.062 0.94 0.002 -30.333 0.000 
Utility Use 2015 Squared   0.0007 1.000 0.000 13.976 0.000 
Contract Choice 2015 
Renewable  
0.672 1.958 0.083 8.136 0.000 
Salutation 2016 Female 0.354 1.424 0.023 15.524 0.000 
Salutation 2016 Male      -0.234 0.792 0.014 -16.251 0.000 
Null Deviance=158,029 points on 223,247 degrees of freedom 
Residual Deviance=155,577 points on 223,242 degrees of freedom 
 
In Table 26 the results of the logistic regression for short-term default acceptance can 
be found for the household customer sample (n=223,248), with Contract Choice 01.01.2016 
being the dependent variable and Utility Use 2015, Utility Use 2015 Squared, Contract Choice 
2015 Renewable, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male being the independent 
variables. 
The coefficients of the variables Utility Use 2015 (-0.062, p=0.000) and Utility Use 2015 
Squared (0.0007, p=0.000) had a significant influence on the odds of household customers 
accepting the default product. This supports the hypothesis that utility use would have a 
negative effect on short-term default product acceptance and that this effect would be non-
linear. Therefore, with very low and very high utility consumption, the odds of accepting the 
default product short-term significantly increased in comparison with moderate utility 
consumption. The coefficient of Utility Use 2015 is -0.062 and the exponent of the coefficient 
is 0.94. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-term default 
acceptance were decreased for customers by 6% for an increase in yearly utility use of 1,000 
kWh. With a p-value of 0, this effect is significant. The former hypothesis that Utility Use 2015 
would significantly decrease the odds of short-term default acceptance for customers is 
supported by the data. Calculating the same model and excluding the highest and lowest 5% 
of utility use in the variable Utility Use 2015 (and also Utility Use 2015 Squared) does not 
change the direction or the significance levels of those two variables. Therefore, the 
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curvilinear relationship of Utility Use 2015 and short-term default acceptance is valid and not 
due to uncleaned data containing influential data points.  
Figure 39 shows the odds of short-term default acceptance for the utility use in 2015 
in the household sample (n=223,248), holding all other independent variables constant. The 
lowest odds (0.27) occurred at a yearly utility use of 41,672 kWh (see Figure 39; point marked 
with a blue dotted line). For a better visual on the curvilinear relationship between Utility Use 
2015 and the odds of accepting the default in the short-term, the x-axis ranges from 0 to 
80,000, thus not including the very extreme cases of utility use in the household sample. As 
an orientation on the distribution of the variable, the mean of Utility Use 2015 for the 
household sample is marked with a red dotted line in Figure 39 (the mean of yearly utility use 
is 4,853 kWh in the household sample). The median of Utility Use 2015 for the household 
sample is 3,436 kWh. 
Figure 39. Odds of Short-Term Default Acceptance for Utility Use 2015 (own 
illustration; n=223,248) 
 
 
The coefficient for Contract Choice Renewable 2015 is 0.672 (p=0.000) and the 
exponent is 1.958. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-term 
default acceptance were increased by 96% for customers with renewable (or renewable-plus) 
contracts in comparison to customers with conventional contracts as measured on the first 
day of January in 2015. This supports the hypothesis that former renewable contract holders 
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would more eagerly accept the new renewable default product. This is a result that is also 
seen in the bivariate analysis of the contingency table of Contract Choice 01.01.2015 and 
01.01.2016 (see Table 20).  
The coefficient for Salutation 2016 Female is 0.354 (p=0.000) and the exponent is 
1.424. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-term default 
acceptance were increased by 42.4% for customers with female salutations in comparison to 
customers with undefined salutations. 
The coefficient for Salutation 2016 Male is -0.234 (p=0.000) and the exponent is 0.792. 
Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-term default acceptance 
were decreased by 21% for customers with male salutations in comparison to customers with 
undefined salutations. 
Model Goodness of Fit  
The analysis of deviance table that shows the significance levels of the independent 
variables added sequentially (first to last) to the model shows that all independent variables 
are significant. The ANOVA calculation, comparing a model containing only the intercept and 
dependent variable with the model including all independent variables, is also significant. 
Concerning the goodness of fit of this generalized linear model, the null deviance indicates a 
value of 158,029 on 223,247 degrees of freedom. Including the independent variables 
(weight and displacement) decreases the deviance to 155,577 points on 223,242 degrees of 
freedom, which is a significant reduction in deviance. The residual deviance has been reduced 
by 2,452 points with a loss of five degrees of freedom. Keeping in mind the large sample size 
and according numbers of degrees of freedom, the inclusion of the independent variables 
does not improve this model by much. Even though the inclusion of the independent 
variables is significant, the reduction of deviance can be considered small. While the default 
acceptance effect is very strong in the sample, the independent variables seem to not hold a 
lot of explanatory power of why this effect is so strong.  
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Conclusion 
Table 27. Overview of Percentage Changes in Logistic Regression for Short-Term 
Default Acceptance  
Variable 
Percentage Change:  
Whole Dataset 
(n=230,881) 
Percentage Change: 
Business Sample 
(n=7,633) 
Percentage Change: 
Household Sample 
(n=223,248) 
Customer Type 
Household 
9.4%*   
Utility Use 2015 -1%*** 0% -6%*** 
Utility Use 2015 Squared   0%*** 0% 0%***  
Contract Choice 2015 
Renewable  
98.8%*** 63.9% 95.8%*** 
Salutation 2016 Female 51.7%*** 22.6% 42.4%*** 
Salutation 2016 Male -21.9%*** -31.7%*** -20.9%*** 
+p<0.10     *p<0.05     **p<0.01     ***p<0.001 
Table 27 gives an overview of the calculated percentage changes from the logistic 
regressions for short-term default acceptance in this chapter. From the results of these three 
models, it becomes clear that the whole dataset and the household sample show very similar 
directions and significance levels for the independent variables. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the overall sample is primarily made up of household samples. The business sample has 
more deviation in directions and significance levels for the independent variables. Only one 
independent variable is stable in its direction and significance level among all three models, 
and that is Salutation 2016 Male. Holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-term 
default acceptance are decreased by a range of 20.9% (business sample) to 31.7% (household 
sample) for customers with male salutations in comparison to customers with undefined 
salutations. 
While the former descriptive and bivariate analyses showcase the strength of the 
default effect in the data, the multivariate analysis points out the shortcomings and lack of 
powerful explanatory variables in the data. Even though the dataset received from the utility 
company covers a large pool of customers, it offers only little information on the customers 
themselves. There is an imbalance of powerful default effect and weak explanatory variables. 
Drawing from theory, there are variables one can think of that are missing in this dataset and 
hold the potential to explain more in-depth what underlies the power of the default effect. 
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Most of those theorized variables are on the individual level, fleshing out the economic 
situation and the social descriptive characteristics of the decision-makers. Possible customer 
characteristics that are not captured in this dataset but could potentially hold explanatory 
power for the heterogeneity of the default effect are explored in the discussion of the results 
(Chapter 6). 
4.3.2 Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Effect 
While the previous chapter analyses what influences the default product acceptance 
in the short-term, this chapter concentrates on the long-term default acceptance. In order to 
explore the possible heterogeneity in the long-term default effect acceptance, it needs to be 
asked which customer characteristics boost the default acceptance and which seem to be 
hindrances to the default acceptance. The default acceptance is the dependent variable, and 
the available customer characteristics are independent variables. The long-term default 
effect refers to the timeframe starting with the first day of January 2016, when the default 
product change was introduced, and ending on the 24th of December 2016. This time range 
covers nearly a full year, and with that, four utility bills to the customers. 
A Word on the Dependent Variable 
Due to the binary outcome variable – that is, the acceptance of the default product 
long-term – a generalized linear model in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the odds of accepting the default product in which the predicted probability of the binary 
logistic regression is chosen. The dependent variable is calculated as the persistent 
acceptance of the default product throughout 2016. It combines information of the tariff 
choices of the customers on 01.01.2016 and on 24.12.2016. The former three values 
(conventional/renewable/renewable-plus) of the tariff choice on 01.01.2016 and 24.12.2016 
were recoded into long-term default acceptance (1=default acceptance on both time 
points/0=default acceptance on only one of the time points or none of the time points).59 
                                                          
59 Calculating a model where the persistence of default acceptance is modeled via an independent 
variable showed several problems. The persistence of default acceptance is very strong in the data 
while other independent variables only have none or weak explanatory power. The overwhelming 
strength of the coefficient is due to the fact that 99.17% (n=202,652) of the customers stayed with 
the renewable default contract from 01.01.2016 to 24.12.2016. Calculating a model where the 
persistence of default acceptance is modeled as an independent variable and comparing the same 
model without that independent variable shows the major explanatory power in the AIC value. 
Without the persistence of default acceptance variable the AIC value is 169,895 and with the 
variable it is 19,888. The unbalance of explanatory power between the independent variables shows 
itself through strong autocorrelation between the independent variable modeling the persistence of 
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Table 28. Contingency Table of Contract Choices 01.01.2016 and 24.12.2016 
(n=230,881) 
 Conventional 
24.12.2016 
n=27,260 
Renewable 
24.12.2016 
n=202,685 
Renewable-plus 
24.12.2016 
n=936 
Conventional 
01.01.2016 
n=25,663 
25,663 
(99.88%) 
28 
(0.11%) 
2 
(0.01%) 
Renewable 
01.01.2016 
n=204,339 
1,594 
(0.78%)    
202,652 
(99.17%)   
93 
(0.05%) 
Renewable-plus 
01.01.2016 
n=849 
3 
(0.35%)       
5 
(0.59%)         
841 
(99.06%) 
 
Table 28 shows the contingency table of the two variables contract choice 01.01.2016 
and contract choice 24.12.2016 (n=230,881). This contingency table shows how many 
customers changed their products over the course of the year after the default product 
change initiation. On the left side of the table, one can see the contract choices made on 
01.01.2016, and on the right side of the table are the contract choices made on 24.12.2016. 
Customers who choose to opt out of the renewable default product between August 2015 
and the first of January 2016 and those who chose conventional electricity were 25,693, of 
which 25,663 (99.88%) stayed with their product choice over the course of the year. Only 28 
(0.11%) switched back to renewable products and two (0.01%) opted to switch to the 
renewable premium product (renewable-plus). The number of customers who chose to stay 
with the renewable default product between August 2015 and the first of January 2016 was 
204,339, of which 202,652 stayed with their product choice over the course of the year, 1,594 
(0.78%) switched to conventional products, and 93 (0.05%) opted to switch to the renewable 
premium product (renewable-plus). The number of customers who chose to opt out of the 
renewable default product between August 2015 and the first of January 2016 and buy 
renewable-plus electricity was 849, of which 841 (99.06%) stayed with their product choice 
over the course of the year. Only three (0.35%) switched to conventional products and five 
                                                          
default effect and the other independent variables. Summarizing, modeling the persistence of 
default effect as an independent variable leads to a fake deflation of the AIC value and showed 
strong autocorrelation with other independent variables. The presented model, where persistence 
of default effect is modelled as the dependent variable, has a much higher AIC value but is true to 
the data.   
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(0.59%) opted to switch to the renewable product. All in all, this shows that the choice 
persistence was high over the timespan of one year, irrespective of the product chosen. The 
percentage range of customers staying with the product they had chosen on 01.01.2016 over 
the course of 2016 ranged from 99.06% (renewable-plus) to 99.88% (conventional). 
From Table 20 and Table 28, one can infer that most product migration was driven by 
the change of the default product. It also becomes clear that the response to the default 
product change had an imminent effect from August 2015 to the first of January 2016. The 
number of customers choosing conventional electricity on 01.01.2015 as well as on 
01.01.2016 (n=25,641) also remained surprisingly stable through 24.12.2016 (n=25,663).60 
The Independent Variables 
The independent variables are Customer Type Household, Utility Use 2015, Utility Use 
2015 Squared, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male.    
The independent variable Customer Type Household is a dummy variable based on the 
variable Customer Type (1=Household and 0=Business). The variable identifies customer 
types on the basis of tariff choice. Based on the main hypothesis, it was expected that the 
variable Customer Type Household would increase the odds of long-term default acceptance 
significantly in comparison to its reference group of business customers.61 
The independent variables Utility Use 2015 and Utility Use 2015 Squared show the 
yearly utility use for the customers in the time range beginning in 2015 and continuing until 
the end of 2016. Chapter 4.1.1 shows in detail how the measurement of the annual utility 
use is made up of the corresponding meter reading groups and demonstrates the timeframe 
of the meter reading groups for that year. Since the variable Utility Use 2015 covers the utility 
usage before and after the default product change, it was chosen in preference to the variable 
Utility Use 2016. Based on the theory of price sensitivity, It is hypothesised that the variable 
Utility Use 2015 would decrease the odds of long-term default acceptance significantly. The 
relationship between Utility Use 2015 and default product acceptance was hypothesised as 
                                                          
60 Comparing the acceptance rate of the default option in the beginning of 2016 (88.60% of 
n=223,248 household customers) and in the end of 2016 (88.00% of n=223,248 household 
customers) shows to tell that 0.60% of customers adjusted from the default option to their true 
preference. All of those household customers who opted out during the year of the default 
introduction chose the energy contract their originally held before: conventional energy. Therefore 
one could conclude that the 0.60% of household customers had an original preference for 
conventional energy, did not seem to notice the default product change at first but during the course 
of the first year and opted out during that time, realigning their preference with their actual contract 
choice. 
61 For more information, refer to Section 2.2.2 - Using Default rules to Promote Renewable Energy 
Uptake. 
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non-linear, and therefore the independent variable Utility Use 2015 Squared was 
hypothesised as significant. 
The independent variables Salutation 2016 Female and Salutation 2016 Male are both 
dummy variables based on the variable Salutation 2016. Since information such as household 
size and other social descriptive information was not available on an individual level in the 
utility company’s data, salutation is the only variable that describes the metering points on 
the individual level. Salutation 2016 connects each metering point with the individual who 
receives the bills for that metering point. The re-coding of the salutations followed the 
heuristics of determining the gender of the billed individual on the basis of the information 
given in the salutation. While ‘female’ and ‘male’ describe the salutations of billed individuals 
clearly indicating the gender of the billed individual, the value ‘mixed’ was assigned when a 
clear gender indicator could not be derived from the information given in the salutation. This 
was applicable when the salutation addressed a couple, a family, or some other term that did 
not clearly reveal gender. The value ‘NA’ marks all missing entries for salutation. For this 
analysis, the values ‘mixed’ and ‘NA’ were re-categorized as the reference category 
‘undefined’. Even though Salutation 2016 makes assumptions regarding the genders of the 
decision-makers, it is not conclusive. Salutation 2016 indicates the gender of the billed 
individual, but not the gender (or number – singular/plural) of the decision-makers per se.62  
Table 29. Descriptive Findings on the Independent Variables in the Logistic 
Regression for Long-term Default Acceptance 
Variable M SD Min Max Description 
Customer Type 
Household 
0.967 - 0 1 
1=Household (n=223,248) 
0=Business (n=7,633) 
Utility Use 2015 6,217.0 20,099.8 0.0 3,790,160 
Yearly utility use in 1,000 kWh of the 
customers in the timespan 2015-2016 
(depending on reading cycle)  
Salutation 2016 
Female 
0.162 - 0 1 
1=Female (n=37,571) 
0=Undefined (n=193,310) 
Salutation 2016 
Male 
0.429 - 0 1 
1=Male (n=98,956) 
0=Undefined (n=131,925) 
 
                                                          
62 For more information on the variable Salutation 2016, refer to Section 3.4.2 - Re-coding. 
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Table 29 gives the descriptive findings on the independent variables and Table 30 
shows the results of the logistic regression for long-term default acceptance for the all 
customers (n=230,881). 
Results of Logistic Regression for Long-Term Default Acceptance for All Customers 
(n=230,881) 
Table 30. Results of Logistic Regression for Long-Term Default Acceptance for All 
Customers (n=230,881) 
Variable Estimate Odds Ratio Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)63 
Intercept 1.970 7.173 0.040 49.129 0.000 
Customer Type 
Household 
0.100 1.106 0.038 2.610 0.009 
Utility Use 2015 -0.007 0.992 0.001 -13.701 0.000 
Utility Use 2015 Squared   2.735e-06 1.000 0.000 8.004 0.000 
Salutation 2016 Female 0.421 1.524 0.022 19.322 0.000 
Salutation 2016 Male      -0.226 0.798 0.014 -16.567 0.000 
Null Deviance=171,506 points on 230,880 degrees of freedom 
Residual Deviance=170,012 points on 230,875 degrees of freedom 
 
In Table 30 the results of the logistic regression for long-term default acceptance can 
be found. The persistence of default acceptance throughout 2016 is the dependent variable 
and Customer Type Household, Utility Use 2015, Utility Use 2015 Squared, Salutation 2016 
Female, and Salutation 2016 Male are the independent variables. 
The variable Customer Type Household has a coefficient of 0.1, and the exponent of 
the coefficient is 1.106. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance were increased by 10.6% for household customers in comparison to 
business customers. The effect is significant (p=0.009) and supports the hypothesis that 
business customers had a lower default acceptance than household customers.64 Calculating 
the same model and excluding the highest and lowest 5% of utility use in the variable Utility 
                                                          
63 A significance level of 5% is considered if not stated otherwise. 
64 For more information, refer to Section 2.2.2 - Using Default rules to Promote Renewable Energy 
Uptake. 
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Use 2015 (and also Utility Use 2015 Squared) does make the effect of Customer Type 
Household non-significant. It seems that the distinction between household and business 
customers is connected to their different utility use profiles. When the highest 5% of utility 
users are excluded (which can directly be translated as excluding the highest 5% of utility use 
of business customers) the significant distinction of how the customer type affects the odds 
of long-term default acceptance is lost. Therefore, the effect of the independent variable 
Customer Type Household is to some extent driven by the underlying utility use profiles, and 
more specifically, the extremely high utility use of the top 5% of the business sample. 
The coefficient of the variables Utility Use 2015 and Utility Use 2015 Squared have to 
be interpreted together. Both variables have a significant effect on the log odds of customers 
accepting the default product. Since the direction of Utility Use 2015 is negative, one can infer 
that Utility Use 2015 had a negative effect on the odds of accepting the default product long-
term. The direction of Utility Use 2015 Squared is positive, which indicates a curvilinear 
relationship between Utility Use 2015 and long-term default acceptance. Therefore, there is 
no basic linear relationship between Utility Usage 2015 and long-term default acceptance, 
but there is a significant curvilinear relationship. The odds for very low and very high utility 
use are significantly higher than the odds for moderate utility use, supporting the 
hypothesised relationship between Utility Use 2015 and long-term default acceptance. The 
coefficient of Utility Use 2015 is -0.007, and the exponent of the coefficient is 0.992. 
Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term default acceptance 
were decreased for customers by 0.8% for each 1,000 kWh increase in Utility Use 2015. An 
increase of 1,000 kWh in yearly utility use would be approximately a change of a three person 
household becoming a four person household.  With a p-value of 0, this effect is significant. 
The hypothesis that Utility Use 2015 would significantly decrease the odds of short-term 
default acceptance for customers is supported. Calculating the same model and excluding the 
highest and lowest 5% of utility use in the variable Utility Use 2015 (and also Utility Use 2015 
Squared) does not change the directions or the significance levels of those two independent 
variables. Therefore, the curvilinear relationship of Utility Use 2015 and long-term default 
acceptance is valid and not due to uncleaned data containing influential data points.  
The variable Salutation 2016 Female is a dummy variable marking the female 
salutations used in 2016. The coefficient of Salutation 2016 Female is 0.421 and the exponent 
is 1.524. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term default 
acceptance were increased by 52.4% for customers with female salutations in comparison to 
customers with undefined salutations. This effect is also significant.  
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The variable Salutation 2016 Male is a dummy variable marking the male salutations 
used in 2016. The coefficient of Salutation 2016 Male is -0.226 and the exponent is 0.798. 
Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term default acceptance 
were decreased by 20.2% for customers with male salutations in comparison to customers 
with undefined salutations. This effect is also significant. While both salutation variables show 
an unexpected significant effect on the odds of accepting the default product long-term, this 
effect should be interpreted with care due to the measurement issues with the variable 
Salutation 2016.  
Model Goodness of Fit 
The analysis of deviance table shows the significance levels of the independent 
variables, which were added sequentially (first to last) to the model. It shows that all the 
independent variables are significant. The ANOVA calculation comparing the model 
containing only the intercept and dependent variable with the model including the 
independent variables is also significant. Concerning the goodness of fit of this generalized 
linear model, the null deviance indicates a value of 171,506 on 230,880 degrees of freedom. 
Including the independent variables (weight and displacement) decreases the deviance to 
170,012 points on 230,875 degrees of freedom. The residual deviance is reduced by 1,494 
points with a loss of five degrees of freedom. Keeping in mind the large sample size and 
accordant number of degrees of freedom, the inclusion of the independent variables does 
not improve this model by much. Even though the inclusion of the independent variables is 
significant, the reduction of deviance might only be judged significant given the high number 
of degrees of freedom. While the long-term default acceptance effect is very strong in the 
sample, the independent variables seem to not hold a lot of explanatory power of why this 
effect is so strong.  
Results of Logistic Regression for Long-Term Default Acceptance for Business Customers 
(n=7,633) 
Since the independent variable Customer Type Household is significant in the main 
model including all customers, two separate models for each customer type were calculated. 
The model described next is the logistic regression model for the long-term default 
acceptance in the business sample. The dependent variable was calculated as the persistent 
acceptance of the default product throughout 2016. The independent variables are Utility 
Use 2015, Utility Use 2015 Squared, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male.    
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Table 31. Descriptive Findings on the Independent Variables in the Logistic 
Regression for Long-term Default Acceptance (n=7,633) 
Variable M SD Min Max Description 
Utility Use 
2015 
46,123.68 97,896.43 0.0 3,790,160 
Yearly utility use of the customers in the 
timespan 2015-2016 (depending on 
reading cycle)  
Salutation 
2016 Female 
0.027 - 0 1 
1=Female (n=207) 
0=Undefined (n=7,426) 
Salutation 
2016 Male 
0.337 - 0 1 
1=Male (n=2,575) 
0=Undefined (n=5,058) 
 
Table 31 shows the descriptive findings on the independent variables in the logistic 
regression for long-term default acceptance in the business customer sample (n=7,633).  
Table 32. Results of Logistic Regression for Long-Term Default Acceptance for 
Business Customers (n=7,633) 
Variable Estimate Odds Ratio Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept 1.718 5.571 0.049 35.231 0.000 
Utility Use 
2015 
-0.001 0.999 0.001 -1.395 0.163 
Utility Use 
2015 Squared   
1.109e-08 1.000 0.000 0.050 0.960 
Salutation 
2016 Female 
0.202 1.224 0.211 0.959 0.337 
Salutation 
2016 Male  
-0.347 0.707 0.064 -5.425 0.000 
Null Deviance=7,045.7 points on 7,632 degrees of freedom 
Residual Deviance=7,008.2 points on 7,628 degrees of freedom 
 
Table 32 shows the results of the logistic regression for long-term default acceptance 
for the business customer sample (n=7,633), with the persistence of default acceptance 
throughout 2016 being the dependent variable and Utility Use 2015, Utility Use 2015 
Squared, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male being the independent variables. 
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The coefficients of the variables Utility Use 2015 (-0.001, p=0.163) and Utility Use 2015 
Squared (1.109e-08, p=0.960) had no significant influence on the log odds of customers 
accepting the default product. This is a surprising finding, since It is hypothesised that utility 
use would have a significant negative effect on the odds of customers accepting the default 
product long-term. It was expected that this would be even truer for the business sample, 
since the utility use was significantly higher than that of the household sample, which would 
possibly increase the hypothesised effect.65 
The coefficient of Salutation 2016 Female is not significant (0.202, p=0.337). This might 
be due to the unequal grouping of this variable, which is even more pronounced in the 
business sample than in the household sample (or the main sample). Finally, the coefficient 
of Salutation 2016 Male is significant (-0.347, p=0.000). The exponent of the coefficient of 
Salutation 2016 Male is 0.707. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of 
long-term default acceptance were decreased by 29.3% for customers with male salutations 
in comparison to customers with salutations indicating undefined genders. 
Model Goodness of Fit  
The analysis of deviance table shows the significance levels of the independent 
variables, which were added sequentially (first to last) to the model. It shows that only Utility 
Use 2015, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male are significant. The ANOVA 
calculation comparing a model containing only the intercept and dependent variable with the 
model including all independent variables is significant. Concerning the goodness of fit of this 
generalized linear model, the null deviance indicates a value of 7,045.7 on 7,632 degrees of 
freedom. Including the independent variables (weight and displacement) decreases the 
deviance to 7,008.2 points on 7,628 degrees of freedom. The residual deviance is reduced by 
37.53 points with a loss of four degrees of freedom, which is a reduction in deviance that is 
still deemed significant. Even though the inclusion of the independent variables is partly 
significant, the reduction of deviance can be considered small. While the persistence of the 
default acceptance effect is very strong in the sample, the independent variables seem to not 
hold a lot of explanatory power of why this effect is so strong. It seems that there is 
information missing on customer characteristics that would be able to explain the true 
heterogeneity in acceptance of the default product. 
                                                          
65 For the sake of comparability to the other models, the curvilinear term of Utility Use 2015 was 
included in this model even though it is non-significant. Estimating the model with a linear term of 
Utility Use 2015 shows that the effect is still non-significant. 
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Table 33. Descriptive Findings on the Independent Variables in the Logistic 
Regression for Long-term Default Acceptance (n=223,248) 
Variable M SD Min Max Description 
Utility Use 
2015 
4,852.543 5,819.726 0.0 766,533 
Yearly utility use of the customers in the 
timespan 2015-2016 (depending on reading 
cycle)  
Salutation 
2016 Female 
0.167 - 0 1 
1=Female (n=37,364) 
0=Undefined (n=185,884) 
Salutation 
2016 Male 
0.432 - 0 1 
1=Male (n=96,381) 
0=Undefined (n=126,867) 
Results of Logistic Regression for Long-Term Default Acceptance for Household Customers 
(n=223,248) 
Due to the binary outcome variable that is the persistent acceptance of the default 
product throughout 2016, a generalized linear model in which the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the odds of accepting the default product in which the predicted probability of 
the binary logistic regression was chosen. The independent variables are Utility Use 2015, 
Utility Use 2015 Squared, Salutation 2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male.    
Table 33 shows the descriptive findings on the independent variables in the logistic 
regression for long-term default acceptance in the household customer sample (n=223,248). 
Table 34. Results of Logistic Regression for Long-Term Default Acceptance for 
Household Customers (n=223,248) 
Variable Estimate Odds Ratio Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept 2.304 10.013 0.013 171.326 0.000 
Utility Use 
2015 
-0.057 0.945 0.002 -31.471 0.000 
Utility Use 
2015 Squared   
5.206e-04 1.000 0.000 13.272 0.000 
Salutation 
2016 Female 
0.362 1.437 0.022 16.41 0.000 
Salutation 
2016 Male 
-0.215 0.807 0.014 -15.35 0.000 
Null Deviance=164,285 points on 223,247 degrees of freedom 
Residual Deviance=161,865 points on 223,243 degrees of freedom 
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Table 34 shows the results of the logistic regression for long-term default acceptance 
in the household customer sample (n=223,248) with persistence of default acceptance in 
2016 being the dependent variable and Utility Use 2015, Utility Use 2015 Squared, Salutation 
2016 Female, and Salutation 2016 Male being the independent variables. 
The coefficients of the variables Utility Use 2015 (-0.057, p=0.000) and Utility Use 2015 
Squared (5.206e-04, p=0.000) had a significant influence on the odds of customers’ long-term 
acceptance of the default product. This supports the hypothesis that utility use would have a 
negative effect on long-term default product acceptance and that this effect would be non-
linear. Therefore, with very low and very high utility consumption, the odds of accepting the 
default product in the long term significantly increased in comparison to those with moderate 
utility consumption. The coefficient of Utility Use 2015 is -0.057, and the exponent of the 
coefficient is 0.945. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of short-term 
default acceptance decreased by 5.54% for each 1,000 kWh increase in Utility Use 2015. An 
increase of 1,000 kWh increase in yearly utility use would approximately equal a three person 
household becoming a four person household. With a p-value of 0, this effect is significant. 
The hypothesis that Utility Use 2015 would significantly decrease the odds of short-term 
default acceptance for customers is supported by the data. Calculating the same model and 
excluding the highest and lowest 5% of utility use in the variable Utility Use 2015 and Utility 
Use 2015 Squared does not change the directions or the significance levels of those two 
independent variables. Therefore, the curvilinear relationship of Utility Use 2015 and short-
term default acceptance is valid and not due to uncleaned data containing influential data 
points.  
Figure 40 shows the odds of the long-term default acceptance for Utility Use 2015 in 
the household sample (n=223,248), holding all other independent variables constant. The 
lowest odds (0.21) can be found at a yearly utility use of 54,418 kWh (see Figure 40; point 
marked with a blue dotted line). For a better visual on the curvilinear relationship between 
Utility Use 2015 and the odds of long-term default acceptance, the x-axis ranges from 0 to 
80,000 kWh, not covering extreme cases of utility use in the household sample. For a better 
orientation of the distribution of the variable Utility Use 2015, the mean of Utility Use 2015 
for the household sample (4,853 kWh) is marked with a red dotted line in Figure 40. The 
median of Utility Use 2015 for the household sample is 3,436 kWh. 
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Figure 40. Odds of Long-Term Default Acceptance for Utility Use 2015 (own 
illustration; n=223,248) 
 
 
The coefficient for Salutation 2016 Female is 0.362 (p=0.000) and the exponent is 
1.437. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term default 
acceptance were increased by 43.7% for customers with female salutations in comparison to 
customers with salutations of undefined gender. This effect is significant. 
The coefficient for Salutation 2016 Male is -0.215 (p=0.000) and the exponent is 0.807. 
Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term default acceptance 
decreased by 19.3% for customers with male salutations in comparison to customers with 
salutations of undefined gender. This effect is also significant. 
Model Goodness of Fit 
The analysis of deviance table that shows the significance levels of the independent 
variables, which were added sequentially (first to last) to the model, show that all 
independent variables are significant. The ANOVA calculation comparing a model containing 
only the intercept and dependent variable with the model including all independent variables 
is also significant. Concerning the goodness of fit of this generalized linear model, the null 
deviance indicates a value of 164,285 on 223,247 degrees of freedom. Including the 
independent variables (weight and displacement) decreases the deviance to 161,865 points 
on 223,243 degrees of freedom, which is a significant reduction in deviance. The residual 
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deviance has decreased by 2,420 points with a loss of four degrees of freedom. Keeping in 
mind the large sample size and accordant number of degrees of freedom, the inclusion of the 
independent variables does not improve this model by much. Even though the inclusions of 
the independent variables are all significant, the reduction of deviance can be considered 
small. While the long-term default acceptance effect is very strong in the sample, the 
independent variables seem to not hold a lot of explanatory power of why this effect is so 
strong.  
Conclusion 
Table 35. Overview of Percentage Changes in Logistic Regression for Short-Term and 
Long-Term Default Acceptance  
Variable 
Percentage Change:  
Whole Dataset 
(n=230,881) 
Percentage Change: 
Business Sample 
(n=7,633) 
Percentage Change: 
Household Sample 
(n=223,248) 
Customer Type 
Household 
l-t: 10.6%** 
s-t: 9.4%* 
 
 
 
Utility Use 2015 
l-t: -0.8%*** 
s-t: -1%*** 
l-t: -0.1% 
s-t: 0% 
l-t: -5.54%*** 
s-t: -6%*** 
Utility Use 2015 
Squared 
l-t: 0%*** 
s-t: 0%*** 
l-t: 0% 
s-t: 0% 
l-t: 0%*** 
s-t: 0%*** 
Contract Choice 
2015 Renewable 
l-t: - 
s-t: 98.8%*** 
l-t: - 
s-t: 63.9% 
l-t: - 
s-t: 95.8%*** 
Salutation 2016 
Female 
l-t: 52.4%*** 
s-t: 51.7%*** 
l-t: 22.4% 
s-t: 22.6% 
l-t: 43.7%*** 
s-t: 42.4%*** 
Salutation 2016 
Male 
l-t: -20.2%*** 
s-t: -21.9%*** 
l-t: -29.3%*** 
s-t: -31.7%*** 
l-t: -19.3%*** 
s-t: -20.9%*** 
+p<0.10     *p<0.05     **p<0.01     ***p<0.001, s-t: short-term default acceptance which is 
calculated from August 2015 to 01.01.2016; l-t: long-term default acceptance which is 
calculated from 01.01.2016 to 24.12.2016. 
Table 35 gives an overview on the calculated percentage changes from the logistic 
regressions for the short-term and the long-term default acceptance in this chapter. From the 
results of these six models, it becomes clear that both the whole dataset and the household 
sample show very similar direction and significance levels for the independent variables. This 
is due to the fact that the whole sample is mainly composed of the household sample. The 
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business sample has more deviation of directions and significance levels for the independent 
variables compared to the whole sample and the household sample. Only one independent 
variable seems to be stable in its direction and significance level among all three samples and 
all six models, and that is Salutation 2016 Male. Therefore, holding all other variables 
constant, the odds of default acceptance were significantly decreased by a range from 19.3% 
(long-term, household-only sample) to 31.7% (short-term, business-only sample) for 
customers with a male salutation in comparison to those with an undefined salutation. While 
the percentage changes are not directly comparable across samples and models, the 
direction and significance levels of Salutation 2016 Male are comparable and show stability.  
Concentrating and comparing the direction of the effects and significance levels across 
the short-term and long-term default acceptance models, Customer Type Household had a 
significant positive effect on the odds of short-term/long-term default acceptance. Utility Use 
2015 has a significant curvilinear relationship to the short-term/long-term default acceptance 
for the household sample (and the main sample) but not for the business sample. 
Furthermore, Utility Use 2015 had a significant negative effect on the odds of short-
term/long-term default acceptance for the household sample (and the main sample) but not 
for the business sample. Salutation 2016 Female had a significant positive effect on the odds 
of short-term/long-term default acceptance in the household sample (and the main sample) 
but not the business sample. As pointed out before, Salutation 2016 Male had a significant 
negative effect on the odds of short-term/long-term default acceptance in all samples and all 
models. 
While the previous descriptive and bivariate analyses showcase the impressive default 
effect in the data, the multivariate analysis points out the shortcomings and lack of powerful 
explanatory variables in the data. There is an imbalance of powerful default effects and weak 
explanatory variables. Drawing from theory, there are variables missing in this dataset that 
could hold the potential to explain more deeply what underlies the power of the default 
effect. Most of these variables are on the individual level, fleshing out the economic 
situations and the social descriptive characteristics of the decision-makers. Possible customer 
characteristics that are not captured in this dataset but would potentially hold explanatory 
power for the heterogeneity of the default effect are explored in the discussion of results 
(Chapter 6).  
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4.3.3 Multilevel Logistic Regression  
As the experimental data of the customers of the utility company is nested in municipalities, 
a multilevel logistic regression was calculated to control for variance among municipalities. 
Additionally, municipality data was added in the form of social descriptive details such as 
population density, and age structure, as well as political voting data as in the voting results 
of the initiative of the nuclear power phase-out. The data on municipality characteristics was 
published by the Swiss Federal Department for Statistics. Based on the customers’ geographic 
locations, the municipalities in the data set were matched with the information from the 
Federal Department for Statistics. Additionally, the proximity to the only nuclear power plant 
in the geographical realm of the sample was added. In two sections of the bivariate analyses, 
the influences of the voting results of the ‘nuclear power phase-out’66 initiative and the 
proximity to the nuclear power plant67 as descriptive variables on the municipality level were 
analysed regarding their influence on the default acceptance. In the bivariate analysis, it was 
hypothesised that municipalities with the majority voting for a quick nuclear power phase-
out would in larger numbers stick with the renewable default. This was verified, as 
municipalities voting ‘For Initiative’ had 2.7 percentage points more customers who stuck 
with the renewable default than those voting ‘Against Initiative’. On the grounds of this 
finding, the voting results of the initiative ‘nuclear power phase-out’ will be further explored 
in the multilevel logistic regression in this chapter. In addition, the other bivariate analysis on 
the municipality level, which analysed the proximity to the nuclear power plant, showed 
valuable insights. The municipality with the nuclear power plant had a higher-than-average 
rate of opting out of the renewable electricity default product. This effect was also seen for 
the municipalities directly surrounding the municipality with the nuclear power plant. On the 
basis of this finding, information on the proximity to the nuclear power plant will be further 
explored in the multilevel logistic regression in this chapter.  
The multilevel logistic regression models show not only the variance among 
municipalities but offer also insight into the degree to which this variance can be explained 
by the independent variables on the individual as well as on the municipality level (Gelman 
& Hill, 2006; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). This chapter entails a separate multilevel logistic 
regression model, first for the business customers and then for the household customers. At 
                                                          
66 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.3 - The Voting Initiative ‘Nuclear Power Phase Out’ and 
Renewable Default Acceptance on the Municipality Level. 
67 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.4 - Proximity to a Nuclear Power Plant and Renewable 
Default Acceptance on the Municipality Level 
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the end of the chapter, a summary will contrast the findings in both models and conclude 
with comparisons to the logistic regression models regarding long-term default acceptance 
in the previous chapter, 4.3.2.  
A Word on the Dependent Variable 
Due to the binary outcome variable – that is, the acceptance of the default product 
long-term – a generalized linear model in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the odds of accepting the default product in which the predicted probability of the binary 
logistic regression was chosen. The dependent variable was calculated as the persistent 
acceptance of the default product throughout 2016. This combines information on the tariff 
choices of the customers on 01.01.2016 and on 24.12.2016. The three values 
(conventional/renewable/renewable-plus) of the tariff choices on 01.01.2016 and 
24.12.2016 were recoded into the long-term default acceptance (1=default acceptance on 
both time points/0=default acceptance on one of the time points or none of the time 
points).68 
The Independent Variables on the Individual Level 
The independent variables on the individual level are Salutation 2016 Female, 
Salutation 2016 Male, and Utility Use 2015. Table 36 shows the descriptive findings for the 
independent variables on individual level in the multilevel logistic regression model for the 
household and business sample (n=230,881).  
                                                          
68 Calculating a model where the persistence of default acceptance is modeled via an independent 
variable showed several problems in the logistic regression with long-term effect. The persistence of 
default acceptance is very strong in the data while other independent variables only have none or 
weak explanatory power. The overwhelming strength of the coefficient is due to the fact that 99.17% 
(n=202,652) of the customers stayed with the renewable default contract from 01.01.2016 to 
24.12.2016. Judging on basis of the logistic regression with long-term effect, calculating a model 
where the persistence of default acceptance is modeled as an independent variable and comparing 
the same model without that independent variable shows the major explanatory power in the AIC 
value. Without the persistence of default acceptance variable the AIC value is 169,895 and with the 
variable it is 19,888. The unbalance of explanatory power between the independent variables shows 
itself through strong autocorrelation between the independent variable modeling the persistence of 
default effect and the other independent variables. Summarizing, modeling the persistence of 
default effect as an independent variable leads to a fake deflation of the AIC value and showed 
strong autocorrelation with other independent variables. The presented model in Section 4.3.2, 
where persistence of default effect is modelled as the dependent variable, has a much higher AIC 
value but is true to the data. Therefore, also for the multilevel logistic regression the dependent 
variable will be operated as the long-term default acceptance.  
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Table 36. Descriptive Findings for Independent Variables on the Individual Level in 
the Multilevel Logistic Regression  
Variable M SD Min Max Description 
Salutation 2016 
Female 
0.163 - 0 1 
1=Female (n=37,571) 
0=Undefined (n=193,310) 
Salutation 2016 
Male 
0.429 - 0 1 
1=Male (n=98,956) 
0=Undefined (n=131,925) 
Utility Use 
2015 
6,217.0 20,099.8 0.0 3,790,160 
Yearly utility use of the customers in the 
timespan 2015-2016 (depending on reading 
cycle)  
 
The independent variables Salutation 2016 Female and Salutation 2016 Male are both 
dummy variables based on the variable Salutation 2016. Since information such as household 
size and other social descriptive information was not available on an individual level in the 
utility company’s data, Salutation 2016 is the only variable that describes the metering points 
on the individual level as social descriptive information. Salutation 2016 connects each 
metering point with the individual who receives the bills for that metering point. The re-
coding of the salutations followed the heuristics of determining the gender of the billed 
individual on basis of the information given in the salutation. While ‘female’ and ‘male’ 
describe the salutations of billed individuals by clearly indicating the gender of the billed 
individual, the value ‘mixed’ was assigned when a clear gender indication could not be 
derived from the information given in the salutation. This was applicable when the salutation 
addressed a couple or family or used some other term that did not clearly reveal gender. The 
value ‘NA’ marks all missing entries for salutation. For this analysis, the values ‘mixed’ and 
‘NA’ were re-categorized as the reference category ‘undefined’. Even though Salutation 2016 
makes assumptions regarding the genders of the decision-makers, it is not conclusive. 
Salutation 2016 indicates the gender of the billed individual, but not the gender (or number 
– singular/plural) of the decision-maker per se.69  
The independent variable Utility Use 2015 shows the yearly utility use for the 
customers in the time range beginning in 2015 and continuing until the end of 2016. Chapter 
4.1.1 shows in detail how the measurement of the annual utility use is made up of the 
corresponding meter reading groups and demonstrates the timeframe of the meter reading 
groups for that year. Since the variable Utility Use 2015 covers utility usage before and after 
the default product change, it was chosen in preference to the variable Utility Use 2016. 
                                                          
69 For more information on the variable Salutation 2016, refer to Section 3.4.2 - Re-coding. 
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Based on the theory of price sensitivity, it was hypothesised that the variable Utility Use 2015 
would significantly decrease the odds of long-term default acceptance for customers.  
The Independent Variables on the Municipality Level 
On the municipality level, the following variables were added to the model: Nuclear Phase-
out Voting 2016, Direct Proximity NPP, Indirect Proximity NPP, Population Density 2015, and 
Age Distribution: 0-19.  
Table 37. Descriptive Findings for Independent Variables on the Municipality Level 
in the Multilevel Logistic Regression  
Variable M SD Min Max Description 
Nuclear Phase-out 
Voting 2016 
0.21 - 0 1 
1=Yes-votes for the initiative ‘Nuclear Power 
Phase Out’ >50% (n=48,321) 
0= Yes-votes for the initiative ‘Nuclear Power 
Phase Out’ <50% (n=169,970) 
Direct Proximity NPP 0.0061 - 0 1 
1=Municipality with NPP and neighbouring 
Municipalities (n=1,418) 
0=All other Municipalities (n=229,463) 
Indirect Proximity 
NPP 
0.041 - 0 1 
1=Municipality with NPP and neighbouring 
Municipalities (n=9,523) 
0=All other Municipalities (n=221,358) 
Population Density 
2015 
546.1 727.5 1 4,576 Density for people in km2 
Age Distribution: 
0-19 
19.8 2.2 7.7 30.2 
The percentage of people who are 0 - 19 years 
old 
 
Table 37 shows the descriptive findings for the independent variables on the 
municipality level in the multilevel logistic regression model for the household and business 
sample (n=230,881). The independent variable Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016 shows the yes-
votes in percentages concerning the public vote on the initiative ‘Nuclear Power Phase-Out’ 
on 27.11.2017. Section 4.3.2 (The Voting Initiative ‘Nuclear Power Phase Out’ and Renewable 
Default Acceptance at the Municipality Level) shows the bivariate analysis and further 
information on the public voting initiative. In the bivariate analysis, the group for the initiative 
has +2.7 percentage points of customers who stuck with the renewable default in comparison 
to the group against the Initiative. While the difference is small, the results of a Welch's 
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unequal variances t-test show that the mean of customers in the group that was for the 
initiative is significantly different from the mean of the customers in the group against the 
initiative.70 Based on this bivariate analysis, it was hypothesised that the variable Nuclear 
Phase-out Voting 2016 would significantly increase the odds of long-term default acceptance 
for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression models. 
Population Density 2015 indicates the population density of the municipalities in 
population per km2. For the multilevel logistic regression models, the variable Population 
Density 2015 was rescaled and measured in thousands of inhabitants per km2.71 It was 
hypothesised that the variable population density 2015 would increase the odds of long-term 
default acceptance significantly for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression 
models.  
Direct Proximity NPP and Indirect Proximity NPP show the proximity of each 
municipality to the one nuclear power plant in the geographical area that is serviced by the 
utility company. The municipalities in the utility company’s dataset are coded into three 
zones. The first zone identifies the municipality that contains the nuclear power plant 
(n=1,418). The second zone identifies the municipalities that are direct neighbours to the 
municipality with a nuclear power plant (n=9,523). The third zone identifies all municipalities 
that neither have a nuclear power plant nor neighbour the municipality with a nuclear power 
plant (n=219,940). Section 4.2.4 (Proximity to a Nuclear Power Plant and Renewable Default 
Acceptance at the Municipality Level) shows the matching bivariate analysis. The bivariate 
analysis shows that the metering points located in the municipality with the nuclear power 
plant had a higher-than-average rate of opting out of the renewable electricity default and 
downgrading their contracts to conventional electricity, which is sourced mostly through 
nuclear energy. This effect can also be seen for the municipalities directly surrounding the 
municipality with the nuclear power plant. The effect on the surrounding municipalities is 
visible but weaker in comparison to the municipality containing the nuclear power plant. The 
variable Direct Proximity NPP is a dummy variable where ‘1’ marks the municipality that 
contains the NPP (zone 1) and ‘0’ marks all the other municipalities. The variable Indirect 
Proximity NPP is a dummy variable where ‘1’ marks the municipalities that directly neighbour 
on the municipality that contains the NPP (zone 2) and ‘0’ marks all the other municipalities. 
Based on the results from the bivariate analysis, it was hypothesised that the variable Direct 
Proximity NPP, as well as the variable Indirect Proximity NPP, would decrease the odds of long-
                                                          
70 Results Welch's unequal variances t-test: t= -17.13655; df= 85536.8; p-value= 1.020395e-65. 
71 For more information on Population Density 2015, refer to Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of 
Variables on the Municipality Level.  
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term default acceptance significantly for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic 
regression models.  
The variable Age Distribution: 0-19 shows the number of citizens in each municipality 
below 20 years of age.72 For the multilevel logistic regression models, the variable Age 
Distribution: 0-19 was rescaled to express the proportion of people with a scale ranging from 
0-1 instead of using the 0-100 scale. As families are shown to behave in a manner that is more 
environmentally friendly than, for example, single households, it was hypothesised that the 
variable Age Distribution: 0-19 would increase the odds of long-term default acceptance 
significantly for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression model. 
Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression for Business Customers 
Table 38 shows the results of a multilevel logistic regression model, which has 7,104 
observations (the business customers) nested in 277 groups (the municipalities they are 
located in). The variance of the random intercepts is 0.05764 and therefore positive. As a 
result, the hypothesis holds true that the default acceptance of the business customers does 
vary across municipalities and the variation is worth further exploring through a multilevel 
logistic regression model.  
In interpreting the percentage change for the estimates, one has to take the odds ratio 
of the estimate, subtract 1, and multiply by 100 (Long, 2003, pp. 64–84). This will give the 
percentage change that the binary outcome variable will take on 1, which in this case means 
that the customer accepts the default product long-term. For the variable Salutation 2016 
Female, the coefficient is 0.227 and the exponent of the coefficient is 1.255. Therefore, 
holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term default acceptance are increased 
by 25.48% for customers with a female salutation in comparison to customers with an 
undefined salutation.  However, with a p-value of 0.288, this effect is not significant 
For the variable Salutation 2016 Male, the coefficient is -0.207 and the exponent of the 
coefficient is 0.813. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance were decreased by 18.7% for customers with male salutations in 
comparison to customers with undefined salutations. With a p-value of 0.004, this effect is 
significant.  
 
                                                          
72 For more information on Age Distribution: 0-19, refer to Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of 
Variables on the Municipality Level. 
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Table 38. Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression for Long-Term Default 
Acceptance for Business Customers (n observations=7,104; n groups=277) 73 
Fixed effect Estimate 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)74 
Intercept 2.189 8.926 0.541 4.044 0 
Salutation 2016  
Female 
0.227 1.255 0.214 1.062 0.288 
Salutation 2016   
Male 
-0.207 0.813 0.072 -2.865 0.004 
Log Utility Use 2015 -0.071 0.931 0.038 -1.895 0.058 
Nuclear Phase-out  
Voting 2016 
0.36 1.433 0.114 3.164 0.002 
Population Density 2015 0.09 1.094 0.073 1.236 0.216 
Direct Proximity NPP -0.45 0.638 0.358 -1.258 0.208 
Indirect Proximity NPP 0.14 1.15 0.195 0.717 0.474 
Age Distribution: 
0-19 
0.554 1.74 1.781 0.311 0.756 
N 
n observations 7,104 
n groups 277 
Log Likelihood -3213.2 
AIC 6446.4 
Random Part Variance Component Std. Dev. 
Level two variance 0.05764 0.2401 
 
For the variable Log Utility Use 2015,75 the coefficient is -0.071 and the exponent of 
the coefficient is 0.931. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
                                                          
73 About the model convergence: It was difficult to get the multilevel logistic regression model to 
convergence. The convergence tolerance level of the algorithms was relaxed from the original 0.001 
to 0.05. The algorithm was run several times, without a significant difference in the estimates, 
therefore results are stable even with the relaxed convergence tolerance level of 0.05. 
74 A significance level of 5% is considered if not stated otherwise. 
75 For utility use 2015 a logarithm function is used to rescale the values of the variable in a way that 
the range of this variable and the corresponding parameter size is of a similar magnitude of those of 
the other variables even though the interest lies in significance and not in marginal effects 
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default acceptance decreased for customers by 6.85% for each one-unit increase in the 
logarithm of Utility Use 2015. With a p-value of 0.058, this effect is not significant at the 5% 
level. It follows that the data contradicts the hypothesis that Utility Use 2015 would 
significantly decrease the odds of long-term default acceptance for customers. 
For the variable Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016, the coefficient is 0.36 and the 
exponent of the coefficient is 1.433. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds 
of long-term default acceptance increased for municipalities who voted at least 50% for the 
nuclear phase out initiative by 43.33% in comparison to the municipalities that voted less 
than 50% for the nuclear phase out initiative. With a p-value of 0.002, this effect is significant. 
Hence, the data supports the hypothesis that Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016 increased the 
odds of long-term default acceptance for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic 
regression model. 
For the variable Population Density 2015, the coefficient is 0.09 and the exponent of 
the coefficient is 1.094. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance increased for municipalities by 9.42% for each thousand-inhabitant 
increase per squared kilometre. However, with a p-value of 0.216, this effect is not significant. 
This contradicts the hypothesis that Population Density 2015 would increase the odds of long-
term default acceptance for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression model. 
For the variable Direct Proximity NPP, the coefficient is -0.45 and the exponent of the 
coefficient is 0.638. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance decreased by 36.24% for the municipalities having a nuclear power plant 
in comparison to other municipalities. However, with a p-value of 0.208, this effect is not 
significant. This contradicts the hypothesis that Direct Proximity NPP would significantly 
decrease the odds of long-term default acceptance for municipalities in the multilevel logistic 
regression model. 
For the variable Indirect Proximity NPP, the coefficient is 0.14 and the exponent of the 
coefficient is 1.15. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance increased by 15.03% for the municipalities directly neighbouring to a 
                                                          
comparison. In the former chapter utility use 2015 was used without the logarithm function and in 
addition utility use 2015 squared was inserted into the logistic regression model. In the multilevel 
model we had unfortunately problem of convergence when including the squared term and 
therefore we left it out. As a check for robustness of estimates, the multilevel logistic regression 
model is also calculated with utility use 2015 instead of the transformed, log utility use 2015, and all 
estimates showed no variation in significance level and direction, and non significant variation in size 
of the covariates. Since effect sizes are not comparable between the logistic regression model and 
the multilevel logistic regression model, the interest lies into the comparison of significance levels 
which is irrelevant of the operationalization of the variable. 
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municipality having a nuclear power plant in comparison to other municipalities. However, 
with a p-value of 0.474, this effect is not significant. This contradicts the hypothesis that 
Indirect Proximity NPP would significantly decrease the odds of long-term default acceptance 
for municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression model. 
For the variable Age Distribution: 0-19, the coefficient is 0.554 and the exponent of the 
coefficient is 1.74. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance increased for municipalities by 74.02% for each one-percentage increase 
in Age Distribution: 0-19. With a p-value of 0.756, however, this effect is not significant. This 
contradicts the hypothesis that Age Distribution: 0-19 would significantly increase the odds 
of long-term default acceptance for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression 
model. 
Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression for Household Customers  
Table 39 shows the results of a multilevel logistic regression model that has 210,849 
observations, which are the household customers nested in 286 groups representing the 
municipalities in which they are located. The variance of the random intercepts is 0.09063 
and therefore positive. Thus, the hypothesis holds true that the default acceptance of the 
household customers does vary by municipality, and the variation is worth further exploring 
through a multilevel logistic regression model.  
For the variable Salutation 2016 Female, the coefficient is 0.544 and the exponent of 
the coefficient is 1.723. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance increased by 72.29% for customers with female salutations in comparison 
to customers with undefined salutations.  With a p-value of 0, this effect is significant.  
For the variable Salutation 2016 Male, the coefficient is -0.041 and the exponent of the 
coefficient is 0.96. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance decreased by 4.02% for customers with male salutations in comparison 
to customers with undefined salutations. With a p-value of 0.011, this effect is significant. 
For the variable Log Utility Use 2015,76 the coefficient is -0.187 and the exponent of 
the coefficient is 0.829. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term  
                                                          
76 For utility use 2015 a logarithm function is used to rescale the values of the variable in a way that 
the range of this variable and the corresponding parameter size is of a similar magnitude of those of 
the other variables even though the interest lies in significance and not in marginal effects 
comparison. In the former chapter utility use 2015 was used without the logarithm function and in 
addition utility use 2015 squared was inserted into the logistic regression model. In the multilevel 
model we had unfortunately problem of convergence when including the squared term and 
therefore we left it out. As a check for robustness of estimates, the multilevel logistic regression 
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Table 39. Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression for Long-Term Default 
Acceptance for Household Customers (n observations=210,849; n groups=286)77 
Fixed Effects Estimate 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Error 
z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept 3.359 28.760 0.17 19.791 0 
Salutation 2016  
Female 
0.544 1.723 0.024 22.866 0 
Salutation 2016  
Male 
-0.041 0.956 0.016 -2.555 0.011 
Log Utility Use 2015 -0.187 0.829 0.007 -28.665 0 
Nuclear Phase-out  
Voting 2016 
0.315 1.370 0.058 5.426 0 
Population Density 2015 -0.11 0.896 0.049 -2.245 0.025 
Direct Proximity NPP -1.064 0.345 0.309 -3.437 0.001 
Indirect Proximity NPP -0.423 0.655 0.124 -3.401 0.001 
Age Distribution: 
0-19 
0.73 2.075 0.769 0.949 0.343 
N 
n observations 210,849 
n groups 286 
Log Likelihood -75434.4 
AIC 150888.8 
Random Part Variance Component Std. Dev. 
Level two variance 0.09063 0.301 
 
default acceptance decreased for customers by 17.06% for each one-unit increase in the 
logarithm of Utility Use 2015. With a p-value of 0, this effect is significant. The hypothesis that 
                                                          
model is also calculated with utility use 2015 instead of the transformed, log utility use 2015, and all 
estimates showed no variation in significance level and direction, and non significant variation in size 
of the covariates. Since effect sizes are not comparable between the logistic regression model and 
the multilevel logistic regression model, the interest lies into the comparison of significance levels 
which is irrelevant of the operationalization of the variable. 
77 About the model convergence: It was difficult to get the multilevel logistic regression model to 
convergence. The convergence tolerance level of the algorithms was relaxed from the original 0.001 
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Utility Use 2015 would significantly decrease the odds of long-term default acceptance for 
customers is supported by the data. 
For the variable Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016, the coefficient is 0.315 and the 
exponent of the coefficient is 1.37. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds 
of long-term default acceptance increased for municipalities who voted at least 50% for the 
nuclear phase out initiative by 37.03% in comparison to the municipalities that voted less 
than 50% for the nuclear phase out initiative. With a p-value of 0, this effect is significant. 
This supports the hypothesis that Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016 would increase the odds of 
long-term default acceptance for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression 
model. 
For the variable Population Density 2015, the coefficient is -0.11 and the exponent of 
the coefficient is 0.896. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance decreased for municipalities by 10.42% for each thousand-inhabitant 
increase per km2. With a p-value of 0.025, this effect is significant. This contradicts the 
hypothesis that Population Density 2015 would increase the odds of long-term default 
acceptance for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression model.  
For the variable Direct Proximity NPP, the coefficient is -1.064 and the exponent of the 
coefficient is 0.345. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance for municipalities decreased by 65.49% for the municipality with a nuclear 
power plant in comparison to other municipalities. With a p-value of 0.001, this effect is 
significant. This supports the hypothesis that Direct Proximity NPP would significantly 
decrease the odds of long-term default acceptance for the municipalities in the multilevel 
logistic regression model. 
For the variable Indirect Proximity NPP, the coefficient is -0.423 and the exponent of 
the coefficient is 0.655. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
default acceptance for municipalities decreased by 34.49% for municipalities neighbouring 
directly to the municipality with a nuclear power plant in comparison to other municipalities. 
With a p-value of 0.001, this effect is significant. This supports the hypothesis that Indirect 
Proximity NPP would significantly decrease the odds of long-term default acceptance for the 
municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression model. 
For the variable Age Distribution: 0-19, the coefficient is 0.73 and the exponent of the 
coefficient is 2.075. Therefore, holding all other variables constant, the odds of long-term 
                                                          
to 0.05. The algorithm was run several times, without a significant difference in the estimates, 
therefore results are stable even with the relaxed convergence tolerance level of 0.05. 
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default acceptance increased for municipalities by 107.51% for each one-percentage increase 
in Age Distribution: 0-19. With a p-value of 0.343, however, this effect is not significant. This 
contradicts the hypothesis that Age Distribution: 0-19 would significantly increase the odds 
of long-term default acceptance for the municipalities in the multilevel logistic regression 
model. 
Conclusion 
Table 40. Overview of Percentage Changes from Multilevel Logistic Regression of 
Long-Term Default Acceptance  
Variable 
Percentage Change: Business Sample 
(n observations=7,104; n groups=277) 
Percentage Change: Household Sample (n 
observations=210,849; n groups=286) 
Salutation 2016 
Female 
25.48% 72.29%*** 
Salutation 2016 
Male 
-18.7%** -4.02%* 
Log Utility Use 
2015 
-6.85%+ -17.06%*** 
Nuclear Phase-
out  
Voting 2016 
43.33%** 37.03%*** 
Population 
Density 2015 
9.42% -10.42%* 
Direct Proximity 
NPP 
-36.24% -65.49%*** 
Indirect 
Proximity NPP 
15.03% -34.49%*** 
Age 
Distribution: 
0-19 
74.02% 107.51% 
+p<0.10     *p<0.05     **p<0.01     ***p<0.001 
Table 40 gives an overview of the calculated percentage changes from the multilevel 
logistic regressions for the long-term default acceptance for the business sample and the 
household sample in this chapter. From the results of these two models, it becomes clear that 
the business sample and the household sample show apparent differences in the direction as 
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well as significance levels for the independent variables. This was to be expected, based on 
the results of the logistic regression models in the previous two chapters.78  
The main purpose of the multilevel logistic regression models was to detect possible 
variations in default acceptance among the municipalities. Independent variables on the 
municipality level were added to help to explain some of that variance. While the percentage 
changes of the independent variables are not directly comparable along the household and 
business samples and models, the direction and significance levels can be compared and are 
an indication of the stability of the effects. When comparing the significance levels of the 
effects among the household and business models, the different sample sizes should be kept 
in mind. Concentrating and comparing the direction of the effects and significance levels 
across the business and household multilevel logistic regression long-term default 
acceptance models, Salutation 2016 Female had a significant positive effect on the odds of 
long-term default acceptance in the household sample (72.29%***) but a non-significant 
positive effect in the business sample (25.48%). This finding replicates the findings of the 
logistic regressions in the prior chapter regarding the direction of the effects and the 
significance levels. Salutation 2016 Male had a significant negative effect on the odds of long-
term default acceptance in the household sample (-4.02%*) as well as in the business sample 
(-18.7%**). This result replicates the findings of the logistic regressions in the prior chapter 
regarding the direction of the effects and the significant levels. Log Utility Use 2015 had a 
significant negative effect on the odds of long-term default acceptance in the household 
sample (-17.06%***), but a non-significant negative effect in the business sample (-6.85%+). 
This result also replicates the findings of the logistic regressions in the prior chapter regarding 
the direction of the effects and the significance levels. While the independent variables on 
the individual level are similar in direction and significance level compared to the previous 
logistic regression models in terms of long-term default acceptance, the independent 
variables on the municipality level offer some new insights.  
Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016 had a significant positive effect on the odds of long-
term default acceptance of municipalities in the household sample (37.03%***) as well as a 
significant positive effect of municipalities in the business sample (43.33%**). Population 
Density 2015 had a significant negative effect on the odds of long-term default acceptance of 
municipalities in the household sample (-10.42%*) but a non-significant positive effect of 
municipalities in the business sample (9.42%). Direct Proximity NPP had a significant negative 
                                                          
78 For more information, refer to 4.3.1 Logistic Regression with Short-Term Default Effect and 4.3.2 
Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Effect. 
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effect on the odds of long-term default acceptance of municipalities in the household sample 
(-65.49%***) as well as a non-significant positive effect of municipalities in the business 
sample (-36.24%). Indirect Proximity NPP had a significant negative effect on the odds of long-
term default acceptance of municipalities in the household sample (-34.49%***) as well as a 
non-significant positive effect of municipalities in the business sample (15.03%). Age 
Distribution: 0-19 had a non-significant positive effect on the odds of long-term default 
acceptance of municipalities in the household sample (107.51%) as well as a non-significant 
positive effect of municipalities in the business sample (74.02%).  
Comparing the direction of the effects and significance levels of the independent 
variables on the individual level across the logistic regression models with long-term default 
acceptance with the multilevel logistic regression models proves the stability of the models. 
Among all four models ((1) Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Acceptance in the 
Business Sample, (2) Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Acceptance in the Household 
Sample, (3) Multilevel Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Acceptance in the Business 
Sample, and (4) Multilevel Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Acceptance in the 
Business Sample), the direction and significance levels of the independent variables 
Salutation 2016 Female, Salutation 2016 Male and Utility Use 2015 are similar. Salutation 
2016 Female had a significant positive effect on the odds of long-term default acceptance in 
the household sample but not the business sample. As pointed out before, Salutation 2016 
Male had a significant negative effect on the odds of long-term default acceptance in all 
samples and all models. Furthermore, Utility Use 2015 had a significant negative effect on 
the odds of long-term default acceptance for the household sample but not for the business 
sample. 
While the independent variables on municipality level show new insights, compared to 
the other multivariate analyses, two of them replicate findings already established in the 
bivariate analyses. Those two variables are Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016 and Direct 
Proximity NPP/Indirect Proximity NPP. On the grounds of the findings of the bivariate 
analyses, Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016 was hypothesised to significantly increase and 
Direct Proximity NPP/Indirect Proximity NPP to significantly decrease the odds of 
municipalities accepting the default long-term. In both multilevel logistic models, Nuclear 
Phase-out Voting 2016 significantly increased the odds of municipalities accepting the default 
long-term. Therefore, the results of the former bivariate analyses were able to be replicated 
by the multilevel logistic models. For Direct Proximity NPP/Indirect Proximity NPP, only the 
multilevel logistic model in the household sample had a significant negative effect on the 
odds of municipalities accepting the default long-term. The finding of the previous bivariate 
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analysis could not be replicated by the multilevel logistic regression model in the business 
sample.
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5. Summary of Results 
The summary of results recapitulates all statistical analyses ranging from bivariate analyses 
to the multivariate analyses. 
The bivariate analyses explore the potential influences one by one on the default 
acceptance. On the individual level, the type of customer (household versus business), yearly 
utility use, previous renewable electricity use, and customer salutation are investigated for 
their influences on the default acceptance rates. On the municipality level, the voting results 
from the Nuclear Power Phase Out initiative and the proximity to one of the five Swiss nuclear 
power plants are investigated for their influences on the default acceptance rates. Apart from 
these investigations, two subsamples are analysed that are excluded in all the other analyses: 
the group of customers who moved in the first year of the default product change and the 
group of premium-paying customers who received the renewable-plus default product (the 
premium renewable product) instead of the renewable default product.  
The multivariate analyses explore the potential influence in their interdependence on 
the default acceptance. Previous factors, that are also considered in the bivariate analyses 
are further explored with the more accurate tools of multivariate statistics. There are six 
logistic regression models and two multilevel logistic regressions models that investigate 
what causes heterogeneity in the default product acceptance both short-term and long-term.  
The independent variables, on individual level, range from type of customer (household 
versus business), yearly utility use, previous renewable electricity use, and customer 
salutation. On the municipality level, social descriptive details like population density, age 
structure, closeness of municipalities to the only nuclear power plant, as well as political 
voting data, as in voting results of the initiative of the nuclear power phase out are added. 
The logistic regression models lay out what affects the odds of customers accepting the 
default product short-term and long-term. The multilevel logistic regression model 
additionally models the municipalities and what affects the odds of municipalities accepting 
the default product long-term.  
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Heterogeneity in the Short-Term Default Effect 
In order to fully understand the effect that the default switch had on customer choices, 
it is necessary to analyse the situation before the default product change took place (for all 
details, see Section 4.1.2, Descriptive Statistics for Renewable Energy Contracts 2014 and 
2015). Only in comparison to the situation before the default product change can the default 
effect be accurately judged. Before the default product changed in 2016, the utility company 
had conventionally sourced electricity contracts as their default products for household and 
business customers alike. Only a small minority of customers (0.89%) held renewable 
electricity contracts in the years 2014 and 2015 – the years before the default product 
changed.79 The new default product, a 100% renewably sourced electricity contract, was 
introduced to the customer population in August 2015 and implemented on the first of 
January 2016. The imminent strength of the default effect can be accurately judged by 
contrasting the percentage of customers who held renewable electricity contracts in the 
beginning of 2015 (0.89%) with the percentage of customers who held renewable electricity 
contracts in the beginning of 2016 (88.50%). This resulted in a short-term default effect80 of 
87.61% for all customers. Splitting up the customer pool into household customers and 
business customers shows the heterogeneity in the imminent response to the default product 
change. Only 0.91% of household customers held renewable electricity contracts in the 
beginning of 2015, and 88.64% of household customers held renewable electricity contracts 
in the beginning of 2016. This was a short-term default effect of 87.73% for household 
customers alone. Of business customers, 0.38% held renewable electricity contracts in the 
beginning of 2015 and 84.46% held renewable electricity contracts in the beginning of 2016. 
This was a short-term default effect of 84.08% for business customers alone. The household 
customer sample had a greater short-term default product acceptance rate than the business 
customer sample . In addition, the short-term default effect was greater for the household 
customers than for the business customers.  
                                                          
79 In preparation of the default product change the utility company ordered a renewable energy 
report in the years 2014 and 2015. For the year 2013 and before there are no clear information on 
renewable energy acquisition from customers and no identification which customers bought how 
much renewable energy tranches. From 2016 on with the product change and default product 
change there is a clear differentiation in «Renewable-plus-tariff», «Renewable-tariff» and 
“Conventional-tariff”. 
80 The default effect is the number of customers with a renewable energy tariff in 2016 minus the 
number of customers with a renewable energy tariff in 2015. This number is then calculated into 
percentage given out the pure default effect (the percentage of customers who only because of the 
default product change now hold a renewable energy tariff in 2016). Both short-term and long-term 
default effects are calculated against the percentage of customers having a renewable contract in 
2015. 
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Heterogeneity in the Long-Term Default Effect 
While the strength of the default effect is prominent, the question of the stability of 
this strong effect naturally arises. The acceptance of the new default product was not only 
measured on the 1st of January 2016 but also on the 24th of December 2016. Over this year, 
customers received four utility bills. Household customers would been able to recognize a 
slight increase in their utility bills due to the new default product, if they had not already 
opted for a different product (+0.03 CHF/kWh for the day tariff and +0.02 CHF/kWh for the 
night tariff). The bills for the business customers did not show any increases in price, but they 
did show information on the possibility of saving money by downgrading back to the 
conventional electricity product (possible savings -0.01 CHF/kWh for the day tariff and for the 
night tariff). Customers – both household and business – had the opportunity to opt out of 
the new default product at any time during that year simply by calling the utility company. 
Regardless of the increase in utility bills for the household customers and the opportunity to 
save costs for the business customers (who were considered more price-sensitive), the 
default effect showed surprising stability in its strength throughout the first year. As 
previously pointed out, only 0.91% of household customers held renewable electricity 
contracts in the beginning of 2015, and 87.96% of household customers held renewable 
electricity contracts at the end of 2016. This was a long-term default effect of 87.05% for 
household customers. Of the business customers, 0.38% held renewable electricity contracts 
in the beginning of 2015 and 82.65% held renewable electricity contracts at the end of 2016. 
This was a long-term default effect of 82.27% for business customers. The household 
customer sample had a greater long-term default effect on product acceptance than the 
business customer sample did (87.96% for the household sample vs. 82.65% for the business 
sample). In addition, the long-term default effect was greater for household customer 
(87.05%) than for business customers (82.27%).  
Comparing the short-term and long-term default effects shows that the effect dropped 
from 87.73% to 87.05% for the household sample and from 84.04% to 82.27% for the 
business sample. In conclusion, the default effect was stable in both samples, with a slightly 
more pronounced decrease for the business sample.81 
                                                          
81 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.1 - The Default Effect. 
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Default Effects Depending on Utility Use 
The slight difference in responses to the new default product found for household and 
business customer types paved the way for further questions. On the grounds of the theory 
of price sensitivity, it can be presumed that business customers are more aware of utility costs 
than household customers and therefore more sensitive to the possibility of saving on their 
utility bills. Not only is the heuristic of business customers more aware of opportunities to 
decrease costs, but also their utility consumption is typically significantly higher than that of 
household customers. This higher utility use makes business customers even more likely to 
have a higher awareness of the opportunity to save costs on utility bills, because their 
possibility for monetary savings is much higher. Calculating the default effects for quartiles of 
yearly utility consumption separated by customer type gives a first indication of whether the 
default effect is stable among the different quartiles of utility use. According to the theory of 
price sensitivity, the higher the utility use the weaker the default effect should be. This 
pattern should be more pronounced in the business sample than in the household sample.  
For the household sample, it was found that with increases in utility use the short-term 
default effect decreases. The first quartile of utility use had the highest percentage of short-
term default effects (91.1%), which steadily decreased into the second quartile (89.3%), the 
third quartile (86.6%), and the fourth quartile (83.8%). The same pattern can be detected 
when it comes to the long-term default effect in the household sample. The first quartile of 
utility use had the highest percentage of long-term default effects (90.6%), which steadily 
decreased into the second quartile (88.8%), the third quartile (85.9%), and the fourth quartile 
(82.8%). This leads to the conclusion that with increasing utility consumption, the default 
effect decreases in the household sample in both the short-term and long-term. 
Looking into the short-term default effects for each quartile of utility consumption 
shows different pictures for the business and household samples. There is not a significant 
variance for the business samples in the short-term default effects (ranging from 83.5% to 
84.9%). Aside from this small range, there is also no pattern of a decrease in short-term 
default effects with higher utility use. The long-term default effects by utility quartile proves 
to be steady as well, but with a slight decrease. The percentages of long-term default effects 
in the business sample ranged from 81.5% (the fourth quartile) to 83.4% (the first quartile). 
There was a slight decrease in long-term default effects given increases in utility use, as can 
be seen in the decreasing default effects of the different quartiles for the business customers. 
It would be natural to conclude that the amount of utility use has no evident influences on 
the short-term default effect and only slight influences on the long-term default effect, but 
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the small size of the business sample as well as the high range of utility use prohibits drawing 
a definite conclusion. The price sensitivity that is assumed to be more pronounced in the 
business than in the household sample is not supported by the data.82  
Subsample Analysis of Moving Customers 
Apart from connecting the default product acceptance to the type of the customer and 
the utility use profile of the customer, the awareness that the customer has for the default 
product change is another avenue worth exploring. Customers moving in the year of the 
default product change are different from the established customer pool in their awareness 
of the default product change. While customers in the established customer pool received a 
letter only, new customers also received a pamphlet explaining the three possible electricity 
products. Apart from this additional informational treatment, moving customers are also 
deemed to pay more attention to amenities when moving houses than already established 
customers. The sample of moving customers in 2016 is excluded in all other analyses. Apart 
from the building, the inhabitants are the second biggest influence on electricity usage. 
Excluding the moving customers meant reducing unobserved heterogeneity in the 
measurement of utility usage. It is hypothesised that customers who moved in the year of 
the default product change would read the letter (and pamphlet) announcing the default 
product change more carefully than non-moving customers. This greater attention should be 
noticeable in lower acceptance rates for the renewable default and higher uptake on 
conventional electricity contracts. It turns out that this was not the case. Moving customers, 
in comparison to established customers, did not have significantly higher renewable default 
opt-out numbers (13.2% for movers versus 12.2% for non-movers). This is especially true 
since the difference between the two groups is small in general and points in a different 
direction when split up into business (12.6% for movers versus 17.3% for non-movers) and 
household customers (13.3% for movers versus 12.0% for non-movers). 
Default Effects in Dependency on the Nuclear Power Phase-Out Voting Initiative 
While previous analyses concentrated on individual characteristics of the decision-
maker and their influences on the default acceptance, the following analysis adds a customer 
characteristic on the group level. The Nuclear Power Phase-Out voting initiative, a direct 
democratic vote either for or against a rapid nuclear phase-out by 2029, came to a vote just 
                                                          
82 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.1 - The Default Effect. 
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in the first year of the default product change. It was hypothesised that municipalities with 
at least 50% of votes for the realisation of the rapid nuclear phase-out would have higher 
rates of acceptance of the renewable default product than other municipalities. For this 
analysis, customers were grouped in their municipalities and the voting results for each 
municipality were added. Contrasting the short-term default acceptance of municipalities 
who voted with at least 50% in favour of the initiative with those who voted with less than 
50% in favour of the initiative shows only a very small effect. The municipalities that voted 
with at least 50% for the initiative had a 1.9% higher short-term default acceptance.83 
Default Effects Depending on Proximity to Nuclear Power Plant 
Another interesting customer characteristic analysed on the municipality level was that 
of geographical proximity to the nuclear power plant situated in the service area of the utility 
company. It was hypothesised that municipalities closer to the nuclear power plant would 
have a self-selection bias demonstrated in a pro-nuclear attitude, and thus would have a 
lower short-term default acceptance of the renewable electricity product. The metering 
points localized in the municipality with the nuclear power plant had higher-than-average 
rates of opting out of the renewable electricity default and downgrading their contracts to 
conventional electricity (27.1% versus 10.9%). This effect can also be seen for the 
neighbouring municipalities directly surrounding the municipality with the nuclear power 
plant (13.4% versus 10.9%). Therefore, the added information of the proximity to the nuclear 
power plant on the municipality level adds some explanatory variable to investigate the 
heterogeneity in the default effect.84 
Subsample Analysis of the Renewable-Plus Default 
The subsample analysis of the renewable-plus default parallels the main default switch 
from conventional to renewable electricity for a small and specific subsample. This subsample 
was excluded in all other analyses, since the customers in it did not receive the main default 
treatment of the renewable electricity product. Comparing the acceptance rates from the 
major default treatment (conventional to renewable) to the acceptance rates of the minor 
default treatment (conventional to renewable-plus for the subsample of premium-paying 
customers) shows that default acceptance rates for the household samples are strikingly 
                                                          
83 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.3 – The Voting Initiative ‘Nuclear Power Phase-out’ and 
Renewable Default Acceptance at the Municipality Level. 
84 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.4 – Proximity to Nuclear Power Plant and Renewable 
Default Acceptance at the Municipality Level. 
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similar, but this is not true for the business samples. The household sample accepted the 
major default at rates of 88.60% (short-term) and 88% (long-term) and the minor default at 
rates of 89.80% (short-term) and 88.70% (long-term). The business sample accepted the 
major default at rates of 84.50% (short-term) and 82.70% (long-term) and the minor default 
at rates of 83.30% (short-term) and 73.80% (long-term). The deviation in long-term 
acceptance rates for the business sample should be judged keeping in mind the numbers of 
business customers that are compared here (major default treatment n=7,633 vs. minor 
default treatment n=42).85  
Logistic Regression Short-Term and Long-Term 
A logistic regression model gives insight into what customer traits influence the short-
term and long-term default product acceptance rates. The short-term logistic regression 
model investigates the effects of customer type, utility use, previous renewable energy 
consumption, and customer salutation on short-term default acceptance. The long-term term 
logistic regression model investigates the effects of customer type, utility use, and customer 
salutation on the long-term default acceptance. Two models (short-term and long-term) were 
separately estimated for all customers, only the business customers, and only the household 
customers. From the results of these six models, it becomes clear that the whole dataset and 
the household sample show very similar direction and significance levels for the independent 
variables. This is mainly due to the fact that the whole sample is primarily made up of the 
household customers. The business sample had more deviation of direction and significance 
levels for the independent variables compared to the whole sample and the household 
sample. Only one independent variable was stable in its direction and significance level 
among all three samples, and that was the male customer salutation. The male customer 
salutation significantly decreased the odds of default acceptance in the short-term and long-
term by a range of 19.3% (long-term, household sample) to 31.7% (short-term, business 
sample).  
Concentrating on the direction of the effects and significance levels across the short-
term and long-term default acceptance models, Customer Type: Household had a significant 
positive effect on short-term/long-term default acceptance. Utility use had a significant 
curvilinear relationship to the short-term/long-term default acceptance for the household-
only sample (and the main sample) but not for the business sample. Therefore, household 
customers with either very low or very high utility use has higher odds of accepting the 
                                                          
85 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.5 – Subsample Analysis: Renewable-plus Default. 
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default product short-term/long-term than with an average utility use. A female salutation 
shows a significant positive effect on short-term/long-term default acceptance in the 
household sample (and the main sample) but not in the business sample. As pointed out 
before, a male salutation had a significant negative effect on short-term/long-term default 
acceptance in all samples. 
While the previously described descriptive and bivariate analysis highlighted the 
impressive default effect in the data, the logistic regression models point out the 
shortcomings and lack of powerful, explanatory variables. There is an imbalance of a powerful 
default effect on the one side, and weak explanatory variables on the other side. Drawing 
from theory, there are variables one can think of that are missing in this dataset and hold the 
potential to explain more deeply what underlies the power of the default effect. Most of 
those variables are on the individual level, fleshing out the economic situation and the social 
descriptive characteristics of the decision-maker. Customer characteristics that are not 
captured in this dataset but could potentially hold explanatory power for the heterogeneity 
of the default effect are covered in the discussion of the results (Chapter 6).  
Multilevel Logistic Regression 
As the experimental data of the customers of the utility company is nested in 
municipalities, a multilevel logistic regression is calculated to control for variance among 
municipalities. Models are estimated separately for the household customers and for the 
business customers and show insight into what affects the odds of long-term default 
acceptance on the customer level, as well as on the municipality level. The independent 
variables, on individual level, are customer salutation and utility use. On the municipality 
level, social descriptive details like population density, age structure, closeness of 
municipalities to the only nuclear power plant, as well as political voting data, like the voting 
results of the initiative of the nuclear power phase out are added.  
Results show how variables on the individual level affect the odds of customers 
accepting the default product and how variables on the municipality level affect the odds of 
customers grouped in municipalities accepting the default product. A female salutation has a 
significant positive effect on the odds of long-term default acceptance in the household 
sample but not the business sample. And, an male salutation has a significant negative effect 
on the odds of long-term default acceptance in both models. Furthermore, utility use has a 
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significant negative effect on the odds of long-term default acceptance for the household 
sample and the business sample.86 
While the independent variables on municipality level show new insights, compared to 
the other multivariate analyses, two of them replicate findings already established in the 
bivariate analyses. Those two variables are the voting results of the nuclear phase-out 
initiative in 2016 and the geographical proximity to a nuclear power plant. On the grounds of 
the findings of the bivariate analyses, the voting results of the nuclear phase-out initiative is 
hypothesised to significantly increase and proximity to the NPP to significantly decrease the 
odds of municipalities accepting the default product long-term. In both multilevel logistic 
models, the voting results of the nuclear phase-out initiative significantly increased the odds 
of municipalities accepting the default long-term. Therefore, the results of the former 
bivariate analyses are able to be replicated by the multilevel logistic models. Concerning 
proximity to the NPP, only the multilevel logistic model in the household sample had a 
significant negative effect on the odds of municipalities accepting the default long-term. Also 
the effect size of proximity to the NPP replicate the results found in the bivariate analysis. 
Unfortunately, the former bivariate analysis’ finding could not be replicated by the multilevel 
logistic regression model in the business sample.  
Additional variables on municipality level that can uniquely be found only in the 
multilevel logistic regression model are population density, and age distribution: 0-19. 
Population density has a significant negative effect on the odds of long-term default 
acceptance of municipalities in the household sample, but a non-significant positive effect of 
municipalities in the business sample. Age distribution: 0-19 has a non-significant positive 
effect on the odds of long-term default acceptance of municipalities in the household sample, 
as well as in the business sample. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the summary of results show the potential influences that affect the 
heterogeneity of short-term and long-term default product acceptance. On the individual 
level, it draws on the type of customer (household or business), utility use, previous 
renewable energy uptake, and salutation for further explanation. On the municipality level, 
it connects social descriptive information, voting behaviour and geographic proximity to the 
NPP to default product acceptance.  
                                                          
86 The effect of utility use in the business sample is not significant at the 5% level, but at the 10% 
level. 
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6. Discussion of Results 
The discussion of results starts with the strength and longevity of the default effect in the 
household sample as well as in the business sample. This will be followed up by exploring the 
heterogeneity of customers responding to the default product change. There are three 
different choices of electricity contracts (conventional, renewable, and renewable-plus) and 
three different time points where these contract choices were measured (beginning of 2015, 
beginning of 2016, and end of 2016) that are relevant for this analysis. While heterogeneity 
in response can be observed in the different contract choices at different time points, it are 
the customer characteristics behind it that are motivating and inhibiting forces on the choice. 
The heterogeneity in response can be partially explained by the customer characteristics. The 
available customer characteristics that were found to influence the response towards the 
default product change will be discussed in their significance and strength. On the individual 
level, these are customer type, utility use, previous renewable energy uptake, and salutation. 
On the municipality level, these are, for example, the closeness to a nuclear power plant. 
Furthermore, potential missing information on customer characteristics that is not available 
in the dataset from the utility company will be listed. Finally, a discussion of possible 
unwanted side effects that might have accompanied the default product change are 
presented at the end of the chapter and a more general, political discussion of using nudging 
techniques as soft policy tools follows suit (see Section 6.2 – Using Nudging Techniques as 
Soft Policy Tools). This ethical discussion of nudging is aimed at using nudging as policy tools, 
but it should also be carefully regarded by those who want to use nudging in commercial 
settings. Nudging interventions should not be applied to customers or citizens before 
considering the ethical discourse of protecting individual liberties. Responsible nudging 
would weigh costs and benefits of the application. 
 
226  6. Discussion of Results 
 
6.1 The Strong and Lasting Default Effect in this 
Sample 
The default rules intervention in the study at hand highlights a strong and lasting default 
effect on the contract choice of the utility company’s customers. Before 2016, when the 
conventional electricity default product was in place, the overwhelming majority of 
household and business customers held conventional contracts. After 2016, one can see the 
power of the default effect manifested in the overwhelming majority of both customer types 
holding renewable contracts. Looking at the change in only household customers with 
renewably sourced contracts over time, the effect of changing the default product to 
renewable electricity becomes evident. As previously pointed out, only 0.91% of household 
customers held renewable electricity contracts in the beginning of 2015, and 87.96% of 
household customers held renewable electricity contracts at the end of 2016, resulting in a 
long-term default effect87 of 87.05% for household customers alone. For the business 
customers, 0.38% held renewable electricity contracts in the beginning of 2015, and 82.65% 
of business customers held renewable electricity contracts at the end of 2016, resulting in a 
long-term default effect of 82.27% for business customers alone. One customer characteristic 
that saw a difference in responses accepting the default product change is the differentiation 
between household and business customers. Household customers have a long-term default 
effect of 87.05%, while business customers have a lower long-term default effect of 82.27%.88 
In the logistic regression models for the short-term and long-term, the household customer 
type had a significant positive effect on short-term/long-term default acceptance verses the 
business customer type.89 From the available information in the data set that further 
describes these two types of customers, the biggest difference is in the yearly amount of 
utility use. With increasing utility consumption, the default effect decreases in the household 
sample over both the short-term and the long-term. Also for the business customers the 
default effect slightly decreases in the long-term measurement.90 Regarding the logistic 
                                                          
87 The default effect is the number of customers with a renewable energy tariff in 2016 minus the 
number of customers with a renewable energy tariff in 2015. This number was then calculated into 
percentage to determine the pure default effect (the percentage of customers who hold a renewable 
energy tariff in 2016 only because of the default product change). Both short-term as well as long-
term default effects are calculated against the percentage of customers having a renewable contract 
in 2015. 
88 For more information, refer to Section 4.1.3 - Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice: 2013 – 
2016. 
89 For more information, refer to Section 4.3.1 - Logistic Regression with Short-Term Default Effect, 
and 4.3.2 Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Effect. 
90 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.1 - The Default Effect. 
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regression models, utility use had a significant curvilinear relationship to short-term/long-
term default acceptance for the household sample, but not for the business sample.91 In the 
multilevel logistic regression model, utility use has a significant negative effect on the odds 
of accepting the renewable default product for business and household customers alike.92 
These findings repeat what can be found in the bivariate analysis, which shows that with 
increases in utility use, default acceptance decreases in the household sample.93 Apart from 
the customer type (household versus business) and utility use, the former uptake of 
renewable energy is also valuable information for predicting the default acceptance of a 
customer. The number of customers choosing a renewable electricity contract in the year 
before the default product changed towards renewable energy had a significant positive 
influence on default acceptance for the household sample, but was not significant for the 
business sample. Furthermore, the salutation of the customer is also shown also to be 
relevant information as a customer characteristic that either can have a positive or negative 
influence on the acceptance of the default product. A female salutation had a significantly 
positive effect on short-term/long-term default acceptance in the household sample but not 
the business sample, regarding the logistic regression models. This effect was replicated in 
the multilevel logistic regression model for the household sample. Male salutations had a 
significant negative effect on short-term/long-term default acceptance in the household and 
business samples in all multivariate models. In conclusion, on the individual level, the 
customer type (household versus business) held the highest explanatory power for default 
product acceptance. Regarding the results for each sample alone, in the household sample, 
utility use shows a curvilinear relationship between default acceptance and former 
renewable energy uptake, and female salutations show a positive influence while male 
salutations show a negative influence on default product acceptance. The business sample is 
smaller and less well-balanced in its customer characteristics, and shows only male 
salutations to have a significantly negative influence on default product acceptance.  
At the municipality level, there is the customer characteristic of living in a municipality 
where a nuclear power plant is located in or living somewhere neighbouring a municipality 
where a nuclear power plant is located in. The customers localized in the municipality with 
the nuclear power plant had a higher than average likelihood of opting out of the renewable 
electricity default and downgrading their contract to conventional electricity. This effect can 
                                                          
91 For more information, refer to Section 4.3.1 - Logistic Regression with Short-Term Default Effect, 
and 4.3.2 - Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Effect. 
92 The effect of utility use in the business sample is not significant at the 5% level, but at the 10% 
level. 
93 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.1 - The Default Effect. 
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also be seen for the direct neighbouring municipalities surrounding the municipality with the 
nuclear power plant. Both effects are seen in comparison to municipalities neither 
neighbouring nor having a nuclear power plant.94 This effect is visible in the bivariate analysis, 
as well as in the multilevel logistic regression model for the household sample. Another effect 
that is clearly visible in the bivariate analysis, as well as in the multilevel logistic regression 
models, is the significant positive effect that the voting initiative ‘Nuclear Power Phase-Out’ 
has on the default acceptance. Municipalities with at least 50% Yes votes regarding the 
initiative having significantly higher odds of accepting the default product than municipalities 
with less than 50% Yes votes. In the multilevel logistic regression models population density 
and the age distribution of children (0-19 Years) were added to further describe municipalities 
and the hypothesised variation among them. The population density has a significant 
negative effect on the odds of municipalities accepting the default in the household sample.     
The age distribution: 0-19 has a non-significant positive effect on the odds of default 
acceptance of municipalities in the household sample as well as in the business sample. 
 
In general, there seems to be an imbalance, with a powerful default effect on the one 
side and rather weak explanatory variables on the other side. As previously stated, customer 
characteristics are drawn from theory, and information is missing in this dataset that holds 
the potential to explain what underlies the power of the default effect in more detail. On the 
individual level, those theorized customer characteristics would flesh out the economic 
situation and the social descriptive characteristics of the customers. The decision to accept 
the default product in the form of a renewable electricity contract can be described as a 
difficult trade-off between demands of morally and socially desired behaviour and self-
interest (Merritt et al., 2010). The morally and socially desired behaviour is the collective goal 
of protecting the environment by agreeing to the default product of renewable energy. The 
self-interest is the individual goal of opting out of the default product and choosing the 
cheaper conventional product in order to save one’s own monetary resources. The individual 
goal to save money on utility bills contrasts with the collective goal of choosing the more 
environmentally friendly action. This dilemma of contrasting goals is what surrounds the 
decision of accepting or not accepting the default product. The underlying motivations for 
accepting or not accepting the default product needs to be considered regarding what is 
pushing for and what is pushing against acceptance. Finally, a measurement of the strength 
                                                          
94 For more information, refer to Section 4.2.4 - Proximity to Nuclear Power Plant and Renewable 
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of individual goals (as in price sensitivity, spendable income, and willingness to pay) as well 
as the strength of collective goals (as in importance of adhering to social norms to protect 
the environment and attitudes towards the goal of replacing all energy with renewably 
sourced energy) as they are balanced in the individual would be especially insightful.  
Even though there is missing information that would describe in more detail why some 
customers accepted while others did not accept the default product in the study at hand, the 
acceptance rate overall is still an overwhelming number. A view back at the theories that seek 
to explain the influence that default rules can have on decision-making gives answers as to 
why the overwhelming majority of customers choose to stick with the new default product 
in this study. The different behavioural presuppositions that are said to underlie the 
effectiveness of default rules are that default rules minimize information costs and simplify 
decision-making, and the status quo bias strengthens the influence of the default setting.  
The theory of default rules minimizing information costs would argue that the majority 
of the customers of the utility company stayed with the default product because it allowed 
them to avoid the costs of gathering enough information to confidently make decisions on 
their own. An active choice in comparison to the default setting is connected to costs such as 
gathering the information needed to make a confident choice and weighing the options 
presented according to one’s own preferences. This behavioural construct of the costliness 
of choosing an alternative to the default choice is along the lines of default settings priming 
type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing) in order to influence type 2 processing 
(reflective processing). The customer is primed by the default setting in automatic processing, 
engages his or her reflective processing on the matter, and concludes that the cost of 
gathering information in this case is too high. He or she finally chooses to stay with the default 
product of renewable energy to avoid these costs. Pichert states that the default effect is 
especially strong when the decision-maker is uncertain about the decision content and his or 
her preferences. This uncertainty can happen for various reasons, such as a lack of 
information (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008). This can be also true for the study at hand. The 
differentiation of electricity product characteristics is still rather new, and most customers 
have unclear preferences for product features and an unclear willingness to pay for those 
product features, which altogether increases information costs on the customer side that 
would apply to changing the electricity product manually without the help of the default 
product change.95 Therefore, the default product change minimized the search and 
                                                          
95 For more information, refer to Section 3.1 - Description of the Renewably Sourced Electricity 
Market in Switzerland. 
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information costs on the customer side that would have to be paid in changing from 
conventional electricity to the renewable contract.  
Another factor that makes the default effect strong in this sample can be argued based 
on the theory stating that default rules simplify decision-making by offering a guiding choice. 
Active choice settings do not offer such a guiding choice. The more complicated the decision 
topic is, the more likely it is that the customer will accept this simplification by accepting the 
default product. As stated before, the product differentiation of electricity products is fairly 
new, and most customers have difficulties formulating preferences for different product 
features and connecting these preferences with their willingness to pay. Apart from that, 
most customers are not familiar enough with common certificates and do not feel informed 
enough to successfully evaluate electricity products in regard to their preferences for product 
features. When most customers do not feel informed enough to make a satisfying choice on 
their own, they tend to be led by the default settings in place. Complexity can lead decision-
makers to inaction, and this inaction is then translated by the default rules intervention into 
the acceptance of the default product (Sunstein, 2011, pp. 1352–1353). Before 2016, that 
was the conventional electricity contract, and after 2016, it was the renewable electricity 
contract. The strong and lasting default effect, found in the study at hand, is therefore also a 
testimony to the subjectively experienced complexity that customers experienced when 
faced with choosing a type of electricity contract.  
The default effect is strong in this sample and this decision topic because the default 
helped customers to avoid information costs and simplified decision-making. Apart from that, 
there are also other behavioural presuppositions that can strengthen the influence of the 
default rule, including the status quo bias. The status quo bias is a phenomenon mainly driven 
by type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing). The decision-maker is primed with 
the default option, and in automatic processing experiences it as loss to change the default 
setting and choose a different option instead. The default setting can be experienced as the 
status quo of decision-making. In this way, the decision-maker would also experience a loss if 
he or she were to choose not to stay with the default choice. This tendency to accept the 
priming of the default setting as a kind of anchoring effect is also described as status quo bias. 
The customer generally finds it easier to accept the default product and be primed by it in 
later decision-making than to switch away from the default product. The effect of the status 
quo bias becomes even stronger with rising decision complexity (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). As 
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already stated, the subjectively experienced complexity of choosing an electricity contract is 
high, which can underlie the power of the default effect in this sample.96 
In summary, the strength and longevity of the default effect in this study could be due 
to minimizing information costs and simplifying the decision-making process as well as to 
status quo bias. The subjectively experienced complexity of choosing a type of electricity 
contract is high, and therefore the relief that the default rule intervention brings to this topic 
of decision-making seems to be more eagerly accepted, which could contribute to the size of 
the default effect. 
The Default Effect and Unwanted Side Effects 
Apart from discussing the long-lasting and strong default effect in the study at hand, it 
is also necessary to revisit the list of possible unwanted side effects that might accompany 
this default effect. As documented in Section 2.2.3 (Unwanted Side Effects of Default Rules), 
the unwanted side effects that are most prominent for this study are moral self-licensing and 
ethical problems in the form of manipulation. Of minor concern is the distortion of 
preferences, and the rebound effect is not applicable. In this section, first moral self-licensing 
and then the distortion of decision preferences will be discussed. Finally, a discussion on the 
ethical problems of manipulation will follow, which prepares for a more general discussion 
on using nudging techniques as a soft policy tool (see Section 6.2 – Using Nudging Techniques 
as a Soft Policy Tool).  
Moral self-licensing is an unwanted side effect that is theorised to occur either in the 
form of moral credentials or moral credits. Both forms of moral self-licensing enable 
customers to balance out immoral behaviour with moral behaviour without feeling 
consequently immoral themselves (Merritt et al., 2010). In regard to the study at hand, the 
acceptance of the new default product setting on renewable electricity could be interpreted 
by customers as moral credentials or moral credits. Accepting the renewable default product 
is the moral and socially desired behaviour through which the consumer can earn moral 
credential or moral credits. When the moral and socially desired behaviour is realized through 
the default product change, the question remains of how the customer will now balance out 
his or her interests with licensed behaviour towards self-interest. The uptake of renewable 
electricity will most likely be framed as progress toward the goal of becoming an 
environmentally minded individual/household and not as a goal commitment to being an 
environmentally minded individual/household. Framing the moral behaviour as progress 
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instead of commitment to a goal makes moral self-licensing more likely to occur (Fishbach 
& Dhar, 2005). If the agreement with the new default product of renewable electricity was 
interpreted as a moral credential, moral self-licensing behaviour could occur in the same 
decision arena, with behaviour that is linked to the topic of protecting (or not protecting) the 
environment. The acceptance of the renewable electricity contract establishes moral 
credentials, and through this lens, some subsequent immoral behaviour is seen as acceptable, 
thus giving a nod to moral self-licensing behaviour (Effron & Monin, 2010). Therefore, it is 
plausible that agreement to the renewable electricity contract could have caused customers 
to license environmentally harmful behaviour as a consequence. Customers would feel their 
moral credentials as environmentally minded individuals had been established enough to 
license some minor behaviour that is not environmentally friendly. The magnitude of the 
licensed behaviour is not rationally but subjectively assessed. The yearly utility use in the 
years before and after the default product was changed did not indicate a significant increase 
in electricity consumption.97 Apart from the possibly licensed behaviour of increasing 
electricity consumption, there are endless other possible behavioural outlets that could have 
been licensed once the moral credentials of environmental mindedness had been 
established. The licensed behaviour could range in magnitude of environmental impact from 
increasing water usage in the household to booking a cruise to Alaska for the whole family. 
Furthermore, the moral act of accepting the renewable electricity default product could not 
only license behaviour in the same realm (environmentalism), but also in other realms. 
Customers could engage in moral self-licensing behaviour in other domains through moral 
credits. Interpreting the agreement with the new default product as moral credits, moral self-
licensing behaviour could occur in the same or any other decision arena. Since moral credits 
interpret moral behaviour as credits and immoral behaviour as debits, the earned credits of 
agreeing to the renewable electricity contract could be spend as debits on any kind of 
immoral behaviour considered by the individual to be of the same weight (Effron & Monin, 
2010). Again, the weight of spendable moral credits is  subjectively and self-determined by 
each customer. Depending on the subjective effort that customers took on themselves to 
accept the default product, they will be able to subsequently reinvest that effort in indulging 
in some immoral behaviour in some other domain. The acceptance of the renewable default 
product could give some an excuse to follow goals of self-interest that were previously latent, 
resulting in whatever behaviour is engaged in that self-interest. This could, for example, mean 
                                                          
97 For more information, see Section 4.1.1 - Descriptive Statistics for Utility Use. 
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that the individual could buy an additional household appliance that he or she thought of as 
a luxury beforehand. 
The unwanted side effects of moral self-licensing show that decisions cannot be 
analysed in a vacuum. Every decision and every decision manipulation needs to be 
understood as one in a sea of many. Each decision either hinders or promotes other decisions 
and their possible outcomes (Mazar & Zhong, 2010). This conclusion cannot be based on the 
results of this study, since information showing the frequency and gravity of moral self-
licensing effects was not possible to collect. Since the study at hand had the aim of promoting 
renewable electricity uptake and not the aim of promoting environmentally friendly 
behaviour or even decreasing CO2 output, it was not necessary, from the perspective of the 
utility company, to control for different kinds of moral self-licensing behaviour in order to be 
able to judge the goal of the invention as successful or not. In sum, moral self-licensing could 
be an unwanted side effect of the default product change that is neither possible to control 
for nor possible to conclusively evaluate in this study.  
The distortion of decision preferences is a misalignment of what the customer prefers 
and what the customer finally chooses due to the influence of the nudging intervention.98 As 
laid out in Section 4.3.2 (Logistic Regression with Long-Term Default Effect), the number of 
customers changing their contracts in the first year after the default product changed was 
miniscule. With the upswing of renewable electricity, electricity as such has experienced a 
change in customers’ perceptions: before, electricity was not grasped as a commodity with 
different product features, but after the introduction of renewable electricity products, it 
increasingly became a commodity in which the customer needed to learn how to distinguish 
different product features. Since this transformation is rather new, customers commonly do 
not have fixed preferences about their electricity products (Truffer et al., 2001).99 This can 
also be seen in the strong default effect before and after the default product change. If the 
household and business customers had strong preferences for the source or price of either 
electricity product, this would have become visible through lower acceptance rates and a 
higher number of customers switching back to their true preferences during the first year of 
the default setting change. The high acceptance rates of both default setting (conventional 
energy before 2016 and renewable electricity after 2016) testify to the customer population 
having weak and unclear preferences on their preferred types of electricity contract. 
Furthermore, the miniscule number of customers changing their electricity contracts in the 
                                                          
98 For more information, refer to Section 2.2.3.3. - Other Forms of Unwanted Side Effects. 
99 For more information, refer to Section 3.1 - Description of the Renewably Sourced Electricity 
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year after the default product changed testifies to the default rule intervention not causing a 
considerable amount of distortion of preferences. This being said, with the social norm of 
environmental mindedness becoming stronger, it is presumable that customers held at least 
weak preferences for renewable electricity. Judging from the lack of motivation to switch to 
renewable electricity before the default product changed, these preferences seemed mostly 
latent. It is also presumable that the strength of the default effect is due to the social norm 
of environmental mindedness becoming stronger. Nevertheless, latent or weak preferences 
do not mean that the change in default setting is easily reversible with the same effect. A 
change back to a conventional default setting would go against the established social norm 
of environmental mindedness, as well as the latent preferences for renewable electricity that 
are now aligned with behaviour. 
Apart from concerns of this nudging intervention causing moral self-licensing and a 
distortion of preferences, there are also accusations of manipulation to consider. In Section 
2.2.3.2 (Ethical Problems of Manipulation) the theoretical applications of manipulation 
accusations in regard to nudging techniques are discussed. These theoretical applications are 
now boiled down to their specifics as they concern the application of default rules in 
promoting renewable electricity uptake, and more specifically the study at hand. In Section 
2.2.3.2, the argument of manipulation accusations is broken down for nudging techniques 
only directly aiming at type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing) and the correct 
fulfilment of the four core characteristics of nudging. Manipulation is further defined as being 
deceptive and/or abusive. The deception criterion depends on the transparency of the 
nudging techniques and on the awareness that the targeted individual has of the nudging 
intervention. The criterion of a nudging intervention being abusive is defined in regard to the 
promoted end goal and whether that is in alignment with the targeted individual.  
One of the main foundations for manipulation accusations can be found in the way 
default rules, as a nudging technique, influence behaviour. Default rules directly aim for the 
behavioural outcome of type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing) and not for 
understanding, which would be directly targeting the outcome of type 2 processing (reflective 
processing) (Gigerenzer, 2015). The default product change towards the renewable electricity 
contract also directly aimed for type 1 processing and only indirectly had the potential to 
influence type 2 processing. Therefore, there was a chance that customers might have low 
levels of awareness, or maybe even no awareness, of their behaviour being targeted by a 
behavioural intervention that promotes renewable electricity uptake. As theorized in Section 
2.2.3.2, low or no awareness of a nudging intervention opens itself up to accusations of being 
deceptive and manipulative. However, while the default product change to the renewable 
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electricity contract in the first notification could be missed due to customers ignoring the 
letter from the utility company, the following reminders of the product change, as well as the 
opportunity to change contracts any day of the year, minimized the potential customer 
deception. The regular quarterly utility letters have the function of reminding customers of 
their new electricity contracts. Customers have the possibility of opting out of the default 
electricity contract at any time by calling the local number of the utility company. The ease of 
the possible opt-out holds the cost of going against the default rules intervention to a 
minimum. Furthermore, the potential of deception in a nudging intervention also depends 
on its fulfilment of the four core characteristics of nudging. In the study at hand, all four core 
characteristics are fulfilled: the application of the default rules on the promotion of 
renewable electricity uptake intentionally changed the choice architecture while maintaining 
the (economic) incentive structure. It also maintained the freedom of choice and was 
transparent to the decision-maker.100  
Apart from the argument of deception, there is also the argument of default rule 
interventions that promote end goals that are not aligned with the decision preferences of 
the targeted individuals. As stated in the paragraph before, on the topic of electricity 
contracts, most individuals hold no clear or strong preferences. When asked in theory, 
individuals show a preference for renewable electricity.101 The switch towards renewable 
electricity can therefore be understood as promoting end goals that are in the interests of 
the customer population. This default rules intervention, which promotes the renewable 
electricity uptake, hence has few grounds for being labelled as an abusive tactic. In summary, 
the default rules intervention as applied in the study at hand can neither be called strongly 
deceptive nor abusive, which minimizes the potential unwanted side effects in the form of 
manipulation that can accompany a default rules intervention.  
Concluding this section of the discussion of results, the default effect in this study is 
strong and shows longevity. The customer characteristics that show the most explanatory 
power are the customer type, with the household type having a positive influence on default 
acceptance in comparison to the business type. The default effect is strong in this nudging 
intervention, arguably due to most customers experiencing a choice between different 
electricity contracts to be complex decision-making. This subjectively experienced complexity 
is minimized by the customer simply accepting the new default product. Potential unwanted 
side effects including the distortion of decision preferences and accusations of manipulation 
                                                          
100 For more information, refer to Section 2.1 - Defining Nudging. 
101 For more information, refer to Section 3.1 - Description of the Renewably Sourced Electricity 
Market in Switzerland.  
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were kept minimal for this study. Moral self-licensing was neither possible to control for nor 
possible to fully evaluate here.  
6.2 Using Nudging as a Soft Policy Tool 
For a complete discussion of the results, it is also necessary to upscale the perspective on the 
default rules experiment and include a general political discussion of using nudging 
techniques as a soft policy tool. While in this study, nudging techniques were applied without 
a political agenda, nudging techniques are becoming a commonly used soft policy tool. When 
nudging techniques are used as soft policy tools, regulators should be aware of their positive 
and negative characteristics and the consequences of their use. The positives include cost-
efficiency and the ability to directly affect target behaviour. The negatives include the short-
term effects on target behaviour and the lack of effects on attitudes and cognitive reasoning. 
When discussing nudging as a policy tool, it is not enough to only consider its characteristics 
as a policy tool. It is also of great importance to consider the moral aspects of using nudging 
as a policy tool. When choosing a nudging technique as a policy tool, there is an unavoidable 
ethical discourse on manipulation and questioning the compatibility of nudging with 
democratic consent (Selinger & Whyte, 2011). Justifying the use of nudging techniques as 
policy tools goes back to the discrepancy between human behaviour and rational behaviour 
in the standard economics model. Thus, declaring human behaviour not to be aligned with 
the regulators’ preferences gives ground to the paternalistic aspects of libertarian 
paternalism, which is translated into nudges that aim to align so-called irrational human 
behaviour with citizens’ so-called true preferences (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). Apart from 
this detailed discussion, this section will focus on the framework of libertarian paternalism 
that claims nudging as a libertarian policy tool. These claims of nudging being of libertarian 
nature will be contrasted with opposing opinions that consider nudging to be a paternalistic 
soft policy tool. 
Nudging as a Soft Policy Tool 
The definition of a soft policy tool is a tool that guides but does not restrict behaviour. 
As with nudging, soft policy tools can nudge an individual’s behaviour to a decision outcome 
that is preferred but still leaves the individual the freedom to choose. Apart from nudging 
techniques, other forms of soft policy tools include positive or negative monetary incentives 
and providing information in order to educate or persuade individuals (Michalek et al., 2016). 
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Nudging techniques have as their unique selling point, among other soft policy tools, that 
they influence type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing). Other soft policy tools 
aim for influencing type 2 processing (reflective processing) (Michalek et al., 2016, p. 11). The 
combination of nudging techniques and other soft policy instruments is especially promising, 
since this combines the behavioural influence of type 1 processing with the behavioural 
influence of type 2 processing. Influencing both types of processing in the same intervention 
can help with heterogeneity among decision-makers who may make decisions using either or 
both processing types (Michalek et al., 2016, pp. 26–27).  
There are four nudging techniques that are well-established soft policy tools: 
disclosure, default rules, salience, and the promotion of social norms. The disclosure of 
information can be described as a policy tool that makes information processing easier by 
shaping that information to be more in line with how people process information. Default 
rules as a policy tool also minimize the complexity of a decision by providing a default choice. 
Making some information related to the decision more salient is also a policy tool that 
minimizes complexity. Promoting public norms in line with public goals can also be an efficient 
public policy tool for aligning individual behaviour with public goals (Sunstein, 2011). In order 
to judge nudging techniques for their feasibility as soft policy tools, they need to be compared 
to other, more established soft policy tools regarding effectiveness, cost efficiency, and 
acceptance in society (Michalek et al., 2016, p. 12). Nudges are known for their cost-efficiency 
(Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010) and for maintaining individuals’ freedom of choice, which 
increases their acceptance in society compared to more restrictive soft policy tools (Michalek 
et al., 2016, p. 12). Reisch and Sandrini state that the retained freedom of choice is the 
greatest benefit of using nudging as a soft policy tool (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015, p. 19). The 
discussion of whether nudging indeed maintains freedom of choice successfully leads to a 
discussion about the framework of liberal paternalism. 
Nudges in the Framework of Liberal Paternalism 
Thaler and Sunstein introduced the term ‘libertarian paternalism’ (Sunstein & Thaler, 
2003). The idea of libertarian paternalism is to give nudging guidelines. For example, there is 
a stipulation that nudging should be done with the aim to increase citizen welfare (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2009, p. 2). The regulator – in this case the public policy maker – is seen as the 
choice architect in charge of shaping the decision-making context in question (Thaler 
& Sunstein, 2009, p. 3). The decision-maker can be a citizen, an institution, or a company, and 
the object of the decision can be a product, a service, a bundle of products and services, or 
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even a behavioural option (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). According to the idea of liberal 
paternalism, nudges are used to change the decision-making framework in a way that is 
physical, social, or psychological, and thus change the decision-making architecture with a 
specific goal in mind (Reisch & Sandrini, 2015). The goal is to make one decision outcome, 
which is considered to be superior to the other outcomes, more likely. The promoted decision 
outcome may be found to be superior on the grounds of arguments such as the promotion 
of health, well-being, environmental sustainability, ecological benefits, or economic benefits. 
In short, the desired outcome is thought of as being in line with strengthening social welfare 
(Reisch & Sandrini, 2015).  
Nudging techniques, used under the umbrella of libertarian paternalism, are defined 
by a regulator. The regulator defines the objective and engineers a nudging technique that 
brings forth the objective, justifying the choice of a soft policy tool through psychological 
research. The choice architecture is re-engineered with a specific objective in mind. Re-
engineering through the application of a nudge is said to maintain citizens’ freedom of choice. 
However, the choice of choosing a nudge to influence behaviour is also a choice against more 
lasting means of educating citizens to become self-governed decision-makers (Gigerenzer, 
2015). The grounds on which Thaler and Sunstein judge a nudging intervention as being in 
the frame of libertarian paternalism is that the promoted decision outcome increases social 
welfare and is in line with what the individual would prefer if he or she were to act like homo 
economicus. Nonetheless, the judgement as to whether the promoted behaviour is in the 
interest of the decision-maker is not the defining characteristic of a paternalistic policy. 
Rather, the means and ends of a policy are what classify it as paternalistic (Hausman & Welch, 
2010).  
Libertarian Paternalism is Paternalism 
Libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron, since a policy tool cannot be libertarian and 
paternalistic at the same time (Hausman & Welch, 2010). The contradiction of nudging is that 
it is neither fully in accord with libertarianism nor fully in accord with paternalism. The 
question is whether the opposed ideas of libertarianism and paternalism can find a 
compromise in nudging, or whether the paternalism overweighs the libertarianism (Reisch 
& Sandrini, 2015). It has been argued that libertarian paternalism is a ‘distinctive variety of 
paternalism whose libertarian credentials are dubious’ (Hausman & Welch, 2010, p. 124), and 
that the paternalistic motive is what drives libertarian paternalism (Hausman & Welch, 2010). 
The core of the paternalistic motive can be found in the use of the only soft policy instrument 
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that aims at automatic and intuitive processing (type 1 processing), which renders its 
interventions nearly undetectable by those that it tries to influence. There are behavioural 
interventions and other policy tools that aim to address reflective processing that are better 
at respecting individuals’ autonomy and making sure that the individual is free to control his 
or her choices. This is in direct opposite to nudging aimed at influencing type 1 processing, 
which can be a threat to an individual’s control of their choices without the individual even 
noticing (Hausman & Welch, 2010). In this way, nudging as a policy tool can be a bigger threat 
to individuals’ liberty and control over their choices than overt coercion (Hausman & Welch, 
2010). In overt coercion, the decision-maker at least is aware that his or her liberty to choose 
is being taken away and can fight for his or her right to choose. With nudging, he or she might 
not even be aware that the liberty to choose is diminished, and thus cannot take action 
against it. 
While Thaler and Sunstein state that libertarian paternalism is non-intrusive in its 
paternalism, it can also be seen as the most intrusive tool available to paternalism. With a 
prohibition, the decision-maker is at least able to independently choose whether to comply 
with the prohibition or not. The individual can make a decision with their autonomy 
unscathed and their control over the choice intact (Hausman & Welch, 2010). Nudges can be 
deceptive in that they minimize the set of choice alternatives in the perception of the 
decision-maker, even though the full set is still technically available. Maybe the right question 
to find out whether nudges maintain the freedom of choice would not be whether the 
number of choice alternatives and incentive structure is still intact, but whether they are 
perceived to be intact by the decision-maker (Hausman & Welch, 2010). Individual liberty 
cannot be boiled down to keeping choice alternatives constant or not changing the incentive 
structure behind the choice alternatives. Individual liberty should be defined more widely as 
retaining the individual’s autonomy, or retaining ‘the control an individual has over his or her 
own evaluations and choices’ (Hausman & Welch, 2010, p. 128). There is a difference 
between the un-nudged outcome of a choice that is the individual’s free action and the 
nudged outcome of a choice (Hausman & Welch, 2010).  
The argument for labelling nudges as partly a libertarian policy tool springs from the 
controversial assumption that there is no alternative to nudging. Thaler and Sunstein 
promote the idea that there is no alternative to nudging and do not agree with the notion of 
a neutral decision-making design. Speaking in their terms, a choice architect is compared to 
a real architect. It is unavoidable that a building will be built, or likewise, that the context of 
a choice will be designed by the choice architect (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009, pp. 3–11). It is 
argued that wherever there is a choice, there is a choice architecture, and with that, there is 
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a nudge. The contradicting argument to this can be found in the defining criteria of nudges – 
that is, intentionality. Even though the context of a choice is always present, if the context is 
not intentionally modified to promote a certain end, it cannot be defined as a nudge (Hansen 
& Jespersen, 2013).  
Another justification is based on human decision-making being unlike the decision-
making of rational agents in models of standard economics. Other policy tools, such as 
information provision and (in-) direct regulations, hold on to the assumption that citizens are 
capable of acting in line with their preferences as long as they are guided by information, 
incentives, and rules. Nudges often find their justification in the argument that citizens are 
unable to decide in line with their preferences, and thus need some paternalistic help to act 
rationally according to that argument (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013). However, the argument 
that humans behave in a way that from an economist view is called systematic irrationally 
cannot be directly translated into the need for paternalistic behavioural interventions that 
address this so-called systematic irrationality (Gigerenzer, 2015). 
Nudges shape choices using the cognitive biases available to promote a specific end 
that is preferred by the regulator (Hausman & Welch, 2010). There are also differences in 
nudges concerning the argument of cognitive biases. There are nudges that empower 
individuals to choose according to their preferences by counteracting common cognitive 
biases. But there are also nudges that use cognitive biases to promote a certain decision 
outcome (Hausman & Welch, 2010). Regardless, the difference in nudges that act with or 
counteract cognitive biases is that the latter show the paternalistic motives behind the 
intervention, which are to steer assumedly incorrect behaviour towards what the regulator 
defines as correct behaviour. The argument that individuals are not able to decide according 
to their preferences is not an argument to use nudging liberally, but rather a paternalistic 
argument that leaves any claim of libertarianism even more dubious. 
Nudging is More Paternalistic than Libertarian 
At the core of the definition of a paternalistic policy stands the attempt to exchange 
the individuals’ preferences for the regulators’ preferences. The heuristic behind this is that 
the regulator knows what is good for the individual better than the individual himself does 
(Hausman & Welch, 2010). The definition of a paternalistic policy is as follows: ‘a policy is 
paternalistic if and only if it aims to advance the interest of some person P either (a) via 
influencing P’s choices by shaping how P chooses or limiting what P can choose or (b) by some 
means that will take effect regardless of what P does and against P’s will’ (Hausman & Welch, 
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2010, p. 129). Nudging is known to influence choice by shaping how an individual chooses, 
and therefore fulfils the definition of a paternalistic policy. It can even be argued that some 
nudges go one step further, drawing deceptive limits to the choices available while leaving 
the number of choice alternatives on paper intact. 
Paternalistic tools justify their purpose depending on their means and ends (Hausman 
& Welch, 2010). Even though paternalism is morally problematic due to its interference with 
individual liberty, for the right reasons, it can make sense to use nudging techniques as 
paternalistic soft policy tools (Hausman & Welch, 2010). The justification for nudging, as for 
any other policy tool, is determined by the cost-benefit analysis of each specific case. This 
cost-benefit analysis should not only take into account the monetary cost efficiency of using 
a nudge in comparison to other policy instruments, but also the ethical cost of possibly 
hurting individual liberty. Nudges are not costless, but have the power to minimize 
individuals’ control of their choices, and with that, their autonomy (Hausman & Welch, 2010).  
Nudges are paternalistic in nature, and therefore, default rules, as nudging techniques, are 
paternalistic in nature. Default rules address – as with every other nudge – type 1 processing 
(automatic processing) and do not address type 2 processing (reflective processing) through 
rational persuasion. In this way, default rules minimize the autonomy of the individual, and 
with that, the individual’s control over evaluating choice alternatives and choosing one choice 
alternative independently. In the end, the individual’s choice will reflect the regulator’s 
preference more than his or her own independent decision-making (Hausman & Welch, 
2010). The intentionality – one of the defining characteristics of nudging techniques – with 
which the choice architecture is changed to promote a certain outcome can be directly 
translated into imposing the regulator’s will on the decision-maker (Hausman & Welch, 
2010). The choice made is no longer a pure reflection of the decision-maker’s choice, but of 
the regulator’s preferences (Hausman & Welch, 2010). A government that respects its citizens 
as autonomous decision-makers should be careful when using behavioural interventions that 
aim for type 1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing), and should instead rely on 
policy tools that aim for type 2 processing (reflective processing) (Hausman & Welch, 2010). 
Behavioural interventions that address type 2 processing are more respectful of individuals’ 
decision-making sovereignty, and allow individuals to retain their autonomy because the 
individuals are actually aware of the intervention (Hausman & Welch, 2010).  
It seems like the libertarian claim of libertarian paternalism makes nudging more 
morally dubious than flat-out paternalistic policy tools (Hausman & Welch, 2010). The 
libertarian part of libertarian paternalism can only be understood as libertarian if the freedom 
to choose is defined by an untouched number and incentive structure of choice alternatives, 
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and not defined by the actual untouched control of choice that defines an autonomous 
decision-maker (Hausman & Welch, 2010). The fact that nudges aim at influencing only type 
1 processing (automatic and intuitive processing), and with that, minimizing individuals’ 
control over their choices, makes nudging as a policy tool more morally questionable than 
openly constraining choices (Hausman & Welch, 2010). The problem with a policy tool that is 
only processed through automatic and intuitive processing is that it is open to abuse, since it 
is difficult for the decision-maker to monitor what is going on (Hausman & Welch, 2010).  
A Warning About Nudges as Policy Tools: Unpredictable Behavioural Results 
Apart from the argument that nudges are paternalistically motivated soft policy tools 
with questionable claims to libertarianism, nudges are also policy tools for which the 
behavioural results are hard to predict. The reason for these unpredictable behavioural 
results lies in the very nature of a policy tool that only affects automatic and intuitive 
processing and makes use of cognitive biases. Neither influencing automatic and intuitive 
processing nor taming cognitive biases is a straightforward process for which the effects can 
be predicted with certainty. 
Cognitive biases or presuppositions can be numerous and heterogeneous among 
decision-makers, and nudges can only attempt to answer a small number of them. In the 
same way, the available heuristics differ from one decision-maker to the next. This can also 
be seen in how household and business customers react differently to the introduction of the 
renewable default product in this study. The diverse forces that surround decision-making 
can point in different directions, and thus influence the effect that nudging techniques have 
on the occurrence of the promoted outcome (Sunstein, 2011, pp. 1361–1362). One example 
of the unforeseen consequences of a social norm nudge that promoted energy saving was 
that households whose energy consumption was less than the average increased rather than 
decreased their energy consumption (Schultz et al., 2007). The social norm nudge, therefore, 
had different effects on different households, with the original household energy 
consumption being the characteristic that decided whether a household would decrease or 
increase its energy use. Deviation from the norm can refer to deviation above or below the 
norm. The social norm nudge motivated households to align with the stated norm of 
household energy consumption. Therefore, households above the norm decreased their 
energy consumption, and households below the norm increased their energy consumption 
(Schultz et al., 2007). As Lewin so pointedly states, ‘in social management as in medicine, 
there are no patent medicines and each case demands careful diagnosis’ (Lewin, 1947). 
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However, even careful diagnosis cannot foresee the multiple forces that surround decision-
making. 
Conclusion 
When considering using nudges as a paternalistic policy tool, it is important not to let 
the positive traits of this tool alone guide a decision, but also to account for the negative 
traits. The decision should not be made lightly, driven by cost efficiency and the appeal of a 
quick way to affect target behaviour. The decision should be made by considering other 
options for policy tools that are better at retaining individuals’ liberty to choose, and should 
not hinder citizens in becoming self-governed decision-makers. Only autonomous decision-
makers can do their part in a democratic country, which is to scrutinize policies according to 
their means and ends. Not only does nudging contribute nothing to helping citizens become 
self-governed decision-makers, it can also be deceptive to the citizens in its means and ends, 
making their job to supervise that much harder. 
Educating citizens is a long-term endeavour that cannot be replaced by just nudging 
citizens into the right behaviour. Governmental regulations are necessary to protect citizens 
and should not be replaced by nudging the worst consequences out of the way. Nudging, with 
its immediate effects on target behaviour, is a quick fix, and cannot compete with more 
permanent solutions achieved through other policy tools. Therefore, nudges as paternalistic 
soft policy tools should be administered only after careful cost-benefit analyses. 
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7. Outlook 
The application of the default rules intervention by the utility company in this study was 
undeniably successful in the promotion of renewable electricity uptake among its customers. 
As theory and data show, default rules are a reliable nudging tool especially when decision-
makers have low preferences and decision-making is experienced as complicated enough to 
induce inertia. Inertia then is translated successfully into an acceptance of the default setting. 
Low preferences are helpful in boosting the acceptance rate of the default setting overall.  
Further research is needed that starts with the replication of the findings of the study at hand. 
One study alone cannot fill the research gap of heterogeneity in default effects in general, or 
more specifically, the heterogeneity of customers accepting a default product in the form of 
a renewable electricity contract. The explored heterogeneity found in customer 
characteristics, as summarized in Chapter 5, needs to be solidified through replication of the 
same effects in studies that are comparable to the study at hand.  
Apart from the need to replicate the heterogeneity in default acceptance rates among 
the business and household customers, there is still more heterogeneity to explore in regard 
to customer characteristics and which information was missing in this dataset but is theorized 
to motivate or hinder default acceptance. More research is needed to gain further insights 
on default effect heterogeneity in customer populations. 
In regard to other avenues worth further exploration, the costs of not accepting a 
default setting, as well as the height of awareness of default rules interventions come to 
mind. There is not enough research available exploring the effectiveness of default rules 
depending on opt-out costs. Opt-out costs can be marked by relative costs, as in the costs of 
contacting the company for the opt-out solution. Calling a company or logging into an online 
interface can be experienced as different costs by different demographics. To be even more 
specific, the duration of wait time when calling a utility company’s customer service number 
is experienced as a cost by the customer. The length of the telephone service number or the 
complexity of the log-in instructions for the online service tool are also of relevance to the 
experienced costliness of the opt-out. Another factor would be the monetary cost of 
accepting the default product in comparison to other offered products. Finally, there are the 
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information costs that the decision-maker has to invest in to confidently opt out of the default 
product setting. 
Apart from further exploring the strength of a default effect depending on the opt-out 
costs, there is also further research to be done exploring the height of awareness of nudged 
individuals when faced with a default rules intervention. How large is the share of customers 
who do not understand that they are making a decision by simply not responding? And do 
they understand all the implications of the decision that they are making by simply not doing 
anything?  
Last but not least, unwanted side effects of default rules interventions, as well as, 
nudging interventions need to be thoroughly addressed by future research. In order to get a 
more complete picture regrading unwanted side effects not only the extent to other decision 
making arenas has to be considered but also the length of time they occur in. An unwanted 
side effect can be regarded as less grave when the behaviour is only short lived.  
In conclusion, building on the work at hand, future research is first advised to replicate 
the findings of this study, and then second to explore the influence of opt-out costs, 
intervention awareness on the default effect, and unwanted side effects. 
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Appendix 1: Utility Companies in Switzerland and 
their Default Setting as of 12th July 2017 
Utility 
Company/Power 
Plant 
Product 
Name 
Electricity Source Note 
AEK Energie Standard 
Strom zu 
100% 
erneuerbar 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 100% 
Solar etc. 
AEW Energie AEW classic 
naturstrom 
Hydropower 90%, 
Solar 8%, 
Biomass 2% 
 
Albula-Landwasser 
Kraftwerke 
  Part of Axpo (see Axpo AG) 
Alpiq Holding   No default product, does not deliver to 
households directly 
Arosa Energie Arosaenergie Hydropower 100% 100% of local power plants 
Atel Holding   Part of Alpiq holding (see Alpiq Holding) 
Axpo AG   Only sells products to businesses, not to 
households 
Axpo Holding   Only sells products to businesses, not to 
households 
Axpo Trading   Only sells products to businesses, not to 
households 
Kraftwerk 
Birsfelden 
  No products for households (only for 
shareholders, energy trading) 
BKW Energie Energy blue Hydropower 97.5%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 2.5% 
 
Blenio Kraftwerke   No website, but assumed to deliver to 
other power plants instead of households 
Bündner 
Kraftwerke  
  New ‘Repower AG’ (see Repower AG) 
Centralscheizerisc
he Kraftwerke 
CKW 
Wasserkraft 
Hydropower 100%  
EBL 
(Genossenschaft 
Elektra Baselland) 
EBL Standard Hydropower 95%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 5% 
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Elektrizitätswerk 
des Kantons 
Schaffhausen 
Normal Strom Hydropower 96%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 4% 
 
Elektrizitätswerk 
Schwyz 
EWS 
Wasserkraft - 
Der Klassiker 
Hydropower 95%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 5% 
 
Elektrowatt    Does not exist anymore 
Energie Wasser 
Bern 
Ewb.NATUR.st
rom 
Hydropower 91.9%, 
Solar 4%, 
Biomass 4.1% 
 
Energiedienst 
Holding 
 Hydropower 100% 33% renewable energy according to EEG, 
67% other renewable energy 
Engadiner 
Kraftwerke 
  No products for households 
EOS Holding   No products for households, energy 
trading 
Etzelwerk   No products for households, supplies 
railway system 
EWL Energie 
Wasser Luzern 
Holding 
Ewl 
Naturstrom 
Hydropower 97.5%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 2.5% 
 
Groupe E Plus Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 100% 
No information on percentages, phone 
service did not want to provide this 
information 
Industrielle 
Betriebe 
Interlaken 
Bödeli 
Blaustrom 
Hydropower 100% 90% from Swiss power plants, 10% from 
Saxetal 
IWB IWB Strom Hydropower 94.95%, 
Wind 0.17%, 
Solar 0.28%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 4.6% 
 
All from Swiss inhouse production 
Kraftwerk Wägital Ewz.basis Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 100% 
 
Kraftwerke 
Hinterrhein 
  No products for households 
Kraftwerke Linth-
Limmern 
  Part of Axpo (no extra website, see Axpo 
AG) 
Kraftwerke   Part of Axpo (no extra website, see Axpo 
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Sarganserland AG) 
Kraftwerke 
Vorderrhein 
  Part of Axpo (no extra website, see Axpo 
AG) 
Elektrizitätsgesells
chaft Laufenburg 
  Part of Axpo (no extra website, see Axpo 
AG) 
EWL 
Genossenschaf 
Schweizer 
Wasserkraft 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy  100% 
Mostly hydro power 
Maggia Kraftwerke   No products for households 
NaturEnergie Natuenergie Hydropower 100% Only has 1 product (default) 100% 
regional 
Kraftwerke 
Oberhasli 
  No products for household customers 
Elektrizitätswerk 
Obwalden 
EWO 
NaturStrom 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 100% 
Mostly hydro and solar power 
Regio Energie 
Solothurn 
So regional   
Repower AG Aqua Power Hydropower 100%  
Romande Energie 
Holding 
Terre Suisse Hydropower 60%, 
Nuclear 40% 
 
 
Services 
Industriels de 
Genève 
 Hydropower 100%  
Società Elettrica 
Sopracenerina 
Tiacqua Hydropower 97.5%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 2.5% 
100% Swiss production 
St Gallisch-
Appenzellische 
Kraftwerke 
Naturstrom 
basic 
Hydropower 95%, 
Photovoltaik 5% 
 
Steiner Energie SEM 
Wasserkraft 
Hydropower 95%, 
Solar 2%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 3% 
Mostly from Swiss production 
Swissgrid   No information online or on phone 
Swisspower   Delivers to multiple city power plants, 
hence only delivers to household 
customers indirectly, e.g. through 
Stadtwerk Winterthur, IBAarau 
EKT Holding   Consists of many different power plants, 
with different products and defaults 
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Wasserwerke Zug 100 Prozent 
Schweizer 
Wasserkraft 
Hydropower 100%  
Elektrizitäts- und 
Wasserwerk 
Wettingen 
Standard 
Strommix 
Hydropower 96.2%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy 3.8% 
100% renewable energy from Swiss 
production 
Stadtwerk 
Winterthur 
E-
Strom.Bronze 
(naturmade 
basic) 
Hydropower 95%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy min 5% 
**All the same 
Elektrizitätswerke 
des Kantons Zürich 
Ewz-Basis Hydropower 95%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy min 5% 
 
IBAarau STANDARD 
POWER 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy min 5% 
**All the same 
Elektrizitätswerk 
der Stadt Zürich 
Ewz-Basis Hydropower 95%, 
Undifferentiated renewable 
energy min 5% 
**all the same 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables on the 
Metering Point Level 
Variable: ‘Metering Point’ 
The dataset is organized by metering points and not by customer numbers. The logic 
behind this is that one customer number could have a number of associated metering points, 
but each metering point has only one corresponding customer number. The original dataset 
entails all metering points with a supply tariff and a tariff for the electrical network 
(n=338,574). The variable metering point had NA entries (n=542) that were taken out in the 
process of data cleaning. Only a valid entry in the metering point ensured the possibility of 
actually measuring the electricity usage. The NA entries marked customers that did not have 
supply tariffs but only electrical network tariffs – in most cases, supplying electricity back into 
the utility company’s electrical network. 
Variable: ‘Customer Number’ 
A ‘customer number’ was assigned to each customer by the utility company. One 
customer number can be tied to multiple metering points, as one customer can have multiple 
flats or houses (and thus multiple metering points) in his or her customer account. 
Variable: ‘Data Import Year’ 
The year when the dataset was scheduled to be delivered. Since there were two data 
shipments scheduled, the first data import is marked with the value ‘2016’ and the second 
with ‘2017’. The first data import – 2016 – entails electricity readings for the whole year of 
2015 and simulated electricity readings for 2016. The second import – 2017 – consists of 
electricity readings for the whole year of 2016 and simulated electricity readings for 2017. 
Each metering point was read only on a yearly basis but billed every three months. The meter 
readings were organized by dividing the meter points into four seasonal groups, for which 
one group was read each spring, summer, autumn, and winter. Electricity billing always relies 
on simulated data based on former electricity usage and some other constants (for example, 
approximated ‘heating days’). After each yearly meter reading, the billing is adjusted for the 
next four quarters until the next annual reading. This billing and reading custom, which is 
typical for utility companies, controls the schedule of the data import. 
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Variable: ‘Number of Connection Objects’ 
The connection object is the object in which the metering points are found, for 
example, a building that is a house or a flat. One connection object can have multiple 
metering points. For example, a connection object that is a one-family house can have one 
metering point for the main electricity usage and another metering point for the boiler in the 
house. In this case, the connection object would have two metering points in the dataset. 
Another example could be a connection object that is a high rise apartment building, with a 
metering point for each flat within it. In this case, the described connection object would 
have a multitude of metering points in the dataset.  
Variable: ‘Connection Object Postal Code’ 
Each connection object has one assigned postal code extracted from the billing 
information from the corresponding customer number. This is a geographical categorization. 
Variable: ‘Connection Object Place’ 
Each connection object has one assigned geographical location. This is also a 
geographical categorization. 
 
Variable: ‘Municipality Code’ 
Each connection object is assigned a political geographical location in the form of a 
municipality code. 
Variable: ‘Municipality Name’ 
Each connection object is assigned a political geographical location in the form of a 
municipality name. 
Variable: ‘Customer Type’ 
This variable identifies customer types on the basis of tariff choice and has five values: 
‘NA’ (n=3,082), ‘Business’ (n=11,619), ‘Household’ (n=318,487), ‘Special’ (n=5,368), and 
‘Distribution Network Companies’ (n=18) in the raw dataset (n=338,574). ‘Special’ describes 
tariff types that cannot be categorized as household customers, business customers, or 
distribution network companies. This could be, for example, the meter reading of electricity 
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production of a facility that creates solar energy and needs meter readings for evidence of 
origin certificates. The groups ‘Special’ and ‘Distribution Network Company’ both were taken 
out during data cleaning because they do not entail normal utility readings or have normal 
electricity contracts. 
Variable: ‘Number of Metering Points in Connection Object’ 
This variable identifies the number of metering points for the connection object that 
the meters are planted in. The values have a range of 1-90. For example, a connection object 
that has 90 metering points is a high-rise apartment complex. 
Variable: ‘Type of Housing’ 
This variable identifies the type of housing (the kind of connection object) on the 
grounds of the information given out in the variable ‘Number of Metering Points in 
Connection Object’. It has two values: ‘House’ (n=149,233) and ‘Apartment’ (n=189,340). 
‘House’ describes all the connection objects with less than three metering points. 
‘Apartment’ describes all the connection objects that have three or more metering points. 
This variable derives information from metering points on connection objects and is therefore 
not exact in the identification of connection objects as either houses or apartments.  
Variable: ‘Utility Usage 2013’ 
This variable is the 2013 annual meter reads for each metering point, including day and 
night utility usage for metering points that have double tariffs and 24-hour usage for metering 
points that have Basic tariffs. A value of ‘NA’ means that for 2013, no meter reading happened 
for this metering point. A value of ‘0.00’ means that for 2013, a meter reading happened for 
this metering point but the utility usage was 0.00. 
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Table 41. Descriptive Statistic for Utility Usage 2013 
 
Utility Usage 2013 
in kWh 
Number of values 231,234 
Number of null values 30 
Number of 
missing values 
6,099 
Minimal value 0.0 
Maximal value 3,942,782 
Range  3,942,782 
Sum of all non-missing values 1,534,395,422.6 
Median 3,830.0 
Mean 6,635.7 
Standard error on the mean 39.2 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 76.8 
Variance 355,495,201.2 
Standard deviation 18,854.6 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean 
norm 
2.8 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable and renewable-plus defaults (n=237,333). 
Variable: ‘Utility Usage 2014’ 
This variable is the 2014 annual meter reads for each metering point, summing up day 
and night usage for metering points that have double tariffs and 24-hour usage for metering 
points that have Basic tariffs. A value of ‘NA’ means that for 2014, no meter readings 
happened for this metering point. A value of ‘0.00’ means that for 2014, a meter reading had 
happened for this metering point but the utility usage was 0.00. 
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Table 42. Descriptive Statistics for Utility Usage 2014 
 
Utility Usage 2014 
in kWh 
Number of values 237,333 
Number of null values 2,831 
Number of 
missing values 
0 
Minimal value 0.0 
Maximal value 3,807,496 
Range  3,807,496 
Sum of all non-missing values 1,404,117,263.7 
Median 3,384 
Mean 5,916.2 
Standard error on the mean 40.1 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 78.6 
Variance 382,145,188.5 
Standard deviation 19,548.5 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean 
norm 
3.3 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable and renewable-plus defaults (n=237,333). 
 Variable: ‘Utility Usage 2015’ 
This variable is the 2015 annual meter reads for each metering point, summing up day 
and night usage for metering points that have double tariffs and 24-hour usage for metering 
points that have Basic tariffs. A value of ‘NA’ means that for 2015, no meter reading happened 
for this metering point. A value of ‘0.00’ means that for 2015, a meter reading happened for 
this metering point but the utility usage was 0.00. 
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Table 43. Descriptive Statistics for Utility Usage 2015 
 
Utility Usage 2015 
in kWh 
Number of values 237,333 
Number of null values 1,554 
Number of 
missing values 
0 
Minimal value 0.0 
Maximal value 3,790,160 
Range  3,790,160 
Sum of all non-missing values 1,457,060,517.1 
Median 3,528 
Mean 6,139.3 
Standard error on the mean 40.7 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 79.8 
Variance 393,625,618.3 
Standard deviation 19,840 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean 
norm 
3.2 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable and renewable-plus defaults (n=237,333). 
Variable: ‘Utility Usage 2016’ 
This variable is the 2016 annual meter reads for each metering point, summing up day 
and night usage for metering points that have double tariffs and 24-hour usage for metering 
points that have Basic tariffs. A value of ‘NA’ means that for 2016, no meter reading happened 
for this metering point. A value of ‘0.00’ means that for 2016, a meter reading happened for 
this metering point but the utility usage was 0.00. 
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Table 44. Descriptive Statistics for Utility Usage 2016 
 
Utility Usage 2016 
in kWh 
Number of values 237,333 
Number of null values 34 
Number of 
missing values 
1,055 
Minimal value 0.0 
Maximal value 3,015,695 
Range  3,015,695 
Sum of all non-missing values 1,467,117,120 
Median 3,519 
Mean 6,209 
Standard error on the mean 39 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 76 
Variance 357,336,093 
Standard deviation 18,903 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean norm 
3 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable and renewable-plus defaults (n=237,333). 
Variable: ‘Contract Choice 2013’ 
This variable had 38 values in the beginning. These were recoded into two values: 
conventional energy (n=233,338) and ‘NA’ (n=3,995), which marks all the metering points for 
which contract information is missing. 
Variable: ‘Contract Choice 2014’ 
This variable had 45 values in the raw dataset and nine values in the cleaned dataset. 
A surcharge for renewable electricity as can be seen in the tariff type and tranches from the 
renewable electricity report. In the process of data preparation, additional variables from the 
renewable energy report 2014 were combined to mark which metering points held 
Appendices   265 
 
renewable and renewable-plus energy. The original variable contract choice for 2014 gave no 
indication as to which customers held renewable or renewable-plus energy contracts.  
Table 45. Descriptive Statistics for Re-coded Contract Choice 2014 
Time Point 
n  
Conventional 
Contracts  
n  
Renewable 
Contracts 
n  
Renewable-
plus Contracts 
n 
NA 
Contract Choice 2014 234,167 2,138 1,028 0 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable and renewable-plus defaults (n=237,333). 
Variable: ‘Solar Tranche: Ordered Amount 2014’ 
This variable had entries for 6,976 metering points. This is a tranche product (the 
customer chooses a specific annual amount) and not a full tariff. The variable ‘Solar Tranche: 
Ordered Amount 2014’ shows the ordered amount of solar tranche in kWh that customers 
ordered in 2014. This ordered amount is not reflective of the actual used amount. 
Variable: ‘Wind Tranche: Ordered Amount 2014’ 
This variable had entries for 6,976 metering points. This is a tranche product (the 
customer chooses a specific annual amount) and not a full tariff. The variable ‘Wind Tranche: 
Ordered Amount 2014’ shows the ordered amount of wind tranche in kWh that customers 
ordered in 2014. This ordered amount is indifferent to the actual used amount. 
Variable: ‘Water Tranche: Ordered Amount 2014’ 
This variable had entries for 6,976 metering points. This is a tranche product (the 
customer chooses a specific annual amount) and not a full tariff. The variable ‘Water Tranche: 
Ordered Amount 2014’ shows the ordered amount of water tranche in kWh that customers 
ordered in 2014. This ordered amount is not reflective of the actual used amount. This water 
tranche is Nature Star Water, which is different from Nature Basic Water. Both hydropower 
tranches/tariffs are made up off 100% certified hydropower made in Switzerland, but Nature 
Star Water invests 1 Rappen for each kWh into ecological funds that invest locally in water 
renaturations. 
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Variable: ‘Full Tariff Nature Basic 2014’ 
This variable had entries for 3,166 metering points. This is a full tariff (the customer 
chooses the tariff not a specific amount like a tranche product). Only the metering points with 
this Nature Basic tariff fall back on hydropower after their renewable energy tranches are 
used up. Unfortunately, not all metering points that have this tariff can be found through this 
variable – some of them have ‘hidden’ Nature Basic tariffs which can only be found out 
through additional information found in other variables. Nature Basic’s composition is 95% 
Nature Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, and 2.5% Nature Basic Sun, Wind, and Bio. (The 
difference between Nature Basic Water und Nature Star Water is that both hydropower 
tranches/tariffs are made up off 100% certified hydropower made in Switzerland, but Nature 
Star Water invests 1 Rappen for each kWh into ecological funds that invest locally in water 
renaturations). This used amount is based on simulated data, meter-read data, and weighted 
data. 
Variable: ‘Contract Choice 2015’ 
This variable had 45 values in the raw dataset and 16 in the cleaned dataset, which 
were recoded into the three values ‘conventional’ (n=231,105), ‘renewable’ (n=4,597), 
‘renewable-plus’ (n=1,631). For the process of re-coding, additional variables from the 
renewable energy report 2015 were consulted. The surcharge for renewable electricity can 
be seen in the tariff type and tranches from the renewable electricity report. 
Variable: ‘Sun Tranche: Ordered Amount 2015’ 
This variable had entries for 9,355 metering points. This is a tranche product (the 
customer chooses a specific annual amount) and not a full tariff. The variable ‘Sun Tranche: 
Ordered Amount 2015’ shows the ordered amount of solar tranche in kWh that customers 
ordered in 2015. This ordered amount is not the actual used amount. 
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Table 46. Descriptive Statistics for Sun Tranche: Ordered Amount 2015 
 
Sun: Ordered 
Amount 2015 
Household in 
kWh 
(n=434) 
Sun: Ordered 
Amount 2015 
Business in 
kWh 
(n=39) 
Number of values 434 39 
Number of null values 0 0 
Number of 
missing values 
222,814 7,594 
Minimal value 50 50 
Maximal value 12,600 11,300 
Range  12,550 11,250 
Sum of all non-missing values 90,200 53,350.0 
Median 100 1,000 
Mean 207.8 1,367.9 
Standard error on the mean 31.9 316.3 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level 
.95 
62.7 640.4 
Variance 442,005.5 3,902,827.3 
Standard deviation 664.8 1,975.6 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard 
deviation divided by the mean norm 
3.2 1.4 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market with renewable defaults 
(household dataset n=223,248; business dataset n=7,633). 
Variable: ‘Wind Tranche: Ordered Amount 2015’ 
This variable had entries for 9,355 metering points. This is a tranche product (the 
customer chooses a specific annual amount) and not a full tariff. The variable ‘Wind Tranche: 
Ordered Amount 2015’ shows the ordered amount of wind tranche in kWh that customers 
ordered in 2015. This ordered amount is not the actual used amount. 
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Table 47. Descriptive Statistics for Wind Tranche: Ordered Amount 2015 
 
Wind: Ordered 
Amount 2015 
Households in 
kWh 
(n=363) 
Wind: Ordered 
Amount 2015 
Business in kWh 
(n=42) 
Number of values 363 42 
Number of null values 0 0 
Number of 
missing values 
222,885 7,591 
Minimal value 100 500 
Maximal value 10,000 20,000 
Range  9,900 19,500 
Sum of all non-missing values 273,237.6 150,500.0 
Median 250 2,000 
Mean 752.7 3,583.3 
Standard error on the mean 67.4 777.9 
Confidence interval of the mean at the 
p level .95 
132.5 1,570.9 
Variance 1,646,773.6 25,413,617.9 
Standard deviation 1,283.3 
5,041.2 
 
Variation coefficient defined as the 
standard deviation divided by the 
mean norm 
1.7 1.4 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market with renewable defaults 
(household dataset n=223,248; business dataset n=7,633). 
Variable: ‘Water Tranche: Ordered Amount 2015’ 
This variable had entries for 9,355 metering points. This is a tranche product (the 
customer chooses a specific annual amount) and not a full tariff. The variable ‘Water Tranche: 
Ordered Amount 2015’ shows the ordered amount of water tranche in kWh that customers 
ordered in 2015. This ordered amount is not the actual amount used. This water tranche is 
Nature Star Water, which is different from Nature Basic Water. Both hydropower 
tranches/tariffs are made up of 100% certified hydropower made in Switzerland, but Nature 
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Star Water invests 1 Rappen for each kWh into ecological funds that invest locally in water 
renaturations. 
Table 48. Descriptive Statistics for Water Tranche: Ordered Amount 2015 
 
Water: Ordered 
Amount 2015 
Households in 
kWh 
(n=1,470) 
Water: Ordered 
Amount 2015 
Business in kWh 
(n=123) 
Number of values 1,470 123 
Number of null values 0 0 
Number of 
missing values 
221,778 7,510 
Minimal value 9.5 1,000 
Maximal value 74,143 923,094 
Range  74,133.5 922,094 
Sum of all non-missing values 3,014,917 4,782,805.8 
Median 2,000.0 14,000 
Mean 2,051 38,884.6 
Standard error on the mean 73.1 10,186.0 
Confidence interval of the mean at the 
p level .95 
143.3 20,164.2 
Variance 7,849,776.3 12,761,850,308.7 
Standard deviation 2,801.7 112,968.4 
Variation coefficient defined as the 
standard deviation divided by the 
mean norm 
1.4 2.9 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market with renewable defaults 
(household dataset n=223,248; business dataset n=7,633). 
Variable: ‘Full Tariff Nature Basic 2015’ 
This variable had entries for 9,355 metering points. This is a full tariff (the customer 
chooses the tariff, not a specific amount like for a tranche product). The metering points with 
this Nature Basic tariff fall back on hydropower after their renewable energy tranches are 
used up. Unfortunately, not all metering points that have this tariff can be identified through 
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this variable. Some of them have ‘hidden’ Nature Basic tariffs. The composition of Nature 
Basic is 95% Nature Basic Water, 2.5% Nature Star Water, and 2.5% Nature Basic Sun, Wind, 
and Bio. (The difference between Nature Basic Water and Nature Star Water is that both 
hydropower tranches/tariffs are made up off 100% certified hydropower made in 
Switzerland, but Nature Star Water invests 1 Rappen for each kWh into ecological funds that 
invest locally in water renaturations). This used amount is based on simulated data, meter-
read data, and weighted data. 
Table 49. Descriptive Statistics for Full Tariff Nature Basic 2015 
 
Nature Basic 2015 
Household in kWh 
(n=2,598) 
Nature Basic 2015 
Business in kWh 
(n=50) 
Number of values 2,598 50 
Number of null values 0 0 
Number of 
missing values 
220,650 7,583 
Minimal value 0.00048 1,250.9 
Maximal value 117,647.4 364,875 
Range  117,647.4 363,624.1 
Sum of all non-missing values 10,210,451.1 1,552,582.9 
Median 3,284.8 19,972.6 
Mean 3,930.1 31,051.7 
Standard error on the mean 72.3 7,475.4 
Confidence interval of the mean at the 
p level .95 
141.8 15,022.4 
Variance 13,585,912.3 2,794,072,783.9 
Standard deviation 3,685.9 52,859 
Variation coefficient defined as the 
standard deviation divided by the 
mean norm 
0.9 1.7 
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All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable defaults (household dataset n=223,248; business 
dataset n=7,633). 
Variable: ‘Full Tariff Nature 2015’ 
This variable had entries for 9,355 metering points. This is a full tariff (the customer 
chooses the tariff not a specific amount like a tranche product). The composition of this tariff 
is 85% Nature Basic Water, 5% Nature Basic Wind, 5% Nature Basic Sun, and 5% biomass 
energy. (The difference between Nature Basic Water and Nature Star Water is that both 
hydropower tranches/tariffs are made up off 100% certified hydropower made in 
Switzerland, but Nature Star Water invests 1 Rappen for each kWh into ecological funds that 
invest locally in water renaturations). This used amount is based on simulated data, meter-
read data, and weighted data. For the customers who received only the renewable default, 
there were only household customers on the nature tariff in 2015, and no business 
customers. 
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Table 50. Descriptive Statistics for Full Tariff Nature 2015 
 
Nature 2015 
Households in 
kWh 
(n=10) 
Number of values 10 
Number of null values 0 
Number of 
missing values 
223,238 
Minimal value 3.3 
Maximal value 46,578.0 
Range  46,574.7 
Sum of all non-missing values 106,810.6 
Median 7,515.6 
Mean 10,681.1 
Standard error on the mean 4,335.4 
Confidence interval of the mean at the 
p level .95 
9,807.4 
Variance 187,959,494.4 
Standard deviation 13,709.8 
Variation coefficient defined as the 
standard deviation divided by the 
mean norm 
1.3 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household customers 
with renewable defaults (n=223,248). 
Variable: ‘Full Tariff Nature Star 2015’ 
This variable had entries for 9,355 metering points. This is a full tariff (the customer 
chooses the tariff, not a specific amount like a tranche product). The composition of Full Tariff 
Nature Star is 70% Nature Star Water, 10% Nature Star Wind, 10% Nature Star Sun, and 10% 
biomass energy. (The difference between Nature Basic Water and Nature Star Water is that 
both hydropower tranches/tariffs are made up of 100% certified hydropower made in 
Switzerland, but Nature Star Water invests 1 Rappen for each kWh into ecological funds that 
invest locally in water renaturations). This used amount is based on simulated data, meter-
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read data, and weighted data. Of the customers who received only the renewable default, 
there were only household customers on the Nature Star tariff in 2015, and no business 
customers. 
Table 51. Descriptive Statistics for Full Tariff Nature Star 2015 
 
Nature Star 2015 
Household in kWh 
(n=5) 
Number of values 5 
Number of null values 0 
Number of 
missing values 
223,243 
Minimal value 259.3 
Maximal value 7,266.3 
Range  7006.9 
Sum of all non-missing values 21,278.7 
Median 4,484.6 
Mean 4,255.7 
Standard error on the mean 1,277.7 
Confidence interval of the mean at the 
p level .95 
3,547.5 
Variance 8,162,591.2 
Standard deviation 2,857.0 
Variation coefficient defined as the 
standard deviation divided by the 
mean norm 
0.7 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household customers 
with renewable defaults (n=223,248). 
Variable: ‘Initial Default Allocation’ 
The variable ‘Initial Default Allocation’ shows the initial default for each metering point 
at the end of August 2015. The default allocation was communicated via mail to each 
customer. There were three possible default allocations. Some customers did not receive a 
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new default, but rather kept their old contracts (conventional default). The main group of 
customers received the new ‘renewable’ default and a small number of customers received 
the ‘renewable-plus’ default. The default allocation became active on 01.01.2016. 
Variable: ‘Contract Choice 01.01.2016’ 
The variable ‘Contract Choice 01.01.2016’ had 20 values initially. These were recoded 
into the three values ‘conventional’ (n=25,693), ‘renewable’ (n=204,339), and ‘renewable-
plus’ (n=849).  
Table 52. Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice 01.01.2016 
Time Point 
n  
Conventional 
Contracts  
n  
Renewable 
Contracts 
n  
Renewable-
plus Contracts 
n 
NA 
Contract Choice 01.01.2016 25,693 204,339 849 0 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable defaults (n=230,881). 
Variable: ‘Contract Choice 24.12.2016’ 
The variable ‘Contract Choice 24.12.2016’ had 21 values initially. These were recoded into the 
three values ‘conventional’ (n=27,260), ‘renewable’ (n=202,685), and ‘renewable-plus’ 
(n=936).  
Table 53. Descriptive Statistics for Contract Choice 24.12.2016 
Time Point 
n  
Conventional 
Contracts  
n  
Renewable 
Contracts 
n  
Renewable-
plus Contracts 
n 
NA 
Contract Choice 24.12.2016 27,260 202,685 936 0 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable defaults (n=230,881). 
Variable: ‘Salutation 2013’ 
This information was extracted from the salutation part of the address of the customer. 
This variable had 12 values that were recoded into four values: ‘female’ (n=37,221), ‘male’ 
(n=102,883), ‘mixed’ (n=31,343), and ‘NA’ (n=65,886).  
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Variable: ‘Salutation 2014’ 
This information was extracted from the salutation part of the address of the customer. 
This variable had 12 values that were recoded into four values: ‘female’ (n=38,066), ‘male’ 
(n=102,970), ‘mixed’ (n=32,014), and ‘NA’ (n=64,283).  
Variable: ‘Salutation 2015’ 
This information was extracted from the salutation part of the address of the customer. 
This variable had 13 values that were recoded into four values: ‘female’ (n=38,760), ‘male’ 
(n=103,086), ‘mixed’ (n=32,635), and ‘NA’ (n=62,852). 
Variable: ‘Salutation 2016’ 
This information was extracted from the salutation part of the address of the customer. 
This variable had 13 values that were recoded into four values: ‘female’ (n=39,336), ‘male’ 
(n=102,130), ‘mixed’ (n=32,790), and ‘NA’ (n=63,077). 
Variable: ‘Mover 2014’ 
This information was extracted from changes in the customer numbers on metering 
points in the time frame of 31.12.2013 to 31.12.2014. This is a dummy variable marking the 
movers with an ‘X’, and therefore has two values: ‘X’ (n=26,552) and ‘NA’ (n=312,022). In line 
with data cleaning, all movers in 2014 were deleted. All descriptive details come from the 
clean dataset: the free and regulated market of business and household customers with 
renewable and renewable-plus contracts and no defaults. 
Variable: ‘Mover 2015’ 
This information was extracted from changes in the customer numbers on metering 
points in the time frame of 31.12.2014 to 31.12.2015. This is a dummy variable marking the 
movers with an ‘X’, and therefore has two values: ‘X’ (n=19,468) and ‘NA’ (n=319,106). In line 
with the data cleaning, all movers in 2015 were deleted. All descriptive details come from the 
clean dataset: the free and regulated market of business and household customers with 
renewable and renewable-plus contracts and no defaults. 
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Variable: ‘Mover 2016’ 
This information was extracted from changes in the customer numbers on metering 
points in the time frame of 31.12.2015 to 31.12.2016. This is a dummy variable marking the 
movers with an ‘X’, and therefore has two values: ‘X’ (n=32,505) and ‘NA’ (n=306,069). In line 
with data cleaning, all movers in 2016 were deleted. All descriptive details come from the 
clean dataset: the free and regulated market of business and household customers with 
renewable and renewable-plus contracts and no defaults. 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables on the 
Municipality Level 
Variable: ‘Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016’ 
Yes-votes as a percentage on the municipality level were matched with the utility 
company’s municipalities in their dataset. This variable concerns the public vote on the 
Nuclear Power Phase-Out initiative on 27.11.2017. 
The voting data comes from the website of the Federal Department for Statistics 
(https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/politik/abstimmungen/jahr-
2016/2016-11-27/initiative-atomausstieg.assetdetail.1363831.html, downloaded on 
21.09.2017). The voting data was published by the Swiss Federal Agency for Statistics on 
27.11.2016 on its website. The BFS-Number is je-d-17.03.03.bx.608.c. 
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Table 54. Descriptive Statistics for Nuclear Phase-out Voting 2016 
 
Nuclear Phase-out 
Voting 
Number of values 218,291 
Number of null values 0 
Number of 
missing values 
12,590 
Minimal value 5.7 
Maximal value 69.6 
Range  63.9 
Sum of all non-missing values 9,158,487.3 
Median 42.6 
Mean 42.0 
Standard error on the mean 0.02 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 0.04 
Variance 83.2 
Standard deviation 9.1 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean 
norm 
0.2 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable defaults (n=230,881). 
Variable: ‘Proximity NPP’ 
Municipalities in the utility company’s dataset were coded into three zones. The first 
zone identifies the municipality that contains a nuclear power plant (here, n is the number of 
metering points in that municipality; n=1,418). The second zone identifies the municipalities 
that are direct neighbours to the municipality with a nuclear power plant (n=9,523). The third 
zone identifies all the municipalities that neither have a nuclear power plant nor neighbour a 
municipality with a nuclear power plant (n=219,940). All descriptive details come from the 
whole dataset of the regulated market of household and business customers with renewable 
defaults (n=230,881). 
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Variable: ‘Population Density 2015’ 
One of the municipality characteristics, population density from the year 2015 (newest 
available data), was matched to the municipalities in the utility company’s dataset. The data 
comes from the website of the Federal Department for Statistics 
(https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/regionalstatistik/regionale-portraets-
kennzahlen/gemeinden.assetdetail.2422865.html, downloaded on 21.09.2017). The data on 
municipality characteristics was published by the Swiss Federal Department for Statistics on 
18.05.2017. The data represents the time frame from 2014 until 2016. The BFS-Number is je-
d-21.03.01. 
Table 55. Descriptive Statistics for Population Density 2015 
 
Population 
Density 2015 
Number of values 219,021 
Number of null values 0 
Number of 
missing values 
11,860 
Minimal value 1 
Maximal value 4,576 
Range  4,575 
Median 214 
Mean 546.1 
Standard error on the mean 1.6 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 3.0 
Variance 529,278.9 
Standard deviation 727.5 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean 
norm 
1.3 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable defaults (n=230,881). 
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Variable: ‘Age Distribution: 0-19’ 
The municipality characteristic of age distribution from the year 2015 (the newest 
available data) was matched to the municipalities in the utility company’s dataset. ‘Age 
Distribution: 0-19’ describes the number of citizens in each municipality that are between 0 
and 19 years old as a percentage.  
The data comes from the website of the Swiss Federal Department for Statistics 
(https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/regionalstatistik/regionale-portraets-
kennzahlen/gemeinden.assetdetail.2422865.html, downloaded on 21.09.2017). The data on 
municipality characteristics was published by the Federal Department for Statistics on 
18.05.2017. The data represents the time frame from 2014 until 2016. The BFS-Number is je-
d-21.03.01. 
Table 56. Descriptive Statistics for Age Distribution: 0-19 
 
Age Distribution: 
0-19 
Number of values 219,021 
Number of null values 0 
Number of 
missing values 
11,860 
Minimal value 7.7 
Maximal value 30.2 
Range  22.5 
Median 19.1 
Mean 19.8 
Standard error on the mean 0.005 
Confidence interval of the mean at the p level .95 0.009 
Variance 4.7 
Standard deviation 2.2 
Variation coefficient defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean 
norm 
0.1 
All descriptive details come from the whole dataset of the regulated market of household and 
business customers with renewable defaults (n=230,881). 
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